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Abstract 
Standing by my bedroom window, looking out at the ocean, a huge wave comes and swallows up 
my building. Everything around me is gone, including me. I wake up. I am 13 years old and 
living in the Coney Island Houses on Surf Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. With ongoing 
anthropogenic changes to the natural environment such as sea level rise and intensifying storms, 
coastal communities, especially ones segregated by class and culture, are particularly vulnerable 
in this context that challenges a way of life, and in some instances, threatens that life’s survival. 
This dissertation focuses specifically on what one massive storm—Hurricane Sandy (Superstorm 
Sandy)—left behind. This research explored how these experiences impacted the design/ 
planning professionals’ (architects, planners, landscape architects, engineers) approaches to 
future climate-related events, as well as the impacts upon them personally, professionally, and 
societally. A single, embedded case study with narrative inquiry was used to gather first-person 
accounts and insights into the work, thoughts, and feelings of professionals whom society relies 
on increasingly as climate-induced crises proliferate. Data were classified into three pillars: 
Personal (impacts on the self/individual, psycho-social challenges, empathy/stress), Professional 
(impact to professional practice, reflection on strategies post-Sandy, impact on future events), 
and Societal (local and global impacts, leadership). Prominent themes under the personal pillar 
were impermanence, emotional resilience, and dignity. Professionally, Sandy left the study 
participants looking toward a more reflective design practice. The societal pillar described the 
broader social issues that emerged from the interviews. Two significant findings were lack of 
equal attention to marginalized communities and lack of diversity and inclusion within the 
design/planning profession. As more populations are being impacted by Hurricane Sandy-like 
events, designers/planners will need to become leaders in changing to both a reflective and 
vi 
proactive stance to professional practice in the context of climate, economic and social justice. 
This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and 
Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/, and OhioLINK ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/. 
Keywords: Climate Adaptation, Climate Change, Post-Disaster Recovery, Disasters, 
Hurricane Sandy, Managed Retreat, Narrative Inquiry, Superstorm Sandy, Design/Planning 
Professionals, Resilience, Leadership, Vulnerable/Marginalized Communities 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
This dissertation is about what a massive storm left behind. Hurricane Sandy hit the New 
York region in fall of 2012. The storm’s damage and process of recovery, while certainly the 
most obvious, was in the aftermath coupled with many more questions than answers. Did this 
mark the beginning of a new normal in the Northeast? How would the storm and its recovery 
impact the built and natural environments? How would design/planning professionals, 
(custodians within the built environment) address these challenges? Will these challenges change 
this profession? How will this impact both the individual practitioner and larger societal issues 
that either pre-dated or were the result of a storm of this magnitude?  
  
   
 
There are almost innumerable scholarly and literary accounts of the impacts of great 
storms through history: tales of the destruction of the works of humanity and of untimely deaths, 
of natural environments—already weakened by human meddling—smashed into unrecognizable 
shadows of the protective ecosystems they once had been. However, this story is about a 
different array of effects that are not well discussed in academic or other literature: how 
Hurricane Sandy changed the social context, the lives and the professional practice of people 
Since the massive storm occurred, part of its legacy has been to not only rebuild and
recover but to investigate, act, and reflect upon these much larger questions. Although each in its
own right deserves research and study, this dissertation focuses specifically on the impact of
Hurricane Sandy (Superstorm Sandy) on design/planning professionals. Within the context of
this study, the phrase designers/planners is used as a generic phrase that encompasses architects,
planners, landscape architects, and engineers. While each is independent in nature, there is an
interdependency between them all which is further underscored in the aftermath of a climate-
impactful event.
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who are sorely needed to help humanity confront such storms and global climate impacts: 
designers/planners.  
The Genesis of the Research Question 
Design/planning professionals respond to post-Sandy-like events in a myriad of different 
ways that range from targeted short-term solutions for immediacy to long-term solutions. This 
trajectory is the genesis for the following primary research question: In what ways did 
post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future 
climate-related events personally (individually), professionally, and societally? 
Design/Planning Professionals—Who They Are and Why It Matters 
In New York State, a “Design Professional” is defined in the New York State Business 
Corporation Law as someone who is licensed in New York as an architect, landscape architect, 
professional engineer, land surveyor, or geologist. All of these services are related to the design 
and construction of buildings and the spaces around them. (New York State Education 
Department, Office of the Professions, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).  
According to the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards the definition of 
an architect is:  
Licensed professionals trained in the art and science of the design and construction of 
buildings and structures that primarily provide shelter. An architect will create the overall 
aesthetic and look of buildings and structures, but the design of a building involves far 
more than its appearance. Buildings also must be functional, safe, and economical and 
must suit the specific needs of the people who use them. Most importantly, they must be 
built with the public’s health, safety, and welfare in mind. (as cited in Hubbard, 2018, 
para. 3) 
Planners by definition provide services that are related to the work of these other 
professionals. Planners’ work as explained by the American Planning Association (n.d.) is as 
follows:  
3 
The goal of planning is to maximize the health, safety, and economic well-being of all 
people living in our communities. . . . Planning helps create communities of lasting value. 
. . . planners take a broad view while architects often focus on a single building or the 
structures themselves (paras. 1–2). 
Landscape architects are defined by the American Society of Landscape Architects (n.d.) 
as follows: “Landscape architects analyze, plan, design, manage, and nurture the built and 
natural environments. Landscape architects have a significant impact on communities and quality 
of life” (para 1). 
 
  
  
  
   
 
While there are other practices within the profession of engineering, such as structural for 
example, the ones defined above are represented by the participants in this study. 
Given the interdependent trajectories and the direct societal impact design/planning 
professionals have on the built and natural environments, part of what this study shows is how 
they are more than custodians but are in many instances the conscience in collaboration with the 
community during the planning of or recovery from a storm like Hurricane Sandy.  
A Personal Journey to Sandy and the Dissertation Topic 
Standing by my bedroom window, looking out at the ocean, a huge wave comes and 
swallows up my building. Everything around me is gone, including me. I wake up. I am 
 Consulting engineers, as defined by the American Council of Engineering Companies of 
New York (n.d.), are,
 Licensed professionals . . . who provide design services . . . integral in shaping our
 communities and our worldÑ designing our highways, bridges, tunnels, and transit
 systems . . . buildings . . . energy-eff icient mechanical, electrical and f ire safety systems;
 and water and wastewater treatment plants. (para. 1)
 The American Society of Civil Engineers (n.d.) explains geotechnical engineering as 
follows: Ò Geotechnical engineering util izes the disciplines of rock and soi l mechanics to 
investigate subsurface and geologic conditions. These investigations are used to design, and 
build foundations, earth structures, and pavement sub-gradesÓ  (para. 1).
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13 years old and living in the Coney Island Houses on Surf Avenue, Brooklyn, New 
York. 
As a young girl, I dreamt of becoming a mapmaker—not because I lived in a world that 
felt global or vast but because I lived in a world that felt small and constricted. I desperately 
wanted to redraw the lines that defined my neighborhood, so I could make it bigger, wider, 
longer. I was inspired to do this by the natural world I saw outside my window: the ocean. Its 
vastness and movement knew no boundaries. Even when it met the limits of the shore, it could 
just as easily move back out and join the bigger part of itself. This was the world I wanted to 
become a part of, but short of becoming a mermaid, I took to the urban landscape and began, 
with great obsession, drawing lines on the sidewalk with big chunky colorful chalk,                 
block-by-block up and down Surf and Mermaid Avenues. If I could only draw fast enough, far 
enough, long enough, then maybe I could break this spell of isolation by redrawing a world that 
separated people by street names, building numbers, racial diversity, and economic disparity. As 
time progressed, so did I, and I moved from drawing lines on sidewalks to using words to create 
place-based narratives at the crossroads of the individual and the societal. I learned that when 
these were contextualized, they did, in fact, become the collective stories upon which cities and 
communities are built.  
Surf Avenue, Coney Island, and the Projects left a powerful imprint that not only 
translated to the city as a very active protagonist in my life but became the foundation for a 
dialectical relationship between the natural and built environments. Post-Sandy, the child who 
once dreamt of disaster and the adult who wanted to do something about it met in a timeless 
space along the shoreline, a foreshadowing of what was yet to come. Figure 1.1 shows me as an 
adult standing in front of the apartment complex where I grew up. 
5 
Figure 1.1. The author in front of her childhood home at Coney Island (Brooklyn). Photograph 
by Gretchen Bank. Used with permission. 
Coney Island was called a war zone during my childhood. Burned-out buildings, arson, 
random drug-related and gang-related shootings were part of daily life as was a strong sense of 
neighborhood identity and local activism within this multi-racial community. As a graduate 
student, I wanted to understand what a war zone was like outside the urban inner city. I studied 
the writings of urban planners, many of whom lived in Bosnia during the ethnic cleansing. They 
wrote about how the destruction of architecture was used as a weapon of war. By systematically 
destroying aspects of urban life that held the greatest cultural and historical memory of its 
people, the built environment, once seemingly impenetrable, was reduced to an abstraction. 
Writers and urbanists alike described being haunted by the ghosts not just of the people they lost 
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but also of the buildings destroyed, communal and familial—a church, mosque, synagogue, 
library, theater, school, park. 
When I went to Bosnia after that semester, the brutality of the loss of urban geography on 
the human psyche was something I saw first-hand. As I watched people in deeply wounded cities 
try to adapt and recover, the urban environment took on an eerily human element of vulnerability 
and fragility. 
On September 11, 2001, while on my way to work, a low-flying plane traveling up 
University Place in New York’s East Village looked as though it had gone off-course and was 
going to crash into the building directly in front of where I was walking. Instead, it raised its 
altitude and continued toward what was to become its ultimate destination, the Twin Towers of 
the World Trade Center.  
Months later, as a writer on one of the earlier proposals for the site master plan for 
Ground Zero, and later as a liaison with the initial design team and the victims’ families, I 
experienced how the recovery and rebuilding were far outpacing one’s ability to process the level 
of trauma and grief. It was during this time that people in New York became increasingly 
sensitized to a professional community—the planning and design community—that most did not 
think much about—their impact on our shared, built environment. The terms “architecture,” 
“planning,” “structural integrity,” and “progressive collapse,” moved into the collective zeitgeist 
along with design charrettes and public hearings. 
Not only did 9/11 provide the public with an understanding into the role of these 
professionals in response to disasters, it also galvanized the voices of design/planning 
professionals within their own community, along with civic and grassroots organizations. This 
response was the result of design decisions being made by government officials that did not 
7 
always take the public realm and those of the families and city dwellers into account. Designers/ 
planners found themselves in the role of helping the city and the country move forward through 
the design and rebuilding, but it was also being done in the most traumatic and tragic of 
circumstances. 
Close to four years later, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast and devastated New 
Orleans, Louisiana, and along the coast to Gulfport, Mississippi. Close to a year later, I was 
engaged with a team in Iberville, New Orleans, to study an art deco low-income housing 
complex as the researcher and custodial storyteller for the people who had lived there and had 
been evacuated. It was a short-lived assignment.  
While Hurricane Sandy was not an act of terrorism like 9/11, nor as catastrophic as 
Hurricane Katrina, lives and homes were lost, and it did have massive economic and physical 
impacts.2 Hurricane Sandy also brought into question a different kind of vulnerability from 9/11, 
but not so much different from Katrina, in which the boundaries of the built environment and the 
natural world blurred with devastating results.  
A Dissertation Turning Point in Coming Home to Sandy 
After distributing hot meals to displaced people from the parking lot of the Cyclone 
Baseball Stadium in Coney Island, post-“Superstorm Sandy” as the media had dubbed it, I walk 
along the fractured boardwalk to the building where I grew up. Right below the window that was 
once my bedroom, there was a waterline from Sandy’s surge. Sands had shifted from the beach’s 
flat grade to mountainous hills in the middle of the streets. Pieces of the boardwalk were 
dismembered by the sheer force of the 14-foot storm surge; homes, schools, houses of worship, 
2 Although the total reach of economic effects of both catastrophes are difficult to determine overall, September 11 
terrorist attacks in New York City are estimated to have cost between $10 billion and $13 billion in property and 
infrastructure damage (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, n.d., para 7), while Superstorm Sandy’s were 
approximately $19 billion (PlaNYC, 2013, p. 5).  
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businesses penetrated by the ocean or the nearby creek. As I walked from Surf to Mermaid to 
Neptune Avenues, the smell of mold permeated the air; possessions lay in wait for the taking on 
the sand. Water seized memories and life with velocity and an incomprehensible roar. The force 
was merciless.  
Walking along the shoreline on that day, trying to help people clean up the debris, the 
beach seemed so much smaller than I remembered it to be. The ocean was that odd green color, 
more than blue, that it gets in the winter, and the smell of the salty sea air, usually intermingled 
with Nathan’s Famous hot dogs and fries, was uncomfortably absent.  
It was sobering.  
Hurricane Sandy was sobering.  
Sea level rise, with an increase of climate-impactful events is sobering.  
Sandy was an act of nature. Nature creates a home for all life to exist. Standing on the 
shore in the aftermath of Sandy’s wrath, I could not demonize the very thing that had given me 
an understanding of hope, beauty, and the vastness of the world. However, I could not deny its 
explosive power and how humanity fared in the face of it.  
So, where does one go with this preservation of human community and, yet, the changes 
in the natural world? The answer will, in part, be determined by the work of design/planning 
professionals, in collaboration with communities, governments, and other actors. For this 
reason, the research on how those professionals have been impacted by Sandy, needed to be 
explored. 
New York City had never experienced a storm of this size that had caused so much 
damage and affected so many lives (PlaNYC, 2013; see especially Chapter I, “Sandy and Its 
Impacts”). Central to this dissertation’s purpose, Sandy is also an instance where design/planning 
9 
professionals, after the first responders, were the ones literally on the front lines of planning, 
rebuilding, and reimagining along with the impacted communities, the narrative for their future. 
Many of them were also personally impacted either directly or tangentially by the events of 
Sandy themselves. How that affected them personally and professionally, and the implications 
for coping with future climate change and the disasters it can bring societally, is this 
dissertation’s subject and purpose.  
Changing Realities Impacting Design/Planning Professionals  
Today, New York is a city with 520 miles of coastline, home to more than eight million 
people living within five boroughs: Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island, 
all within one of the largest natural harbors.  
Nearly half of the world’s population lives within 60 miles of the sea, and hundreds of 
millions more reside in river valleys. In Hong Kong and Singapore, New York and 
Shanghai, thousands of acres of new waterfront land have been created by landfill. 
Seas are rising, land is sinking. The soil under Jakarta, Indonesia, for instance, drained 
steadily of groundwater, is collapsing four inches a year. (Chu, 2013, para. 6) 
Perhaps the place to start in trying to come to terms with what is increasingly becoming 
our new reality is at the very core of the human psyche, that we as human beings tend to look at 
life as something that goes on forever, until the moment when one realizes that it does not. That 
realization is the gateway to enter the paradoxical juncture between the finite—one’s life  
span—and the infinite, which includes being part of something bigger than oneself, such as God, 
eternity, or the earth itself. It is an existential passage that brings one to a moment of reckoning 
and reassessment. From my perspective, this is where we as a society are now standing. 
With the increase of climate-related events impacting people across the global 
community on a more regular basis, it is not just human beings facing into this paradox but the 
natural world as well. It is a planetary message that has gone viral.  
10 
A key question is: Are we listening? And if we are, what are we going to do about it? 
And, instrumental to that question is another: Who are the leaders on the front line of this 
movement to bridge the natural world with the human-built environment as changes continue to 
unfold? And what can they achieve?  
How post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impacted the design/planning professionals’ 
approaches to future climate-related events, as well as the impacts upon them individually 
(personally), professionally, and societally, was the basis of this research. The hope is that this 
exploration will contribute to the design/planning field and how designers/planners can help lead 
communities through disaster to recovery, fully mindful that they, too, are humans who not only 
strive to shape events but who also are shaped by them.  
About Hurricane Sandy and Climate Change Related Disasters 
With ongoing anthropogenic changes to the natural environment, such as sea level rise, 
there is a pattern of growing interdependency between the natural world and the human-scale 
built environment. Coastal communities are particularly vulnerable in this context that challenges 
a way of life, and in some instances, threatens that life’s survival, with relocation strategies 
becoming sometimes mandatory options for residents from Newtok Village, Alaska, to 
Vunidogoloa Village, Fiji, to Oakwood Beach, Staten Island (post-Hurricane Sandy).  
Hurricane Sandy3 made landfall in the New Jersey–New York City area on the evening of 
October 29, 2012. From satellite photos, its power and enormity were unmistakable (Figure 1.2). 
3 Hurricane Sandy, as it struck New York, was frequently called Superstorm Sandy, in reference to the fact that 
while the system was designated a hurricane during its early formation east of the Caribbean Sea, it had been 
downgraded, technically to a tropical storm, then upgraded back to a hurricane and back down to a storm, all within 
a matter of days (see Blake, Kimberlain, Berg, Cangialosi, & Beven, 2013, especially p. 1). For consistency, I refer 
to it as Hurricane Sandy in this dissertation, except when quoting sources using the term “Superstorm.” 
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Figure. 1.2. Satellite photo of Hurricane Sandy as eye moves towards New Jersey–New York 
shore. Adapted from “Hurricane Sandy,” United States Geological Survey, 
(https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/hurricane-sandy). In the public domain. 
When Sandy was downgraded from a hurricane to a post-tropical cyclone, people of the 
region thought they had dodged a bullet, particularly when there did not seem to be a lot of 
rainfall. Nevertheless, there was a powerful wind field that extended for 1,000 miles with winds 
topping 90 miles per hour. It was the strength of the wind, in combination with the angle of the 
storm, which gave rise to a fast-rising storm surge. These factors were in addition to a full moon 
that brought on one of the highest tides of the year in combination with the New York bight and 
bathymetry and a disturbance in the jet stream that resulted in the storm’s unanticipated turn west 
into New Jersey. 
In the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) post-storm report 
(Sullivan & Uccellini, 2013), Sandy caused significant damage in both the Caribbean and the 
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continental United States. While the highest storm surge and greatest inundation was in New 
Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, the water levels rose along the entire East Coast of the 
United States from Florida up to Maine. In many of these locations, especially along the coasts 
of central and northern New Jersey, Staten Island, and southward-facing shores of Long Island, 
the surge was accompanied by powerful waves with storm surge in some areas exceeding eight 
feet above ground level. Some coastal communities in New Jersey were without power for 
months. The late October timing of the storm also resulted in heavy snows across portions of the 
central Appalachians, most particularly in West Virginia and the mountains of western North 
Carolina. Snowfall totals were up to 36 inches in these areas. Closer to the coast, more than 12 
inches of rainfall resulted in river, stream, and creek flooding over portions of the Mid-Atlantic.  
Sandy’s immediate impacts. During Sandy’s surge, the East River was more than nine 
feet high. The seawall was overcome by water, and low-lying parts of Lower Manhattan were hit 
with a storm surge that rose to 14 feet (Kluger, 2012). Areas became inundated with water 
including New York’s Financial District, Battery Park City, eastern parts of Chinatown and the 
Lower East Side, and farther north in Chelsea and Greenwich Village. In Chelsea, a four-story 
building's facade crumbled and collapsed, leaving the interior on full display during the height of 
the storm. 
The New York Stock Exchange was closed for two weather-related days, something that 
had not happened since the blizzard of 1888. Brooklyn’s Red Hook, Navy Yard, Coney Island, 
and Brighton Beach were under several feet of water. Red Hook, with 70% of its community 
living in public housing, and surrounded by water on three sides, was devastated by the storm.  
In Queens, Long Island City and Jamaica Bay were severely flooded. Breezy Point, a 
private community on the far west end, had fires break out and destroy parts of the community 
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due to salt-water inundating electrical equipment in homes prior to the Long Island Power 
Authority and National Grid turning the power off (Sobel, 2014). While the Bronx was impacted 
in areas across Long Island Sound, if the storm had hit at a slightly different angle, it could have 
heavily damaged Hunts Point in the South Bronx, New York’s primary food distribution center. 
Staten Island, especially along its southern shore in communities such as Oakwood Beach, 
Midland Beach, Ocean Breeze, and South Beach, that are built on swamp land with only low 
dunes to protect them, had the highest rates of fatality.  
There were 6,500 patients who had to be evacuated from hospitals and nursing homes; 
1.1 million children were unable to attend school for a week; nearly 90,000 buildings flooded 
with water (K. H. Jacob, 2015; PlaNYC, 2013). There were 650,000 homes damaged or 
destroyed; 200,000 small business closures due to damage or power outages (Ovink & 
Boeijenga, 2018). Insurers said that New York suffered $19 billion in damages (PlaNYC, 2013), 
and insurers say the total loss was $65 billion, of which $30 billion were insured losses (Munich 
Re, 2013).  
With the entrances of tunnels being close to sea level, there was an attempt to keep the 
water out. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) shut down the entire subway 
system—all 660 miles of track and 468 stations—impacting more than 5.3 million commuters at 
the time (Kluger, 2012). Specifically, air vents and station entrances were covered; for example, 
“The impromptu plywood dam they threw up to protect the 148th Street tunnel in East Harlem, 
saved the No. 3 line from flooding” (Sobel, 2014, pp. 147–148). PATH trains were also shut 
down. Seven other subway tunnels were flooded along with the Brooklyn–Battery Tunnel, 
Midtown Tunnel to Queens, and Holland Tunnel to New Jersey. The Lincoln Tunnel was the 
only one not flooded. Runways at both LaGuardia and JFK airports were also submerged, with 
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flights cancelled at LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark International airports, and the airports were 
closed during and immediately after the storm.  
Subways were shut down for an unprecedented amount of time, coming back on-line 
within a week. The power station at the East River and 13th Street was shorted out by the       
salt-water inundation and caused a huge transformer explosion. In addition, two other lower 
Manhattan substation outages resulted in blackouts that lasted for days from downtown 
Manhattan with a dividing line in midtown above 30th Street where residents had power. There 
were no traffic lights, no working cash machines, and nowhere to get a hot cup of coffee or a 
meal. Places that had their own generators set up recharging stations so that people could charge 
their phones. There were impromptu ice cream parties and makeshift barbeques in backyards and 
on building stoops as people salvaged what they could from a defrosting refrigerator to share 
with neighbors and passing strangers. Power was out to 1.1 million people in New York City and 
within the New York–New Jersey region, more than 8.5 million people were without electricity. 
Countless trees, and subsequently power lines, were brought down by the rain and heavy winds. 
Over one hundred million gallons of raw sewage was released into Hewlett Bay on Long Island, 
two days after Sandy (Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018).  
In New Jersey, Sandy’s core hit near Atlantic City, and the damage was extensive along a 
coastline that is composed of mostly flat barrier islands (Figure 1.3) When the peak surge hit, the 
sea split Island Beach, located in Mantoloking, in two. Seaside Heights, known for its 
amusement park, had ruptured gas lines, and the small community of Camp Osborne went up in 
flames.  
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Figure 1.3. Damage from Hurricane Sandy at Mantoloking, NJ. From “Aerial photograph of 
Hurricane Sandy storm damage at Mantoloking, New Jersey coastline,” United States Geological 
Survey (2012). Photo by Greg Thompson, USFWS (https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/aerial-
photograph-hurricane-sandy-storm-damage-mantoloking-new-jersey-coastline). In the public 
domain. 
 
Hoboken, an island until the 20th century, lies predominantly below sea level. More than 
half of the city flooded, either from the surge or sewers backing up. (Sobel, 2014, p. 154). Gas 
shortages also developed, and New Jersey Governor Christie, later followed by New York City 
Mayor Bloomberg, began an odd–even day rationing. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 capture but a minute 
sense of the vast destruction wrought by the storm in residential areas. 
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Figure 1.4. Debris scattered about a Brooklyn shorefront. Photo by MCC J. Ryan, U.S. Marine 
Corps. (https://www.marines.mil/Photos/?igphoto=2000001214). In the public domain.  
 
 
Figure 1.5. House on Brooklyn shorefront after Sandy. Photo by “Proud Novice,” 2012. 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Damage_from_Hurricane_Sandy_to_house_in_Brook
lyn,_NY.jpeg). Creative Commons License BY-SA 3.0.  
17 
 
 
Sandy did not discriminate between areas of privilege and those areas that were less 
privileged and therefore more vulnerable. However, in the aftermath of Sandy the impacts were 
experienced differently. Household income had a huge impact on how quickly people could 
build back their lives. Thirty percent of homeowners and 65% of renters who registered with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had household incomes that were at or well 
below the federal poverty level for a family of three. Sandy destroyed over 300,000 housing 
units in New York City, many of which were home to economically disadvantaged households. 
There were 402 New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings that lost electricity and 
access to elevators, and many lost heat and water. In total, over 77,000 residents were heavily 
impacted due to storm. The Housing Authority was unprepared to deal with the extent of 
destruction and the consequential needs of its residents, especially those most vulnerable, 
including the elderly and disabled (New York Women’s Foundation Strategic Learning 
Department, 2015).  
The direct death toll from Hurricane Sandy—including as it changed into what came to 
be called Superstorm Sandy—was estimated to be a total of 147 people (Blake, Kimberlain, 
Berg, Cangialosi, & Beven, 2013) including 43 in New York; 12 in New Jersey; nine in 
Maryland; six in Pennsylvania; five in West Virginia; four in Connecticut; two in Virginia; and 
one in North Carolina. One person died in Canada, and at least 67 people were killed in the 
Caribbean, including 54 in Haiti. Blake et al. (2013) pointed out that at the time this was the 
deadliest hurricane to hit the United States, outside the South, since Hurricane Agnes in 1972.  
Residents and government officials did not anticipate that the storm would breach the 
vulnerable areas marked by FEMA on their flood zone map with such veracity. Certainly, no one 
expected that its extent would invalidate FEMA’s mapping by moving beyond what was 
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considered a vulnerable location. It should be noted that in this reference, the term vulnerable is 
defined as the actual physical location of a site. It is not meant to infer the use of vulnerable areas 
in the sole context of economic vulnerability. Yes, people believed that an event like Sandy 
would happen someday, just not in their lifetime. In fact, according to a report done about Sandy 
by the Natural Resources Defense Council, it was noted that “the record-breaking flood height 
and storm surge that accompanied Sandy was on par with the New York City Panel on Climate 
Change projections for the 2050s” (Knowlton & Rotkin-Ellman, 2014, para. 4). In 2015, updated 
FEMA flood maps were produced that expanded the areas of risk based upon the flooding from 
Sandy which New York City’s current Mayor de Blasio appealed. New FEMA flood maps are 
not expected until 2024. Without a common set of flood maps, more people are left exposed, 
especially those in vulnerable communities. 
 Implications of Sandy for designers/planners. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the 
long-term objective that ran through many of the planning initiatives is to develop communities 
that are more sustainable in the face of climate impacts. The phrase sustainable communities has 
a variety of different meanings. In their sustainability framework, The American Planning 
Association (2016) relied on a common definition of sustainability, developed by several NGOs 
and UN agencies in 1991.  
Given the rise of sustainability as a concept over the last decade, there are many different 
versions of definitions of sustainability. Most definitions reference the need to respect 
environmental, economic, and social conditions. Another common element is managing 
resources for both current and future generations. For the purposes of the Policy 
Framework, the following definition of sustainability is used: Sustainability means 
improving the quality of people’s lives while living within the capacities of supporting 
natural and human systems. (p. 5) 
 
Tackling these issues in a comprehensive way requires systemic solutions of frameworks 
and leadership that shift the current thinking, perceptions, and values. An outgrowth of this 
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expansion in thinking is a fundamental change in our collective moral compass where inclusion, 
respect, and dignity are interconnected as part of a complex system of people, place, profit, and 
planet. While each of us may be called upon to embody these ideas in our own unique way, the 
professional planners, architects, engineers, landscape architects, and builders are on the front 
line. Not only are they the front lines for reimagining solutions in response to these events, but 
they are the ones by the very nature of their responsibilities who will be impacted in terms of 
evolved elements of their professions and mapping their own personal and professional 
experiences. According to one summary report prepared by a climate change network of 
megacities from around the world: (it should be noted that the definition of a megacity from the 
Cambridge Dictionary is “a very large city, especially one with more than 10 million people 
living it” (Megacity, n.d.).  
By 2050, over 570 low-lying coastal cities will face projected sea level rise by at least 0.5 
meters. 
• Over 800 million people will be at risk from the impacts of rising seas and storm 
surges. 
• The global economic costs to cities, from rising seas and flooding, could amount to 
$1 trillion by mid-century. 
• Local factors mean that cities will experience sea level rise at different paces. Cities 
on the east coast of the United States, along with major cities in Asia, are particularly 
vulnerable. 
• Sea level rise and flooding can impact essential services such as energy, transport, 
and health. When Hurricane Sandy struck New York in 2012, coastal floods impacted 
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an estimated 90,000 buildings; 2 million people lost power, which caused extensive 
damage and disrupted commercial activity to a cost of over $19 billion. 
• Resilience strategies, strengthened coastal protection, upgrades to existing buildings 
and infrastructure, relocation from the most at-risk areas as well as community 
engagement and preparedness can help cities adapt to sea level rise and coastal 
flooding. (C40 Cities, n.d., paras. 1–6) 
The final bullet in this overview cues a central role and a need for designers/planners 
whose work centers on decisions and approaches to building for resilience and engaging with 
leaders and options such as rebuilding and relocation. The readiness of these professions and 
their ability to guide these decisions, will depend on how previous experiences with climate 
crises have affected these groups of people.  
The Study’s Purpose 
When disasters strike, people are strongly affected, often harmed, but always changed. 
Understandably, impacts on affected communities and their citizens have been the primary focus 
of aftermath studies along with the broad-scale effects on natural ecosystems (Erikson, 1976; 
Friesma, Caporaso, Goldstein, Linberry, & McCleary, 1979; Lindell & Prater, 2003). Literature 
on the social, psychological, economic, and cultural impacts of disasters related to climate 
change are reviewed in Chapter II. However, when it comes to professionals whose work is vital 
dealing with the short- and long-term effects of such disasters, especially after the immediate 
emergency subsides, studies tend to be about their work as a mitigating factor, not about how 
they themselves have been impacted and changed by the disaster and by what they have had to 
do as a result of disasters. Those impacts are the subject of this dissertation. By gathering and 
analyzing the narratives of designers/planners in relation to Hurricane Sandy, I have garnered 
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first-person accounts and insights into the work, the thoughts, and the feelings of professionals 
who society will rely on more and more as climate impactful events proceed. 
Clearly, the ability of the New York/New Jersey coastal region, and other urbanized 
coastlines worldwide, to deal with the complex and uncertain future against a backdrop of 
heightened effects of global warming, will require a wide array of professional work under 
conditions that are far from normal. Medical professionals are an obvious example who are 
bound to be in unusually high demand when catastrophes strike, whether these are  
climate-related or not. Other professions who become engaged to their capacity when hurricanes, 
floods, and forest fires strike include fire fighters, law enforcement, as well as a wide variety of 
rescue workers, some professionally trained, but many not. These practitioners are collectively 
referred to as first responders and researchers have undertaken an increasing amount of study 
over the last several decades on how first responders and their effectiveness is impacted.  
While these and other professions take leading roles in dealing with the acute phase of 
disaster recovery, societies need to plan mid- and longer-term responses—and the ones who are 
central to such initiatives as recovery, rebuilding, relocation, adaptation, mitigation, and 
prevention, like first responders—do their work amidst highly traumatic situations and distraught 
fellow citizens and neighborhoods.  
For designers/planners, professional responsibility especially relates to the mid- to         
long-term. Like other professionals, they are likely to be placed in situations of tragic choices 
that have the characteristics of what in medicine is called triage: “the selection and categorization 
of the victims of a disaster with the view to appropriate treatment according to the degree of 
severity of illness or injury, and the availability of medical and transport facilities” (Domres, 
Koch, Manger, & Becker, 2001, p. 53). 
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Making these kinds of choices, whether in a makeshift medical tent or in considering who 
will be helped and listened to, for example, the relocation of physically vulnerable communities, 
will be stressful; if the disaster is huge, it may be stressful enough to incapacitate helping 
professionals temporarily or long-term. In preliminary discussions about this doctoral research, 
several design/planning professionals referred even to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as 
something to consider among those who have been most deeply involved in dealing with such 
events as Hurricane Sandy (2012); Hurricane Katrina (2005); and more recent disasters including 
Hurricane Matthew (2016), and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria (all of which struck in the late 
summer of 2017); Hurricanes Florence, Michael (2018); and Hurricanes Barry, Dorian and 
Humberto (2019). 
These practitioners must do this amidst stresses also unforeseen and perhaps 
unforeseeable. Thus, we need to understand how professionals will cope, adapt, and successfully 
face the unknown, if possible. There are few professions that will not be affected. Having gone 
through Hurricanes Katrina, Ike, Sandy, and a growing steady number of other climate-related 
catastrophes, such as wildfires in California, has been a reminder of the diversity of professions 
whose ability—and equanimity—will be needed and yet jeopardized by the uncertainty and the 
scale of events. This new zeitgeist of natural disasters will include medical professionals whose 
facilities will be severely strained at the very time that a spike of physically and mentally 
traumatized patients need them; it will include police, fire, and other emergency workers; it will 
include engineers who are called upon to restore infrastructure. My focus is on a group that has a 
special role to play in facing climate change and catastrophic events: designers/planners, 
including architects, landscape architects, planners, and engineers. There is some scholarly and 
related documentation about the role that planners face in disastrous events generally (e.g., 
23 
 
 
Litman, 2006; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, & Smith, 1998) and climate change in particular 
(e.g., Dubois, Cloutier, Rosenkilde-Rynning, Adolphe, & Bonhomme, 2016). But, to repeat, 
there appears to be very little research on how these professionals are impacted by experiencing 
disasters on which they will be later working.  
One of the leading authorities of cities in the 20th century, Lewis Mumford (1960), wrote 
in The Culture of Cities: “Cities are a product of the earth, whereby people transform a          
nature-based reality into a place of physical form that supports human growth and sustenance” 
(p. 3). Though not an architect or planner, Mumford became a spokesperson for the Regional 
Planning Association of America—a leading professional organization of practicing planners and 
designers. Environmental degradation and its impact on our cities and their social fabric became 
a main focus of his professional and personal discourse.  
Today, designers/planners are facing their own kind of critical examination of their role 
in the context of the transformation of the built and natural environments.  
In 2016, an estimated 54.5 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban settlements. 
By 2030, urban areas are projected to house 60 per cent of people globally, and one in 
every three people will live in cities with at least half a million inhabitants (United 
Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs, 2016, p. ii)  
 
A later report from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, predicted 
68%—2.5 billion more people—could live in urban areas by 2050 (Lardieri, 2018).  
In this highly vulnerable stage after a climate impactful event, the design or planning 
professional is, in fact, addressing a situation where not only the physical but the psychosocial 
has changed (Mooney et al., 2011). The psychosocial was defined by an advisory group 
following the 2011 New Zealand Canterbury Earthquakes during the disaster recovery phase, as 
“encompassing cultural, psychological, social, economic and physical (including housing, 
infrastructure and physical health) dimensions that are part of the regeneration of a community 
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that has experienced adversity” (Mooney et al., 2011, p. 3). That begins to give a sense of just 
how complex and wide an array of issues and considerations designers/planners need to be 
taking account of in aftermaths of climate change related disasters.  
The Research Context, Questions, and Focus 
The problem context in brief. Philosopher Takashi Uchiyama, in talking about recovery 
in the context of Japan, a country that has had more than its share of natural and human-made 
disasters, states: 
The main subject for the recovery is neither “people,” nor “nature.” It is not granting 
from the government, or experts who instigate the process as “recovery from zero.” 
What shapes the recovery processes are relations: relations between human beings and 
nature, relations between people, relations between us and those we lost, including our 
ancestors, relations between our lives and local cultures and histories. (Uchiyama as 
cited in Murakami & Murakami-Wood, 2014, p. 238) 
What became increasingly clear through the body of the research and the narratives of the 
professionals that were interviewed for this study, is that recovery and planning in advance of 
any future events is not in isolation, nor is it pre-prescribed. It is a shared approach done for an 
agreed upon common purpose. It follows that designers/planners—whether architects, planners, 
landscape architects, or engineers—are in relationship-based professions in which they create or 
enhance place and space within the built environment. The work is technical, but it is also 
inescapably about relationships. That inclusive approach is especially critical when designing or 
planning for climate-vulnerable communities or in response and rebuilding in communities,    
post-disaster. This was underscored post-Sandy, when many of the efforts, later described within 
this chapter, focused on moving beyond negotiating solutions and toward building even better 
results. To accomplish this type of approach requires transparency and trust developed from a 
relationship-based perspective that Uchiyama so eloquently described. More often than not, 
designers/planners may be working within a community where they have no previous                
25 
 
 
on-the-ground history. While this presents its own set of challenges, the narratives in Chapter IV 
describes how these challenges have been approached from a variety of perspectives. 
Designers/planners are not regularly exposed to disaster-related events, so there is no 
direct correlation as part of the professional expectation of working with the psychosocial 
dynamics of people within communities when they are planning for or implementing plans for 
recovery and rebuilding.  
Consider this dynamic following the experience with Hurricane Sandy. Immediately after 
such a disaster, there is a period of shock followed by the global awareness that what had just 
happened was even worse than anyone had initially anticipated. This juxtaposition creates an 
understandable amount of disorientation and emotions that include fear, confusion, and loss. This 
disorienting dilemma is often where designers/planners are entering when they begin to work 
with communities in the recovery and adaption stages. A disorienting dilemma (Mezirow, 2000) 
is part of a transformative learning theory in which an individual confronts situations that 
challenge professional and personal paradigms of assumptions, beliefs, and values. Experiencing 
such a dilemma can result in a discourse that is more relational and inclusive. In light of this, the 
study focused on the ways in which design/planning practitioners have coped, were personally 
impacted, and how they would approach the next climate-related event based upon their 
experiences. 
Main and interrelated research questions. Recognizing these challenges through the 
primary research question, in what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the 
design/planning professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally, 
professionally, and societally, a number of other potential foreshadowed questions have been 
explored as relevant to the participants’ stories, including the following: 
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• As a result of Hurricane Sandy and other climate impactful events, how have 
designers/planners developed solutions that reshape thinking and behavior around 
two of the most challenging issues that we will have to face in the coming decades:  
sea level rise and drought?  
   
 
• How do or will they cope with the impacts and use the learning inherent in working in 
a crisis situation in charting the new course for New York and, by implication, other 
human communities in the face of the changing global climate?   
• As a result of what they experienced during and after Sandy, have they or their 
practices changed? 
• How did Sandy’s impact on marginalized or economically challenged communities 
impact their perspective and approach personally, professionally, and societally? 
• Have designers/planners evolved a more nuanced appreciation for their role amidst 
the greater complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts of this 
extraordinary context?  
• Does this new and often shocking context for their work and their lives, test their 
limits personally, professionally, and societally? Has there been an emergence of 
professional paradigms that recognize certain limitations and the resultant need for 
designing and planning for contingency and surprises?  
In effect, designers/planners are walking into situations that are atypical—which is, in 
essence, at the core of the research for this study. Some would say that atypical contexts are, 
paradoxically, the rule and not the exception for the professions of design/planning. Schön 
¥ How are designers/planners addressing controversial adaptive measures such as
 managed retreat?
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You have to help people navigate . . . as they sift through what is essential and what is 
expendable, and as they experiment with solutions to the adaptive challenge at hand. This 
disequilibrium can catalyze everything from conflict, frustration, and panic to confusion, 
disorientation, and fear of losing something dear. This is not what you are paid to do and 
will certainly not be as well received as when you are mobilizing people to address a 
technical issue that is within their competence or requires expertise that can be readily 
obtained. Consequently, when you are practicing adaptive leadership, distinctive skills 
and insights are necessary to deal with this swirling mass of energies. You need to be 
able to do two things: (1) manage yourself in that environment and (2) help people 
tolerate the discomfort they are experiencing. You need to live into the disequilibrium. 
(pp. 28–29) 
This perspective on leadership was particularly insightful when evaluating participants’ 
approaches to design and planning challenges post-Sandy and what changes need to be made in 
the future, based upon both their professional and personal experiences. 
Framework for interpreting planning and design practice after Sandy: The three 
pillars. To organize the approach to this intricate and daunting knot of questions, the normative 
work of Lederach (1997, 2003) was most inspiring. He focused on peacekeepers rather than 
designers/planners, but the settings within which these practitioners work bear strong 
similarities. Both are caught up in “repair and prevention” work in contexts where traumatic 
human suffering and physical destruction surrounds them. Both peacekeepers, on one hand, and 
designer/planners, on the other, are expected to both solve critical immediate issues, yet lay the 
(1983) in The Reflective Practitioner, wrote, ÒT he institutional context of planning is notoriously 
unstableÓ  (p. 204). Many others before and since have stressed that the designer/planner, perhaps 
more than most other professionals, is always working with issues in contexts that are wrought
withÑ again in SchnÕs  (1983) wordsÑ Òc omplexity, uncertainty, instabil ity, uniqueness, and 
value conf lictsÓ  (p. 14). In a post-Sandy scenario, designers/planners enter a space of 
disequili brium with individuals whose very community and personal wellbeing has been 
threatened. Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky (2009), in the context of leadership, state of such 
situations:
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ground for better societal futures where the sorry conditions do not recur and, hopefully, better 
worlds exist for deeply impacted human beings.  
Lederach (2003) proposed four categories of adaptive response for peacekeepers to grasp 
and strengthen their crucial work and working lives: 
 Personal: Changes affected in and desired for the individual; 
 Relational: Changes in face-to-face relationships; 
 Structural: [Coming to understand] the underlying causes of conflict;  
 Cultural: Changes produced by conflict in the broadest patterns of group life. (pp. 
23–26)  
From Lederach’s (1997) perspective, effecting such changes is the key intended outcome 
for peacekeepers in these contexts: reconciliation.  
Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns 
about both the past and the future can meet. Reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that 
space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is the necessary 
ingredient for reframing the present. (p. 27) 
In looking at the work and mission of designers/planners post-Sandy, I believe that 
reconciliation also describes the ideal towards which they work. There are more than enough 
interpersonal and social divides for them to reckon with as traumatized people struggle to resume 
and be protected in good lives in the wake of disasters. Social conflict abounds and is 
accentuated after disasters, as was seen nowhere more dramatically than in New Orleans,  
post-Katrina. But in the aftermath of climate-driven catastrophes, there is renewed urgency as 
well, for a broader reconciliation between humans and the natural environment (cf. Ashby, 
1978).  
The research has drawn from Lederach’s (1997, 2003) agenda for peacekeepers in his 
work on reconciliation, broadly speaking, as a means of looking at the core issues being faced by 
designers/planners in terms of three pillars—related to, though not quite commensurate with his 
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four categories of adaptive response to conflict. The pillars for breaking down and understanding 
the strategy and impacts are:  
• Personal—Impacts on the self/individual; psycho-social challenges, such as 
empathy/stress 
• Professional—Impact to professional practice, reflections on strategies                     
post-Hurricane Sandy, and impact on future events. 
• Societal—Local and global impacts, leadership. 
Figure 1.6 figuratively summarizes this framework. These categories of impact have been 
the way to “step in” to the undoubtedly bewildering complexity of the experiences of 
designers/planners as they were impacted by and continued to respond on society’s behalf to 
Hurricane Sandy and other climate impactful events. The pillars differ from what one expects of 
literal pillars, which include a solidity and something that will persist as they are when first 
created. Instead this structure is my way of organizing questions and the data that this 
dissertation yields. The questions from what I had initially planned did change in the course of 
my research. These changes were informed by the “talk back”4 to my initial formulations of this 
work.  
 
4 The notions of “stepping in” to problematic situations and then listening to the “talk back” of what 
results from studying them, are drawn from Schön’s (1983) view of research as a “reflective 
conversation” (p. 268) with the research problem. 
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Figure 1.6. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies 
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners. 
 
In addition to Lederach’s (2003) work with and for peacekeepers, there are a number of 
other professions by which designers/planners can be informed. By the nature of a longer history 
of this type of disaster-related work, these professions bring much insight into  
multi-disciplinary challenges the design community may need to address with an increase in 
“Sandy-like” impactful events. This cross-professional pollination is essential because the entire 
way that professional activity has been understood, both post-disaster as well as planning for 
vulnerable communities, has had to undergo significant change in the recent past. At a seminar 
convened by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2011, Leonard Doyle of 
the International Organization for Migration in Haiti observed:  
Quite honestly, I think a little over three decades ago we did fairly well in bringing 
communities back into recovery and then moving into rehabilitation. But things have 
obviously changed . . . I must admit I really thought that we could handle pretty much 
anything . . . But we’ve come to the conclusion recently that we don’t have all the 
31 
 
 
answers. Two things have happened. One, very healthily, we have recognized that 
disaster management is just not a health discipline, it is the first multidisciplinary 
discipline including social sciences, anthropology, religions, etc. Increasingly we are 
looking to those elements of society to come up with the answers that we can no 
longer supply. Things are a lot more complex. We have to move outside of our 
traditional disaster management assets, look much more, not only with [other 
disciplines] but certainly the community. (Doyle as quoted in Scribner & Herzer,     
2011, pp. 33–34) 
This quote underscores the importance of having aligned professional disciplines outside 
the immediate study area as part of the research. The following four professionals who had 
worked on the ground beside design/planning professionals were interviewed as part of this 
study: 
• a communication specialist, who underscored how the impact of the narrative                  
post-Hurricane Sandy impacted design/planning professionals;  
• a social activist from Occupy Sandy who worked in conjunction with design/planning 
professionals during the recovery;  
• an activist/storyteller who provided insights into some of the challenges being faced 
by designers/planners; and  
• an urban strategist who refers to herself as a “community activator,” and was 
instrumental as a consensus builder with designers/planners in the aftermath of 
Sandy. 
Designers/planners can learn much about the changes they will be affected by from other 
practitioners who work in the aftermath of climate-intensified storms. There is a further body of 
literature that is examined in Chapter II on such changes, both for designers/planners, and from 
other areas of intervention from which much can be learned.  
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The Methodological Approach Previewed 
Given that the methods and research plan are outlined in Chapter III, an initial overview 
of the research approach is offered here. An embedded case study research design was chosen, 
due to the complex and contextualized nature of the object of study (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 
2014). This approach allowed for the exploration of the impact of Sandy on design/planning 
professionals from different perspectives and integrated multiple data sources (Scholz & Tietje, 
2002). Within this structure, the study utilized biographical narrative inquiry (Chamberlayne, 
Bornat, & Wengraf, 2000) and focused on the stories of designers/planners engaged in those 
initiatives. One of the key reasons for using a narrative inquiry methodology is because it 
provides a structure for parsing out the struggle between the aspirational aspects of the 
profession and the practicality of the actual ground action over a period of days, weeks, months, 
years, and even decades. This requires a structure where complex, seemingly conflicted realities 
can co-exist in the mind of the interviewee; their narrative must prevail, however odd it may 
seem to the researcher, and can only do so if it has space, rather than the researcher-imposed 
categories. Narrative stories are the best way to hold and convey the depth of this experience and 
information. The stories these professionals shared are critical to understanding not only what the 
best approaches are for going forward to meet those challenges, but also, in parallel, the impact 
of those narratives within themselves and each other. 
For this portion of the study, professionals who were engaged post-Sandy, and who may 
have also participated in similar type of events prior to or since, were interviewed, focusing on 
their first-hand accounts within the larger societal context, alongside the personal and 
professional impact of the three pillars: Personal, Professional, and Societal. 
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The findings of the study are organized into two components using a research procedure 
of two-tiered sampling. Details are further described in Chapter III, but in summary, the first part 
centered on interviews approached and aimed at drawing forth 28 robust stories. This consisted 
of architects, planners, landscape architects, engineers, and several associated professionals that 
worked closely with designers/planners. Therefore, four of these narratives included an urban 
strategist, communication specialist, activist/storyteller, and social activist. A focus group, which 
tested the study’s findings, included one architect, one architect/planner, and one landscape 
architect/architect.   
The general method of data gathering was biographical narrative interviewing in which 
fairly minimal questioning or prompts from the researcher were used, leaving the participant 
wide latitude to structure his or her “stories of Sandy” in his or her own way. Some questions 
about each participant’s professional background were asked so that there was a foundational 
base of information prior to delving into more personal experiences. This yielded a range of 
insights based directly on the design/planner’s lived experience. While the focus was on the          
post-Sandy experience and the effect on the design/planning professionals, the participants did 
bring up other places they worked before or after Sandy as a further means of expanding upon 
their response to Sandy. The second part of this two-tiered research approach was in the form of 
a focus group, which consisted of three professionals, who were given a series of questions with 
the intent of triangulating the research and testing the viability of specific responses from the 
study with them. Details on the plan for this focus group discussion and on the subsequent 
analysis of the recorded discussion are described in Chapters III and IV. 
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An Overview of Post-Sandy Strategies Engaging Design/Planning Professionals 
In the aftermath of a major disaster striking one of the world’s largest and most 
prominent urban regions, an array of different initiatives with the broad intent of reconstruction 
and prevention of recurrence were put into place.  
This section provides an overview of the main post-Sandy initiatives on which 
designers/planners worked. Participants in this study have participated significantly in one or 
more of these initiatives:  
  
 Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Rebuild by Design,  
 New York Rising/Buy It Back (a New York State initiative), 
 Build It Back (a New York City initiative), and  
 Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative that overlapped with a number of these 
programs). 
Political and agency leaders strove to plan and act in ways that could support residents 
and communities with short-and long-term responses to the effects of the storm. They vary in 
several important ways based upon the extent to which affected communities’ perspectives were 
central or not, and in the larger view of the storm as a rare catastrophe versus a symptom on 
longer-term “permanent white water” (Vaill, 1996, book subtitle). Vaill defines a fast-changing 
reality that pervades an existing paradigm as a permanent white water. He goes on to stress the 
importance of life-long learning within this context: “The presence of permanent white water 
demands that we look anew at the challenge of continued lifelong learning—what it involves, 
what the barriers are, and whether we even understand it well enough to practice it (Vaill, 1996, 
p. 20). 
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency,
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This concept of permanent white water and life-long learning not only pertains to the 
challenges political and agency leaders may have been facing post-Sandy, but it also pertains to 
the narrative interviews during the research phase of the dissertation. Many of the 
design/planning professionals post-Sandy were faced with certain technical challenges that made 
them feel as if they were engaging in a level of learning for which even decades in the profession 
had not prepared them. 
  
 
 
      
 
            
              
              
             
           
              
                 
              
               
             
                 
          
The final SIRR report, A Stronger More Resilient New York, was released in June 2013 
(PlaNYC, 2013), resulting in an array of recommended pilot projects for rebuilding the 
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency.
 Ò I think weÕre  deluding ourselves,Ó  says Ron Shiffman, a veteran city planner. Ò ThereÕs
 only so far you can kick the can down the road. We know sea-level rise wil l be six feet by
 the end of the century. ThatÕs  an enormous amount; we need to be able to plan for it.Ó
 (Murphy, 2015, para. 8)
 In December 2012,Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced thedevelopment of theNYC
Special Initiative for Rebui lding andResi liency (SIRR) to address creating a moreresil ient New
York City, post-Hurricane Sandy. The focus was on developing plans to prepare and protect 
morethan adozen communities throughout New York. Organized by publ ic officials and 
stakeholders and design/planning professionals, meetingswereset up within theheavily
impacted communities, to share ideas and to listen to community concernsaboutthe rebuilding
and resil iency process. As a result, relationshipswerebuil t andpeoplewho had a Ò big stake in
thechallenge, whatever their perspectives, were l istened to and their interests and voices were
taken into accountÓ (p. 135),as Heifetz et al. (2009), in discussionsof adaptive leadership
described. This gave those in positionsof authority, alongsidethestakeholders, theopportunity
to look at someof the technical aspects that werebeing suggested (seawalls, for example) and
discuss thesewithin thecontext of theadaptivechallenge.
36 
 
 
communities impacted by Sandy and increasing the resilience of infrastructure and buildings 
citywide. This new effort preceded a number of other programs and frameworks that advanced 
the work with which NYC SIRR initially began. As a result, for example, New York City with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers replenished beaches in vulnerable areas like Coney Island and 
Rockaway as well as rebuilt dunes on Staten Island.  
Rebuild by Design. 
“We didn’t want to just build barriers; we wanted to build an ecosystem,” said Henk 
Ovink, a Dutch water-management expert who also served as a senior adviser to the 
Presidential Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, a group within the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, which earmarked billions for the program. “For that to 
happen, we have to live with the water, to understand it, while still understanding our 
vulnerabilities.” (Feuer, 2014, para. 4) 
Rebuild by Design (RBD) began as part of former President Barack Obama’s Hurricane 
Sandy Rebuilding Strategy led by a task force. The President signed an executive order in 
December 2012 that created the task force, with work that began in February 2013, culminating 
in a detailed, multi-faceted report by August of the same year. 
RBD began in June 2013, “to promote resilience in the Sandy-affected region by 
attracting world-class talent to develop innovative projects” (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task 
Force, 2013, p. 4). This resulted in an international design competition led by HUD with a       
high-ranking planning official from the Netherlands, Henk Ovink, on loan to the United States 
from the Dutch government. The intended outcome was that this would become the model of 
working with communities in post-disaster recovery, one that was more holistic in nature so that 
the model of recovery was not dictated, but done in concert with each specific community, and 
with sources of funding and leadership that involve design/planning professionals as well as  
non-profit organizations with a history of  community-based change locally and world-wide. The 
organizations in partnership with HUD for the competition included The Municipal Art Society 
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of New York, Regional Plan Association, Institute for Public Knowledge–NYU, Van Alen 
Institute, and support from The Rockefeller Foundation and other philanthropic partners.  
New York Rising/Buy It Back. The NY Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR) 
Program described itself as a “participatory recovery and resiliency initiative that supports the 
planning and implementation of community-developed projects to 124 communities severely 
damaged by Superstorm Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and Tropical Storm Lee” (Governor's Office of 
Storm Recovery, n.d.-b, para. 1). Unlike Rebuild by Design, NYRCR was not an international 
design but administered at the state level by the New York State Governor’s Office of Storm 
Recovery (GOSR). NYRCR was overseen by a planning committee that assessed storm 
damages, risks, community needs and opportunities, and developed strategies that encompassed 
both recovery and resiliency. As part of the post-Sandy initiative, the GOSR also managed the 
State’s voluntary Buyout and Acquisition Programs (Buy It Back) in which homeowners could 
ask the state to buy back properties that were substantially damaged or destroyed. A similar 
buyout program was developed by Governor Christie of New Jersey.  
This state program was a departure from the NYC SIRR plan in that it refused to 
entertain withdrawal or a strategy that has been attracting considerable attention—managed 
retreat—which means acceding to there being some impacted areas that are never to be rebuilt 
(cf. Agyeman, Devine-Wright, & Prange, 2009).  
The NY Rising Acquisition Program was created by GOSR to offer individual 
homeowners whose property was in the floodplain and have suffered substantial damage, the 
opportunity to sell their homes to GOSR to be auctioned for redevelopment and elevation. The 
NY Rising initiative focused on developing reconstruction plans in 124 New York State 
communities well beyond the immediate New York metropolitan area. 
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A press release from the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (2017) about the 
Acquisition Program, stated that the goal of this program was to give storm-impacted owners in 
affected neighborhoods a chance to sell their uninhabitable homes, allowing the properties to be 
redeveloped in accordance with local codes as new, resilient housing to replace vacant  
storm-damaged properties. Over the course of three auctions, beginning in May 2015, GOSR 
auctioned 470 properties for a total of $73 million; 466 of these are now in private hands, and 44 
properties have completed reconstruction. Projects included in the planning ranged from 
community-wide infrastructure improvements, retrofits of critical community facilities with 
emergency backup, and training programs.  
Build It Back. The Build It Back Program of the NYC Mayor’s Office of Housing 
Recovery Operations has been by far the most controversial of all the post-Sandy programs. It 
was announced seven months after Sandy to help New Yorkers in the five  
boroughs—Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island—to rebuild their homes and 
also to improve the resiliency of their homes in communities impacted by Sandy. It was 
described to potential beneficiaries as follows: 
If your home was demolished or destroyed as a result of damage caused by Hurricane 
Sandy, Build It Back may provide you with the construction funds necessary to help you 
rebuild what you had before Sandy. You may choose to rebuild using the City-selected 
Developer who has pre-approved plans to start rebuilding your home. Or you may choose 
your own contractor to build one a home for you, following program guidelines and 
within cost restrictions. In both rebuild options, NYC Build It Back will make payments 
directly to the contractor. (New	York	City Housing Recovery, n.d.-b, para. 1)5 
In the days following the storm, New York City helped families return to their homes 
through the Rapid Repairs program, which was described in self-congratulatory language as:  
 
5 Note that some of the websites that the City and its agencies established to assist with recovery after 
Sandy have been revised after programs came to an end. The wording here is no longer on the website 
cited in the references.  
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A first-of-its-kind pilot program to provide free, government assistance to thousands of 
homeowners left without heat, power and hot water after Hurricane Sandy. No other city 
has ever responded to a natural disaster by offering emergency repairs to allow 
homeowners to shelter in their own homes. Rapid Repairs restored essential, emergency 
services and served as a critical first step in helping residents rebuild their homes more 
quickly. (New York City Housing Recovery, n.d.-a, para. 1) 
This program was different from the approach with Build It Back, which focused more 
on long-term rebuilding. 
As noted, the Build It Back program has become widely criticized with suggestions that,  
to some New Yorkers whose homes were destroyed by Hurricane Sandy, the phrase 
Build It Back has come to sound like a perverse taunt. Across the flood zones of 
Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island, hundreds of homeowners are still doing battle with 
the troubled city program that was created to put them back on their feet quickly and 
efficiently. (Blau & Durkin, 2017)  
Reflecting on Build It Back, as well as post-Hurricane Katrina rebuilding initiatives, Brad 
Gair (2016) the Director of Housing Recovery Operations in the New York Mayor’s Office at the 
time of Hurricane Sandy, referred to both as “categorical failures” (as cited in Wachs, 2016, 
para. 2).  
Occupy Sandy. Unlike the aforementioned four initiatives, Occupy Sandy was entirely a 
volunteer grassroots disaster relief organization. It grew out of the well-known Occupy Wall 
Street collective, shifting, as Sandy struck, from protest to relief work. Eventually the Occupy 
Sandy initiative worked in partnerships with local communities, FEMA, the Red Cross, and 
design/planning professionals in short-term needs and long-term rebuilding efforts. However, 
like Occupy Wall Street, it maintained an anti-establishment credo, based on the idea that 
everyday people had to be the leaders in public action and the sometimes implicit, often explicit, 
presumption that large, formal, top-down-run organizations, such as government agencies or 
more established non-profits, cannot be relied on. Instead the philosophy is one of “mutual aid” 
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(Occupy Sandy, n.d.-b, para 1), a phrase that recurs in Occupy movements seemingly inspired by 
anarchist thinkers such as Kropotkin (1902).  
Occupy Sandy raised well over $1 million and played a leading though collaborative role 
in supporting a wide array of rebuilding actions in the first several months after Sandy. The 
movement worked on the following initiatives in their post-Sandy funded program of activities: 
Worker Owned Rockaway Cooperatives: . . . an initiative to rebuild after Sandy in a way 
that addresses both the storm’s impact and the long-term systemic issues in the 
neighborhood. The program’s goal is to equip Far Rockaway residents with the skills and 
financing to launch small, worker-owned businesses that fill a need in their community . . . 
Rockaway Wildfire: . . . geared toward community empowerment and activism through 
learning in action, in light of Superstorm Sandy. We aim to strengthen the community, 
create alternatives, engage in political education, and be involved in the redevelopment 
and planning in the Rockaways.  
FLO Solutions: FLO Solutions for Disaster Relief  is a project that brings the best 
free/libre/open-source tools and techniques to New York City-based disaster relief groups 
and helps them document their best practices and share them with people around the 
world. 
Occupy Sandy New Jersey: From the Delaware Bay to the Hudson River, OSNJ strives to 
help communities drive their own recovery. 
SI Unity Hub: Occupy Sandy Staten Island is a volunteer-based group helping to rebuild 
and support the Staten Island community in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. We are 
actively interested in building relationships with other grassroots community 
organizations and sharing our network of legal aids, medics, translators, skilled 
tradespeople and volunteers with donation drop off/pick up spots, volunteer hubs, and 
community groups in need. 
YANA . . . which stands for “You Are Never Alone,” is a community resource center 
devastated by Sandy which re-emerged as a relief hub before a gut renovation was 
completed with an eye towards green technology and sustainability. 
[Sandy] Storyline: StoryLine is a collaborative documentary for us to share experiences 
of Hurricane Sandy and relief efforts. 
Respond & Rebuild: [an] on-the-ground effort coordinating relief workers, residents, 
resources, and volunteer power to communities most affected by Hurricane Sandy. 
(Occupy Sandy, n.d.-a, paras. 1–8) 
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Each of the major post-Sandy initiatives undertaken by governments and  
non-government organizations are multi-faceted with diverse components in terms of physical 
and social actions. My research demonstrated that each required the significant involvement of a 
wide range of design/planning professionals—the focus of the present study. In the course of my 
work, I identified the array of professionals associated with each initiative and then explored, 
through interviews, their involvement and how this impacted them personally and professionally.  
Significance of the Proposed Research 
There is little research on how designers/planners (as individuals and as professionals) 
are affected at the personal, professional, and societal level by their engagement in post-disaster 
and pre-planning/design. The scant efforts to discover such published assessments are presented 
in Chapter II. By way of contrast, many studies have looked at how working amidst catastrophes 
and their aftermaths, the impacts of disasters on first responders and front-line workers, such as 
police (Alexander & Wells, 1991), fire fighters and rescuers (Berger et al., 2012), paramedics 
(Durham, McCammon, & Allison, 1985), and medical and mental health workers (Dyregrov & 
Solomon, 1991). There has been especially broad attention to PTSD for emergency workers 
(e.g., Figley, 2013; Regehr & Bober, 2005). However, this framework has not been applied to 
design/planning professionals. Neither have other broader impacts—positive as well as 
negative—been examined for those whose work extends long beyond emergency response, to 
assisting in preparedness and adaptation for future climate events.  
The research is intended to provide a significant contribution to understanding 
professionals that are not, by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with disaster and 
trauma as part of their discourse. With the greater frequency of these climate impactful events, 
design/planning professionals will need to address these challenges in the long-term. This 
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challenge is not dissimilar from professionals who work in areas of conflict where issues around 
rebuilding in traumatized communities take their toll not just on the people who have 
experienced the loss but those who are helping to facilitate the rebuilding and reclamation 
process.  
This equally complex set of voices and approaches interviewed for this study required a 
methodology that allows for a structured yet nuanced approach which is evidenced in the use of 
the case study. As defined by Yin (2014), “a case study investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the ‘case’) in its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (p. 2). More specifically, the use of an 
embedded single case study, meaning that within the single case there are several embedded 
units of analysis, addresses the six related but conceptually distinct initiatives the 
design/planning professionals would have encountered during Sandy that were previously 
mentioned.  
A key variable among these initiatives is the extent to which and the means by which the 
design/planning professionals engaged with non-professionals, which is an important feature 
because climate change adaptation and mitigation arguably should be based on a constituency of 
involvement from those most affected by the storm. Otherwise the individual and collective 
change and learning that climate-impactful events necessitates will not take hold. Further, as 
stressed in Chapter II, there are difficult ethical issues of inequality that become inescapable in 
urban areas impacted by disasters—a theme that the Katrina experience indelibly underlined. 
Thus, one of the principal impacts of Sandy on design/planning professionals that may be 
uncovered is an altered disposition toward the public and its role in what has long been seen as 
exclusively professional work. Therefore, the use of the embedded single case study relied on 
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biographical interviewing for data about how design/planning professionals were impacted and, 
possibly, changed by the Sandy experience. It also entailed looking at documents, broadly 
speaking, that recount the events and responses to them (especially by design/planning 
professionals) during and after Sandy. 
My Positionality 
Revelation of a researcher’s positionality is about much more than bias but rather about 
telling readers as much as possible about the lens through which she/he sees the story that is told. 
A large part of how I looked at Hurricane Sandy was revealed at the beginning of this chapter, as 
I showed more than told about what it is to grow up, work, and live in a great world city that is 
imperiled by a storm and, more broadly, by massive changes in the world’s climate.  
The qualitative researcher’s perspective can be a paradoxical one: It is to be acutely 
tuned-in to the experiences and meaning systems of others and at the same time to be aware of 
how one’s own biases and preconceptions may be influencing what one is trying to understand. 
(Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). 
Therefore, while I am neither a designer nor a planner, I have worked within the 
profession of the built environment as a writer, researcher, in communications, and as marketing 
specialist with designers/planners (architecture and engineering) for more than two decades. I 
was a researcher, writer, and editor for the American Institute of Architects (AIA) Post-Sandy 
Initiative report; a communications liaison on one of the Rebuild by Design teams during the 
initial competition; participated in public meetings for New York Rising; worked as part of 
Occupy Sandy; participated in and organized and facilitated post-Sandy symposia; a member of 
the AIA New York’s Design for Risk and Reconstruction working group, and a member of The 
Municipal Art Society’s post-Sandy roundtables, as well as one of the co-editors for The Future 
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of Cities: An Integrated Approach to Urban Challenges (Çelik, Leighton, & Yurtseven, 2016), 
based on the February 2015 conference at UN Headquarters in New York City. 
In Coney Island, I was one of the volunteer facilitators as part of the New York City 
SIRR report as well as a visiting professional in one of the design studios focusing on Coney 
Island post-Sandy for Pratt Institute’s RAMP (Recovery, Adaptation, Mitigation and Planning). 
Additionally, I worked on a preliminary study for Iberville, New Orleans, post-Katrina, a  
WPA6 affordable housing complex. 
As noted in the introduction, with my deep roots in New York and having grown up in 
NYCHA affordable housing does give me a depth of understanding that could contribute to a 
level of bias particularly in relation to marginalized communities because of my own experience. 
This means that while I listened to designers/planners’ experiences, I needed to be able to view 
my work from a place of discovery rather than on inferences from previous personal experiences, 
and to not direct the participants’ attention to a particular area that I would want to study 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Josselson, 2007).  
Given these significant and diverse involvements, it was important to acknowledge this to 
the participants to maintain transparency and be cognizant of any potential bias that may have 
arisen.  
Ethical Considerations 
Any research that heavily relies on people to share their experiences, especially when 
those experiences have stressful, possibly even traumatic undertones, requires the utmost care to 
protect participants. For this topic, many of the key participants either still are working in 
 
6 WPA stands for Works Progress Administration, an initiative from the 1930s by the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Administration as a measure to alleviate the Great Depression. Numerous public works in New 
Orleans and other U.S. cities are still identified as “WPA."  
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contexts that they can be asked to discuss or have moved to other sensitive positions. Their 
reputations and the confidentiality requirements of their positions, past and present, needed to be 
respected. Further discussion of the ethical issues and how they were addressed are at the 
conclusion of Chapter III. 
The Study’s Limitations  
Any qualitative study must face a number of challenges to both validity and to its 
applicability to other settings with broadly similar issues. In regard to the latter, generalizability 
is not a primary intent in a qualitative study. Such research cares about relating information and 
knowledge that can be useful to others, but that is not the same as aiming to infer general 
theories that can be transferred to other cities and their design/planning professionals who cope 
with climate change. Using cases (examples) is an ancient, time-honored way humans use to 
transfer understandings between settings. Embedding lessons from experience is as old as 
hunter/gatherer elders relating stories of past tribal events, not to tell their listeners what will 
happen in the future, but to familiarize them with adaptation to always-changing, ever-uncertain 
events. It is in that spirit, that this research studied the experiences of design/planning 
professionals as they coped with an event that will not be the same, not only in some other urban 
settings, but the next time in the New York region. Stake and Easley (1978) suggests that 
qualitative case studies should aim for “naturalistic generalization” (p. 6) whereby the researcher 
maximizes the richness and thoroughness of detail about a context and events, thereby giving 
others in roughly parallel situations, the responsibility to take what they will from the case. They 
state that naturalistic generalization is, 
arrived at by recognizing the similarities of issues in and out of context . . . naturalistic 
generalizations develop . . . as a product of experience. They derive from the tacit 
knowledge of how things are, why they are, how people feel about them and how these 
things are likely to be later or in other places . . . They seldom take the form of 
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predictions but lead regularly to expectation. They guide action, in fact they are 
inseparable from action. (Stake & Easley, 1978, p. 6)  
To repeat the objective for this study’s usefulness is not in being able to predict what 
might be the case with design/planning professionals facing disasters later or elsewhere. Rather it 
is in providing some guide for action here and for other regions facing similar and potentially 
inevitable negative consequences.  
A second possible limitation of this work was more particular to the interactions with 
some of the participants. There was a challenge, and thus a potential limitation in this study, with 
participants too readily reverting to “plannerese” (Stephens, 2005)—such as “we need to change 
our paradigms”—and other truisms common to the profession. The narrative could have ended 
up with a lot of flowery forward-looking idealism rather than creating a bridge between the 
aspirational and the practical. Therefore, questions were created that discouraged platitudes and 
got deeper into real, perhaps sometimes politically incorrect perspectives. Another limitation to 
the study was that there were a few participants who were either unable or unwilling to decouple 
the personal pillar from the professional pillar. When questions designed to open up that 
conversation failed to produce any results, rather than pushing the issue, I looked to see if that 
would be a pattern throughout the study. It was not. 
It was very difficult to find a significant number of engineers for this study. Many of the 
individuals I queried declined participation in this study when they learned I worked for an 
engineering firm that they viewed as a competitor. 
It was very important to leave room for a breadth of responses since both personally and 
professionally there is the need for a different idea of what designers/planners have historically 
experienced. Climate-related events may in fact be the great disruptor that will have lasting 
impact upon the profession. It was also important to avoid imposing my own experience or to 
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access that experience when asking the same question in different ways did not bear any results. 
It was important to allow participants to tell their stories and to act in the role of facilitator but to 
listen from the space of the observer.  
  
    
 
    
  
Additionally, there were limitations as to the degree to which the experiences of 
professionals post-Sandy were or were not applicable or transferrable to other design/planning 
professionals in small urban environments or in communities where there was greater discussion 
about managed retreat.   
Outline of Succeeding Dissertation Chapters  
Chapter II, the literature review, presents a critical look at relevant theory, research, and 
practice. It addresses historically climate-impactful events, the increasing frequency of these 
events, most specifically focusing on rising sea levels and coastal cities and what the research is 
showing in terms of future impacts. This next area of reviewed research focused on the actual 
Sandy event, its damage and how at the time it was the second costliest hurricane in U.S. history, 
after Hurricane Katrina. To further this study, literature from other areas of the world were 
explored, examining how global communities and professionals elsewhere have addressed 
issues, whether arising from a specific climate-impactful coastal event or as seen in the proactive 
steps taken in areas known to be vulnerable to sea level rise where there is evidence of change 
without a specific precipitating threatening event. The chapter is also comprised of highlights 
 Design/planning professionals who did not want to be openly identif ied because of the 
current pol itical climate and the country had the option to participate in these interviews 
anonymously with their stories included under pseudonyms. However, after completing the 
interviews, and reviewing the transcripts, and noting the volume of deeply personal 
comments, I elected to use pseudonyms for all the participants.
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from the literature about stress and other responses by responders to major disasters, whether 
human-caused or natural. The literature review chapter also explores ideas about mitigation, risk, 
adaptation, recovery, resolution, resiliency, and transformation, as applied to the physical impact 
of the aftermath of disasters or advancing ideas in vulnerable areas ahead of any impactful 
events.  
Chapter III, on methodology and research procedures, provides insight into how I 
gathered and analyzed the data for this dissertation. The research points to a methodology of 
inquiry that can provide empirical knowledge of situations not hitherto well explored. To achieve 
this end, the method of this study utilized an embedded singular case study with narrative 
inquiry. Chapter III defines the case being studied, the methods employed (embedded singular 
case study and narrative inquiry) along with their foundational history. The connection was also 
made that the case study approach is commonly used in the profession of design/planning for the 
study of places, processes, and events impacting the built environment—but more rarely to look 
at the professionals themselves.  
Chapter IV presents the findings and results of the study. It draws upon major themes 
from the interviews in terms of how interviewees described the impact through the structure of 
the three pillars on the personal, the professional, and the societal context. These interviews are 
enriched with documentary and archival research that was uncovered. Findings from the 
narrative research were presented in a series of questions to a focus group of three, with the 
intention of testing the validity of some of the major themes that came from the interviews with 
them. 
Chapter V, the conclusions, places the findings into the context of the literature about the 
professional facing disaster-related events. Findings are interpreted as well as the impact on the 
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design/planning professionals and the implications for climate-impactful events in the context of 
leadership and change in the profession. Additionally, there are recommendations for actions and 
further study. This chapter also includes my reflections on the experience with the process: what 
was learned in doing the research, and its personal impact as a scholar–practitioner and leader 
committed to cities and sustainable change.  
  
50 
 
 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
The literature that examines the impacts of Hurricane Sandy and climate change-induced 
storms, on the changing nature of the work of design/planning professionals in those 
communities, is vast and complex. The extensive array of works that were reviewed, assimilated, 
and analyzed in this dissertation set the stage for this study. Moreover, by the very nature of the 
topic, the literature highlighted the harsh realities that lie within the context of 
designers/planners' complex roles in preparing for future climate-induced events.  
The bottom line is that we as a civilization are facing an array of threats and problems 
well beyond what have been variously dubbed over the years “meta-problems” (Chevalier, 
1969), “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973), “messes” (Ackoff, 1974), and 
“climacterics” (Ashby, 1978). Global climate events reach into every realm of human life and 
concern, including cities, complex organisms that exist with a framework of interdependency 
between both the ecological and human communities (Hallegatte, Henriet, & Corfee-Morlot, 
2011).  
Disasters have a disproportionate effect on urban places. Dense by definition, cities 
and their environs face major disruptions in their complex, interdependent 
environmental, economic, and social systems. Weaknesses not readily apparent in   
pre-disaster times surface as longstanding structural and substantive problems become 
prominent; environmental abuses are exposed; the local economy falters; municipal 
services collapse; social and political rifts widen. (Birch & Wachter, 2006, p. 1) 
This litany of breakdowns, seen from a long-term perspective, calls on no professional 
group as much as it does designers/planners. It is almost as if many of the inequities and 
behaviors that we as a society could not self-correct must now be faced or dealt with by a force 
greater than our own. This is not meant as a punishment, in the biblical sense, by some angry 
patriarchal God or some cruel matriarchal force of nature but as an awakening, as an opportunity 
to rethink how we live with nature and with each other in a more equitable manner. The impact 
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and the road to travel there is a challenging one; how we meet it will depend on how deep we can 
enter into the conversation and the solutions.  
I remember as a little girl, my Polish immigrant grandmother sitting me in front of a 
globe and telling me that the world is round, not flat, so nothing falls off or goes away. With a 
twig in her hand from a tree outside her kitchen window, she showed me where she had grown 
up and how the land she farmed there was related to the earth in which she planted seeds for 
flowers in America. My grandmother wanted me to consider that there was a great underground 
system that connected all the roots in nature in the world together, and that even if we could not 
see it, we should imagine and feel it. That is the conversation I am engaged in with all of the 
voices from within this literature review, connecting all these systems into one coherent storyline 
from the underworld to the outer world of design/planning professionals. My grandmother’s 
statement is accentuated in the words of an architect interviewed in Chapter IV. There, Roberta 
describes the interconnectedness of all living things, as putting your finger on the map—a 
manner in which to gain insight into people and places within and outside your own experience.  
Flow of the Review  
The topics needed as background to this dissertation are as diverse as the challenges are 
broad. The fundamental driving force behind the increasing storms with which we all—but of 
central interest here, designers/planners—will need to cope with and confront climate change. 
The main focus here amidst this enormous subject and literature is the connection between the 
phenomenon of climate change and the increasing intensity and threat of major storms. The 
second section is about those storms and their impacts, beginning with and focusing on 
Hurricane Sandy. I briefly noted the technical reports that have delineated the nature of the storm 
and then move to the topic of impacts, both the obvious and immediate physical impacts. These 
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include, but are not limited to, coastal change, flooding, infrastructure and housing damage, and 
then the economic, psychological, and social effects. Information from other experiences, 
notably Hurricane Katrina, but also internationally, are noted.  
Following the review of literature about climate change-induced storms, I focused on the 
writings that examined the implications of such catastrophes for professionals in general and 
then specifically for designers/planners. It was found that there is an especially limited literature 
base about these professionals. It is a gap that this dissertation intends to begin to fill, 
recognizing that their work is pivotal in human societies’ and especially cities’ attempts to deal 
with climate change. In this section I looked at some of the ways that researchers have examined 
the work of designers/planners and related practitioners.  
In the third section, I highlighted some previous areas of research on how those in critical 
and influential positions face extraordinary contexts, ones that take them out of zones of 
familiarity and comfort into settings of high uncertainty and lack of precedent, yet for which 
society needs them most. The fourth and final section explored literature about catastrophes more 
generally, focusing on what is known from the field of disaster studies regarding the impacts on 
communities and individuals. That section closes with a specific review of literature about how 
professionals and responders are affected by the traumatic nature of disasters. Figure 2.1 charts 
the flow of the chapter as just described.  
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Figure 2.1. Flow of sections in literature review.  
About Climate Change and Its Relation to Disasters  
It is important to situate Sandy within the wider, global array of extreme weather and 
other impacts of climate change. In this section, literature was reviewed on an issue which, sadly, 
continues to be debated both in the course of legitimate debate among scientific experts, but also 
as a result of willful denial. I have not allotted much space here to the latter. Instead, I began by 
referencing the legitimate scientific question of how connected climate change is to increasingly 
powerful storms that are being experienced around the world. First, because the terms climate 
change and climate impactful events are used throughout the research, a brief and authoritative 
current definition from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, n.d.) is presented 
here: 
Climate change . . . refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified . 
. . by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for 
an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over 
time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. (p. 30)  
The uniqueness of the predicament is underscored, according to the IPCC report,  by the 
fact that “eleven of the last twelve years (1995–2006) rank among the twelve warmest years in 
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the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since 1850)” (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, n.d., p. 30).  
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
The reality and overall scope of climate change is a topic so profuse in scholarly and 
other publications that this dissertation focused only on the critical issue of how intensified 
storms are related to global warming. For more general reviews of the global climate context, a 
 Most significantly to this study is that climate change induces weather phenomena that
can spell catastrophe over vast regions. In addition to the storms and associated f looding that I 
focused on, note should also made of the several other kinds of disasters which are associated 
with climate change: increasing numbers and scale of wildfires (Marlon et al., 2009; Westerling, 
Hidalgo, Cayan, &  Swetnam, 2006) and heat waves that aff l ict more and more people, often 
fatal ly (Meehl &  Tebaldi, 2004). Relatedly, droughts may increasingly aff lict areas vital to 
feeding and supplying urban areas with water, another cumulating impact on cities suffering 
from other climate change impacts. Severe dryness and heat wil l also increase the likelihood and 
severity of forest and range fires and of infestationsof pests in woodlands (Clark et al., 2016;
Dale et al., 2001; Hanson & Weltzin, 2000). All of these can and probably wil l impact human 
populations and natural ecosystems in a cumulative manner, thereby adding to the burden and 
complexity of design/planning professionalsÕ  responsibili ties. Urban areas may not experience
forest fires or directly suffer because of drought, but it must be remembered that the needs of 
cities for food, water, and other essentials are enormous, and that climate-induced catastrophes in 
non-urban areas that reduce such resources wil l drastical ly impinge upon urban populations 
(Misra, 2014). It is important to note that from time to time, two or more of the most worrying 
cl imate change-induced crises may coincide, greatly exacerbating the strain on societies.
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Another overview that is of special pertinence to this study is Bulkeley’s (2012) synoptic 
collection, Cities and Climate Change—although it must be noted that the sheer volume of major 
overviews being steadily published, not to mention the massive worldwide scientific 
investigation of climate change, means that any hard copy publication is rapidly superseded and 
outdated.  
As in most complex scientific questions, perspectives vary. At its most moderate, some 
scientists caution that there is still not enough known to definitely make the link. An example is 
the publication by Pielke, Landsea, Mayfield, Layer, and Pasch (2005), who stated: 
Claims of linkages between global warming and hurricane impacts are premature for 
three reasons. First, no connection has been established between greenhouse gas 
emissions and the observed behavior of hurricanes . . . Second, the peer-reviewed 
literature reflects that a scientific consensus exists that any future changes in hurricane 
intensities will likely be small in the context of observed variability . . . And third, 
under the assumptions of the IPCC, expected future damages to society of its projected 
changes in the behavior of hurricanes are dwarfed by the influence of its own 
projections of growing wealth and population . . . While future research or experience 
may yet overturn these conclusions, the state of the peer-reviewed knowledge today is 
such that there are good reasons to expect that any conclusive connection between 
global warming and hurricanes or their impacts will not be made in the near term. Yet, 
claims of such connections persist. (p. 1574) 
 
prime source is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988 by 
the World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 
TheIPCC is presently into its sixth cycle of assessment. Its website is the main way to be current
with its frequent assemblies and previous reports (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
n.d.). Of noteareseveral special reports released by theIPCC during the Sixth Assessment Cycle 
in 2018 and 2019, includingGlobal Warming of 1.5¡C (October) and in 2019, The Refinement to 
the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (May), Climate Change and 
Land(August) and The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (September).
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Pielke et al. (2005) went on to worry that 
invoking the modulation of future hurricanes to justify energy policies to mitigate 
climate change may prove counterproductive. Not only does this provide a great 
opening for criticism of the underlying scientific reasoning, it leads to advocacy of 
policies that simply will not be effective with respect to addressing future hurricane 
impacts. (p. 1574) 
This was written almost 15 years ago, and while healthy skepticism continues to motivate 
the work of climate scientists, more and more inferences in the literature can be found that there 
is a strong, if complex, connection (Knutson et al., 2010). The argument, put simply, is that two 
of the major consequences of climate change—sea level rise and increased sea surface               
temperatures—combine to make storms larger, more frequent and, when they hit, more likely to 
do damage. This phenomenon, now based on sophisticated predictive modelling (e.g., Lin, 
Emanuel, Oppenheimer, & Vanmarcke, 2012), is widely acknowledged. Therefore, climate 
change-based energy or recovery policies are no longer vulnerable to equivocation. A. J. Garner 
et al. (2017) have developed a model for coastal flood hazard impacts of climate change 
stretching from early colonial times to 2300, concluding that large slow-moving systems like 
Sandy are almost certain to expose the city to a future of recurrent catastrophe.  
In addition to climate change bringing on more severe storms and hurricanes, it must be 
emphasized that a second and equally major factor in the ever-increasing risk of Sandy-like 
events is sea level rise. In January 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and NOAA reported that 2019 was the second warmest year on record, only exceeded 
by 2016 (NASA, 2020). This comes shortly after a December 2019 report from an international 
consortium of polar scientists (the IMBIE Team) stated that because of the warming 
climate leading to Greenland ice sheets melting, an approximate 2 to 5 inches (50 to 130 
millimeters) of global sea level rise could result by 2100, are in alignment with previous       
worst-case projections if the ice loss continues (IMBIE Team, 2019). Similarly, alarming 
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conclusions have been drawn by the same scientists based on study of melting in Antarctica 
(Shepherd et al., 2018).  
Again, climate skeptics and deniers may point to the indisputable fact that long before 
our excessive reliance on fossil fuels, the height on shorelines of the world’s oceans has gone 
through cyclic and non-cyclic long-term oscillations (Douglas, Kearney, & Leatherman, 
2000). As with increasing intensity of storms and with even less scientific controversy, it is 
accepted that an acceleration of the rise of sea level has occurred in the last century. In fact, seas 
do not rise evenly around the world and the east coast of the United Stated happens to be 
somewhat of a “hot spot” for these changes (Sallenger, Doran, & Howd, 2012). The consequence 
is that when storms of any strength attack, the higher the sea level the greater the area affected 
and the impacts of storms like Sandy (Shepard et al., 2012).  
Other dimensions of climate change contribute further to the risk of catastrophic events 
especially in coastal areas. Though variable in its effects over the globe, in many regions, climate 
change will bring about a significant change in rainfall. Trenberth (1998) explains the complex 
interactions which may tragically imply that where there is too little rainfall, less will come, 
while in areas that are already subject to seasonal deluges, those may get worse: 
Increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere produce global warming through an 
increase in downwelling infrared radiation, and thus not only increase surface 
temperatures but also enhance the hydrological cycle, as much of the heating at the 
surface goes into evaporating surface moisture. Global temperature increases signify 
that the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere increases and, together with 
enhanced evaporation, this means that the actual atmospheric moisture should 
increase. It follows that naturally-occurring droughts are likely to be exacerbated by 
enhanced potential evapotranspiration. Further, globally there must be an increase in 
precipitation to balance the enhanced evaporation. (p. 667) 
The implications of such shifts are already being felt in one of the world’s most advanced 
and largest metropolitan areas, Tokyo, Japan:  
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Across Japan, rainfall measuring more than two inches an hour has increased by 30 
percent over the past three decades, the Japan Meteorological Agency estimates. 
Rising oceans also make the Tokyo metropolitan region, home to 38 million people, 
vulnerable to storm surges, even as major redevelopment projects open up the 
previously industrial waterfront to new residences and businesses. And years of 
pumping groundwater has led some parts of the city to sink by almost 15 feet over the 
past century. (Tabuchi, 2017) 
“In July 2018, two million people had to evacuate their homes due to devasting 
downpours that flooded thousands of homes and took more than 200 lives” (The Climate Reality 
Project, 2019). 
Storms and Their Impacts 
About Hurricane Sandy. Edging into eight years after Hurricane Sandy, the effects of 
the storm still linger. Yes, much work was done but challenges remain. The growing body of 
literature surrounding Sandy reflects the ongoing impact not only of the storm but how prepared 
this region is for the future. The literature describes and analyzes three major topics on this: 
• In what ways and why the impacts may have surpassed any previous expectations; 
• what the actions have been in response to these events; and  
• how individuals within impacted communities have fared as the water recaptures 
shoreline, sidewalks and neighborhoods that were once wetlands and thriving 
ecosystems—and may be so again whether by natural force or community choice.  
This section highlights observable physical aspects of the storm itself, its meteorological 
characteristics, including path, velocity, and timeline, so that the study has a clear picture of just 
what happened. This is the reality that the people at the eye of this story experienced and with 
which they strove to cope.  
The overarching impact of Hurricane Sandy in physically vulnerable and economically 
marginalized communities was often underserved in the course of rebuilding and future 
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planning. This was underscored in a number of the interviews conducted during this study and is 
further expanded upon in Chapter IV. 
The storm. To a significant degree, Sandy, like Hurricane Katrina, is as much about 
water “out of place” as it is about the horrific winds that one thinks about when the word 
“hurricane” is used. Mathur and da Cunha’s (2006) expression, used in the context of Hurricane 
Katrina, aptly frames what was faced in New York and what will become the new normal—that 
we must negotiate a fluid terrain, places, of “ambiguity and relative flows . . . undecided between 
land and sea, part of both, belonging to none” (p. 34). Sandy was a clarion call from the 71% of 
the earth we call water. Its message was that the changing atmospheric conditions are influencing 
the water’s behavior on the surface of the earth, with shattering results on human communities 
and the natural world. An understanding of the storm, therefore, begins in and of the water. Thus, 
when futuristic (but not that far in the future) scenarios of disaster are envisioned, inundation of 
critically important urban and rural areas is high amidst our fears. A brief video imagining New 
York 60 to 80 years from the present, dramatically if controversially envisioned the submergence 
in part or whole of iconic New York spaces (Maxim// Menilmonde, n.d.). Similar dramatic 
images abound just for New York in documentary and in fictional films and artwork, and others, 
for example Goodell (2017), have written full and well-documented treatises—tellingly a book 
about Miami’s future is titled, The Water Will Come. While some of the visuals from movies 
such as The Day After Tomorrow and Artificial Intelligence seem so imaginary, when one looks 
through an online gallery such as that mounted by the Gizmodo Media Group’s (Diaz, 2012; 
Grace, 2012) of Sandy flooding, futuristic fears of inundation seem not so farfetched.  
As already outlined, the water has come to the New York/New Jersey region already. 
Catastrophic storms were not strangers to the region for years prior to Sandy, which struck in 
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October 2012. Weather 2000 (n.d.) tabulated notable storms impacting the New York coastal 
area, going back to “the Great Storm of 1693” (which, coincidentally struck on the same date as 
Sandy, 319 years later). Sedimentary evidence of intense hurricane strikes slamming New Jersey 
have been traced back 700 years (Donnelly et al., 2001). However, as is briefly reviewed below, 
it is now becoming quite clear that like coastal cities worldwide, the New York region can expect 
severity and frequency of massive storms increasingly as global warming continues. Given that 
the region is also far more urbanized than ever before when historic storms struck a less settled 
New York, it is not surprising that the casualties and costs of Sandy are unprecedented in this 
history.  
Awareness of the threats associated with climate change arose well before Sandy. The 
City of New York had undertaken a major conceptual planning initiative that began shortly after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and issued A Greener Greater New York (PlaNYC, 
2007) six years later. A chapter was devoted to climate change—what it could do to the region 
and broadly, how design/planning could be used to prepare. This chapter was expanded in an 
update released four years later (PlaNYC, 2011) in which it was said:  
Cities are at the forefront of both the causes and effects of climate change. Urban areas 
are estimated to be the source of approximately 80% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. At the same time, urban areas located on a coast like New York City face 
increased climate risks. Accordingly, cities have a responsibility to deal with both the 
causes and effects of climate change. New York City has always faced climate risks, 
including heat waves, snowstorms, high winds, tropical storms, storm surges, 
lightning, and torrential downpours. These events affect every New Yorker, and as our 
climate changes, they will become more frequent and severe. (p. 150)  
The report went on to say that there is no one single action that will change this but that 
many coordinated strategies must be followed. Part of what designers/planners are doing on the 
ground, whether planning for or responding to climate impactful events, is to develop these 
strategies whether these are ones of mitigation, adaptation, or resiliency.  
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Several months later, and still a year before Sandy struck, the New York State Energy 
Research and Development Authority issued a climate outlook for New York. Orchestrated by 
researchers at Columbia University’s Earth Institute, Cornell University, and the City University 
of New York, they drew upon input from more than 50 scientists. The resulting 600-page report, 
Responding to Climate Change in New York State (Rosenzweig et al., 2011), predicted 8 to 23 
inches of relative sea-level rise by the 2080s forewarned that a drastic 55 inches—four and one-
half feet—could occur if melting of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets accelerates. The 
report pointed out that New York City is at risk because of its extensive shoreline, but so too are 
towns and cities along the Hudson River as far north as the Federal Dam at Troy, 150 miles north 
of Manhattan. The report summarized that as early as 2020,  
nearly 96,000 people on the barrier island of Long Beach area alone may be at risk from 
sea level rise under the rapid ice melt scenario; by 2080, that number may rise to more 
than 114,500 people. The value of property at risk in the Long Beach area under this 
scenario ranges from about $6.4 billion in 2020 to about $7.2 billion in 2080. 
(Rosenzweig et al., 2011, p. 23) 
This study was also updated several years later (Stevens et al., 2014), by which time, the 
realities of climate-induced catastrophe had become all too clear for the city and the surrounding 
area. 
In Chapter I, both personal/subjective impressions and more factual information about the 
dimensions of the storm were presented. Now, more than seven years later, there is an abundance 
of literature on Sandy’s chronology, its physical /meteorological characteristics, and the resultant 
economic and social impacts. Among the most thorough overviews of the storm is the National 
Hurricane Center’s Tropical Cyclone Report, issued several months after the events (Blake et al., 
2013). It is worth quoting the full opening paragraph of this report as a way of reiterating what 
New York City and the design/planning professionals, who are the focus here, must confront as a 
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memory, a source of continuing consequences, and a foreshadowing of  
climate-change-induced challenges to come: 
Sandy was a classic late-season hurricane in the southwestern Caribbean Sea. The 
cyclone made landfall as a category 1 hurricane (on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane 
Wind Scale) in Jamaica, and as a 100-kt category 3 hurricane in eastern Cuba before 
quickly weakening to a category 1 hurricane while moving through the central and 
northwestern Bahamas. Sandy underwent a complex evolution and grew considerably 
in size while over the Bahamas and continued to grow despite weakening into a 
tropical storm north of those islands.  
The system re-strengthened into a hurricane while it moved northeastward, 
parallel to the coast of the southeastern United States, and reached a secondary peak 
intensity of 85 kt [knots]while it turned northwestward toward the mid-Atlantic states. 
Sandy weakened somewhat and then made landfall as a post-tropical cyclone near 
Brigantine, New Jersey with 70-kt maximum sustained winds. Because of its 
tremendous size, however, Sandy drove a catastrophic storm surge into the New Jersey 
and New York coastlines. Preliminary U.S. damage estimates are near $50 billion, 
making Sandy the second-costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1901. There 
were at least 147 direct deaths recorded across the Atlantic basin due to Sandy, with 72 
of these fatalities occurring in the mid-Atlantic and northeastern United States. (Blake 
et al., 2013, p. 1) 
In addition to federal assessments of the storm’s history and damage, both New York 
State, the State of New Jersey, and the City of New York prepared their own detailed overviews. 
The State of New Jersey fully reviewed the natural resource impacts of Sandy (Office of Science, 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 2015); the Mayor’s Office in New York 
prepared what was referred to as an “after action report” outlining both what Sandy did and the 
city’s overall response (Gibbs & Holloway, 2013), and of course the lead federal agency dealing 
with disasters, FEMA (2013), likewise released an “after action” assessment. A more concise but 
quite helpful plain-language overview of the storm was issued by the international reinsurance 
firm AON Benfield (2013). Similarly, Halverson and Rabenhorst (2013) wrote a straightforward 
summary which, like the AON Benfield document, provides a clear jargon-free overview of how 
the storm built up and then its effects on American locales. Both documents present clear, 
understandable graphics portraying the development and physical impact areas of Sandy.  
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Since then, many multi-author collaborative studies have appeared that provide 
overviews of Sandy and its impacts. Additionally, a massive amount of literature continues to 
build on particular scientific questions about the course of the storm and its direct ecological and 
technical effects. For example, a consortium of German researchers prepared a detailed 
chronology and impact assessment including economic effects (Kunz et al., 2013). Many other 
papers from the natural sciences and engineering focus on one or several closely related 
scientific/technical dimensions of describing Sandy. Examples are Hapke, Brenner, Henderson, 
and Reynolds, who examined impacts on Fire Island dune and beach systems; Smallegan, Irish, 
Van Dongeren, and Den Bieman’s (2016) study of barrier island effects; and Trembanis et al.’s 
(2013) assessment of changes in the seabed off of New Jersey and Long Island. The U.S. 
Geological Survey prepared a detailed overall summary of the wide range of biophysical 
research that was needed to take full stock of a system like Sandy and what it can do to nature 
itself (Hapke et al., 2013).  
Human and psychosocial impacts of Sandy. The term psychosocial, introduced in 
Chapter I, was characterized in 2001 by an advisory group following earthquakes in New 
Zealand. They defined it as “encompassing cultural, psychological, social, economic and 
physical (including housing, infrastructure and physical health) dimensions that are part of the 
regeneration of a community that has experienced adversity” (Mooney et al., 2011, p. 3).  
There have already been many specific explorations of the social and human impacts of 
Sandy. Some of these have been quite specific. For example, Kelman et al. (2015), and Lempert 
and Kopp (2013), have looked at impacts on as specific a medical condition as kidney failure and 
the drop in the quality of chronic care of sufferers. There have also been studies to appear about 
diabetes care as affected by the storm (D. C. Lee et al., 2016). In turn, the many different ways in 
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which Sandy impeded access to medical care for chronic conditions led to an increase in mental 
health difficulties among people already suffering from serious chronic conditions, as reported 
by Ruskin et al. (2018).  
Without delving further into such specific literature, it is fair to presume that these are but 
a foreshadowing of the wide and diverse array of stressful potential impacts. While medical 
professionals are especially affected in terms of their practice, these are but a few of the impacts 
that design/planning professionals will have to account for as they create future strategies to cope 
with disasters like Sandy. Facility and transportation plans will have to plan for this 
diminishment of normal essential services. Moreover, designers/planners, like first responders, 
may also be personally touched by exposure to the trauma of others, what N. Garner, Baker, and 
Hagelgans (2016) called “private trauma” (p. 168). They may suffer from the ripple effects of 
such impacts within their own families and neighborhoods, a topic that was addressed in my 
interviews with the study participants.  
Sandy also had larger and broader impacts on key services, and in turn, left many 
individuals within the region impaired in their everyday lives and work. Shortly after the storm, 
Kaufman, Qing, Levenson, and Hanson (2012) reviewed the impacts on transportation 
infrastructure in New York City and the surrounding region, pointing to vulnerabilities that had 
been demonstrated but also commenting: 
During and after the storm, New Yorkers displayed impressive inventiveness to 
maintain their mobility. Individuals created new routes and combinations of modes to 
get to work, using a variety of systems: bus shuttles, bikes, shared vehicles with 
strangers, ferries, alternate work sites, and telecommuting. (p. i)  
Housing was among the most powerfully affected human needs during and after the 
storm. Sandy was a reminder of that, and while many can forget once the waters receded and life 
returned to what many consider normal, that was not the case for everyone. Particularly those 
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who face into the reality of vulnerability on a more consistent basis, in areas such as Red Hook 
and Coney Island, Brooklyn, and The Rockaways, Queens, were all heavily impacted by Sandy, 
with large percentages of New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing.  
It is easy to forget how vulnerable life is, particularly in places like New York, where one 
is more connected to the concrete than to nature, where tall heroic buildings are powerful 
manmade forces, that can appear like an impenetrable force field. Events like 9/11 or Hurricane 
Sandy show us how vulnerable we are. We are reminded “just how fragile the busy world we 
humans build around us really is” (Mead, 2012, para. 1). Perhaps it is human nature to run from 
that reality, even though we all know that at some juncture, into every life a storm does make 
landfall, and we are taken aback when it does happen.  
A strong source of additional information on the broad sweep of Sandy’s impacts has 
been prepared jointly by Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness, the 
NYU College of Global Public Health, and Rutgers School of Social Work (Abramson et al., 
2015). Their work is divided into four reports including the Place Report, which scrutinizes the 
evacuation procedures, the levels of displacement, housing damage and loss and insurance 
dimensions, and the Person Report, which bears down on changes in physical and mental health, 
alcohol and drug abuse impacts, child academic and behavioral issues, and storm related stress 
and uncertainty. The Person Report is of particular interest in defining the panoply of planning 
issues which professionals must confront both in their work and in their own lives.  
A “fact brief” prepared jointly by the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy 
and the Moelis Institute for Affordable Housing Policy (2013)—both institutes at New York 
University—summarized,  
Overall, almost 20% of NYCHA’s 178,000 total units were in buildings that were 
damaged by Sandy. Many of the nearly 80,000 residents of these buildings were left 
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without heat or electricity because the basements of the buildings, where the heating and 
electrical systems are located, flooded. (pp. 3–4)  
Similarly, dire effects were experienced in other affordable housing and privately-owned  
rent-stabilized units. McArdle (2013) suggested that the winds and waters of Sandy showed that 
any quest for future resilience (a concept that is fully addressed below): 
must take account of the vulnerable populations at its periphery. Superstorm Sandy put 
a face to their vulnerability, including 6,800 evacuees assigned to shelters, 1,800 of 
whom were residents of chronic care facilities located in flood zones. The vulnerable 
English speakers, who were stranded in New York City Housing Authority-owned 
buildings without electricity, heat, and hot water for weeks as a consequence of storm 
surges. (pp. 19–20) 
In Public Housing on the Periphery: Vulnerable Residents and Depleted Resilience 
Reserves Post-Hurricane Sandy, Hernández et al. (2018) further substantiated how New Yorkers 
with the least resources to get them through crises were left stranded: 
Many tenants in NYCHA’s densely populated high-rise housing, many of them elderly 
and disabled, despite being adaptively resourceful were as a result of Sandy adversely 
impacted by exacerbated social, physical, geographic, medical, and economic factors 
within homes that became unlivable with some residents, trapped for days and weeks. 
(pp. 2–3)   
Impacts of other climate change-induced storms. The effects of Sandy on metropolitan 
New York can be helpfully placed in the context of the wider national and global experience of 
cities and regions hit by climate change-induced storms. It is almost impossible to discuss the 
impacts on an American city without delving into the ever-amassing literature about the impacts 
of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. Such studies help to flesh out implications that may not 
yet be fully examined in the case of Sandy.  
Katrina and other hurricanes impacting the United States, the Caribbean and Puerto 
Rico. The storm and breaching of levees in New Orleans in August 2005, remains probably the 
most researched and, in many ways, one of the most lamentable events, showing the power of 
such storms, and the limitations of preparedness and defects in mitigation. The story of the 
67 	
	
storm, the breaching of levees, flooding, and the aftermath, have been looked at in physical 
descriptions of the destruction and especially in regard to the inequities suffered by             
already-marginalized populations. Greater detail about the impact of designers/planners in the 
context of Katrina, is expanded upon in Chapter IV. 
The litany of hurricanes that directly destroy coastal property and bring on devastating 
floods and a loss of life, has not abated. Research is ongoing into the nature and impacts 
particularly of the following events: • Hurricane Harvey (August 2017) tied with Katrina as the costliest hurricane in terms 
of damage to housing and infrastructure, this storm’s impacts were most publicized in 
relation to the city of Houston, though like other hurricanes impacting the southern 
and eastern United States, it had already left a path of catastrophe across the 
Caribbean and affected a broad swath of other smaller cities, towns and rural areas in 
Texas and Louisiana. The federal and other government responses to Harvey are 
generally seen as far more just and adequate than what befell Hurricane Maria, a 
comparison that underscored the issues of inequity associated with climate change 
events. Another dimension that is being brought out in the experience with Harvey is 
the extent to which Houston’s urban development—including massive historic and 
contemporary destruction of wetlands that can protect against storms and flooding 
(Costanza et al., 2008)—illustrates how preventative measures based on ecological 
knowledge were ignored. This too is an issue which the design/planning professionals 
interviewed in this study face in the stress of their post-disaster practice: confronting 
the political, economic, and psychological forces that militate against design.  
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• Hurricane Irma (August–September 2017) was the second of three massive 
hurricanes to strike the Caribbean and the southern United States in the late summer 
of 2017. After heavy impacts on Cuba, it swept along the Gulf Coast of Florida 
imposing probably the highest economic costs ever experienced in that state. There 
was cataclysmic damage in Barbuda where 95% of the structures were destroyed. 
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti each experienced flooding and heavy 
damage, but there was much less destruction than anticipated. While some tragic 
missteps in planning for such an event came to light—notably multiple deaths from 
excess heat in a senior’s home where air conditioning and evacuation failed 
(Nedelman, 2017), there have not yet, to my knowledge, been critical studies of 
issues, especially for design/planning.  • Hurricane Maria (September 2017) is considered to be the third costliest storm 
affecting American territory, and it infamously once again exposed the inequities of 
post-disaster measures, especially in the American Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. A 
study by Harvard medical researchers demonstrated that death tolls were 
underestimated by a factor of 70 (Kishore et al., 2018), evidence of the blatant 
disregard and disrespect of the current U.S. Administration for Puerto Ricans. This 
has been widely seen as evidence of racism as manifest by what happened in New 
Orleans after Katrina (Schulze, 2018), a finding echoed in a publication that 
characterizes Maria as a “public health disaster” according to (Rudner, 2018, p. 257). 
A number of participants in this study discussed in-depth the severity and inequities 
associated with Maria. The hurricane also devastated parts of the Caribbean, 
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including the U.S. Virgin Islands and Dominica, which was still recovering from the 
August 2015 Tropical Storm, Erika.  • Hurricane Florence (August–September 2018) hit the Carolinas, with widespread 
flooding and damage, particularly in North Carolina. It was one of the top ten 
costliest hurricanes to hit the United States. • Hurricane Michael (October 2018) was the “first Category 4 storm in history to make 
landfall in the Florida Panhandle . . . the first Category 3 Hurricane to hit Georgia 
since 1898 . . . and the strongest storm to make landfall in the continental US since 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992” (Miller & Griggs, 2018, bullets 1, 3, & 6).  
• Hurricane Barry (July 2019) made landfall on the central Louisiana coast. While 
Louisiana did have its share of flash flooding, New Orleans was spared from 
devastation. 
•  Hurricane Dorian (September 2019) impacted both North and South Carolina. The 
Grand Bahamas and Abaco Islands had catastrophic damage. 
• Hurricane Humberto (September 2019) was the first named storm to hit Houston since 
Hurricane Harvey and the first Hurricane to make landfall in Bermuda since 2016. 
Major damage was averted. 
As for the 2020 hurricane season, which runs from June 1 through November 30, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is predicting an above normal 
Atlantic Hurricane season. The first named storm, Arthur, was identified in early May before any 
outlooks were even posted (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2020). 
More and more we must accept that these closely spaced storms, severely taxing the 
resources need to provide relief let alone plan for longer term adaptation, are the “new normal.” 
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This comes across with force in a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists with the telling 
title, When Rising Seas Hit Home: Hard Choices Ahead for Hundreds of US Coastal 
Communities (Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2017). Calling attention to the dismal political situation 
in which climate change itself if being denied by the president and other leading political figures 
including cabinet members, this report warns, 
We are at a turning point where we can still avoid some of the most serious human 
consequences and losses that our coasts—and indeed coastal communities around the 
world—face this century. We have time to respond. We must use it wisely.  
(Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2017, p. 42). 
To underscore, it will fall significantly to designers/planners, the focus of this research, to 
deal with the many stressful situations arising from climate change-induced disasters in order to 
help society cope more effectively with those same events.  
Storms and Flooding Internationally. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Risk Report 2020, there was $165 billion U.S. in worldwide economic stress and damage from 
natural disasters in 2018 (World Economic Forum, 2020). It is therefore important when 
considering the broader significance of this study to be aware of the global nature of the 
challenges of climate change-induced disasters. It is also essential to look elsewhere to 
understand how issues that post-Sandy designers/planners face are being confronted elsewhere. 
We look to what has happened internationally and been documented in other coastal areas, urban 
and regional, for a grasp of the dimensions of the challenge.  
In terms of impact, it is clear that coastal areas, whether cities or not, struggle with 
similar impacts, especially on marginalized and already poor and powerless communities around 
the world. Bulkeley (2012) has surveyed a wide array of cities that face major climate-related 
change and which, as she emphasizes, are in fact places that contribute massively to the 
emissions that contribute to the climate problem. She pointed out that “by 2030, over 80% of the 
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increase in global annual energy demand above 2006 levels will come from cities in non-OECD 
countries” (Bulkeley, 2012, p. 8). Benson (2018) summarizes information on the world’s cities 
that are most vulnerable to conflicts resulting from climate change impacts, singling out Manila, 
which has already had to cope with major storms such as Typhoon Haiiyan in 2013. The 
resulting scarcities, he argued, overload not only local capacity and infrastructure, but the 
political system itself:  
Terrorist groups including Abu Sayyaf and ISIS are active in the Philippines, and 
radicalization could thrive in the uncertainty and hardship following a major  
disaster. . . . Because climate change and conflict are so inextricably tied, efforts to 
make a city more sustainable often double as increasing stability and security. Cities 
that prepare may be able to avoid a breakdown of order. But cities that fail to act could 
come apart at the seams. (Benson, 2018, paras. 20–21)  
Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, and Corfee-Morlot (2013) have tabulated anticipated costs of 
flooding and flood prevention in major coastal cities around the world largely resulting from 
storms and sea level rise associated with climate change. They concluded, 
With climate change and subsidence, present protection will need to be upgraded to 
avoid unacceptable losses of US$1 trillion or more per year. Even if adaptation 
investments maintain constant flood probability, subsidence and sea-level rise will 
increase global flood losses to US$60–63 billion per year in 2050. (Hallegatte et al., 
2013, p. 802) 
Because of the very high property values and labor costs in developed countries, the list 
Hallegatte et al. (2013) compiled is dominated by their cities. But the data shows that developing 
world coastal cities face equally bad or worse scenarios; and, of course, they have much less 
capacity to afford rebuilding or other adaptive measures. Some of the major coastal cities in 
developing countries for which there has been research into vulnerability to climate change 
include Lagos, Nigeria (Adelekan, 2010) and Mombasa, Kenya (Awuor, Orindi, & Adwera, 
2008).  
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Beyond cities, some of the most vulnerable areas of the world are best described in terms 
of specific geographic features, notably small island states and highly populated deltaic regions 
such as where the Ganges and Mekong reach the sea in Bangladesh and Vietnam, respectively.  
Small island developing states—of which there are 58 (Sustainable Development Goals 
Knowledge Platform, n.d.)—are among the countries in the world that are most vulnerable to 
climate change and required to adapt to its impacts, yet there is comparatively little research that 
addresses their adaptation to climate change (Robinson, 2017). Places like the Maldives, for 
example, are important lenses for the impact of climate change, adaptation, and resiliency in 
place or managed retreat and how communities with limited levels of social capital are 
responding in the context of design-delivery systems (see World Bank, 2010).  
Geography has made the Maldives especially vulnerable to the consequences of 
climate change. Being land scarce and low-lying, the country is exposed to the risks of 
intensifying weather events such as damage caused by inundation, extreme winds, and 
flooding from storms. With the melting of polar ice caps, the Maldives is also exposed 
to the risks of sea-level rise. Future sea level is projected to rise within the range of 10 
to 100 centimeters by the year 2100, which means the entire country could be 
submerged. (World Bank, 2010, paras. 8–9) 
It is a bitter but not uncommon irony that these disproportionately affected areas have had 
so little role or benefit from the global fossil fuel economy.  
With small island countries contributing less than 1% of global greenhouse emissions, 
nonetheless in the Maldives, rising sea levels are causing salt-water to intrude into 
underground fresh water supplies. In order to adapt, the country is trying to build 
rainwater cisterns and new pipe systems to ensure that its people have safe drinking 
water supplies. (Plumer & Friedman, 2017) 
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Figure 2.2. Coastal city vulnerability and anticipated costs associated with future flooding. From 
“Future flood losses in major coastal cities,” Nature Climate Change by Hallegatte et al., 2013,       
p. 803. Copyright 2013 by Springer Nature. Used with permission.  
As noted, highly populated deltas, especially those in developing countries, are also 
especially prone to impacts of climate change-induced effects, both because of their low-lying 
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altitudes rendering sea level rise a major factor and, typically their exposure to seasonal heavy 
storms, worsened by global warming. Further, by definition, major deltas mean major rivers, and 
in time when seasonal precipitation is increasing due to climate change, flood events are also 
exacerbated. Two important examples of such vulnerable regions are the Mekong Delta and the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta (Khadka, 2015; Toan, 2014). 
The Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta is one of the most densely populated areas in the world 
prone to flooding disasters. Well before the impact of climate change on sea level and storm 
intensities bore down on the area, it had experienced what has been described as the deadliest 
tropical cyclone of the 20th century: The Bhola cyclone is thought to have killed a half million 
people (Reilly, 2009). Although storm warning systems and other physical measures have 
reduced the effects that such a storm would now have, Bangladesh remains one of the most 
disaster-prone regions of earth. Huq (2001) wrote, 
Bangladesh is one of the countries most likely to suffer adverse impacts from 
anthropogenic climate change. Threats include sea level rise (approximately a fifth of 
the country consists of low-lying coastal zones within 1 meter of the high-water mark), 
droughts, floods, and cyclones (approximately 130,000 people were killed in the 
cyclone of April 1990). With a population of 130 million, most of whom earn less than 
U.S.$1 a day, it has some of the poorest people in the world. The impacts of climate 
change will only exacerbate the problems already facing the population. (p. 1617) 
The statistics for this region are further expanded upon in a January 2020 study which states that 
“Depending on the region of the delta, water-level rise could reach 85 to 140 cm by 2100” 
(CNRS, 2020, para.1)  
These almost unthinkable vulnerabilities bring us back to the issue of who suffers most, 
not only during catastrophic storms but in their aftermath, despite having taken measures to 
recover and adapt. Mearns and Norton (2010b), on behalf of the World Bank, have edited a wide 
range of papers that prioritize the issues of (in)equity in relation to climate change. These were 
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contributions at a World Bank workshop in 2008. In their introduction, Mearns and Norton 
(2010a) phrased the issues succinctly: 
Viewing climate change through a social development lens leads us, at the outset, to 
couch the agenda in terms of social justice, at all levels from the global to the local. 
The causes and consequences of climate change are intertwined deeply with global 
patterns of inequality. Climate change acts as a multiplier of existing vulnerabilities in 
a warming and transforming world. It threatens to roll back the hard-earned gains in 
poverty reduction and progress toward maintaining the Millennium Development 
Goals that already have been achieved . . . The global injustice of a world in which 
responsibility for the causes of climate change is inversely proportional to the degree 
of vulnerability to its consequences calls for equity and social justice to be placed at 
the heart of a responsive agenda on climate policy and action [emphasis added]. (p. 2) 
In this volume and of special interest to my inquiries is the idea of developing “a 
framework of pro-poor adaptation to climate change” (Moser & Satterthwaite, 2010, p. 232). 
Meaning, policies that promote social, economic, and environmental justice among all people. I 
have explored such ideas with design/planning professionals in this study.  
Impacts on Professionals 
Design/planning responses to climate change and disasters. How working within these 
types of highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster vulnerable coastal communities is impacting 
design/planning professionals individually and collectively was the focus of my primary research 
question: In what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the design/planning 
professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally (individually), professionally, 
and societally? This is an area of literature that has only begun to surface; this dissertation 
addressed that dearth. 
In this section, I looked at the literature facing up to the disasters in the New York area 
and elsewhere. I began with initiatives in the New York region that were central in the study 
regarding design/planning professionals. Then, the discussion was broadened to look at strategies 
and approaches used elsewhere, beginning by considering the several alternative principles or 
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goals used in guiding post-disaster efforts: rebuilding, adaptation, and the emergence of 
resiliency as an especially popular concept on what needs to be achieved. This discussion, 
especially of the major ascendance of the idea of resilience in post-disaster design/planning 
work, brings the discussion back to questions of equity and inequity—dilemmas that 
practitioners will confront as they attempt to both “do good and be right”7 (cf. Hoch, 1984). First, 
however, main post-Sandy initiatives in the New York area are reviewed here. 
Major design/planning responses to Sandy. This section highlights lay documents 
related to the major regional planning initiatives responding specifically to Sandy. Critical 
commentaries, from newspapers, magazine, and online sources, rather than in scholarly works, 
are also included. As noted in Chapter I, there are five principle responses8 of main interest:  
 NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR); 
 HUD’s Rebuild by Design;  
 New York Rising/Buy It Back (a New York State initiative); 
 Build It Back (a New York City initiative); 
 Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative). 
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency. The plan developed by the City at 
the direction of Mayor Michael Bloomberg comprised a 438-page report titled, A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York (PlaNYC, 2013). Interestingly, its authors chose to have a definition of the 
 
7 The challenge of doing one’s technical urban planning and design work soundly (being right) yet 
achieving social equity especially in relation to the disadvantaged (doing good) was considered below as 
a core issue to explore in this research.  
8 Referring to these as the principal post-Sandy initiatives should not downgrade the large number of 
other studies that have been prepared by scholars, research collaborations, interest groups, and others, 
about the storm and its effects. Such other works are the American Institute of Architects New York 
(2013) Post-Sandy Initiative: Building Better, Building Smarter—Opportunities for Design and 
Development, and the New York State 2100 Commission’s (2013), Recommendations to Improve the 
Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
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definition of the word resilient directly after the cover page, indicating how substantially this 
term is pervading post-disaster and climate-change writings. Emphasizing the path to a more 
resilient response to climate change, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg asserted in his cover letter for 
this report, “We are a coastal city—and we cannot, and will not, abandon our waterfront. Instead, 
we must build a stronger, more resilient city—and this plan puts us on a path to do just that” 
(PlaNYC, 2013, from “Foreword from the Mayor”). This perspective, as we shall see, is not 
necessarily aligned with progressive thinking about disaster planning associated with resilience.  
There follows a detailed chapter on repair and resilience for citywide infrastructure and 
built environment, and, then, community rebuilding plans for each of the five boroughs’ most 
storm-impacted areas. There are more than 250 specific projects comprising this plan with an 
estimated total cost of $20 billion.  
Rebuild by Design. The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force in partnership with 
HUD launched an innovative, international design competition, Rebuild by Design (RBD). The 
competition enlisted the support of civic, philanthropic, and academic institutions that included 
the Municipal Art Society, the Regional Plan Association, NYU’s Institute for Public 
Knowledge, The Van Alen Institute, and The Rockefeller Foundation, that supported this     
multi-stage competition that was: 
a cross-sector, cross-professional collaboration, and iterative design. Participants 
collaborated with community and local government stakeholders to ensure each stage 
of the competition was based on the best knowledge and talent and final proposals 
would be realistic and replicable. (Rebuild by Design, n.d., para. 1) 
Of all the initiatives this design competition was, from my perspective, one that changed 
the way many design/planning professionals approached disaster and resiliency planning. The 
RBD program has been involved in several collaborative publications describing the program 
and its lessons (Grannis, 2016) and assembling the perspectives of designers who were involved 
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in the program (Basalaev-Binder & Wachsmuth, 2018). Another monograph, Too Big: Rebuild 
by Design’s Transformative Response to Climate Change, edited by Ovink and Boeijenga 
(2018), further describes the experience of involvement with the program. The intention was: 
to reflect on it, assess it in all its aspects and embed it in a broader context to offer a 
guide for politicians, designers, change managers, community leaders, researchers, 
activists, and others, offering future approaches wherever climate-change induced, 
water-related urban challenges arise. (NAi Boekverkopers, n.d.)  
Australian architectural professor, Helen Lochhead (2017), looking at the broader 
applicability for approaches akin to RBD, saw the competition as underscoring the critical role of 
urban designers in responding to extreme weather events. “Designers are collaborators, 
visualizers, and synthesizers. RBD provided them the opportunity to unpack issues and put 
together scenarios in new and different ways” (Lochhead, 2017, p. 3). She notes that Hurricane 
Sandy did not limit its impact to political boundaries so neither should the design approach. 
Designers and planners are needed to think from the perspective of regional interdependencies so 
there could be a coordinated approach that did not simply stay at the local level. For example, a 
designer/planner developing a barrier to keep the water out in New Jersey could potentially 
negatively impact a part of New York during a storm, if it was not regionally vetted and 
coordinated. Lochhead (2017) concluded, “The design-led process in RBD has crystallized the 
role of designers as agents of change. The pivotal positioning of the designer in the RBD process 
facilitated imaginative solutions to the complex problems in question” (p. 12). However, she also 
called attention to the “crunch” within which the work of RBD took place, noting, 
because of the compressed timeframe and constrained resources—activities that 
typically take two years, took ten months—this inevitably resulted in a focus on 
projects that address the immediate impacts of the disaster rather than systemic 
vulnerabilities, such as chronic social housing and critical infrastructure in low-lying 
flood prone land, that were exacerbated by the disaster. (Lochhead, 2017, p. 13)  
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This hints at a question which will recur in this chapter and, became a key theme 
explored in the research: Does the urgent work of designers/planners allow or preclude thorough 
attention to public housing and other pre-existing inequities and vulnerabilities faced by 
marginalized groups? 
Another Australian article on RBD is Lentini’s (2016) work. Shapiro-Kline (2014) 
focused on the extent to which RBD’s very open public process succeeded in setting the stage for 
innovative approaches: “The urgency of the design competition timeframe, following from the 
urgency of addressing Sandy’s impacts, brought together a wide range of citizens, organizations, 
businesses, and government agencies, through the design teams as intermediaries and 
facilitators” (p. 49). 
This addresses a dilemma that this study explored: namely, that in the midst of a very 
hurried and urgent response to the threat posed by future climate change and resulting storms, it 
will be challenging for designers/planners to respond expeditiously, to be accountable to public 
perspectives and be innovative. The research documents how design/planning professionals have 
approached these challenges.  
New York Rising/Buy It Back. Both these initiatives are parts of the GOSR program. The 
NY Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR) Program was an initiative established to assist 
124 New York State communities damaged by Hurricane Sandy, as well as Hurricane Irene, and 
Tropical Storm Lee. GOSR allotted more than $700 million in federal funds for planning and 
implementation of recovery and resiliency projects. Other than the website for the initiative 
(Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, n.d.-b) which provides an overview of the entire 
program, the direct documentation of New York Rising consists of the various planning 
documents prepared by each affected community. Summaries of three rounds of planning have 
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been prepared (New York Rising Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014.). 
While innovative in many aspects of its approach, New York Rising did integrate some of the 
more traditional tenets of planning and recovery, informing yet another type of integrated 
approach for planners and designers within communities. 
While the NYC SIRR plan did not favor managed retreat or buyout scenarios, both the 
New York State and New Jersey governors did set up specific programs for buying back homes. 
The program in New York, Buy It Back, focused on specific areas where there has been a history 
of severe flooding and where the vulnerability was such that there was high risk to dangerous 
repeat flooding and that in order to improve the resiliency of the larger community, these 
buyouts returned the land back to nature in the form of wetlands, open space, or storm 
management systems. Part of this buyout also included what was called an Acquisition Program, 
where the property was rebuilt in a manner that was resilient but which the existing tenants were 
either unable or unwilling to do. 
Build It Back. The NYC Mayor's Office of Housing Recovery Operations and the Build 
It Back program was developed to help New Yorkers rebuild, repair, and elevate homes in   
Sandy-impacted communities. Funded by HUD’s Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Recovery Program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, n.d.)  Build 
It Back provided support for homeowners after all other forms of disaster assistance was 
exhausted.  
As of June 2018, the program reported, 
The City is nearing completion of its Hurricane Sandy housing recovery efforts. 
Through June 2018, the Build It Back program has served 99 percent of approximately 
8,300 homeowners (totaling 12,500 households) through either a reimbursement 
check, construction start, or acquisition. The vast majority of these homeowners—95 
percent—have received their full benefit, including construction, reimbursement, or 
acquisition of their home. Over 4,500 projects have been completed across            
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Sandy-impacted areas in Brooklyn, The Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island, including 
98 percent of City-managed construction projects, and 92 percent of all construction 
projects, which also includes homeowner-managed construction. (New York City 
Housing Recovery, n.d.-b, para 4) 
Notwithstanding, this initiative has been the most controversial and contestable of all the 
programs noted here (Blau & Durkin, 2017; Nonko, 2017; Rizzi, 2016). As a result, not only has 
Build It Back had impact on people within the communities—both welcomed and  
resented—but also on the design/planning professionals working on the ground in the rebuilding 
phase. The way that the program impacted or reshaped professionals’ working and thinking was 
explored closely in the dissertation research itself. Again, the involvement of designers/planners 
in this work gives rise to the interview discussion about the trade-off that may arise between 
implementing a program on an urgent basis and yet being sensitive to social and personal 
consequences for groups who are supposed to be helped.  
Occupy Sandy. This initiative was an offshoot of Occupy Wall Street but later became a 
separate grassroots disaster-relief organization to aid communities impacted by Sandy, most 
particularly areas with large concentrations of subsidized or otherwise affordable housing and 
more inter-generationally marginalized communities.  
Occupy Sandy not only impacted the disaster relief community but also the 
design/planning community in the post-disaster planning and rebuilding. The movement 
effectively utilized its social media prowess to respond quickly and sensitively to social needs 
especially among the most marginalized and vulnerable groups and neighborhoods (Jones, 
2013). Not only was Occupy Sandy impressive in its tangible results, but it was able to ensure 
that its accomplishments were well-publicized as both mainstream and alternative media gave its 
aid work high profile. Thus, storylines ranged from positive to heroic as seen in this sampling of 
storylines such as, “Where FEMA fell short, Occupy Sandy was there” (Feuer, 2014), and 
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“Occupy Sandy: True Heroes in a Time of Crisis” (Farr, 2013). Quickly, the movement 
demonstrated its flexibility and agility in comparison to conventional charitable organizations, as 
described in The New Yorker (MacFarquhar, 2012).  
In a wider review of Occupy in the context of more traditional relief institutions, Ogman 
(2014) argued, 
Not only did Occupy Sandy outpace traditional relief institutions, they also absorbed a 
much larger number of volunteers, putting them to work in distribution of donated 
supplies, cleaning away storm rubbish, removing mold from people’s homes, knocking 
on doors in public housing projects and delivering food and assessing medical 
requirements of those trapped in their homes because of elevator power outages, and 
much more. The group had established direct contact with affected populations, and 
immediately ascertained their needs. (par. 104) 
Ogman (2014) further argued that Occupy Sandy used the opportunities created by its 
philanthropic work to reconnect to its original mission of opposition, in word and deed, to 
neoliberal forces. Their work, he suggested, “strengthened their ties to affected communities and 
drove them beyond relief work, back towards protest to get the city, state, and federal 
governments to step up their efforts in the relief and reconstruction” (Ogman, 2014, para. 107).  
Occupy Sandy brings into focus a central theme in the research: the social equity 
dimensions of the storm and of other climate-induced disasters. To what extent, do the responses 
of professionals to urban disasters focus on the well-being of the most marginalized and 
vulnerable populations—or in contrast, is it “them that has gets” in post-disaster strategies? 
Occupy Sandy, clearly was aimed at achieving the former and so, to repeat, brings to the fore the 
inescapable dilemma that designers/planners faced as they engaged in recovering from       
Sandy—and preparing for its successors.  
Different ways of framing the mission in post-disaster initiatives. Each of these  
post-Sandy initiatives incorporates one or more of the principal ways in which 
designers/planners in New York and elsewhere are called upon to respond when large physical 
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disasters occur. Key words for such initiatives are rebuilding, mitigation, vulnerability, 
adaptation, and resilience. All of these reflect different, though not always mutually exclusive, 
future work of design/planning in the face of ever-changing weather and water conditions.  
Rebuilding “what used to be” seems the most instinctive response to a major disaster that 
has destroyed housing and infrastructure. Klaus H. Jacob, who was integrally involved in  
post-Sandy recovery, uses New York City as a case study: 
Looking closely at the major competing approaches: defending against flood and rising 
waters with massive earthworks and expensive engineered structures; accommodating 
to and living with the rising waters so that the city can recover quickly after flooding; 
strategically relocating to higher ground; and spreading the risk via insurance. It also 
examines two other options: doing nothing and stopping the flooding problem at its 
source. (K. H. Jacob, 2015, p. 1) 
Klaus H. Jacob (2015) discusses changing precepts of design/planning work that, he 
suggests, few are yet thinking about: “Science-based forward-looking, quantitative risk 
assessment as a sound foundation on which not just to rebuild but to proactively rebuild” (p. 42). 
K. H. Jacob terms this as “probuild” (p. 42). He evaluates adaptation options in terms of costs 
and risks that bring added value to a resilient future: “Present affordability needs to be balanced 
against intergenerational equity, which comes down to the element of risk.” (Jacob, 2015, p. 43). 
I asked the participants in this study, “How are design/planning professionals to inject such 
measured considerations while they are themselves affected by urgency and recollections of 
traumatized populations living in stress and denial?”   
Johnson and Olshansky’s (2016) After Great Disasters lays out the agenda reviewing 
cases from disasters in China, New Zealand, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States. 
Consistent through this work is that cities are complex systems and communities are                  
self-organizing systems. “Communities with a high level of collective efficacy [emphasis added] 
are most likely to recover” (Johnson & Olshansky, 2016, p. 6). Yet within both the system of the 
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city and community there is a different experience of time that evolves with what one 
experiences as normal conditions and those that evolve post-disaster. Olshansky, Hopkins and 
Johnson (2012) refer to this as “time compression” and the impact of that on both speed and 
deliberation. “A tension that is exhibited between rebuilding quickly and slowing down to 
develop plans that are for the betterment of the community, with the key being to deliberate more 
efficiently within compressed time” (Olshansky et al., 2012, p. 11).  
While this concept of “slowing it down” was critical to the philosophy of Rebuild by 
Design in New York (see above), it was not as effective when compressed deadlines and slowing 
down impacted areas that were already under severe economic and social stress and thereby 
exacerbated by Sandy, particularly in areas of public housing. This is where designers/planners 
play critical roles with potentially huge impacts by helping the city and the community focus on 
early actions and separating that out from longer-range plans. They also can play critical roles in 
communities that while vulnerable, have not been impacted by extreme events, providing time 
for pre-disaster planning. This can improve post-disaster planning. Johnson and Olshansky 
(2016) also concluded from their comparative case studies that communities lacking previous 
post-disaster planning—often because of already being economically disadvantaged areas—were 
not a priority in recovery efforts. This pattern places a heavy moral burden on designers/planners 
as they are sure to be faced with more demands than they can meet: so, do they follow or break 
with patterns of neglect when taking on the immediate work of recovery planning? Who decides 
and how? Johnson and Olshansky (2016) bluntly asked, “To what extent can they facilitate 
significant change from the pre-disaster state?” (p. 323, emphasis added). This analysis was a 
part of the discussions with the post-Sandy designers/planners.  
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Seattle-area planner Karen Wolf (2009) helpfully distinguished between dealing with 
consequences of climate change versus being prepared in ways that reduce the harm inflicted by 
such consequences.  
Mitigation refers to the actions and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Using less and cleaner energy, driving less, and planting trees to sequester carbon are 
all mitigation strategies. . . . But mitigation alone is not enough. Even if greenhouse 
gas emissions ceased today, atmospheric carbon concentrations have already reached 
such levels that global and regional temperatures will still increase to some degree. 
Because some change is inevitable, adaptation strategies must be an equally important 
component of communities' response to climate change. (pp. 1–2) 
Wolf (2009) suggests that planners are the ones who will be at the centre of adaptation.  
Planners are especially well-suited to lead communities in adaptation because of our 
experience in working with a variety of stakeholders—citizens, the business 
community, environmentalists, health professionals—to improve the quality of life for 
all residents. (p. 2) 
Two further concepts to be noted among the guiding ideas and principles to which 
planners and designers are engaged in relation to disasters are vulnerability and adaption.  
Vulnerability. Perhaps beyond the concept of a society’s vulnerability lies that of a 
culture’s adaptability. Broadening the discursive framework beyond vulnerability may not only 
improve the provision and degree of disaster preparedness and relief, but may also help break 
free from the conceptual constraints that have rendered the world “unsafe” for so many millions 
for so long. Bankoff (2001) brings to mind how the poor and marginalized of New York and 
New Orleans have been talked about after hurricane disasters, in warning how narrow discussion 
of vulnerability stigmatizes Third World areas impacted by climate change, “essentialising and 
generalising cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of world as disease‐ridden,        
poverty‐stricken and disaster‐prone” (p. 19).  
While vulnerability is an outcome of climate change, it is exacerbated by conditions that 
long preceded the gravity of the shifting environment. Tanner, Mitchell, Polack, and Guenther 
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(2009) defined five characteristics that formed the basis of climate vulnerable and resilient urban 
governance frameworks: decentralization and autonomy, accountability and transparency, 
responsiveness and flexibility, participation and inclusion, and experience and support. Urban 
governance is inclusive of elected or appointed officials as well as at a local level with 
community stakeholders. Planned and autonomous adaptation and the willingness to tackle 
existing vulnerabilities, is critical to achieving viable solutions across the globe.  
Whether countries are successful in realigning their priorities to impede or ultimately 
reverse the destruction to the planet’s environmental integrity and adopt more of the tenets of a 
sustainable society, cities in both developed and developing countries will depend significantly 
on designers/planners. They need to have more specific frameworks in place to deal with 
climate-related events that have either already happened or may have been set into motion 
without a time stamp of arrival. To accomplish this will take new ways of thinking about 
frameworks that integrate adaptation, vulnerability and resiliency with leadership that can 
embody the dignity of place, people, and planet at its core. This research explored the extent to 
which Hurricane Sandy is changing mind sets of professional practice in this direction.  
Adaptability. With a global movement toward increasingly more sustainable cities comes 
an increase in the need for adaptability. This is especially pronounced in the context of extreme 
climate-related events such as flooding, droughts, and earthquakes. Discussions surrounding 
adaptability (adaptive capacity) in cities has led to a more extensive lexicon, inclusive of terms 
that have a variety of meaning in the social sciences: vulnerability and resiliency. In a report for 
the United Nations Development Program, Schipper, Cigaran, and Hedger (2008) argued that 
“adaptation is not a ‘stand-alone’ issue” (p. 32). Adaptation plans need to be part of a larger plan 
with short, medium, and long-term goals such as disaster management, poverty reduction, 
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economic development, and land use planning—which brings this discussion to the guiding 
concept which, in the last several decades, has moved to the center stage of discussions about 
adapting to climate change. 
The turn to resilience. The general turn to emphasizing resilience as one of the main 
guiding principles in coping with climate-induced disasters is seen both in post-Sandy responses 
and in other urban areas facing climate impactful events. Emergency response management 
remains an inevitable priority directly after a catastrophic event but there is heightened 
awareness—especially as the world faces the certainty of more frequent and intense  
climate-change-induced calamities—that building disaster resilience must not be sacrificed as 
short-term fixes are pursued. This is a fundamental change in philosophy changing the focus 
from purely emergency response management teams to disaster resilience, which engages 
communities to be better prepared and capable of responding to and bouncing back from 
significant climate-impacting events. Additionally, identifying appropriate baseline indicators for 
establishing pre-existing vulnerable conditions in relation to disaster resilience takes place before 
improvements to the resilience of a community can be identified (Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 
2010). 
While the term resilience is ever-more entrenched in the recovery, design/planning 
nomenclature, the word has many definitions. It is derived from the Latin word, resilio, meaning 
“to jump back” (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p. 35). Probably one of the earliest uses in 
literature was the study of resilience in psychology, and psychologists ascertained that there was 
a lack of clarity and unification in the use of this term (De Bruijne, Boin, & Van Eeten, 2010,       
p. 15). In the early 1970s, the term resilience was closely examined by Holling (1973) and his 
associates whose primary interest was not in disaster situations but in how disturbed natural 
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populations’ ecosystems return to prior functioning, if not identical equilibrium points, after 
major perturbations. Holling (1973) defined resilience as, “the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between 
populations or state variables” (p. 14). It is important to emphasize that in this initial formulation, 
Holling was not saying that returning to a previous set of relationships was good. As a scientist, 
he was puzzling over how some natural systems have a better ability to bounce back after 
disturbance than others do. However, in later writings, value judgements about the desirability of 
resilience were clear for having human-designed entities like engineering structures and, then 
having whole social systems persist—meaning survive—seemed intuitively good (Holling, 
2001). This perspective on resilience has become central in the widespread advocacy by social 
scientists, planners, and others, of adopting strategies that maximize it. In disaster studies and 
planning, resilience is seen as a means for dealing with “ever-changing patterns and surprises in 
ecological systems, such as storms, droughts, and over- or under-population—or even the 
extinction of entire species” (De Bruijne et al., 2010, p. 16). 
Since then, resilience has more generally come to be “applied to describe the behavioral 
responses of communities, institutions and economies” (De Bruijne et al., 2010, p. 21), with the 
assumption that to persist is better than to change into something entirely different. The concept 
of resilience has also been used as a concept in organizational and management literature in the 
context of how to address a challenging and ever-changing business climate and is widely 
applied to social systems and institutions in general (Maclean, Cuthill, & Ross, 2014).  
Most pertinent to this study, the idea—and ideal—of resilience has also powerfully 
entered the language and goals of design/planning, especially in the wake of disasters. The edited 
volume, The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster (Vale & Campanella, 
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2005b), provides a wide array of case studies ranging from the aftermaths of terror in both New 
York and Oklahoma City (Linenthal, 2005); Berlin (Ladd, 2005), and Beirut (Sarkis, 2005) after 
the ravages of war; Tangshan in China, after a major earthquake in 1976 (Chen, 2005); and Los 
Angeles after the 1992 riots following the acquittal of police officers who assaulted Rodney King 
(Fulton, 2005). Summarizing the “axioms of resilience” as they call the lessons of this wide 
range of post-disaster experiences, Vale and Campanella (2005a) posit that architecture and 
urban design are pivotal: 
Rebuilding cities reassures us of a future . . . Architecture and urban design are . . . 
central to the reconstruction and reimaging of traumatized places. In the effort to shore 
up the scattered and shattered lives of survivors, post-disaster urbanism operates 
through a series of symbolic acts. . . . They link the ongoing psychological recovery 
process to tangible, visible signs of progress and momentum. (p. 344)  
Vale and Campanella (2005a) go on to say that even in devastated urban areas, the 
rebuild has not always led to visionary new plans that correct deficiencies. Johnson and 
Olshansky (2016) as well as Henk Ovink9 (principal design consultant to the Rebuild by Design 
initiative), both have stressed the importance in the rebuilding process to slow the process down. 
While this is counterintuitive when dealing within a disaster, the space for creating change that is 
substantive can only happen with a level of active listening and reflection. Rather than rushing in 
with heroics to save the day, one needs to take pause and understand the problems well enough 
to be able to create solutions that may mean changes long wished for or never thought of. As 
expressed by Vale and Campanella (2005a), time and reflection are needed for “the construction 
of a suitable interpretative framework that enables psychological, emotional, and symbolic 
recoveries” (p. 340). 
 
9 Ovink is also the co-editor of a collection of reflections by the main collaborators in Rebuild by Design 
(Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018), telling the inside story of politics, human relations, and creativity in Too Big 
(and its challenges), in that major post-Sandy Initiative.	
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Over time, some voices have arisen that see problems with the hastened ascent of 
resilience as the main guiding principle for recovery. Increasingly resilience is taken to be the 
obvious and perhaps literally unquestionable10 responses to disaster. Mykhnenko (2016) ponders 
whether or not resilience is “a ‘right-winger’ ploy” (p. 176), documenting the many sources on 
both sides of the left-right spectrum who have jumped on this bandwagon. In the end, he 
concludes (though one could interpret his evidence to support the opposite conclusion) that 
“analysis does not seem to support the fear expressed by many scholars and commentators of 
resilience as some sort of a Trojan horse of neoliberals used to advance their causes” 
(Mykhnenko, 2016, p. 186).  
Others are less concerned about possible abuse of the term to reinforce returning the 
system to its status quo. Simin Davoudi (Davoudi et al., 2012)—a British architect and 
professor—has worried that the idea of resilience is “in danger of becoming just another buzz 
word” (p. 299). She asked, “Does its malleability mean that many divergent measures, including 
those that might otherwise appear indefensible, can be justified in the name of resilience?” 
(Davoudi et al., 2012, p. 299). In a related paper Davoudi co-authored with urban studies scholar, 
Libby Porter (Davoudi et al, 2012), resilience’s similarity to other “elastic concepts” (p. 329), 
such as sustainability, is noted with the concern that these are “employed to justify diverse and 
even conflicting ends . . . empty signifier[s] which can be filled to justify almost any ends” (p. 
329). This foreshadows other more critically expressed fears that resilience can go hand in hand 
with trying to restore the status quo rather than seize upon disasters as opportunities to effect 
more radical changes in favor of the disadvantaged. Vardy and Smith (2017) suggest that, 
“Resilience risks becoming code word for ‘business as usual’ as industrial, military, and political 
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elites rearrange their operations to acknowledge the reality of climate change while maintaining 
relations of power” (p. 175). Taking a constructive and positive tack at the possible risks of 
resilience-seeking as shoring up pre-existing “them that has gets” relations, Cote and Nightingale 
(2012) call for “resilience approaches . . . needing to engage with the insights and critiques from 
the social sciences about agency” (p. 484).  
This goes to the heart of discussions with design/planning professionals closely addressed 
in the research. The term resilience while sounding so right on the surface, could bypass or beg 
the critical question that arises for those most concerned with social equity and the status quo 
before and after disaster: Are designers/planners unwittingly supporting socially inequitable 
arrangements, where the “powers that be” continue to dominate, through this concept of 
resiliency? This was a controversial question during the research, and designers/planners were 
polarized in their responses.  
When disaster strikes, confusion, panic, disorientation, and often finger-pointing follow. 
Amidst the emergency, people and agencies make forgivable and understandable errors. But it is 
also well-known that after the casualties are cared for, the dead are grieved, and basic 
infrastructure is sufficiently restored to allow some semblance of normal daily life and work, 
authorities still often act without a reasoned approach based on sound design/planning. 
Politically expedient projects may be launched that turn out to have been more harmful than 
helpful. Some of the public and private works may even smack of opportunism and greed as 
when funding is channeled to rebuilding for those who have the greatest means to take care of 
themselves. This pattern has been described and documented in many settings, most notably in 
the United States in the aftermath of Katrina which struck New Orleans and breached the levees 
in late August 2005. Shughart (2006), writing soon after the event, coined a new and derogatory 
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term—Katrinanomics—while nicely highlighting a number of conspicuous failures that made the 
infamous disaster even more disastrous: 
Who was to blame for the authorities’ evident failure, illustrated most vividly by the 
chaos at Louisiana’s Superdome, to mount a timely, well organized effort to succor the 
victims of Katrina’s wrath? Where was the Red Cross? Where was the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)? Why were no police or National Guard 
units in place to prevent the looting and gang violence that erupted in “Baghdad under 
water,” as former Louisiana Senator John Breaux described New Orleans (Gibbs et al., 
2005, p. 44), a city which, by 1 September, “was on the verge of anarchy” (Thomas et 
al., 2005a, p. 47)? Why was the official response to Katrina so “pathetic”? (p. 31)  
In the years after Katrina, billions were expended and yet the predicament of victims and 
survivors—especially those of color—was repeatedly documented as adding up to a colossally 
mismanaged “recovery.” Leeson and Sobel (2008), having looked at disaster relief along the 
Gulf, concluded that: “Natural disasters create resource windfalls in the states they strike by 
triggering federally provided natural-disaster relief. By increasing the benefit of fraudulent 
appropriation and creating new opportunities for such theft, disaster-relief windfalls may also 
increase corruption” (p. 667). Squires and Hartman (2013b) aptly titled their collection of critical 
essays on post-Katrina recovery, There is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and 
Hurricane Katrina. In their editors’ introduction, they list the panoply of post-disaster corruption 
that Katrina exposed: 
Credible accusations of dereliction, even financial improprieties, on the part of 
national sacred cows such as the Red Cross. . . Foreign aid coming to us not from  
us—and then mishandled . . . A mandating of moratoriums (albeit ephemeral) on 
mortgage foreclosures and evictions—an intervention in the housing market unheard 
of since Depression days . . . Absentee voting problems (only partially resolved) on an 
unprecedented scale . . . Police officers simply walking away from their jobs                
. . . Incidents of racism/exclusion/NIMBYism . . . [most notably that] police in the 
Westbank city of Gretna blocked a bridge, preventing large numbers of African 
American evacuees from escaping the deluged city. (Squires & Hartman, 2013a,       
pp. 1–2) 
The chaos, corruption, and heightened marginalization of already marginalized groups 
continue to serve as a warning for those who plan and act in the aftermath of Sandy. And yet, 
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Cohen and Liboiron (2014) conclude that there were actually two Sandys experienced in the 
New York region: “The first was a one-time indiscriminate exceptional catastrophe. The second 
was an extraordinary acceleration of inequalities affecting the poorest New Yorkers” (p. 34). 
Ways of recovering need to be created that not only rectify the destruction wrought by the 
disaster but attend to the special neediness of segments of the population, including going deeper 
into the roots of social inequity—this, I repeat, is central to the mission and varied experience of 
designers/planners in New York and worldwide, as climate change-induced catastrophes 
proliferate. Cohen and Liboiron (2014) sum up well what these professionals and our society 
generally must face up to: 
Disasters don’t just leave infrastructure in rubble. They also illuminate the moments 
when our usual forms of intervention fail to address a devastating problem. New 
systems, communities, and policies must emerge as the old systems are overwhelmed 
by social and physical change. Within this paradigm, the systemic inequities that 
Sandy laid bare occurred long before the hurricane hit. (p. 4) 
Similar concerns have steadily emerged from analyses of responses to both Sandy and 
Katrina. For example, Liberty (2013), a New Jersey public defender, wrote in “The (In)Equities 
of Superstorm Recovery”:  
The entire state [New Jersey] was dramatically changed by Hurricane Sandy, and its 
effects will be long lasting. Like Hurricane Katrina, Sandy exposed many of the 
inequities deeply ingrained in our society. While disaster recovery projects have not 
been fully implemented and the final allocation of recovery funds has not yet occurred, 
the state’s action plan is representative of how it prioritizes damage. As indicated 
above, the state’s recovery plan fails to adequately account for the demonstrated 
relationship between race, poverty, and natural disasters. (para. 36) 
Such insights and a broader critique of conventional public and private response to 
disasters have also emerged internationally. As noted above in a report developed for the United 
Nations Development Program, Schipper et al. (2008) argued that adaptation plans need to be 
part of a larger vision with short, medium, and long-term goals such as disaster management, 
poverty reduction, economic development, and land use planning. This must embrace fine-tuning 
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of policy at the local level so that actions were not static and limited to one event, but rather 
became part of an ongoing process that evolved over time.  
There is of course a strong physical dimension to vulnerability, as certain landforms and 
community locations are so obviously more prone to negative impacts than others (Cutter, Ash, 
& Emrich, 2014). Almost as obvious but often overlooked, is that when catastrophes strike 
within a region or city, some populations are inevitably more at risk and more affected than 
others. These tend to be ones that have long been socially marginalized on grounds of race, 
economic status, gender, health, and even age. Children are often much more at risk than adults, 
all else being equal (see Cutter, 2017). As for gender, Cutter (2017) asserted that the 
“disadvantages in basic living conditions and livelihoods are amplified during and after disasters 
and humanitarian crises” (p. 118). Enarson and Pease (1998a) earlier had written of the 
“gendered terrain of disaster (p. 3)” adding their voice to their edited volume (Enarson & Pease, 
1998b), much of which advocated the study of “men and masculinities” (Enarson & Pease, 
1998a, p. 3) as a way of grasping the uneven effects of catastrophe on women and men.  
The racial dimensions of disaster were nowhere more grotesquely obvious as in the days 
after the flooding in New Orleans caused by Katrina, as documented in numerous books (e.g., 
Brunsma, Overfelt, & Picou, 2010; Wailoo, Dowd, & O’Neill, 2010), scholarly articles (Elliott & 
Pais, 2006; Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008), and in movie documentaries—S. Lee’s (2010) 
When the Levees Broke, for example—and TV s dramas such as Treme (Incaprera, Simon, & 
Overmyer, 2010).  
Given that the research focused on the effects on and actions of designers/planners in 
relation to Sandy, a major theme that was looked at were the impacts of the disaster on  
already-marginalized social groups. My reasoning was that designers/planners have long 
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wrestled with equity implications of their work (Forester & Krumholz, 1990; Hoch, 1984; 
Krumholz, 1982), having had to face up to earlier instances where professional planning had hurt 
disadvantaged groups and caused various social inequities (Goodman, 1971; J. Jacobs, 1961; 
Krumholz, 1982). Eventually professional associations, such as the American Planning 
Association, developed a code of ethics that openly addressed the issue of equity:  
2) Strive to give citizens (including those who lack formal organization or influence) 
full, clear and accurate information on planning issues and the opportunity to have a 
meaningful role in the development of plans and programs; 
3) Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special 
responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons [emphasis 
added]; (American Planning Association & American Institute of Certified Planners, 
1992, p. 2) 
Our society requires a fundamental change in their collective moral compass where 
inclusion, respect and dignity are interconnected. Physician Lise Van Susteren (2017) believes 
that the chronic threat of climate change and its attendant catastrophes is making citizens 
become, 
climate Cassandras gripped by thoughts of future harm, suffering from pre-traumatic 
stress response (a before-the-fact version of classic PTSD) because they know the 
world has not heard the warnings forcefully enough . . . Our canon of ethics says we 
have a duty to protect the public health and to participate in activities that contribute to 
it. (p. 57)  
This canon of ethics applies no less to designers/planners who must create ways not just 
to solve the technically obstinate challenges of adapting to climate change but meet the public’s 
need for understanding and involvement that converts disabling stress into collective action. This 
duty may resemble what Heifetz (1994) wrote of as adaptive work, a concept examined in 
relationship to the question of leadership in the context of the interviews.  
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Professionals in Challenging Times 
The impacts of designing and planning amidst (and after) disaster. The preceding 
discussion has included a substantial amount of research and writing about the impacts of climate 
change-induced disasters, with much of the attention on regions, cities, neighborhoods, and on 
people who are especially vulnerable because of pre-disaster marginalization. Here, the literature 
on the impacts experienced by the very people who play critical roles in responding to disasters 
was explored. The most obvious question, dealt with first, is about how being in the thick of 
highly stressful emergency situations impacts professionals as individuals. This analysis is the 
personal “pillar,” using the idea introduced in Chapter I of three distinguishable aspects of 
understanding the work and perspectives of practitioners: personal, professional, and societal. 
Understandably, the preponderance of research on such individual-level impacts and 
responses to disasters has been first with civilian victims and then about groups known as first 
responders: police, firemen, paramedical emergency workers, nurses, doctors, etc. It is intuitive 
that these professionals, exposed as they are to scenes of carnage, amidst broken streets, 
transportation and electricity infrastructure, and buildings, are likely to suffer from immediate 
and post-traumatic psychological impacts. Mitchell and Dyregrov (1993) reviewed the state of 
research into traumatic stress among disaster workers and emergency responders, and their call 
for significantly greater attention to the plight of such personnel was met by a steady if not 
voluminous array of research and publications. After the attack on the World Trade Center and 
the prominent and admirable role of police, firemen, and other emergency personnel, more 
research ensued (e.g., Adams, Boscarino, & Galea, 2006; Perrin et al., 2007).  
Subsequent studies of mental well-being of emergency responders are insufficient (Surya, 
Jaff, Stilwell, & Schubert, 2017), yet in comparison, there is virtually no work probing the 
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psychosocial impacts on designers/planners. It may be assumed that, unless such professionals 
were accidentally caught up in blatantly traumatic incidents during or immediately after a storm, 
that they are unlikely to suffer from anything close to PTSD or other mental distress. However, 
such professionals do not go untouched. Their work calls for repeated one-on-one and collective 
interactions in meetings with victims of disaster. Such victims are unlikely to be calm 
discussants of the plight of post-disaster conditions. Steady exposure to truly touching stories of 
loss and grief can lead to what has been called “compassion fatigue” (Figley, 2013, book title), 
“secondary traumatic stress,” (Baird & Kracen, 2006, p. 181) or “vicarious traumatization” 
(Baird & Kracen, 2006, p. 181). This idea has been applied in the context of several major 
climate-change related disasters including “Katrina fatigue.” This term was originally coined by 
disaster relief providers in Colorado who found that after a period of months, there developed an 
“inability of Coloradoans to empathize with the evacuees” (Peek, 2012, p. 35). It has since been 
more widely applied to others who continue to work on post-Katrina rebuilding and adaptation. 
Over time, many fell back into racial and economic stereotypes and began to experience what 
had initially appeared as a temporary interruption to their lives, as a burden that grew into 
exhaustion. It is to be noted that many of the professionals engaged in this research study were 
engaged with Sandy, as well as with Katrina and some of the more recent hurricanes previously 
noted, and may therefore be subject to similar feelings as their professional work unfolds amidst 
traumatized individuals.  
There have been several usages of “Sandy fatigue” as well. Katinas (2014) wrote 
“Superstorm Sandy helpers suffer from ‘compassion fatigue’” that “now it’s the helpers who 
need help” (para. 1). Widespread among nurses and social workers, it is reasonable to  
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presume—and investigate—whether designer/planners deeply involved in the aftermath of 
Sandy could manifest the symptoms of such disorders.  
Exploring this and more broadly what the often-subtle impacts have been of working in 
this setting will be, I believe, a significant and new contribution to understanding how 
professionals are to cope with a future of more climate change-induced events.  
Cote (2011) observed, 
Physical urban planning is typically based on historic data, which include avoiding 
past incidences of natural phenomena such as flooding and beach erosion. However, 
there is little precedent in urban planning policy that incorporates scientific prediction 
into decision making processes with respect to physical form of a community and legal 
issues that may exist between climate science and law and how that would impact the 
role of design/planning professionals. (p. 87) 
Secondary traumatic stress and secondary traumatic stress disorder, which is also referred 
to as “compassion stress fatigue” (Figley, 2002), has not to date been studied in any depth within 
the design/planning profession. This is understandable given the fact that while trauma workers 
typically include mental health professionals, victims’ advocates, caseworkers, firefighters, law 
enforcement, paramedics/EMTs, emergency room physicians and staff, there have been 
widespread studies about this in medical, social science, psychological literature (e.g., Beaton, 
Murphy, Johnson, Pike, & Corneil, 1998; Castellano & Plionis, 2006; Knafo, 2004), little of any 
depth has yet been studied among design/planning professionals immersed in disaster situations. 
This is completely understandable as they are not what are usually deemed to be crisis workers. 
Therefore, what I have learned has been primarily through the personal stories of these 
design/planning professionals. And while shared informal stories among professionals are a rich 
and important source of learning, without more systematic efforts, such tutelage is therefore hit 
and miss.  
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Research on design/planning practice. Limited but intense efforts have been made to 
analyze design and planning practice, with a focus on how professionals reflect upon their own 
work. At the general level (i.e., outside the context of disasters), a well-known approach that has 
produced a contribution to the literature outside design/planning fields is Schön’s (1983) notion 
of reflective practice. He based this on the observation that most of the time, professionals are 
taking on problems that have no formulas for ready solution and that unfold in contexts of      
ever-increasing complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts” (Schön,  
1983, p. 14). In his seminal work, The Reflective Practitioner, Schön developed a model 
intended for understanding and educating practitioners of many kinds. Interestingly the chapters 
that at least initially inspired the most commentary were about designers (“Design as a Reflective 
Conversation with the Situation”) and planners (“Town Planning: Limits to Reflection in 
Action”).  
Subsequently, there have been a number of critiques and elaborations on Schön’s way of 
looking at both designers’/planners’ modalities of action (Roozenburg & Dorst, 1998; Visser, 
2010). While the basic concept of reflection-in-action is still seen as worthwhile, there is a sense 
that Schön did not draw on a sufficient breadth of cases to infer how design/planning work. Nor 
did he look at practitioners in the midst of truly complex and stressful situations. Yet, such 
contexts are the very least that designers/planners face amidst climate change-induced disasters.  
A small step towards analyzing design practice in relation to climate change has been 
made by Dubois et al. (2016). In a study conducted in Toulouse, France, they engaged in two 
design workshops based on the role architects, urban designers, planners, and engineers would 
play in climate change. The authors concluded that the response to these issues may have 
resulted in efficient solutions, but it did not often go far enough, and that by providing more 
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holistic and operational information, in essence bridging climate research and practice, more 
could be accomplished. Similar issues were raised during the design process after Sandy, 
resulting in conventional approaches being expanded and transformed to meet the demands of 
the situation. Although quite general, MIT Planning Professor Lawrence Susskind’s lecture at the 
University of Idaho Law School, “Managing Climate Risks in Resilient Cities” (University of 
Utah S. J. Quinney College of Law, 2016), indicates how planning educators have begun to 
anticipate how the profession must itself adapt to what is needed in the face of global warming.  
There is also a small but growing literature specifically about the role that planners can 
and must play in the aftermath of major catastrophes. At the height of the Reagan-era escalation 
of fears of nuclear war, Leaning and Keyes (1984) compiled The Counterfeit Ark. Its primary 
purpose was to rebut the then-prevalent notion among governments that planners (with many 
other professionals) could successfully lead in the adjustments to nuclear holocausts. Many of 
the insights on the limits of design/planning in extreme circumstances may serve as a caution for 
contemporary planners and designers facing events like Hurricane Sandy. March and 
Kornakova’s (2017) Urban Planning for Disaster Recovery illustrates the growing awareness of 
planners’ roles and responsibilities in disaster settings. Of special interest to me is the emergent 
discussion and practice of what in Japan is called Machi-zukuri (community-based planning), 
which Evans (2002) has described in the district at Kobe after an earthquake. There, planners 
shifted away from the traditional establishment view that planning is a technical endeavor to be 
practiced top-down. This literature review and the post Sandy experience indicate that different 
community-driven planning must be the modus operandi of designers/planners confronting 
increasingly frequent and intense climate-change-induced disasters.  
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It must be emphasized that the recent and growing literature about designer/planners and 
climate change/disaster planning is primarily about what these professionals do—and should 
do—in their practice. None really address the issues central to this study: how being part of such 
traumatic and unprecedented events impacts designers/planners. This points to a significant gap 
and need which the work redressed. 
Research on design/planning leadership in changeable and uncertain settings. As 
perspectives of my interviewees were gathered and analyzed, an important framework for 
understanding their roles and strategies can be found within normative literature on leadership: 
How does one lead in contexts of massive uncertainty, complexity, and even trauma? Through 
these interviews, some key insights into leadership studies were highlighted, as was how 
leadership or lack thereof impacted not just planning and recovery but the justification for 
advancing the climate conversation.  
Throughout history, leaders have often felt that they are living in unprecedented times of 
change and uncertainty. Yet, its seems to be the case that everything at this time is changing at an 
accelerated and disorienting pace for which no one is fully prepared. Climate-impactful events 
are so much of this rapid change.  
 
 
 
 
 In the context of events specifically surrounding earth changes, what type of leadership is
needed that will support designers/planners working in service to individuals and communities
facing an uncertain future? While, the research shows that pressure exists on designers/planners
to help people return to what was lost, that may be neither possible nor prudent; then the bigger 
question becomes how to live with uncertainty. To that end, the research looked to the work of 
peacemakers to deepen that understanding.
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Research on peacekeepers and others whose work takes place amidst trauma. As with 
the leadership literature, my findings with designers/planners working in the aftermath of Sandy 
bear some useful parallels to others who work professionally and in the long term within 
traumatic settings. While some similarities can be found among healthcare professionals, the 
work of peacekeepers seems to broadly parallel the practitioners focused upon in this work. 
Unlike first responders at disasters, peacekeepers need to work away steadily and amidst 
stakeholders who are by definition in extreme circumstances. While peacekeepers explicitly 
struggle with parties who are deeply divided, implicitly, designers/planners also work among 
constituencies who may work at cross purposes or turn on each other over matters small and 
large. In light of what has been said in this chapter about the often inequitable and deeply 
resented impacts on already marginalized populations, it is understandable that metaphors of war 
arise in disasters’ aftermaths. Katrina was described as a “war zone” frequently by those who 
witnessed or experienced the violent environment that prevailed long after the floods subsided. 
Kramer’s (2016) article in Slate simply titled “Desert, storm,” describes the reactions of several 
veterans of the Iraq War who, shortly after returning to the United States ended up in New 
Orleans during and just after Katrina struck. Similar parallels can be drawn in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. To that end, many of the challenges and lessons from either 
field can be applicable to both. 
The exact way that understanding about the work and difficulties of peacekeepers can 
shed light on what post-Sandy designers/planners do, is reflected in the analysis of data on their 
experiences. However, I have already benefited in my overall thinking about the work of       
post-Sandy designers/planners from the writings of John Paul Lederach (2003; Lederach & 
Moomaw-Jenner, 2002). It is intriguing that one of his books reverses the metaphor in describing 
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peacekeeping’s journey: Into the Eye of the Storm: A Handbook of International Peacekeeping 
(Lederach & Moomaw-Jenner, 2002). Lederach and Moomaw-Jenner’s (2002) reflections in the 
context of a conflict resolution workshop, are similar to questions designers/planners in this 
study raised post-Sandy.  
How do I know if this is the right thing to be doing at this time in this context?  Will this 
be like parachuting into a place with quick answers and then leaving, or is this the start of 
something that could be truly important and make a difference in the long haul? (p. xiii) 
Kevin Avruch (2002) a professor of anthropology at George Mason University, made two 
critical points for peacekeeping practice and leadership that are closely aligned to what 
design/planning practitioners need to be growingly aware of in post-disaster leadership: “First, 
reflect on your own biases and cultural biases particularly as they relate to your professional 
work and the approaches you use. Second, become inquisitive about the way people make sense 
of things (p. 75).  
Being in the aftermath of a disaster, whether design/planning professionals or 
peacekeepers, requires leadership that can attain access to issues unfolding with accuracy and be 
agile enough to take decisive action while making informed decisions. This is challenging when 
things are developing at a fast pace in real time. It requires agility and the ability to “match the 
complexity of the situation by behaving with the set of behaviors necessary to meet the group’s 
needs” (Northouse, 2007, p. 209). McGrath (as cited in Hackman, Walton, & Goodman, 1986) 
outlined the critical leadership functions of group effectiveness, taking into account the analysis 
of the situation both internally and externally and whether this required phased or immediate 
action (Northouse, 2007, p. 211).  
Final Thoughts on the Literature Review 
In the beginning of this chapter, I spoke of the challenges of reviewing a vast array of 
literature within the often-upsetting context of Sandy and climate change. Challenging because I 
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had lived through the experience and then worked on the recovery, but also because I knew that 
the topic itself was complex: difficult to see both “parts and whole” in some presentable pattern. 
I have come to see how much there is to understand by way of background and yet how 
superficial and selective one needs to be to cover even a partial array of these crucial issues. I felt 
that the writing of this chapter was more discovery than authoritative exposition and that what 
emerged most compellingly was the dilemma that professionals cannot escape. It is that the 
issues are so urgent for designers/planners, yet so wrought with high emotion and social trauma. 
In particular, I have seen how the discussion came back again and again to the inequities 
experienced by marginalized groups and the need for design/planning to be ever mindful of that. 
There were other questions that asked the design/planning practitioners about how Sandy has 
impacted them, but none, I observed, that were so challenging and so important.  
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Chapter III: Methodology and Research Procedures 
This study provides a significant contribution to understanding professionals who are not, 
by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with disaster and trauma. With the greater 
frequency of these climate impactful events, design/planning professionals need to address these 
challenges in the long-term, not unlike people who work in medical or first-responder roles after 
a disaster. This study draws particular parallels to peacekeepers in areas of conflict where issues 
around rebuilding in traumatized communities take their toll not just on the people who have 
experienced the loss but those who are helping to facilitate the rebuilding and reclamation 
process.  
Many studies address how professional designers/planners impact their work situations 
but there is a lack of research about how they (as individuals and as professionals) are impacted 
by their engagements in high stress situations. To use a phrase that has become common in 
phenomenological qualitative research, what are their “lived experiences? (e.g., Van Manen, 
1990). 
The findings from this study will at the very least open a conversation essential to 
knowing the issues designers/planners have amidst tumultuous and traumatic contexts. At best it 
will help to develop a shared strategy with other design/planning practitioners locally, nationally, 
and internationally, of how to accommodate these challenges in the face of transformed roles as 
climate change continues and intensifies. This objective is in close alignment with the goals of 
qualitative researchers who, by inductively gathering their data, are “interested in (1) how people 
interpret and construct their experiences, (2) how they construct their worlds, and (3) what 
meaning they attribute to their experiences” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 24). Therefore, a 
qualitative approach of collecting data through interviews, observations, and documents, rather 
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than taking a more quantitative deductive approach derived through surveys and questionnaires, 
was the basis of developing a well-defined strategy of inquiry to this study, one that gives 
meaning and structure to the research.  
Qualitative Research Designs 
There are a number of potential qualitative research designs as described by Merriam 
(2008). Figure 3.1 is her depiction of the choices among qualitative research studies.   
 
Figure 3.1. Types of qualitative research. From Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and 
Implementation by S. B. Merriam, 2008, p. 37. Copyright 2008 John Wiley & Sons. Used with 
permission.  
 
Additionally, qualitative researchers can to an extent draw eclectically on these 
approaches, choosing aspects of two or more of those Merriam (2008) diagrammed, according to 
how the situation “talks back.” A case study was employed with the primary but not sole data 
source being the narratives or stories of design/planning professionals closely engaged in         
post-Sandy. I used narrative methods to generate a significant part of the data but also turned to 
the archives of writings about Sandy found in the media, in libraries, and as much as became 
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feasible, the files of centrally involved institutions, such as NOAA, Municipal Art Society, 
Sandy Storyline, GOSR, and the New York City Mayor’s Office. Thus, development of the 
stories of designers/planners are complemented by archival and documentary research followed 
by close reading of materials as described below. 
In the following sections, I begin with a detailed discussion of the case study method, 
noting its value and limitations. I then turn to the principal data source I used, namely the stories 
of the lived experiences of design/planning professionals, describing the pros and cons of 
narrative-based research. The discussion then altered briefly to the complementary use of 
documentary materials. It should be noted that in working on this research, the documentary 
analysis preceded interviewing as going through written records assisted in identifying potential 
interviewees: Any media coverage of the post-Sandy initiatives quoted those who were centrally 
involved and who could be strong potential participants or, at least, were good first contacts in 
identifying participants. 
The Case Study Method 
A case study, according to Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) is “an in-depth, 
multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. 
The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on several data sources” (p. 2). They add 
that, while this definition is broad,  
there is further supposition that certain kinds of data collection procedures will be 
employed, procedures that will permit the investigator to examine the phenomenon in 
great depth and detail . . . usually termed qualitative methods and are contrasted with 
quantitative methods. (Orum et al., 1991, p. 2)  
From the perspective of one of the most prominent advocates and formulators of case 
study research, “it is most often under complex social phenomena that focuses on a ‘case’ with a 
real-world perspective and is most often found in the social science and practicing professions 
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(Yin, 2014, pp. 4–5). For example, in law, in psychiatry, urban design, and, as made famous by 
the teaching approach at the Harvard Business School, preparing descriptions of cases is a 
fundamental activity central to human learning and creativity (Christensen, 1987; Flyvbjerg, 
2006). 
The research case study has been defined at length in what is probably by far the most 
cited text on using this approach. Yin’s (2014) detailed twofold definition of the case study is as 
follows: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (p. 16). Yin (2014) goes on to further describe characteristics he feels 
constitute the research case study:  
The case study inquiry, 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result; 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
   triangulating fashion, and as another result; 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
   collection and analysis. (p. 17)  
 
Admirable in its breadth, this widely cited definition does not really set much in the way 
of clear boundaries on what is (and is not) a case study. For example, although the approach 
“benefits” from pre-existing theoretical propositions, a theoretical grounding to the study is not 
essential. Including a term such as “contemporary” also invites controversy and dissension, 
because there is no way of telling just how far back one can go and still be contemporary.  
The value of case studies. A paradox one soon sees in examining the case study method 
is that it is used widely and yet spoken of just as commonly with qualifications, even by 
researchers who use it. Researchers are quick to apologize for what the method cannot do 
compared to the rigorous experimental designs and quantitative research favored in natural 
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sciences. For example, in a paper whose title advances the case study as leading potentially to 
“intellectually ambitious inquiry” (Barzelay, 1993, p. 305), it is noted that: “In the canons of 
social science research, the single case study . . . is ordinarily judged to be lacking in rigor, 
comparability, and replicability” (p. 305). Yin, probably the best-known proponent of research 
case studies wrote “‘The Case Study Crisis’ (1981) many years ago and, three decades later was 
still lamenting that although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, for many 
researchers it is not their first method of choice” (2014, p. 19). 
Gerring (2007) commented, “Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty 
articulating what it is that they are doing, methodologically speaking. The case study survives in 
a curious methodological limbo” (p. 7). For others, such as D. T. Campbell and Stanley (1966), 
the case study was seen as going way below limbo into a kind of much-deserved eternal 
damnation:  
Such studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value . . . 
It seems well-nigh unethical at the present time to allow, as theses or dissertations in 
education, case studies of this nature. (pp. 6–7) 
But, as Flyvbjerg (2006) pointed out, over time Campbell “made a 180-degree turn in his 
views of the case study and has become one of the strongest proponents of this methods”              
(p. 391). Heugens and Mol (2005), describing the change in Campbell’s attitude towards 
research case studies, touched on important strengths of the approach: 
At the core of his [Campbell’s] conversion lies the insight that even single-case studies 
are never N = 1 snapshots of an unchanging reality. Case studies are genuine empirical 
endeavors in that they always explore covariation between purported causes and 
hypothesized effects, sometimes by dividing a sampled case up in subunits, at other times 
by comparing formal units (the person, group, or organization of which the researcher has 
in-depth knowledge) with informal units (all other units that are brought into the analysis 
in a more peripheral way). (p. 118)  
Flyvbjerg’s (2006) article, which addressed “five misunderstandings about case-study 
research” (the article title) also lays out the main value of doing case studies. He argued that to 
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really grasp social phenomena context-rich accounts are essential, in contrast to purely 
theoretical works. Flyvbjerg first became interested in case study research for an urban design 
project. He turned to Karl Popper’s famous formulations about “black swans” to make the case 
for the case study. Flyvbjerg (2006) noted Popper observations: 
“All swans are white,” and proposed that just one observation of a single black swan 
would falsify this proposition and, in this way, have general significance and stimulate 
further investigations and theory-building. The case study is well suited for identifying 
“black swans” because of its in-depth approach [emphasis added]: what appears to be 
“white” often turns out on closer examination to be “black.” (p. 228) 
Flyvbjerg went on to say that his experience of identifying black swans was something he 
became very familiar with during this own in-depth urban politics and planning case study, about 
which he noted: 
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central 
to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other 
methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, 
whereas “the force of example” is underestimated. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228) 
Looking at this in regard to the study, the complex multi-dimensional setting of the 
massive New York metropolitan area during and after Hurricane Sandy, makes looking at the 
storm’s impact on design/planning professionals something of a black swan. Many were the 
observers who in one way or another commented on the unprecedented nature and impact of 
Sandy. For example, the week after the storm Scientific American (2012) titled a “Special 
Report” comprising several separate articles, “Hurricane Sandy: An Unprecedented Disaster” 
Even the harshest critics of case study methods will admit that the approach has exploratory 
value: getting first acquainted with the broad strokes of a complex situation and not 
underestimating the force of example. 
An added advantage of approaching this as a single case study is that this “method” is in 
fact not just a single formulaic methodology but an opportunity to use, as Yin pointed out, 
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“multiple sources of evidence” (p. 101). Along the same lines, Stake (2006), argued that utilizing 
a case study, leaves open the use of a broad range of methods: 
Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied . . . By 
whatever methods we choose to study the case. We could study it analytically or 
holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically, or culturally, 
and by mixed methods—but we concentrate, at least for the time being, on the case.          
(p. 443) 
Additionally, what makes this study a case is that it is bounded, with the study focused on 
one event, Hurricane Sandy and on a specific community of professionals—designers/planners. 
Within this in-depth bounded system other types of qualitative or quantitative research can be 
built into the case study, such as narrative inquiry, presenting individual stories as part of the 
case.  
This study relied on a mixed approach—not in the now common notion of doing 
quantitative and qualitative work together, known as “mixed methods” (see for example Teddlie 
& Tashakkori, 2009)—but relying on in-depth biographical or life history style interviewing, 
with thorough document analysis, relying on written and media accounts to combine with what 
participating design-planning professionals related. What follows is a description of key aspects 
of these methods, within the case study research.  
An embedded single case study. Yin (2014) describes in great detail the primary 
characteristics of a single case study design with specific circumstances and five rationales:  
• Critical—“representing the critical test of a significant theory” (p. 52);  
• Unusual—"represents an extreme/unusual case deviating from theoretical norms of 
everyday occurrences” (p. 52); 
• Common—“capturing the circumstances or conditions of an everyday situation” (p. 52);  
• Revelatory—"analyzing a phenomenon previous inaccessible to social science inquiry” 
(p. 52); 
112 
 
 
• Longitudinal—studying the same single case at two or more different points in time.  
Yin (2014) went on from his explanation and rationales for single case studies to speak of 
“embedded case study design” as opposed to “holistic” ones (pp. 41–42). The former describes 
cases where there are distinctive subunits that can be and are used for some internal comparison 
while holistic, for Yin, is where there is a single unit of analysis.  
 For the purposes of this study a single embedded case study was used. Each of the five 
post-Sandy initiatives mentioned previously in Chapter II, are a “unit of analysis.” These specific 
units of analysis, the macro-, meso-, and micro-level are distinguished for this study as follows: 
Macro: Contextual Forces: Hurricane Sandy 
Meso: Five different initiatives: connections to designers/planners; information rich 
Micro: Designers/planners’ interviews and focus group. 
 The application to this classification to this dissertation is portrayed in Figure 3.2. In 
planning this analysis, a revelatory case study was another alternative but upon further review, it 
is already implied by the very nature of a dissertation, that the research would need to be 
revelatory and not previously studied. In an exploratory embedded case study, while structured 
or focused interviews are employed, this design allowed for an array of samplings that can be 
embedded into the case. 
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Figure 3.2. Research design levels of analysis. 
 
Designing the case study. Yin (2014) identified five components of research design that he 
states as critical in order to avoid not addressing the research questions in a case study: 
• A case study’s questions; 
• Its propositions, if any; 
• Its unit(s) of analysis: 
• The logic linking the data to the propositions; 
• The criteria for interpreting the findings. (p. 29) 
The study’s question was stated in terms of “who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” and “why,” 
with the unit of analysis describing what the case is, which could be groups, organizations or 
countries. For this study, the primary research question was: In what ways did post-Hurricane 
Sandy experiences impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future  
climate-related events personally (individually), professionally, and societally? This raises the 
question of how working on Sandy affected designer/planners’ understanding of their work and 
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lives more generally. Have they been wounded and/or transformed by immersion in a context 
that is rife with suffering and uncertainty? And, as a result developed, a fuller yet more nuanced 
appreciation for their role in terms of the three pillars that was introduced in Chapter I: 
personally, professionally, societally.  
 
Figure 3.3. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies 
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners. 
 
Of the 28 professionals interviewed, 20 participants in this study, were significantly involved 
in one or more of the initiatives outlined in Chapter I, which were:  
• NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) 
• HUD’s Rebuild by Design  
     
• Build It Back (a New York City initiative) 
¥ New York Rising/Buy It Back (New York State initiative)
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• Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative that overlapped with a number of these 
programs) 
As seen in Chapter II, there is no great abundance of research on how designers/planners 
(as individuals and as professionals) are being impacted at the personal, professional, and 
societal level by their engagement in post-disaster design/planning. Therefore, one of the 
objectives of this research was to provide a significant contribution to an area of professionals 
that are not, by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with settings of disaster and trauma. 
Since we knew little about the actual impact to date, I concluded that the use of narrative inquiry 
for this study was the best means for understanding the individual’s experience as a means of 
developing research on this subject (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Therefore, while narrative 
inquiry was a major data source, it was nested within the larger methodological frame of the 
single case study. This approach added another level of authority since case study research 
design principles lend themselves to including numerous strategies that promote data credibility 
or truth value. Triangulation of data sources, data types or researchers is a primary strategy that 
can be used and would support the principle in case study research that the phenomena be 
viewed and explored from multiple perspectives (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 556).  
The Rise of Narrative Research 
The idea that story is, in fact, how we structure our lives (Bruner, 1987; Eakin, 2008, 
Randall, 1995) is related to the fact that stories surface individual meanings which is different 
than what a researcher can infer from structured surveys. Stories blend understanding of a person 
with social phenomena (like the impact of a cataclysmic event) that are often what the researcher 
really wants to understand better. “Personal narratives thus reveal not only much about the 
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narrating self but provide a small window into the engines of history and historical change, as we 
both shape and are shaped by the events of our day” (Andrews, 2007, p. 51). 
While most academic work continues to be non-narrative and based upon quantitative 
data, Clandinin (2007) comments that there has been “a veritable explosion of narrative inquiry 
across disciplines” (p. ix), which more generally has frequently been referred to as the “narrative 
turn” (Czarniawska, 2004; Glover, 2003).  
Pinnegar and Daynes (2007) define this in the context of four different turns toward 
narrative: 
 “Narrative Turn 1: Relationship of researcher and researched” (p. 9)—a change in the 
relationship between the person conducting the research and the person participating 
as the subject (the relationship between the researcher and the researched 
 “Narrative Turn 2: From Numbers to Words as Data” (p. 15) 
 “Narrative Turn 3: From the General to the Particular…a move from generalizability” 
(p. 2) 
 “Narrative Turn 4: Blurring Knowing” (p. 25)—a widening in acceptance of 
alternative epistemologies or ways of knowing.   
For researchers, these are all turns based on a commonality of research, focused on 
language used within the social science and the lived experience. Narrative inquiry is not a new 
practice. John Dewey (1930, 1934/2005), one of the foremost early influencers of narrative 
inquiry, wrote extensively about the nature of experience, and the way in which an individual’s 
personal voices are most often spoken in relationship to a community or within a particular 
social context, that is, a personal, social, and physical environment. As Clandinin and Connelly 
(2000) interpreted this, we are always in a continuum of moving “back and forth between the 
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personal and the social, simultaneously thinking about the past, present and future, and to do so 
in ever-expanding social milieus” (pp. 2–3). This mirrors the three pillars structures of strategy 
that was employed to deepen understanding of practitioners reflecting through narrative inquiry, 
and to see if what they experienced post-Sandy was attributable to that one event and/or if, in 
fact, that one event has had ongoing impact that is shaping a different kind of reality. 
Anthropologist, Mary Catherine Bateson’s work Peripheral Visions: Learning Along the 
Way (1994) is a compelling example of narrative inquiry with resonance to the use of it for this 
study. In this reflective interpretation of her life, and using narrative as a form of inquiry, the 
world is about change. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) described Bateson’s perspective: 
“Everything is changing—the phenomena, the discipline, the agent, the methods, and the 
outcomes . . . It is narrative that allows Bateson as an anthropologist to learn, narrative that 
allows all of us to learn” (p. 8).  
The initial exploration of the literature on narrative inquiry surfaces significant 
differences in how experienced researchers bound the field. Clandinin’s (2007) edited collection 
on narrative inquiry is subtitled “mapping a methodology” because, rather than trying to resolve 
the many different takes on narrative inquiry, she sees demarcating the “landscape of narrative 
inquiry” (Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007, p. 35) as the appropriate task in delineating the field. What 
she and other narrative inquirers appear to share is the idea, as noted above, of simultaneity and 
interactively exploring the personal and the social level. This is well summed up by Pinnegar and 
Daynes (2007): “In essence, narrative inquiry involves the reconstruction of a person’s 
experience in relationship both to the other and to a social milieu” (p. 5).  
One of the leading approaches that aims for the same dual exploration of the personal and 
the societal is referred to variously as biographical or life history studies. Both can be conflated 
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with other literary work, such as doing what are widely called biographies of famous people, 
which, unlike narrative inquiry, are not usually primarily interested in social phenomena of how 
the life described speaks to broader issues. Use of that term and life history may be 
understandably perceived by those outside the field as describing entire life journeys and not 
being equally or more interested in social phenomena (such as is the case here, the impacts of 
events like Sandy on professions and professional individuals).  
Nonetheless, as practiced by scholars like Dan Bar-On (2006) and Molly Andrews 
(2007)—whose work is more fully described below—life history interviewing, and analysis are 
more focused on broad, often challenging societal events, than on the specifics of particular 
individuals’ experiences.  
Dan Bar-On’s work demonstrates how storytelling can be used to work through 
intergenerational intractable conflicts. While the focus of this study is one specific event, which 
to date now spans close to eight years, the way in which he demonstrates data systematically 
through the use of storytelling as a mode of narrative inquiry has particular relevance. Bar-On 
developed theoretical constructs through the analysis of the interviewees that created a bridge 
between the events, the people impacted directly by them and those brought in to help with 
recovery. Bar-On (2006) went on to say,  
While in many quantitative studies hypotheses derive from existing theoretical 
structures and are confirmed or contradicted as the data is generated, the process here 
is an explorative one. The data is generated in order to develop new, yet-unknown 
theoretical constructs. This does not mean that there are no theoretical explanations or 
thoughts that apply to a given situation. But this method requires putting them aside at 
least until after the newly generated data is analyzed, in order to see if other, 
unexpected theoretical explanations can work. (p. 27)   
This approach can be particularly useful when analyzing the experiences of the 
interviewees through the lens of the three pillars.  
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Similarly, Molly Andrews (2007), focused on the “relationship between the stories 
people tell about their lives, and the political frameworks which form the context for these 
stories” (p. 2). For her, stories over time take on different meanings particularly as is the case for 
this study, as more and more design/planning professionals begin to take on similar roles within 
other environmentally impacted communities.  
 Once the interview process begins, a greater understanding is developed that clarifies 
which among these various perspectives is most relevant. That reveals itself when the 
interviewer has the lived experience of working with the respondents. For now, the flexible 
boundaries evident in Connelly and Clandinin’s (1990) Stories of Experience and Narrative 
Inquiry, was employed:  
Narrative inquiry in the social sciences is a form of empirical narrative in which 
empirical data is central to the work. The inevitable interpretation that occurs, something 
which is embedded even in the data collection process, does not make narrative into 
fiction even though the language of narrative inquiry is heavily laced with terms derived 
from literary criticism of fiction. A number of different methods of data collection are 
possible as the researcher and practitioner work together in a collaborative relationship.     
. . . The sense of the whole is built from a rich data source with a focus on the concrete 
particularities of life that create powerful narrative tellings. (p. 4) 
Given the research implications of this study with the use of narrative inquiry, I thought it 
pertinent to once again refer to the work of John Paul Lederach and the impact and role of 
narrative in the context of disaster: 
When I first came into this field I bumped into the word "storytelling" in reference to a 
phase in the mediation process, but it was actually a rather narrow definition of story: tell 
us what happened and why you're mad so we can get you past being mad and find a 
solution . . . the term I'm referring to, or the content, or the understanding I would give to 
storytelling is much more about finding a way to reflect in a much wider sense on what's 
happening in a situation and/or the experience of people . . . help break you out of an 
exclusively cognitive, linear rational understanding of both conflict analysis and solution 
seeking. And whoever the listeners are interact with it like it's a painting. If you stand 
before a painting, everyone has an opportunity to say, "this is what it's saying to me. This 
is what I see." And the story very much has that component to it. It is both on the side of 
the storyteller to put forward things, the ways they configure it, the ways they draw it out, 
but then it becomes very much of a live process in which there is an interaction and the 
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interaction itself is something that's open for interpretation. So suddenly you're in a 
community of meaning-creation, and I think that's a lot of what conflict is about. It's 
about the search for meaning; it's about how do we makes sense of these things that are 
going on, and what are the ways that we might respond to it, that can move it toward—at 
least in terms of my wider goals—finding our way back to being human, being in the 
community, in as constructive a way as we can? (Lederach as cited in Portilla, 2004, 
para. 4)  
Why Use Narrative Inquiry for This Study? 
The adaptation of human communities (including cities and nations) to global climate 
change is almost unthinkably complex. Despite a near consensus of scientists who are expert in 
disciplines relevant to climate change that it is a real and present danger, “an inconvenient truth” 
as former U.S. Vice President Al Gore famously called it, for others the topic is very difficult to 
grasp. When, for example, part of the earth faces a blizzardy winter as much of North America 
did in 2017–2018, and faced a milder winter in 2018–2019, confusion abounds, some of it 
intentionally spread, but much just due to the intricacy of cause and effect in patterns of air flow, 
ocean currents, etc. Thus, as someone grudgingly shovels out a snow-filled driveway in March, 
they can be forgiven for asking, “Where the hell is this ‘global warming?’”  
One might contend that most designers/planners, while well versed in analytic thinking, 
are also caught up in webs of this physical complexity and, yet, must take a lead role in helping 
non-professionals understand what’s happening and participate in strategies to mitigate and adapt 
to increasingly unpredictable meteorological events—like Hurricane Sandy and the future 
superstorms that are sure to be coming. Moreover, as emerged in the discussion in Chapter II, 
designers/planners need to also take the pre-disaster marginalization of certain groups into 
account in their work.  
To grasp their innermost feelings about climate change, weather and sea level 
catastrophes, and the effects of these, and how to do their essential work in the future, is not 
amenable to some of the more common approaches used in social science such as questionnaires 
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or highly structured interviews. To create such a survey would mean having to already grasp the 
complexities, conflicts, and nuances arising for such professionals as they experience and work 
during and after events like Sandy. Narrative inquiry does not depend on the researcher’s 
foreknowledge of complex feelings and experiences, but draws on the stories of participants, 
structured in ways close to their lived experience, and which bring out details that no one 
researcher could hope ever to anticipate.  
Such stories are sure to be full of surprises not only for the researcher but for the narrator. 
It is a common observation both in narrative research as well as in the work of creative 
professional storywriters, that only in the process of telling does the narrator deeply probe, 
reflect on, revise, and develop his/her own understanding. Some have called this “narrative 
knowing” (Polkinghorne, 1988). Or it could just as well be called narrative discovery: getting to 
know one’s own world better by telling stories of one’s experience in it. As Randall (1995) so 
well put it: “The way we story our lives directly affects the way we understand ourselves; the 
way we understand ourselves directly affects the way we act; and the way we act directly affects 
the way the world is” (p. 9). Underlying this topic and this researcher’s commitment to it is the 
belief that nothing is more important, as cities, nations and individuals face up to climate change, 
than an intimate knowledge of this process of self- and situational-understanding. The stories of 
design/planning professionals who play and will play such vital roles in humankind’s coping 
with climate change, are central to survival.  
Additionally, narrative inquiry is a “collaboration between researcher and participants, 
over time, in a place or a series of places, and in social interaction with milieus” (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 2000, p. 20), all commonplace to the lived experience of design/planning 
professionals.  
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The Challenges of the Narrative Case Study Approach 
Narrative inquiry, not unlike other forms of research, involves data collection and 
analyses with the emphasis of the study done through stories. It is a form of making meaning by 
consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what the interviewees have said and what the researcher 
has seen and read. The confluence between data and abstract concepts, between inductive and 
deductive reasoning, between description and interpretation, become the basis of the findings for 
the study. Identifying themes, categories, patterns, or answers to the research questions are the 
basis for the interpretation of the data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, pp. 202–203). The language 
used to tell the stories is part of the analysis.  
However, as noted by Savin-Baden and Van Niekerk (2007), how the researcher is 
managing the story and the ownership of interpretation is critical:   
Understandings of concepts such as credibility, validity or trustworthiness that are used to 
ensure rigor must be addressed with honesty in narrative inquiry. Thus, we must engage 
with the issue of ownership of interpretation, so there is a sense that what we are 
presenting is shared truths and shared values. Thus, people’s norms and values, including 
our own, are always evident in the way data are presented and portrayed. Yet such 
negotiation remains a difficult, complex and time-consuming task. (p. 467) 
Therefore, how stories are interpreted, the clarity with which the interviews are set up and 
the manner in which the stories are gathered become all the more critical. It is also critical that 
that the researcher is very clear about what it means to be a good interviewer. The differences 
between ordinary conversations and in-depth interviews need to be clear from the beginning as is 
the distinction of if someone is providing the reader with a narrative or a story. When one is 
interviewing, the questions are more consciously linked to one another and there are more 
deliberate transitions when topics are being changed. Additionally, the researcher has a different 
intention in that when interviewing someone, she/he has a deliberate intention in terms of 
information gathering that will later be analyzed. An interview is not as informal as ordinary 
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conversation: notes are taken, and the discussion is usually recorded for the purpose of analyzing 
data. While these distinctions seem obvious, it is easy to get so engaged in the flow of a 
conversation during a research interview as to lose track of the objectives. Therefore, while 
allowing for spontaneity, I kept interviews focused on the research question throughout by 
asking follow-up questions that guided the conversation as well as provided greater depth and 
detail.  
The way that a researcher listens is as important as the questions asked. How actively 
researchers listen determines the strength and quality of the connection with the interviewee. 
This is foundational for creating an exchange of respect, safety, responsibility, and empathy so 
that when more sensitive questions are asked, both the researcher and the interviewee have a 
high level of comfort with each other. An additional consideration is that for this particular 
study, I interviewed a number of people with whom there had been a prior professional 
relationship. This made the clarity of all of these distinctions all the more critical. 
This becomes all the more important in considering the ethical issues of conducting 
narrative inquiry. Josselson (2007) speaks of the “ethical conundrum [that] derives from the fact 
that the narrative researcher is in a dual role in an intimate relationship with the participant 
 . . . and in a professionally responsible role in the scholarly community” (p. 535). 
Interviews for Story-Gathering  
In a narrative, the speakers put together what they believe actually occurred, recognizing 
that what they say might be incomplete because they only saw part of what happened or 
only remember a piece of what went on. In contrast, a story is told to make a point or 
present a theme, either stated or implicit, irrespective of the accuracy of the details. In 
telling a story, events may be edited or reordered, and exaggeration may be added for 
effect. (Rubin & Rubin, 2011, p. 109)  
General approach and philosophy in using stories from interviews. Stories from 
professionals could conceivably be gathered in other ways than face-to-face interviewing (Van 
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Manen, 1990). For example, professionals individually need to have ways of charting their 
activity, sometimes even using reflective journals. Others will create written “traces” of their 
work and thought through correspondence, meeting notes, transcripts of their participation in 
public sessions, etc. Access to such materials is likely to be limited at best; who of us would 
willingly turn over diaries, memos, etc. to an eager researcher? Moreover, there is something 
quite different about writing than talking about experiences. Van Manen (1990) suggested that 
participants in a study could, in principle, be asked to write what he calls protocols: “The most 
straightforward way to go about our research is to ask selected individuals to write their 
experiences down” (p. 63). He suggested that researchers could ask participants “to write a direct 
account of a personal experience as [they] lived through it” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 65). This kind 
of approach may work best in participatory action research, such as with educational research 
where the researcher is also the professor of her “subjects” with the resultant extra leverage to 
“persuade” the researched to do this. In contrast, in a context such as this study, there is much 
less likely to be concurrence and acquiescence with such a strategy; exceptionally busy 
design/planning professionals usually have pressing commitments that are more part of their 
everyday role fulfillment; diligently journaling so as to meet this study’s purposes is unlikely to 
be as high a priority. As well, participants are always sure to worry about the eventual fate of 
things that are written.  
Moreover, Van Manen (1990) argued for interviewing because of the predictably 
different kind of product, as opposed to written accounts. 
Sometimes it is easier to talk than to write about a personal experience because writing 
forces the person into a more reflective attitude, which may make it more difficult to stay 
close to an experience as it is immediately lived. (p. 67) 
In this study, the objective was to seek both the “immediately lived” experience and 
reflection but a minimalist interview technique as advocated by Bar-On (2006), based on 
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Rosenthal (1993), and utilized also by Andrews (2007). These authors recommend interviews in 
which the researcher begins with a brief explanation of the subject matter and requests that the 
participant tell his or her story as it relates to the topic. And then, for the most part, the researcher 
stays quiet. Bar-On (2006) describes the approach personally:  
I favor the biographical method developed by Rosenthal (1993), based on a German 
study in which the interviewer opens the interview wide at the outset—for example: 
“Please tell me your life story, starting wherever you would like”—and then lets 
interviewees narrate their life stories undisturbed. Clarifications or questions of interest to 
the interviewer come after the main narration. (p. 29) 
The interviewee as storyteller is then wide open to structuring and recounting a story in a 
way that gets to the heart of their feelings. It should be pointed out that while Bar-On’s (2006) 
words imply that participants may end up describing everything from their moment of birth (or 
before) to the present, the description of the study that the researcher will have given in advance 
of meeting should cue the them towards discussing themes close to the research topic. The key 
point is that how each interviewee relates the topic of interest to a broader flow of life 
experiences is what is needed. Disembodied generalities on the importance of climate change 
and how we all must do our part, etc., are not what is needed to shed light on the topic how 
Hurricane Sandy (and its aftermath) impacted and was experienced by design/planning 
professionals. 
As noted, as they do this, with all the freedom that traditional storytellers have had since 
the earliest of times, they will access ways of looking at the impacts of and changes in them 
caused by so dramatic an event as Sandy. This approach has been used to deal with extremely 
difficult and personally and politically sensitive matters. Whether it is the experiences of 
individuals caught up in rapid social transformation, Whites and Blacks in the transition away 
from apartheid in South Africa or as East Germans after the Berlin Wall came down (Andrews, 
2007). Distinct from such political transitions, the people who are the center of this research have 
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also lived through what are literally tempestuous events; their stories can be used, broadly 
speaking, as Andrews (2007) says: “to provide a small window into the engines of history and 
historical change, as [they] both shape and are shaped by the events of the day” (p. 51). An 
example is the Sandy Storyline, an outgrowth of Occupy Sandy, that began with individual 
stories evolving into a “participatory web-based documentary and exhibition that 
explores the immediate and still-unfolding impacts of Hurricane Sandy through the 
experiences of some of the millions of people whose lives were affected by the storm” 
(Sandy Storyline, n.d., para. 1).  
Data Gathering 
I conducted two tiers of narrative research with participants: an initial round of  
one-on-one conversations and, based then on the results and emerging themes from those, a 
focus group of three professionals who through the response to some pointed questions around 
some prevailing themes, either agreed with or challenged some of the responses. 
Sample size and sampling strategy. “It is said that qualitative methods tend to generate 
large amounts of detailed information about a small number of settings” (Mays & Pope, 1995,   
p. 109). Comparatively small sample size is often raised by critics of qualitative interviewing as 
a weakness as it will inevitably be much smaller than what would be done using surveys. Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) provide a credible response to this suggesting that sampling be only until one 
reaches a point of saturation or redundancy: “[Using this] means that you are hearing the same 
responses to your interview questions or seeing the same behavior in observations; no new 
insights are forthcoming” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 101). Therefore, as part of the structure 
of this study, the goal was to reach a point of saturation which, 
entails bringing new participants continually into the study until the data set is complete, 
as indicated by data replication or redundancy. In other words, saturation is reached when 
127 
 
 
the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being 
added. (Bowen, 2008, p. 140) 
I recognize that “nothing new” is itself a fuzzy concept and that my search for and 
eventual interviewing of a sample was guided also by a subjective sense that “an adequate 
sample size is one that sufficiently answers the research question” (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013,        
p. 192).  
           
              
             
               
               
              
           
The research utilized a mix of approaches to actually locate interviewees, starting with 
people whose professional work I had become familiar with through my own engagement in 
aspects of several of those and other post-Sandy initiatives. From there I utilized snowballing as 
part of purposeful sampling, which basically means a chain referral approach (Biernacki & 
Waldorf, 1981), with current interviewees being asked who else one could speak with and, 
sometimes, even getting the person’s help with making initial contact. I also anticipated locating 
some potential interviewees from a detailed analysis of documents (newspapers, reports, 
published articles, and dissertations); often, such written materials identify professionals, 
including designers/planners, as report authors or as experts cited or thanked by other authors. In 
preparation for the focus group, emerging themes from the impact of Sandy on design/planning 
professionals was prepared as a case highlighting findings for focus group review and discussion. 
 
             
 
            
            
 The sample was comprised of design/planning professionals as well as al lied 
professionals who were integral to the design/planning process and were present in the New
York/New Jersey region during Hurricane Sandy (all or part of the period, approximately 
October 22, 2012—November 2, 2012). They subsequently had an opportunity to work on one or 
more of the f ive post-Sandy initiatives described in Chapters I and II Ñ the NYC Special 
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resil iency, Rebuild by Design, New York Rising, Build It            
Back/Buy It Back, and Occupy Sandy, or other closely aligned climate impactful events.
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One-on-one interviews.  
For a narrative research approach that will rely heavily on interviews, setting up clear 
expectations in the beginning is critical for having a respectful relationship with 
participants. While this is important in any social research, it is all the more critical where 
the participant’s life is interwoven with a particular phenomenon; therefore, the 
researcher has to be transparent about his/her interest in the study so that there is an 
authentic alliance with the participant. (Josselson, 2007, p. 540)  
The strategy was to prepare a clear and concise interview protocol (S. A. Jacob & 
Furgerson, 2012). While working out the detailed structure of interviews, the research structure 
was developed from the topics arising from the three pillars discussed in Chapter I: 
• Personal—Impacts on the self/individual; psycho-social challenges, such as 
empathy/stress 
• Professional—Impact to professional practice, reflections on strategies                 
post-Hurricane Sandy, and impact on future events. 
• Societal—Local and global impacts, leadership. 
Participant Demographics 
What follows is a thematic analysis of 28 participant interviews. Table 3.1 briefly profiles 
the participants, including their profession, experience, years in the profession and gender 
identification. The names are all pseudonyms.  
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Table 3.1  
Interview Participants’ Characteristics (n = 28) 
Name Profession 
 
Years in 
Profession 
Gender 
Identification 
Race/Ethnicity/ 
Nationality 
Eli  Architect 20 Male Euro American 
Penelope Architect 12 Female Latina 
Hannah  Planner 30 Female Euro American 
Roberta  Architect 25 Female Euro American  
Leah  Architect/Planner 15 Female Euro American  
Paul Engineer 30 Male Euro American  
Ross  Architect/Professor 40 Male Euro American  
Muriel  Communications Specialist 35 Female Euro American  
Talib  Architect 12 Male Jamaican  
Liz Engineer 20 Female Greek 
Esther  Activist/Storyteller 10 Female Euro American  
Melissa  Architect/Professor 30 Female Euro American  
Samuel  Architect 20 Male Euro American  
Lyla  Architect 30 Female Euro American  
Nahla  Architect/Professor 15 Female Turkish  
Edward  Architect 20 Male Euro American  
Thomas  Landscape Architect/Urban 
Designer  
15 Male Latino 
Grace  Engineer 20 Female Euro American 
Brianna  Architect/Professor 15 Female Indian/Asian 
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Name Profession 
 
Years in 
Profession 
Gender 
Identification 
Race/Ethnicity/ 
Nationality 
Beryl  Landscape Architect 25 Female Euro American 
Joseph  Social Activist 15 Male African American 
Susan  Urban Strategist 30 Female Euro Canadian 
Kaasar Planner  12 Male Latino 
Robert  Architect 40 Male Euro American 
Mya  Architect 15 Female Latina 
Claire  Architect 12 Female African American 
Vic  Architect 30 Male Euro American 
Jeanine  Landscape Architect 35 Female Euro American 
 
 
   
  
Table 3.2  
Focus Group Participants’ Characteristics 
Name Profession 
 
Years in 
Profession 
Gender 
Identification 
Race/Ethnicity/ 
Nationality 
Adam Architect 40 Male Euro American 
Zac Architect/Planner 30 Male Euro American 
Therese  Landscape 
Architect/Architect 
20 Female Euro American 
 
In the discussion in Chapter IV, I have relied on both the interviews and the focus group 
for insights related to the pillars and emergent themes. 
 Table 3.2 provides information about the profession, experience, years in the profession 
and gender identif ication for the three focus group participants. Again, all of the names are 
pseudonyms.
131 
 
 
Preparing for the interviews. An Informed Consent Agreement was created and provided 
to participants in advance. In preparation for the interviews I circulated a briefing note for 
participants describing the study details and means to be used to assure anonymity and 
confidentiality. Ways of achieving this were considered below.  
A consent form was prepared, modelled on commonly available templates but tailored to 
fit the context. It was further recognized that many of the participants hold significant positions 
in ongoing post-Sandy work, settings where they are expected to be always strong, fast, and sure 
in their professional judgements, and invulnerable to the very kinds of doubts and fears and      
self-transformations that the study sought to explore.  
Conducting interviews. Prior to the interview permission was sought for audio recording, 
accompanied by confidentiality protocols (see on “Ethical Considerations,” below). Recordings 
that were made were professionally transcribed. Security of the actual recordings and the 
transcripts were committed to in the consent form. Interview sessions were all conducted on the 
phone. Each session ran between 60 and 80 minutes.  
Interview Analysis  
Phase One: Transcriptions. The recorded interviews were uploaded to a secure 
computer. Of the 28 interviews, 23 were transcribed by a single investigator from Upwork to 
ensure confidentiality. Four were transcribed by me. This resulted in 457 pages of single-spaced,  
one-sided interview text. The interviews were then read through in their entirety, and initial 
themes and comments were noted in the margins of the documents. This same approach was 
followed in the focus group, which is further expanded on further in this document. 
There were many hours of listening and re-listening with the transcript and note-taking 
with the recordings produced during the interviews. It is further acknowledged what Bar-On 
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(2006) says, that “moving from the interviewing phase into the analysis phase can represent a 
crisis” (p. 32). In using “crisis,” Bar-On is referring to the transition from often coming to feel 
very close to, and empathetic with interviewees, to adopting a more distanced analytic stance. He 
emphasizes the usefulness both for enhancing validity and just for “ventilating” (p. 32) of having 
another researcher brought in to assist in reviewing themes and patterns in this stage of the work. 
While I anticipated prior to beginning the analysis that this might be necessary, I found that I was 
able to maintain my objectivity. This was achieved by structuring enough time between the 
interviews and the actual analysis. As a result, reflection was built into the schedule and a more 
distanced analytic stance was maintained. In terms of enhancing validity and just for 
“ventilating”, that was achieved through the focus group. 
Phase Two: Coding. After the interviews, and all documents were transcribed and 
uploaded to Dedoose,10 an analysis of interview data began. Notes, comments, observations, and 
queries in reading the data began the open coding process. Parent codes were developed for the 
thematic analysis that drew inferences to the interviewee’ stories as they relate to the research 
questions and thus began the assignment of codes to specific data. The initial coding process in 
this study generated three primary or parent codes that aligned with the three pillars: Personal, 
Professional and Societal. All together there were 947 text excerpts, and with multiple code 
applications per excerpt, a total of 965 code applications were part of the final analysis.  
Through the use of thematic analysis, inferences were drawn about the interviewees’ 
stories as they related to the research questions. The details of the strategy were worked out 
based upon the results of the interviews, the form the stories and data took. Braun and Clarke 
(2006) helpfully point out that each researcher can and must consider quite an array of different 
 
10 This software is described as “a cross-platform app for analyzing qualitative and mixed methods 
research with text, photos, audio, videos, spreadsheet data and more” (Dedoose, n.d., para.1).  
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approaches in drawing from his/her corpus of results, themes, or patterns most pertinent to the 
research question. Therefore, in developing this study’s thematic analysis approach, depending 
on the form of the data, I turned to Braun and Clarke’s (2006) approach as well as Aronson’s 
(1995) “Pragmatic View of Thematic Analysis,” which is aimed at ethnographic interviewers; 
Kvale’s (1996) “six steps” (p. 189) of analysis; and Burnard, Gill, Stewart, Treasure, and 
Chadwick’s (2008) thematic content analysis, which involves “analysing transcripts, identifying 
themes within those data, and gathering together examples of those themes from the text”             
(p. 429). In some instances, the interviews yielded longer biographical accounts—given the 
relatively unstructured and open-ended approach in the interviews. Bar-On’s (2006, pp. 32–33) 
three-step approach to analyzing interviews, relying on chronology, linguistic and sequential 
analysis, was also utilized. 
The results of the analysis were useful for my research in and of themselves and also 
became the basis of preparing questions, featuring themes, for use in the second tier of data 
gathering: focus group discussion.  
Conducting the focus group. The second step of my data gathering involved holding 
one focus group to discuss the question of impacts and changes design/planning professionals 
experienced during and after Hurricane Sandy. Prior to arranging the focus group meeting, a first 
cut thematic analysis was completed. This was followed by a concise discussion document, 
outlining (without attribution) results of interviews and posing a set of questions for group 
discussion.  
The selection of participants raised a key question: Is it best to rely on a sample of the 
professionals who have already been interviewed or recruit a different group who would be 
unconstrained by any thoughts of having to support or be consistent with points they have 
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already made? After reviewing all of the data, the decision was made to recruit three individuals 
outside of the study sample to act as the focus group. This was utilized through a snowballing 
technique. While I knew each of the participants through reputation in the industry, they were 
not well known to me either professionally or personally. They consisted of one architect, one 
architect/planner, and one landscape architect/architect. One of the architects and the landscape 
architect were very engaged post-Sandy. One was particularly focused on recovery in NYCHA 
housing. The second architect was engaged with Sandy through one of the non-profits. He had 
ongoing recovery and planning experience post-Katrina and was heavily focused on resiliency 
and vulnerable communities.  
The main purpose of the focus group was to “to clarify, extend, qualify or challenge data 
collected [in interviews]” (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008, p. 293). It is to be noted 
that while what is said in a focus group can be protected with the same measures for anonymity 
and confidentiality used in interviews, there is, by definition, the added issue that group members 
will inevitably be revealing their views and experiences to others than the researcher. Bloor, 
Frankland, Thomas, and Robson (2001) note that while every effort may be taken to assure 
confidentiality of the discussion—what comes up in the group, stays in the group—there is 
bound to be a risk that participants will reveal some of the conversation later outside the group. 
The best approach, they advise, is to have protocols but make focus group participants aware of 
such risks before they agree to attend. Reference to such risks were included in the informed 
consent agreement that each participant reviewed and signed.  
Decisions on venue, length and structure were agreed upon in preparation for the focus 
group tier of research. The guidelines I used were as follows: 
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Venue: As with all the other one-on-one interviews, the focus group was conducted on 
the phone.  
Length: This was subject to participant availability, which ended up being 60 minutes. As 
Stewart and Shamdasani (2015) observed,  
Time is a finite resource in modern society. The time budget of the average individual 
may be more constrained than the financial budget. Asking individuals to spend 90 
minutes to 2 hours in a focus group discussion—plus the time travelling to and from the 
group—is asking for a significant sacrifice. (p. 66)  
Structure: I had a pre-circulated discussion document that explained the study purpose, 
provided an overview of key emergent themes (while pointing out that this is not necessarily a 
complete list of such), and outlined a few questions to guide the discussion. The latter was 
“suggestive” and room was left for new matters to be discussed. One of the participants 
answered all of the questions and sent them back to me. The other two did not. 
One further matter that comes up in designing focus groups for research is the question of 
group moderation or facilitation. Ideally, someone other than the researcher takes care of 
managing the meeting and interactions, freeing the researcher to listen deeply and make highlight 
notes as the discussion unfolds. For my work, budgetary constraints would mean being able to do 
this only if a volunteer facilitator could be recruited which was not feasible. 
The focus group session was taped and transcribed as with the interviews, based on prior 
notification and concurrence of the participants.  
Focus group analysis. The analysis of the focus group transcripts followed closely the 
approach this interviewer developed for the one-on-one interviews, as outlined above. This 
interview was transcribed by the investigator. It resulted in 13 pages of single-spaced one-sided 
interview text. Additionally, one participant provided a one-page written response to the 
questions in advance of the actual interview.  
136 	
	
The interview thematic analysis was considered in formulating the questions that were 
posed in the focus group. This researcher is mindful of remarks made by Gill et al. (2008) on 
some special challenges to analyzing the text from focus groups: 
It is important to note that the analysis of focus group data is different from other 
qualitative data because of their interactive nature, and this needs to be taken into 
consideration during analysis. The importance of the context of other speakers is essential 
to the understanding of individual contributions. For example, in a group situation, 
participants will often challenge each other and justify their remarks because of the group 
setting, in a way that perhaps they would not in a one to-one interview. The analysis of 
focus group data must therefore take account of the group dynamics that have generated 
remarks. (p. 294)  
Document Research 
While the interviews and focus group were the most time-consuming and influential data 
gathering for this research, in this embedded case study involving designers/planners engaged 
with or highly influenced by five post-Sandy initiatives, it was important to have an independent 
understanding of how each initiative worked and what critical incidents and developments may 
have been central. This not only assisted me in gaining a strong sense of the context and 
chronology of each initiative but helped me to come to my own assessments of their professional 
experiences: their victories, their setbacks, their existential moments. I needed to be ready to 
constructively challenge11 those who contribute through interviews and focus groups within the 
analytical and interpretive frame. There was a substantial collection of materials germane to the 
design/planning professional roles, actions and reflections garnered well in advance of those 
interviews. Beyond this role, the documentary records of individuals and organizations, as they 
struggle through crisis situations, provide important insights into how they see and present 
 
11 A major contribution to understanding and even resolving the tension between taking what an 
interviewee says on faith, and yet being scientifically skeptical of it, is Josselson’s (2004) article, “The 
Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion.” Documentary research can be an essential 
part of being able to be a believer and a constructive doubter simultaneously.  
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themselves, the stories they tell, even in comparatively dry documentation, about their work, its 
challenges, their successes and (sometimes) their failings (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011). This was 
part of the study’s analyses along with expanding my familiarity with all relevant written 
materials.  
Jarvis (1999) has described the range of materials that those research professional 
practitioners may try to access and study. A goldmine among these would be the personal notes 
and/or working journal of actual professionals. He suggested, “Such documents . . . are useful 
accessories to understanding the practice because they capture a view of its transitory process 
and shed some light both on what occurred and, on the reasoning, and feelings of the 
practitioners” (p. 113). While actual studies, drawings of plans and site photos of projects under 
construction or completed were easily accessible, given the specific parameters of this study, 
while the researcher could have access to them, it was deemed not worthy of further exploration. 
Jarvis (1999) identified an array of other “more formal” (p. 113) documentary materials 
from within organizations which he recommends be found and studied: “minutes of meetings, 
official correspondence, policy directives, outlines of procedures, statements from management, 
rule books, job descriptions, and so on” (p. 113). He pointed out that, many categories are in the 
public domain though a few are internal; the latter include internal communications which are 
increasingly electronic.  
More readily available documentation, beyond the reports and scholarly literature 
reviewed in Chapter II, include: 
 Newspaper articles about Sandy along with letters to the editors; 
 Presentations by design/planning professionals at conferences, public meetings; 
 Transcripts from community meetings about Sandy;  
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 The frequently super-abundant reports, memos and the like, sometimes referred to as 
“grey literature.” 
Document analysis. This work proceeded concurrently with the interviews and also the 
focus group as materials came up in discussion. As themes emerged from analysis of discussions, 
focal points for documentary analysis developed. Additional documents, beyond those that were 
used to describe the contextual characteristics of the study, were sought during and after the 
interviews as initiated by the participants’ reference to types of sources/information.  
Ethical Issues of the Research Relationship  
Narrative research consists of obtaining and then reflecting on people’s lived experience 
and is inherently a relational endeavor. Every aspect of the work is touched by the ethics 
of the research relationship. (Josselson, 2007, p. 537)  
 
In narrative-based research, the researcher seeks, hears, and later writes about stories that 
are usually momentous to those who recount them. Ethical matters needed to be addressed over 
the entire narrative inquiry process beginning with application for and obtaining approval from 
Antioch’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). This application was prepared and submitted after 
the proposal was accepted and the research process was begun with participants. The ethical 
challenges—and how I planned to meet these—were fully developed for the IRB application, 
and is underscored, as Kvale (1996) suggested, by noting the different ethical issues arising at 
the several stages of the completed research.  
           
           
             
             
                
 
              
 Ethical issues in recruit ing par ticipants. Having worked as a participant and 
collaborator post-Sandy in a variety of rolesÑ researcher for a professional organization, 
communications liaison on one of the Rebuild by Design teams, volunteer with Occupy
Sandy, and faci litator at public events in communities struck by Sandy Ñ I acknowledged this to 
the participants to maintain transparency and be cognizant of any potential bias that may arise.
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Many of the participants held civic positions or government contracts as design/planning 
professionals. I anticipated that interviewees might feel restricted in their responses given the 
professional role they currently held, or any non-disclosure agreements they may have signed. 
Under such circumstances they would be limited in terms of what they could or would be willing 
to discuss beyond the “party line” of their organizations. Clearly, in seeking their agreement to 
be participants I needed to show how, as a researcher, I would balance their possible reluctance 
to reveal innermost thoughts and feelings about post-Sandy experiences with my need to bring 
out valid and meaningful accounts. This was resolved through my characterizing to each 
participant the interview as a mutual project for which both they and I have responsibility. The 
initial consent form and ancillary materials, such as the description of what the research entails, 
was the main way of working towards this balance, along with the discussion prior to their 
commitment to participate. The fact that some of the participating designers/planners were 
people with whom I had varying degrees of prior amicable working contact had implications. 
Brewis (2014) explained, 
The stories we are told by friend-respondents are more likely to be heard stories, so we 
need to reflect on how it might feel for them to narrate these as well as considering how 
much of a “scholarly good” we serve by reproducing these stories in our publications. 
Moreover, friend-researchers and friend-respondents alike have to live with these 
publications after the fact; something which may get neglected in the process of research 
itself. (p. 860) 
Clearly, when one is doing research among people one has worked with before and 
expects to again, the approach and suitable limits must be “negotiated,” the word used and 
explained in detail by Taylor (2011). Additionally, the questions and discussion that I asked so as 
to understand the full array of impacts that Hurricane Sandy had on participants, in some 
instances brought up traumatic memories. It was important that as the researcher, I did not force 
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that direction but rather guided the participant in a manner that allowed a moment like this to 
unfold in a reflective rather than reactive manner.  
As the interviews were recorded, consent was sought from each of the participants with 
full assurance that they will be used only for this research and destroyed when the work was 
done. The participants were given a copy of the transcripts to sign off on and had the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time. Consent was additionally sought verbally at the beginning 
of each interview. 
Note should be made of the particular ethical concerns that are involved with focus group 
research, for as a researcher one can confidently guarantee confidentiality on what happens in 
interviews, when groups convene there is much less control both over what goes on during 
meetings and what is said afterwards. Experienced moderation of sessions—a role I have 
previously played—helped to create an environment where a candid discussion could take place. 
This was challenging at some junctures when deep feelings and conflicting opinions came to 
light, particularly around issues of marginalization and resiliency.  
Insofar as what participants say or reveal outside the sessions, I discussed a guiding 
protocol to minimize “leakage,” emphasizing the adage “what’s said in the room, stays in the 
room.”   
The summation of this chapter is best conveyed through the telling remarks made by Van 
Manen (1990) and later, separately by Bar-On (1996), which accentuate the ethical difficulties 
and yet the moral good that can come out of well-planned narrative research. Most important is 
to know for what, a researcher is responsible.  
The research may have certain effects on the people with whom the research is concerned 
. . . They may feel discomfort, anxiety, false hope, superficiality, guilt, self-doubt, 
irresponsibility—but also hope, increased awareness, moral stimulation, insight, a sense 
of liberation, a certain thoughtfulness, and so on. (Van Manen, 1990, p. 162) 
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I feel that finally, after all that we do, even when we think we are doing a lot of good to 
our interviewees, we have to take into account how they are thinking of themselves, how 
this is changing over time . . . Although we are also only human, I feel we are responsible 
because in such a delicate kind of research, we hold the meaning of people’s lives in our 
hands. Our successes will be gratifying, but our failures may become irreversible.  
(Bar-On, 1996, pp. 19–20)  
 
  
142 
 
 
Chapter IV: Findings 
The unpredictability and sheer force of Hurricane Dorian in 2019—which, in the late 
summer of 2019, swept destructively through the Caribbean devastating the Bahamas and then 
tracking from the southeast United States through Atlantic Canada—was just one more marker 
of how climate-impactful events are influencing the built and natural environments. New York 
City has never experienced a storm of the size of Hurricane Sandy that had caused so much 
damage and affected so many lives. Close to eight years later, how much longer will this 
statement hold true and what will be the lessons learned in response to the next event? This is 
raised not to provoke fear or to question the viability of this study, but rather to further stress the 
importance of insight and understanding into the impacts on and work of design/planning 
professionals. They are the women and men on the front line of rebuilding and future planning 
within climate-vulnerable areas. 
The research question is: In what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the 
design/planning professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally 
(individually), professionally, and societally? The intention is to not only shed light on what has 
been learned in response to this question but to determine what collective insight can be garnered 
as we move forward into a rapidly changing future. 
A cross-section of design/planning professionals—architects, planners, landscape 
architects, and engineers—were interviewed for this study. As one would expect, their responses 
were quite varied, some teetering on the edge of extremes, with many nuances and gradations in 
between. While the participants each brought something unique to the research, there was a 
common single thread that ran throughout their stories; it emerged consistently at the intersection 
of where the personal, professional, and societal. Kaasar, a planner, said it most succinctly. In 
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response to being asked what advice he would give other professionals facing challenges similar 
to the ones he faced after Hurricane Maria, he stated, “So, I try to stay hopeful by staying curious 
and staying critical by staying demanding and also being completely reflexive and thanking fate 
for allowing me to have this opportunity to do that.” This statement illustrates the intersection of 
the three pillars used as a framework for this study—he tried to stay hopeful (personal), and 
reflexive (professional), and demanding in terms of his aims to make a difference in a dire 
situation (societal), 
Purpose of the Study and Research Question  
While it is understandable that many of the studies in the aftermath of a disaster focus on 
the actual work of rebuilding or the experiences of those within a community directly impacted 
by the disaster, this study’s objective was to provide insight into a relationship-based profession 
that responds to the needs of community within a human-made built environment within the 
natural world. Whether one lived on a barrier island like The Rockaways (in Queens), or a 
densely populated urban community in Lower Manhattan, when Sandy struck, design/planning 
professionals responded in ways that ranged from the immediacy of targeted short-term to 
longer-term solutions. Herein lies the genesis of the primary research question. 
In summary, the intent of this study has been to examine an area of literature that has 
only begun to surface. More specifically, I have focused on the following dimensions of the 
research question:  
 How working within highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster climate-vulnerable 
communities, such as in New York post-Sandy, impacts design/planning 
professionals (architects, planners, landscape architects, and engineers) personally, 
professionally, and societally; 
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 While initiatives in the New York region are central to the research regarding 
design/planning professionals, the discussion broadens to include interviews that look 
at strategies and approaches used nationally and internationally guiding post-disaster 
efforts: rebuilding, adaptation, leadership and the emergence of resiliency and 
managed retreat are especially popular concepts on what needs to be achieved or what 
is hotly debated. 
While the above themes were part of the initial primary and interrelated research 
questions, an additional theme emerged in the analysis as a central element. This theme, the way 
in which issues of diversity, equity, and inequity within the profession impact societal and 
professional realms, as well as the way in which they effect design/planning professionals 
emotionally and psychologically, broadened and deepened the research. This is of particular 
significance because (a) it emerged in the context of recovery and planning in marginalized 
communities where public agency attitudes and responses are more often than not based on a 
perspective that is non-inclusionary; and (b) it is difficult to design inclusively when the very 
people doing the work are not representative of large segments of the impacted populations.  
Introduction to the Findings: Study Process Outcomes 
Framework for interpreting design/planning practice after Sandy: The three pillars. The 
research data has been organized utilizing three pillars for breaking down and understanding the 
data and the impacts. While the concept of the three pillars, personal, professional, and societal 
has not changed since the inception of this study, how they have each been defined shifted in 
light of the data. Post-data collection, and based significantly on what I learned from the 
participants through the interviews, each is now defined as follows: 
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• Personal: Self/individual, psycho-social challenges, empathy/stress. Critical 
moments of professional designers/planners that have most deeply impacted these 
individuals emotionally, psychologically, or existentially as an outgrowth of one of 
the following: (a) lived in a Sandy-impacted area; (b) dealt with empathy/stress 
that in some instances were referred to as PTSD; (c) had life-changing events   
post-Sandy that permanently impacted or changed the course of their lives; or (d) 
had experienced the long-term impact of the racial and gender composition within 
the profession. 
• Professional: Impact professional practice, reflection on strategies post-Sandy, 
impact on future events, including, (a) as professionals engaged directly              
post-Sandy or another climate-related events; (b) tangential to a situation related to 
an event that they were not directly engaged in but impacted them personally; or, 
(c) were professionally engaged post-Sandy or with another climate-related event 
that circumstantially impacted them.  
• Societal: Local and global impacts from climate-impactful events and their models 
of leadership: (a) the consequences within vulnerable communities and 
populations; (b) the intersection between the built and natural worlds; (c) 
resiliency, sustainability, and managed retreat from a local and global perspective. 
This also addresses the nature of leadership from a global perspective within the 
design/planning professional community.  
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Figure 4.1 depicts the three pillars.  
 
Figure 4.1. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies 
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners. 
 
Coding Structure of the Findings 
The qualitative and mixed-methods software, Dedoose, assisted in developing a structure 
for the study’s themes, categories, and descriptors (referred to here respectively as the “parent,” 
“child,” and “grandchild” codes). The parent codes are foundational; the child and grandchild 
codes are subordinate codes that further the thematic development. Through an inductive 
method, the codes were applied to excerpts from the transcripts that aligned with the codes. The 
emergent codes were then placed inside each of the three pillars according to their relevance. 
They were further coded to identify those themes within the pillars that had the greatest 
relevance to the research question, and to classify them according to the density of the theme 
across all interviews. This data driven research approach resulted in the thematic structuring (for 
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parent codes) outlined in Table 4.1 and elaborated on in the ensuing extended discussion for each 
pillar.  
Table 4.1 
Themes in Relation to Parent Codes for the Three Pillars 
 Parent Codes In . . .   
 PILLAR 1—PERSONAL PILLAR 2—PROFESSIONAL PILLAR 3—SOCIETAL  
Theme 1.1: Lives and works in 
Sandy-impacted area 
 
Subtheme: Leaving or 
staying within your impacted 
community 
Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy 
Initiatives 
• NYC SIRR 
• Rebuild by Design 
• New York Rising/                   
Buy It Back 
• Build It Back 
• Occupy Sandy 
Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and 
marginalized communities 
Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress  Theme 2.2: Design Strategies in 
Response to Sandy 
Theme 3.2: The intersection 
between nature and the built 
environment 
Theme 1.3: Critical Moment Theme 2.3: It’s not just about 
design it’s about— 
• Data Assessment 
• Safety Training/ Deployment  
• Codes and Policies 
 
Theme 3.3: Resiliency and 
Sustainability 
Theme 1.4: Impacting the 
narrative 
 
 
    
from other hurricane/           
post-disaster events, e.g., 
• Hurricane Katrina 
• Hurricane Maria 
• 9/11 
Theme 3.4: Managed Retreat 
Theme 1.5: The personal 
impact of the racial, gender, 
socio-economic composition of 
the design/planning profession 
Theme 2.5: Reflections            
post-Sandy 
Theme 3.5: International 
Connections 
  Theme 3.6: Leadership 
Note. Shading is for ease of reading and has no significance in distinctions among themes.  
 
A disaggregation of the data into the three pillars provided by excerpts from the 
transcripts illustrates these themes. Pseudonyms and professional affiliation are listed after each 
excerpt so that the individual is identified beyond the overarching phrase designer/planners but 
Theme2.4: LessonsLearned
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Pillar 1: Personal Impacts  
One of the first questions I asked participants was why they choose to go into the 
design/planning profession. My intent was to understand this as something of a starting point for 
each professional in their journey into the unprecedented personal challenges following 
Hurricane Sandy. Figure 4.2 summarizes the themes I identified in regard to Pillar 1, to be 
discussed in this section.  
   
Figure 4.2. Themes identified for Pillar 1(Personal). 
Not one person interviewed for this study said they went into it for the money. Some 
talked about initial motivations in the context of creating a lasting legacy, only to be faced with 
the reality after Sandy about the impermanence of buildings. Others had had personal events in 
early stages of their life that impacted their understanding of the importance of having a voice 
that spoke out for others in our shared environment.  
by their specific professional expertise. In the research, the professional aff i liationsarchitect, 
planner, landscape architect, engineer, communication special ist, urban strategist, social activist, 
and activist/storyteller are important differentiators. Patterns of simi larities and differences 
within each of these aff il iations highlight patterns within the themes of the three pi llars.
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While I have no illusion about the number of design/planning professionals who are more 
driven by ego than altruism, those interviewed as part of this study varied greatly in this regard. 
These professionals were able to balance healthy professional egos with a drive to be successful 
and have an impact, with altruistic intents and inclusive behavior. Sandy and other such          
climate-impactful events, as illustrated in this study, have begun to ignite much more reflection 
within the community of design/planning professionals. This is illustrated in this excerpt from an 
interview with Vic. 
I don’t think there’s any field of experts that is more suited for bringing about change. 
Change, meaning, dealing with the world. Once I got into architecture, I realized how 
completely touching the mission is. How many areas of lives it would touch, how 
important it is to think of the quality and the environment we live in. I think everywhere 
you go, you’re in an environment touched by people. (Vic, architect)12  
 
The following section begins the discussion individually of each of five themes and one 
sub-theme of Pillar 1. 
Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.1: Lives and works in Sandy-impacted area. For 
professionals living in Sandy-impacted areas the storm had substantial effects on their personal 
lives and their professional worldview. The heartbreak, devastation, and loss also showed the 
power of the human spirit and their commitment to community. Some professionals like Vic, 
who lives in Sea Gate, Coney Island, Brooklyn, lost everything. Others like Thomas, though he 
lived in a vulnerable area near the Gowanus Canal (Brooklyn), which flooded but spared his 
home, came to provide a safe haven for friends who lived in the vulnerable Rockaways. Brianna, 
an architect in Red Hook, Brooklyn, experienced her second flooding from a hurricane, the first 
being from Irene. She did not lose everything like Vic did but dealing with flooding for a second 
 
12 In presenting quotations from the participants, I have listed both the given name (pseudonym) and 
profession so that the reader is always aware of each’s occupation, rather than having to repeatedly turn 
back to the list in Table 3.1.  
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time gave her pause about the long-term community impacts, the future for Red Hook, and her 
own long-term future there. 
It’s been a journey about discovery, but it really integrates my understanding of my 
whole life. Any time that human beings experience a trauma, it opens up old wounds. 
Being an architect by training and experience helped unmeasurably because I understood 
the nature of the physical challenge. I can exercise whatever muscles I have that will 
help us and others survive this situation. (Vic, architect) 
 
Unlike Vic’s, Thomas’s home became a place of refuge for others who lived in more 
vulnerable areas than where he lives—The Rockaways in the borough of Queens, New York. 
The Rockaways was one of the hardest hit areas during Sandy, and the disparity here in the 
recovery process was very different for people living in private homes and those living in public 
housing. That will be further discussed in the societal pillar of this research. 
We have a lot of colleagues in this coastal area, Rockaway Beach, which is kind of an 
ocean facing section of New York City. We convinced a lot of the folks, who were 
friends of ours, to evacuate, even though they were on the fence about staying. I was 
watching the canal and it started to swell, and then it started to surge and flood out our 
street. It didn’t quite make it to our doorstep, but it made it to our block. (Thomas, 
landscape architect/urban designer) 
During the interview, Thomas never spoke about wanting to leave his home in Brooklyn near the 
Gowanus Canal (Figure 4.3). However, the issue came up in my discussion with Brianna who 
resides in Red Hook (Figure 4.3) which is bounded by the Gowanus Expressway to the North, 
the Gowanus Canal to the east, Upper New York Bay to the south, and Buttermilk Channel to the 
west. Brianna, who is a long-time resident of Red Hook, Brooklyn, was hard-hit during Sandy.  
We were flooded during Hurricane Irene also. I guess we expected to be flooded during 
Sandy a little bit, but not quite to the extent that we were by the second-high tide, I was 
watching the water come up the street and then I realized that it wasn’t going to stop, and 
it was actually coming incredibly quickly. We watched the water come up into our first 
floor, and then we left. (Brianna, architect) 
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Figure 4.3. Locator map for Red Hook and Gowanus neighborhoods (Brooklyn) . Adapted from 
a map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 
2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005).  
 
Leah, who also lives close to the Gowanus, unlike Thomas and Brianna, left her home 
during Sandy because of what she described as suffering from “hurricane fear.” 
I’m someone who has a lot of hurricane fear. When I saw that storm [Sandy], I decided I 
was leaving. It’s just straight up fear. I do have a house full of emergency candles, solar 
power battery packs, flashlights and I have all that stuff. When I chose to leave during 
Sandy, I gave them to my neighbors. I am too close to the Gowanus. (Leah, 
architect/planner) 
However, after Sandy, she came back and began to help friends in Red Hook who had been hit 
by the storm.  
So, after Sandy, I came back two days after the storm made landfall and the first thing I 
did was jump into Red Hook because I had friends whose homes had flooded in Red 
Hook. I did the first level immediate actions of helping them. I had done this with so 
many friends in New Orleans. (Leah, architect/planner) 
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Leah described this fear in subsequent conversation as related to her experience post-Katrina. 
Subtheme: Leaving or staying within your impacted community. The issue of whether a 
community should rebuild, and what the considerations are for an individual in staying or 
leaving the place that has been home, is a complex one. It is something that will be looked at in 
greater detail under the Societal Pillar (within the theme Managed Retreat). However, because of 
their professional background, designers/planners understand more than most people what the 
risks are. It is a complicated and painful decision—whether you are in a position of privilege to 
even entertain relocation as a choice, or not, knowing the vulnerabilities and risks so as to make 
informed decisions about your own life, your community, and the generations to come. There 
was no conversation with Thomas about relocation, as this was not an issue he was even 
remotely considering. He had known far greater exposure to storms and living with the water 
than most other participants had. While he lived for a time in The Rockaways, he grew up in 
“hurricane alley” in Florida, and still actively works in Puerto Rico, has family there, and was 
impacted personally by Hurricane Maria in 2017.  
The internal debate for design/planning professionals, even with all that they know about 
risk, adaptation, recovery, is challenging. Do you stay or do you go? And for some 
design/planning professionals, they personally had a very different experience of the storm. It all 
depended upon where one lived. Jeanine, who lived on the Upper East Side, didn’t lose power. 
That was a very different experience for Brianna who not only lost power but was flooded out of 
her home. 
My husband [pause] we have fights all the time. He’s like, we’re leaving. We had dinner 
last night with friends. We’ve all lived in Red Hook for 15 or 20 years and it’s coming 
to the point like, are we leaving? When are we leaving? Every year it’s like, when are we 
leaving? It’s not if we’re leaving, it’s when are we leaving. (Brianna, architect) 
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It is human nature to think that one bad event is an isolated event and will not happen 
again for decades—maybe not even within one’s lifetime. In a place like New York, affordability 
plays a big role in this decision, not to mention the significance of community that one has built 
up over time. These are very difficult issues that climate-impactful events are going to make 
more frequent in the years to come even for those who understand the ramifications better than 
most: the design/planning professionals. 
I was planning on dying here, and I still can’t wrap my brain not being here. So, that’s 
going to be a really, like hard moment to leave. I believe that every person living in Red 
Hook right now, or that has been here for a very long time, is beginning to realize that 
the city doesn’t care, and the city isn’t going to do something in time. Therefore, we 
need to figure out a secondary solution, and that solution right now is to leave and that’s 
a really sad moment. (Brianna, architect) 
 
While Brianna experienced damage during Sandy, Vic lost everything and had to decide 
whether he wanted to rebuild and stay in Coney Island. 
Is this really the right direction for us? Is this the right thing for us to do as a family to 
stay here after we lost everything? Is this an opportunity for me to build my dream 
house? Is this a waste of my time? Is this something I simply cannot afford to take on? 
All of those doubts and considerations, repeatedly hammered at me, and my wife, and 
my family. Let’s just sell the property, take what we can get, pay off our mortgage, and 
run. And when we looked at the numbers, they were low, and we couldn’t. (Vic, 
architect) 
 
This kind of poignant debate resonated for hundreds of families after Sandy who have had to 
make decisions that will impact them for the foreseeable future. These are difficult choices under 
any circumstances, but most especially when the loss has been sudden, unexpected and the 
ramifications life changing. 
 Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.1 Lives and works in the Sandy-impacted 
area. For professionals impacted by living in Sandy-impacted areas they had the professional 
experience to navigate post-disaster strategy better than most. However, with that knowledge 
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often came the burden of understanding just how vulnerable their community was and how the 
future could unfold with more Sandy-like events. 
Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress. In a post-Sandy scenario, 
designers/planners enter a space of disequilibrium where the urban fabric and the physical 
structures of communities, are suddenly torn apart. This intensifies the disruption that people 
must suddenly adapt to after an event such as Sandy. For the design/planning professional most 
deeply engaged on the ground in the recovery, the impact can be stressful enough to incapacitate 
helping professionals temporarily or longer. In some instances, several design/planning 
professionals referred even to PTSD as something to consider among those who have been most 
deeply involved in dealing with such events. It can also be a time for many, when the impact of 
experiencing empathy and resulting stress amidst the unforeseen or the unforeseeable, 
significantly altered their own personal world views in irrevocable ways. Empathy, defined as 
“the ability to tune into and share another person’s emotions from their perspective plays a 
crucial role in bringing people together” (Wallace, 2017, para. 2). It builds trust, yet can also 
create anxiety, stress, or low-level depression if someone becomes more consumed with another 
person’s feelings well beyond their own (Manczak, DeLongis, & Chen, 2016).  
Just as nature’s force within a storm has a variety of category strengths, design/planning 
professionals are also impacted personally in varying degrees of empathy and resulting stress. 
How a number of these professionals processed, adapted, and reacted to these circumstances 
from the perspective of empathy/distress are further noted in the following selections from the 
interviews.  
Eli has built a professional practice that directly addresses the impacts of a multitude of 
climate-impactful events and community vulnerabilities locally, nationally, and internationally. 
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Of all the people interviewed on this question, he was the most direct in speaking to grief as part 
of empathy and distress. 
All you can do from a design standpoint is hear what that grief is, listen, and not take it 
in too much. Being human is to empathize with what is taking place. From a greater 
standpoint, the concept of nothing is permanent has really been driven home from these 
circumstances and experiences. Not just this disaster, but other disasters. (Eli, architect) 
 
The discussion evolved to the professional’s own experience of grief not clouding their 
judgment when assisting traumatized community members post disaster.  
Most people say to you, I want it back, I want it back. It’s not a response of wanting their 
house back, it’s a response of, I want it back, I want my life back. But grief is real, it’s 
tangible, and it’s a huge hurdle for the design profession to take in. People just want to be 
heard after the disaster and once you hear them and take that in, it may be best to see if 
you can drive people towards a clear-eyed design effort. (Eli, architect) 
Ideally, a professional maintaining a boundary between feeling and witnessing ultimately 
helps people think through their options and guides them to make the best decisions. But this is 
an experiential process and even with holding boundaries, one cannot help but be impacted by it.  
The grief after Sandy—it’s definitely transformed me in a lot of ways, personally. But, as 
a designer, you have to listen to it but alongside it to make sure that you keep coming 
back to clear-eyed decisions, which are very hard to get it. Very, very, hard to get at. (Eli, 
architect) 
Design/planning professionals are not trained in psychology or grief counseling. In 
expectation of more climate change-related traumatic events, FEMA has put programs in place 
as part of their communications disaster program. There is training for responding after disasters 
for a safety assessment program and a national assessment safety program so that one is prepped 
before going into the field. Eli spoke of a decompression process after what he termed 
“deployment.”  
Your deployment is for a maximum of five or seven days of field work. Even after a 
disaster, and you’re working with government agencies, you are supposed to have two 
weeks on and then to have a break. It’s really how you protect yourself from taking on 
other’s people’s grief. Sometimes I have to go back to that, just to recognize, in myself, 
how do I deal with this grief is a heavy, heavy piece. (Eli, architect) 
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 As part of the snowball sampling, a number of professionals who worked in Puerto Rico, 
post-Hurricane Maria, became integral to deeper insight into the personal impact of              
climate-impactful events on professionals.  
When you start identifying injustices, you see how very little power you have in a 
colonial system which is condescending and racist. Then you get mad, you get unnerved 
and you empathize from that place. Some days you think maybe nothing is going to 
work. But as planners we are trained to be hopeful in some ways. (Kaasar, planner) 
 
What made this insight particularly important in the context of Sandy is that it is 
reflective of how many marginalized communities felt impacts from the storm and its aftermath  
even in one of the wealthiest cities in the world. While it would be misleading to compare what 
happened during Hurricane Maria—with its most deadly impacts centered in relatively 
impoverished Puerto Rico—to Hurricane Sandy, a better comparison would be Hurricane 
Katrina: what is similar was how professionals themselves felt personally impacted even though 
they were certainly dealing with levels of grief and loss on very different parts of the spectrum. 
We are trained to try and think that the future may bring positive outcomes. That’s why 
we plan, we try to look forward, so we keep going. At the same time, I am deeply 
reflective in part because I have to understand my position of privilege as a professional 
sitting in an air-conditioned office where I earn a good living and I actually work on 
something I was actually trained. So, I don’t take that for granted. (Kaasar, planner)  
While Kaasar was not directly engaged in Sandy, he has tremendous insight into empathy 
and distress post-disaster through working as a professional planner in Puerto Rico after 
Hurricane Maria struck in 2017. While our conversation surrounding empathy and distress was 
more focused on anger and injustices, the direct and positive action he took came from a fiercely 
empathetic space and from a position of owning his privilege. What is also particularly critical in 
Kaasar’s insights and responses is that he is experiencing empathy/distress as a professional 
within a community/country that has been historically marginalized. While, as stated, overall 
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New York is far more affluent than most of Puerto Rico, at the neighborhood level, it is also rife 
with communities that have long been economically oppressed and marginalized.  
The one enduring piece of this is constant impermanence. I remember in post-Katrina 
days that vicarious trauma is a real thing and it is in the health profession and I don’t 
think people in design and engineering appreciate that until they go through it 
themselves. (Susan, urban strategist) 
Susan has worked on the ground within communities and in non-profit leadership roles 
during Katrina as well as Sandy. Her role, though not specifically a designer/planner, has been 
critical in the aftermaths and subsequent planning in both events; she was the only person 
interviewed who mentioned vicarious trauma, as a term. Although in looking at what 
architect/planner Leah experienced, one could categorize her experiences as such. 
I don’t talk to anyone about my disaster recovery experience. I was deeply traumatized 
post Katrina, for a huge range of reasons—the amount of deaths, decay, corruption. It’s 
just terrible to see the world turned upside down. I receded talking about it because it was 
emotional. I was like, actually enraged in a constant state for two or three years. (Leah, 
architect/planner) 
While Melissa did not discuss the same stressors that Leah did, she did speak quite a bit 
about empathy not necessarily being a given with all design/planning professionals.  
It certainly increases your empathy, but I don’t think that’s always the case. I was 
working with a structural engineer who couldn’t feel any empathy; but I think for a lot of 
people, though not for all, it increases their empathy. I’ve absorbed some of the stress, for 
sure. It’s come down now, so I’m not quite as aware of it. (Leah, architect/planner) 
Melissa spoke about empathy/distress in the context of how it impacted her and her 
younger staff. An important marker during this interview was her mentioning that experiencing 
empathy/distress as a professional was not a given. She pointed out her own assumptions and 
unconscious bias about empathy/distress. That bias goes like this: how could someone not feel it 
for others in this context? But the point was that not everyone will empathize strongly. From 
Susan’s vantage, that does not make that person hollow or give cause for negative judgement. It 
just makes them human with a different set of coping mechanisms. 
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The engineers interviewed in this study had experiences directly with Sandy but also 
brought a plethora of experience from an international perspective. For Liz, a civil engineer, 
every disaster is personal, and an understanding of empathy and distress is built into how she 
pragmatically executes her role.  
These are life-changing events for me. I have seen loss of life in hospitals because they 
were in the ICU and the emergency batteries do not work. New York in particular. I 
have been through 9/11 and Hurricane Sandy. It’s my city and very personal but every 
city I have gone through something like that; it becomes personal. (Liz, civil engineer)  
 
Liz further spoke of her role in the context of a code of professional conduct to make conditions 
safe and protect people. This was further underscored in Paul’s background, empathy, and 
compassion. 
As an active duty Army Officer, 27 years plus, being involved in a number of operations, 
I’ve seen some things like Somalia where people are starving, literally, and dying on the 
streets, and in the villages. When you see stuff like that it gives you a whole different 
perspective on life. And being in a combat situation, things are happening around you, 
that are life threatening. My spectrum is different than everyone else’s. (Paul, engineer) 
 
Paul is an engineer who has seen active duty. He has seen the ravages of war and has 
brought to his work a level of empathy and an understanding of distress that is unique to anyone 
interviewed in this study. While I am not inferring that architects, landscape architects, planners 
and engineers need to have this level of insight and experience, his viewpoint even after all that 
he has experienced, reflects someone who values life and the importance of interacting and 
connecting with people as an engineer in a post-disaster or planning role. 
In the context of Sandy and other events like that, my first thought is to make a real 
connection to people. I don’t think we do this enough today, this idea of community 
bonding. I got a chance to do this in Katrina, Andrew, Lee, Irene, and then Sandy. It’s 
really satisfying for me to be able to help and to be able to be involved in bringing 
solutions through empathy and understanding distress. (Paul, engineer) 
 
Though Robert was not a military career professional like Paul, he is a member of the Air 
Force Association and the Navy League of the United States. A healthcare architect for more 
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than two decades, Robert was one of the first people who mentioned post-traumatic stress in the 
context of Hurricane Sandy.  
Right after Sandy, going into The Rockaways, talking to homeowners, I not only calmed 
them down, but also started talking about potential solutions, potential funding sources, 
and got into literally house by house discussions; it became quite tragic. It is a difficult 
experience that in the aftermath feels like post-traumatic stress syndrome. (Robert, 
architect) 
 
Robert’s response is certainly reflective of an empathetic approach and a deep 
understanding into the distress of those he is there to bring assistance to. According to the 
American Psychiatric Association, “post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a psychiatric 
disorder that can occur in people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic event such as a 
natural disaster, a serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat, rape or other violent personal 
assault” (Parekh, 2017, para. 1).  
Thomas, a landscape architect who grew up with hurricanes, has a particular poignant 
perspective on Sandy in this context given what he witnessed as an adolescent during Hurricane 
Andrew, a Category 5 hurricane that struck the Bahamas, Louisiana, and Florida in 1992. 
I think Sandy helped me heal a traumatic time in my life, with Hurricane Andrew. I 
mean, you are going from adolescent to adult and your own life is changing and then to 
see the world around you transform, it was a lot to take in. To understand that and 
communicate that with folks in the field is really important. (Thomas, landscape 
architect/urban designer) 
 
Thomas went on to discuss how the personal directly impacted his professional approach in 
training others in post-hurricane scenarios. 
And a lot of our volunteers, we were training them to not just turn the lights on in a 
hospital but also to give hugs. Everyone you meet is going to be in a PTSD type of 
environment. You never really heal from that. Just like grief, when someone dies, the 
pain is just as intense—but when you do remember it, it’s just as intense as day one. 
(Thomas, landscape architect) 
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It takes courage and fortitude to confront and respond to these issues. As reflected in this 
quote, often one doesn’t often grasp the level of personal stress that is absorbed in these 
interactions over time. It is my objective that this study will begin to be a first step in asking 
some of the right questions as more professionals are called into post-disaster action. 
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress. As illustrated by the 
designers/planners in these excerpted narratives, many entered a space of disequilibrium where 
seeing the urban fabric and physical structures of communities suddenly torn apart impacted 
them deeply. Likewise, was witnessing the suffering of people within the communities who 
professionals were there to support. Some designers/planners met that with empathy, others 
grief. Several plannindesign/planning professionals referred to PTSD as something to consider 
among those who have been most deeply involved in dealing with such events. This is an 
experiential process and even with holding boundaries, one cannot help but be impacted by it.  
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.3: Critical moments. The theme of critical moments grew 
out of narratives shared during the interviews revealing personal turning points directly related to 
post-climatic events. These were either events related directly to Hurricane Sandy or even events 
pre-Sandy that impacted their lives dramatically and affected their approach to the Sandy event 
and aftermath. These are insights and changes that made a permanent impact on their lives.  
In many ways, this disaster was the best thing that ever happened to me [pause] to my 
family. Because it brought us together, it brought my wife and I together, in a way that 
we had never. We’ve endured many challenges personally, as a couple, and this was one 
that would have broken anybody’s back. We bound together, and our kids call us the 
dream team. There was nothing we couldn’t take on. (Vic, architect) 
Both Grace (engineer) and Thomas (landscape architect/urban designer) had experienced 
critical moments in previous climate-change related events, ones that deeply affected the 
direction of their professional lives. For Thomas, it was as an adolescent dealing with the loss of 
his best friend’s younger sister after Hurricane Andrew; for Grace it was as a young professional, 
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working on the ground in New Zealand on the recovery effort after the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake. She recounted,   
I have dealt with the impact of these events through so much of my career but being in 
the trenches after the earthquake in New Zealand is probably one of the most impactful 
things for me. In a personal way it has impacted what I do in my career. I’m really 
focused now on the proactive side of disasters rather than just being on the reactive side. 
(Grace, engineer) 
The earthquake in New Zealand was a turning point early in Grace’s career. For Thomas, 
it is what happened to him directly as a teenager during and after a Category 5 hurricane that 
impacted what he wanted to do in life. Claire—who is from Haiti—was impacted by the death of 
her grandmother and other members of her mother’s family during the Haitian earthquake of 
2010. When she went back to Haiti after the quake to support in the rebuilding, the family homes 
she had stayed in just months before had been destroyed. Claire described, 
I had [previously only] seen architecture as a positive thing. But after the earthquake in 
Haiti I saw architecture as an element that could kill. That architecture can be both a 
protagonist and an antagonist. As a woman of color, I am 0.2% of the profession of 
architecture. So, while I can’t solve all the problems, I can support the community and 
tell the story of what has happened. I also need to share my knowledge so that I can help 
people in their own communities use their power to make their own changes. 
This resonated with Thomas’s recollections from his youth in Florida in relation to 
Hurricane Andrew. 
My best friend lived across the street from us. We were like, as teenagers, “Oh chaos, it’s 
so cool!” We had all these plans that we were going to drive around and see the 
wreckage, we had no idea how bad it would be. And I go to his house. He goes, “Naomi 
[his sister]is in the house. A beam flew through the wall and hit her. We’re waiting on the 
ambulance. She died last night.” It impacted the direction of my life. (Thomas, landscape 
architect/urban designer) 
 
Esther is an activist/storyteller and works with Sandy Storyline, an outgrowth of Occupy 
Sandy that described itself as “a participatory documentary that collects and shares stories about 
the impact of Hurricane Sandy on our neighborhoods, our communities and our lives” (Sandy 
Storyline, para. 1). In our interview, Esther described a critical moment in which she came  
162 
 
 
face-to-face with her own despair as an activist and storyteller. She seemed wary of digging up 
the past any further during the interview. In honoring the limits being set in the conversation, I 
asked her why she sounded so sad and engaged her in the present moment as opposed to asking 
her a question that would have meant recalling the past. This self-described poignant moment 
was also a critical moment for me as a reminder of the boundaries that need to be respected in 
conducting research within a moment of observed fragility. “I am sometimes sad because I think 
these stories are so important. And sometimes I feel like it is so hard—even with all the 
storytelling skills in the world—to break through and get these stories out there” (Esther, 
activist/storyteller). 
As I listened to Esther, unavoidably I was also reflecting on what had brought me to the 
dissertation subject. How my own despair and sadness went back to the neighborhood I had 
grown up in and Sandy’s impacts there and, therefore, on me. I shared the feelings of impotence 
Esther described. At the same time, I wondered: Would any of the narratives in this study 
ultimately make even a small dent of awareness into such a large issue? Would it matter? 
Remarks by Eli (architect) were meaningfully parallel: 
Nothing is permanent, the precious object, or precious memory, or photo albums, those 
types of things . . . not even buildings. As a family of immigrants, I wanted to build 
something permanent. It was in part why I became an architect. It’s definitely been driven 
home to me that nothing is permanent. It is kind of liberating in a certain way. I 
appreciate some things more, that you might take for granted. (Eli, architect) 
 
The experience of impermanence in a profession of solidity and structure became 
something of a theme throughout the research. For some professionals, impermanence came in 
the form of knowledge. This is like the Buddhist space of the beginner’s mind (Shoshin) where, 
even after decades of practice, you are always starting over (Suzuki, 1970/2010). A seasoned 
professional returning to a place of not knowing is a critical moment.  
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In college, life seemed so black and white, something was right, or something was wrong. 
It was kind of easy to see the world that way. This issue of how we get our arms around 
climate adaptation—[I] might as well have just gotten out of school. I feel as much at a 
loss professionally today as I did the day I graduated from graduate school. So, it is very, 
very humbling, is all I can say. (Beryl, landscape architect)  
While both Eli and Beryl spoke of their work in deference and respect to the communities 
they worked within. Susan (urban strategist) was more focused on the loss of dignity which she 
experienced as a critical post-Katrina moment.  
Post-Katrina New Orleans was struck by two disasters. One was the hurricane itself and 
the other was people who came in as professional experts to force solutions on them that 
had nothing to do with the people that they were meant to serve. (Susan, urban strategist) 
 
Susan also described professionals who came to New Orleans, learned what they could from the 
community, took those ideas, wrote articles and books (not attributing the narratives from the 
local sources appropriately, in her view) and made names for themselves. When Hurricane 
Sandy struck, Susan was already working with the Municipal Art Society of New York, one of 
the oldest civic organizations focused on the built environment. As a member of the Society’s 
roundtable that Susan chaired post-Sandy, I felt that it was all about inclusionary leadership. 
Notes from the first meeting of that roundtable on February 25, 2013, described its work as 
follows: “As there are many initiatives underway post-Sandy, the Roundtable can provide civil 
society leadership organizations to come together monthly (Municipal Art Society of New York, 
2013, para.1).  
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.3: Critical moments. Among the participants in 
this study there was a wide range of responses about critical moments—events that changed the 
course of a person’s life or made a fundamental change to how they perceived themselves in 
relation to the profession or in their personal lives. Through the loss of his home, one participant 
found his way back to what was really meaningful—his family. For another, as an adolescent in 
Florida, the death of a friend’s sister during Hurricane Andrew, impacted the direction of his life. 
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For several designers/planners the belief in permanence gave way to the wisdom of 
impermanence.   
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.4: Impacting the narrative. Design/planning professionals 
have been exploring how to best communicate the challenges and solutions around                   
post-climactic events such as Sandy to the public as well as to others in the profession. They 
need to find ways to communicate these sometimes harsh or unwelcome realities in a manner 
that is truthful but not fatalistic. Beryl’s narrative exemplifies this conundrum: 
It’s become easier now that Sandy has stayed a bit in people’s trauma memory to suggest 
to them that there is no magic bullet here. Even looking at some of the tide gate 
alternatives that are being proposed across the mouth of the New York Harbor, aside 
from the fact that they probably won’t live to see that ever completed. (Beryl, landscape 
architect) 
Predictions about sea level rise are changing rapidly. The design and technology being 
proposed to address those issues can be tenuous because by the time it gets built it may no longer 
be relevant. How one communicates this narrative is particularly demanding. 
In terms of landscape architecture, there is an impermanence to it because it is always 
changing. I think architects think of what they do as permanent. When you’re dealing 
with something like Sandy, you really get pushed up against the reality that what you’ve 
built to last a lifetime, is really, within a certain context, as impermanent as the 
landscape. I mean, it can be. (Jeanine, landscape architect) 
The theme of impermanence is again being raised but, in this case, in the context of 
impacting the core narrative in the professional’s life. When you are designing for storm 
protection the underlying objective is to build to last; but if critical conditions are changing, and 
there is no precedent in one’s lifetime for that kind of change, how then do you design with an 
eye on the future? How do you communicate this challenge to a community that is putting their 
safety in your hands? 
Agility is a fundamental component, and if we go back to the idea of impermanence, 
what you need is agility. Agility is the ability to move among various issues and 
opportunities and to deal with them successfully. We have to develop that agility in our 
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narrative. We have to have agility and will. I think those two things together could serve 
us quite well. (Ross, architect)  
 
Agility is a key point Ross raised here in regard to impermanence. Reflective-based 
action rather than reactive-based decisions. This is an important distinction, one that I find a 
crucial component of the design/planning professional’s narrative in responding post-disaster or 
in pre-planning within vulnerable communities.  
Another point of discussion in this research of communicating the narrative is how to 
convey just how vulnerable a community may be to the next storm. In the aftermath of a disaster, 
how do you keep people engaged without creating fear or lethargy? This is a very important 
issue especially when informing those affected that perhaps the impacted area should not be 
rebuilt. This dilemma for the professional will be discussed more directly in the societal pillar. 
On one hand the sky is falling and on the other side, the sky may fall in 10 years or in 20 
years, but somewhere out there the sky is falling and it’s all about the speed in which 
you would expect it to happen. How do you plan for that? (Beryl, landscape architect) 
 
A number of the study participants who shared concerns similar to Beryl’s connected this 
level of climate challenge to challenges during war where there is an enemy—and a plan of 
attack to defeat the enemy. But they questioned, “Who is the enemy here?” Nature? The waters 
and the earth that sustains us?” In terms of the impacted and changing narrative that the study 
participants had turned to, there were many more questions than actual answers.  
When you sit down and you say to people, one of them is a war monger, the other is 
Gandhi, how do you get that message out that promotes peace with power and with 
passion and really taps into emotion. That is where the struggle sits in the global climate 
debate. To get people to feel emotional about the climate coming from a place of peace 
and not from a place of the adversary, the enemy. (Edward, architect) 
 
Current global narratives make almost everything seem of the same level of urgency. So, how 
then does a professional communicate the urgency and far reaching impact of climate change on 
future generations?   
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Design/planning professionals were most effective in this process when they truly 
engaged the community with open-ended questions. This encouraged collective perspectives 
more than setting up the problem and pushing for a solution. Liz found that communicating to 
diverse groups of stakeholders so that they understand the issues and potential vulnerabilities 
was clearly a major part of what she did in the aftermath of Sandy.  
So, you have Hurricane Sandy in 2012. And people have a mechanism of protection 
against what is very scary and that includes loss of life. The memory of people is very 
short lived, and I think it is our way of not being afraid or causing others fear, to forget 
these things. So, I think that is a very important thing to communicate these issues in 
ways that people understand. (Liz, engineer) 
 
Not unlike Liz, Samuel sought to communicate the complex messages around Hurricane 
Sandy in a way that could reach people emotionally and across generational lines. 
I’ve thought a lot about what we could do on an emotional level to communicate this 
message in a more meaningful way. I think it’s how you talk to one generation about the 
future of the next generation. I deal a lot with how to communicate science and data. I 
have found storytelling gets people emotionally involved in this, and then they care about 
what the data is showing. (Samuel, architect) 
The global youth movement on climate change has shown that many younger people feel 
that older generations are not invested in protecting the earth for next generations (Foran, Gray, 
& Grosse, 2017; Sengupta, 2019). Eli, one of the architects in the study, suggested “kitchen table 
conversations” where adults and children discuss these issues at home. This would help in the 
sharing of information on a more intimate level and help to integrate these realities more into the 
day-to-day. This is a similar theme underscored by both Hannah (planner) and Roberta 
(architect). Hannah said,  
Well, what is a motivator in this narrative? I mean, maybe some people are motivated by 
fear. Some people are motivated by science. I think the people that are doing work in this 
area are people who are able to not think about themselves all the time, and they can kind 
of see ahead and think about other generations. 
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This statement reflects the importance of design/planning professionals thinking more 
inclusively and intergenerationally in how ideas are conceived of and communicated. Recovery 
from Hurricane Sandy or other climate-impactful events takes years and, in some instances, the 
same communities can be hit by multiple events. Similarly, Roberta brought the intergenerational 
narrative back to storytelling in a very creative and experiential manner. She called it the power 
of putting your finger on the map. 
Impacting the narrative stories are going to be so important for that—the power of putting 
your finger on a map. If you know a place, and you put your finger on that place on the 
map, that connection brings back your history. If you don’t know a place and you put 
your finger on the map, you project desire of what you think it’s going to be like. 
(Roberta, architect) 
 
Roberta then tied this analogy to arriving in a disaster area, underscoring that not understanding 
the people and the location can be as damaging as the disaster itself.  
For those of us who parachute in and do work, how can we understand someone if you 
put your finger there? Do you know what they’re truly trying to tell us? Do you 
understand their narrative? (Roberta, architect) 
 
One of the study’s themes is the importance of design/planning professionals not pushing 
their own agenda on a community that they are there to serve. Esther further built upon the 
importance of this inclusive approach by expanding the narrative to honoring the dignity of the 
person telling the story and being a witness to another’s experience. 
It is about honoring the dignity of the person telling the story. Not every story is meant to 
be told the same way. But telling the story in a way that is meant to create a narrative that 
is collaborative. You know there is some value to being a storyteller and being a witness 
to someone else’s story. (Esther, activist/storyteller) 
This theme reveals that the perspective and practice of the designers/planners, on the 
front lines, can be improved by identifying and seeking out voices of those more vulnerable and 
are often silenced amidst the rush to recover from catastrophes. As such events become more 
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commonplace, the future of the profession may need to become far more inclusive of those 
people who have suffered the loss of community through natural disasters.  
Summary—Pillar 1(Personal), Theme 1.4: Impacting the narrative. With so many 
competing global narratives that make almost everything seem of the same level of urgency, the 
design/planning professional is challenged to deliver an account that is constantly changing, and 
for which there is no precedent in their lifetime. Although the participants offered a number of 
different approaches to tackle this challenge, they consistently endorsed the value of simplicity 
and factual clarity.  
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1. 5: Race, gender, and inclusion with the design/planning 
profession. In 1968, Whitney M. Young, Jr., a civil rights activist and, at the time, the executive 
director of the National Urban League, gave the keynote address at the Portland, Oregon, 
American Institute of Architects National Convention. He stated, “You are not a profession that 
has distinguished itself by your social and civic contributions to the cause of civil rights . . . You 
are most distinguished by your thunderous silence” (American Institute of Architects, 2019, para. 
4). At the time, Young was critical of the high-rise housing projects that were being built in some 
of the poorest and toughest neighborhoods. He questioned why there wasn’t push back from the 
profession. While this goes to the point of the ongoing lack of diversity within the profession, it 
equally shows the lack of inclusiveness in the recovery and planning process within racially 
diverse communities. Participant Talib stated,  
Designing for disaster relief, disaster preparedness comes from really well-intentioned 
folks. Yet, it’s always assuming a kind of general sense of universal needs instead of 
specific needs, attitudes or understandings of culture and community that are worthy of 
being preserved. Community members need to be part of whatever structures are built. 
That goes for refugees from disasters or wars, it’s all kind of the same thing. (Talib, 
architect) 
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Talib’s remarks were reinforced by Penelope who more bluntly brought up infamous 
historical domination while also distinguishing the perspectives of planners versus architects.  
Part of it is that we have to decolonize how we think about space because we are building 
on layers that really, at one point, enforce segregation or slavery. And a lot of that has 
perpetuated itself. We think it’s normal and it’s quite surprising how we don’t even 
realize some of these things. I think with the profession itself it needs to diversify in lots 
of different ways. (Penelope, architect)  
To achieve this kind of fundamental change in the profession requires focusing on 
potential entrants to the profession before college and even before high school. Planner Kaasar 
further expanded upon the importance of professional practitioners being involved in the 
university’s training of the next generation of designers/planners. A significant number of 
professionals interviewed within this study are also educators; their appreciation of the 
importance of (re)education seems almost a given.  
I assume a sort of practitioner hat on a daily basis but also [have] engaged in a more 
academic role . . . in the immediate days after Maria. One of the things I learned was that 
the classroom was a very important place for conscious reflection and critical thinking 
around what needs to happen in the post-disaster period. It opens up the conversation 
with the next generation of planners. (Kaasar, planner) 
Part of what Kaasar is highlighting is the importance of being a reflexive practitioner as a 
way to shape discussions and call out injustices. It is also a way to begin to influence the mindset 
of the next generation of professionals in a far more inclusive manner. 
Asking the same question of Joseph regarding racial and gender equity and the need for 
greater diversity resulted in quite a different response and perspective. Joseph, as previously 
noted, was heavily engaged during Sandy as a social activist and worked closely with 
designers/planners on the ground as part of the rebuilding process. Climate justice is a focus of 
his work. He had a unique perspective on his next steps on tackling the injustices as a result of 
climate crises and referenced his commitment to the existential crises of climate change and 
White nationalism. 
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The far right and climate—these two problems are intertwined. I am trying to understand 
White terrorism. It’s key to building structural racism and is a huge barrier to addressing 
the climate crises. Systems on the planet are collapsing and the ability of humans to live 
on this planet; and with this is a resurgence of White nationalism. (Joseph, social activist) 
 
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal), Theme 1.5: Race, gender, and socio-economic 
composition of the design/planning profession. While women in this study acknowledged that 
the number of women in the design/planning profession had increased exponentially in the past 
20 years, participant designers/planners acknowledged that the same could not be said of Black 
or Brown professionals. They remain underrepresented in the profession. This substantial 
underrepresentation negatively affects design/planning, in predominately Black and marginalized 
communities. Through the sheer lack of diversity, the very democratization of space is impeded. 
This sentiment is reflected in comments about the need to decolonize how we think about space 
and integrating social justice into design. Education plays an important role in shifting this 
paradigm. An increase in Black and Brown professional practitioners at the university level who 
help to train the next generation of designers/planners would therefore be vitally important.  
Pillar 2: Professional Impacts 
Despite the metaphor of pillars, there is not a clear separation between the personal and 
professional dimensions of the interviewed practitioners’ response to Hurricane Sandy. In fact, 
the interrelatedness of what it is to experience the world as “just another” human being and to do 
so as a highly trained professional, should not be siloed. The findings underscore the desirability 
of making the personal, the professional, and vice versa. This said, I have separated the personal 
and professional themes for the purposes of discussion and clarity. In the concluding chapter I 
return to the inevitability of cross flows between personal and professional lives in 
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design/planning. This section looks at each of five themes of Pillar 2, which are summarized in 
Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4. Themes identified for Pillar 2 (Professional). 
Six months before Sandy, Lyla, one of the architects interviewed for this study, was 
contacted by the NYC Mayor’s Office about her role on the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital on 
the Boston waterfront. It is a building Lyla’s firm designed, but her particular role on the project 
was to lead the resiliency and sustainability conversation. She went on to describe how after the 
people at Spaulding watched the media coverage post-Katrina they wanted to put measures into 
place so they would not recreate another scenario like Katrina.  
If something akin to Katrina happened in Boston, people would not be throwing furniture 
through the windows, and the building would be inherently more passively survivable. It 
would be elevated to prevent flooding. And so, it became the first building on the Boston 
waterfront designed to take into account sea level rise and the first one to be designed 
where you have all the infrastructure on the roof. (Lyla, architect)  
 
Lyla’s comment referred to the curiosity and interest the Mayor’s office representatives 
had recognizing that Boston voluntarily built to withstand ocean rise effects. Although the city 
was challenged in convincing property owners along the NYC waterfront to take building 
resiliency seriously, these actions suggest that City of New York was beginning to assess their 
own coastal vulnerabilities long before Sandy. During the Bloomberg mayoralty in 2007, 
PlaNYC was introduced (and updated in 2011) with the objective of what NYC should look like 
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Pillar 2 (Professional), Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy initiatives. To adequately 
understand the professional dimension of the impacts Sandy had on the participants, it is 
necessary to revisit the five post-Sandy initiatives overviewed in Chapters I and II. Here, 
emphasis is on the difference that Sandy made to designers, planners, and related practitioners 
professionally. 
As noted in earlier chapters, I have chosen to focus on professional work that arose 
through participation in five somewhat overlapping but substantively distinct initiatives. These 
were arguably the most comprehensive responses that institutions—governmental and              
non-governmental—made to the overwhelming challenges Sandy left behind. I rely on my 
participants’ experiences primarily in the context of these five programs, to probe the impact of 
Sandy on their professional lives.  
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR). In December 2012, 
approximately a month after Sandy struck, the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency 
(SIRR) convened to address the creation of a more resilient New York City in the wake of 
Sandy. Its long-term focus was on preparing for and protecting against the impacts of climate 
change. A final report released in June 2013—A Stronger More Resilient New York (PlaNYC, 
2013)—laid out plans for a $19.5 billion program to reinforce disaster protocols and prevent 
damage from future climate events. The Administration of Mayor Bill de Blasio, who took office 
in January 2014, continued to back the plan. 
        
       
         
      
in 2030 as a city that was greener and had a more equitable quality of life that addressed the 
climate issues as a coastal city (PlaNYC, 2007, 2011, 2013). Unlike these reports (e.g. NYC 
SIRR), PlaNYC was completely focused on Sandy relief and recovery. After Sandy, many 
 other initiatives began to emerge.
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While the designers/planners interviewed as part of this study categorically 
acknowledged how important this report by the Mayor’s office was right after Sandy, and how 
important the in-depth research and initiatives set forth report were, most of the focus in these 
discussions was on the actual programs that were implemented as result of these reports.  
  
     
    
  
  
  
       
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
              
              
                
                
            
     
  
 
  
 I participated as a facilitator in a rollout of this report in Coney Island at Abraham
Lincoln High School, Brooklyn in 2013. Video footage of that rollout was recorded as input for
this research study. However, when I attempted to play it, I received this message: “Video 
unavailable. This video contains content from Mayor Bloomberg. It is not available in your 
country” (New York City Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency, n.d.). As “my 
country” was squarely in the location of the work and the hurricane, this was worrisome; I saw
this as an ill-starred example of the outreach efforts the initiative purported to emphasize. 
Participant Robert commented on SIRR:
          
            
               
           
 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare 
and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific flood hazard 
areas through the establishment of comprehensive regulations for management of flood 
hazard areas. (UpCodes, n.d., Section G101.1)
Frommy perspective this, [TheNYC Special Initiative for Rebuildingand Resiliency
had a lot to dowith thingsthat architects, planners, engineers, zoningexperts got
involved in right after Sandy. It was agoodimportant step. This continued as more
reports wereproduced and then those reports were translated into codes. (Robert,
architect)
As he further discussed, after the storm many different reports were produced and many 
guidelines wereproffered. All of thoseguidelines weremade into changes in zoning,planning,
and building codes. Ò Thechanges in thebuilding code, which is known as Appendix G, was
particularly critical Ó (Robert, architect). What hewas referring to is noted below and was vital to
therebui lding process for design/planning professionals. The2014addition to thecodeÕ s
purposewas as follows:
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Additionally, changes were also made in the New York City Zoning Resolution of 
October 2013: “The provisions of this Chapter establish special regulations which are designed 
to encourage flood-resilient building practices for new and existing buildings and in so doing to 
promote and protect public health, safety and general welfare” (City of New York & City 
Planning Commission, 2017, para. 1). Robert commented, 
Ultimately, what happened, is that many national codes were affected, building codes, 
zoning codes, FEMA codes and insurance company guidelines, even hospital codes. It 
had a great impact on the profession. Again, that’s what made reports like NYC SIRR 
and others were so important. Many of the FEMA maps that people had been guided [by] 
needed to be revisited. That was another big change that happened. (Robert, architect) 
 
FEMA produces flood maps that rate areas from vulnerable to safe, and from moderately 
hazardous to hazardous. New York was first mapped by FEMA in 1983. With only minor 
changes made since that time, Hurricane Sandy far exceeded the map zoned flooding areas.  
Leah further underscored that the Stronger, More Resilient initiative (PlaNYC, 2013) 
helped to provide guidelines and a roadmap of what communities would be facing in the 
recovery period. 
Being able to tell people in Red Hook, this is what it’s going to be like, the long-haul of 
the process and what’s it’s going to look like. A report like this is useful. So, I felt like 
that fact that New York City had a relatively quick response and could deliver so quickly 
[on the initiative and the report] was impressive. (Leah, architect/planner) 
  
Rebuild by Design. Rebuild by Design (RBD) began as part of former President Obama’s 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy led by a task force that was chaired by the HUD Secretary 
at the time, Shaun Donovan. It began in June 2013, resulting in an international design 
competition led by the United States in cooperation with Henk Ovink, the then acting director 
general of spatial planning and water affairs for the Netherlands (see Chapters I and II for a 
detailed description of this initiative). The participants in this study who had engaged in Rebuild 
by Design emphasized that Ovink’s focus was on the importance of collaboration. The 
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Rockefeller Foundation played a pivotal role in Rebuild by Design. In a review, of the program 
funded by the Foundation, the Urban Institute’s (2014) review called the RBD vision “more 
aspirational than operational” (p. ix). I have noted this here because it foregrounds the struggle 
between the aspirational and the pragmatic, a challenge that many of the participants clearly had 
on their mind in our conversations. Eli’s remarks go to this dilemma.  
So, Rebuild by Design—great that it came up. Great that we had all these amazing 
projects be developed and engage the design and communities. An amazing program for 
demonstration projects. Once the design winners were announced, you got almost a false 
sense of security, that the general public said, “Oh, great, once these are all built, we’re 
going to be fine.” But not everything was funded or will be built. (Eli, architect) 
 
RBD was part of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative that put 
resiliency on the map across the country and around the world. However, another participant, 
Kaasar observed,  
We collaborated with the Resilient Puerto Rico Advisory Council . . . [we] worked with 
the now defunct 100 Resilient Cities program and intersected with the folks in Rebuild by 
Design. My impression with what was going on there was that they had a template of 
things they do on the ground from somewhere else. I don’t think that you can expect to 
do the same things over and over again and call it a success. (Kaasar, planner) 
Kaasar talked about pushing back on many of their ideas and strategies. He was skeptical 
if they were going to be in Puerto Rico for the long haul or if they were just checking off another 
box in the global landscape. At the time of this interview, The Rockefeller Foundation had 
announced that it was changing direction in regard to 100 Resilient Cities. The 100 Resilient 
Cities organization’s work concluded on July 31, 2019. Kaasar reflected on this change: 
100 Resilient Cities is there no more. I have no ill feelings whatsoever with any of the 
individuals who worked here. I don’t blame individuals for what is deployed by 
multinational foundations or international NGOs who sometimes feel they are doing good 
by jumping into a disaster situation or parachuting into a situation without necessarily 
respecting or understanding events on the ground. (Kaasar, planner) 
Kaasar felt that RBD provided lessons learned from Sandy most specifically in engaging 
and, even, fighting with stakeholders on concrete ways by which to engage the community early 
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and often. Kaasar also mentioned that, while the lessons learned from Rebuild by Design in the 
context of Sandy were important and valuable reminders, the tactics proposed to attain what they 
did may have worked in New York but not necessarily in Puerto Rico.  
Susan also shared her views on the experience of RBD:  
Rebuild by Design was for me always an interesting experiment. I have a lot of 
ambivalence about it because I am not convinced that design is always the answer but I 
do think if you are going to invest in infrastructure that is supposed to be catalyzing 
resilience then [RBD] was a fabulous in making the design profession more 
collaborative, better listeners in the design community, and more integrated with other 
disciplines. (Susan, urban strategist) 
Dawn Zimmer had been Mayor of Hoboken, New Jersey, during the Rebuild by Design 
project at the Hudson River. The objective of the design was to protect Hoboken and parts of 
Weehawken and Jersey City from rising sea levels and storm surges, rising tides and heavy 
rainfall. During Sandy, there was $100 million in damage (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014). 
In our interview, Susan reflected on the support Mayor Zimmer had relied on from RBD.  
The access she [Dawn Zimmerman] had to help Hoboken through RBD she couldn’t 
have done that by herself. It would have been a real challenge. But when you had HUD 
and the Secretary so elevating the profile of the role of design and the recovery as an 
opportunity to do something different, it meant the Dawn Zimmerman’s of the world got 
a lot more attention and a lot more resources. I think that part is pretty damn good. 
(Susan, urban strategist) 
 
Because of Sandy, understandably, all the focus became about water. Henk Ovink being a 
water expert and in a leadership position with RBD, contributed to this awareness, which helped 
everyone acknowledge those risks.  
Susan continued in the interview with her sense of limitations of this perspective.  
A lot of this has to do with policy, codes, and procurement. The agencies themselves are 
not very interdisciplinary. If we expect policies to be more place-based and holistic then 
the professions will be more collaborative, reflective, interdisciplinary. Again, RBD was 
good in that it brought architects together with geologists, sociologists, engineers.  
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However, Paul (engineer) brought the topic of collaboration back to the need for a wider 
realm than just professionals. 
The idea was that the community is going to be there from the very beginning. And their 
input is essential and that must be included in the design process. And really investing in 
the community’s ideas and you would drive your designs. So that was the RBD program, 
was a game changer. And the head secretary deserves the credit for that, Shaun Donovan. 
(Paul, engineer) 
 
Melissa, an architect interviewed for this study, spoke about how she engaged with many 
of these same guiding principles in her own work. It’s not a new language for the 
design/planning profession but it was very much in the forefront as a result of Sandy. 
That’s what I did in Sheepshead Bay Brooklyn [hard hit after Sandy] and that’s what I 
did in New Orleans [referring to Katrina] and it was effective in my own little way. But 
that’s what Rebuild by Design tried to do too, to a certain extent. Whether it gets built or 
not . . . engages people in envisioning a different kind of future. (Melissa, architect) 
 
Rebuild by Design was a unique moment in time. In 2020, it is hard to imagine generating that 
same level of political will for a federally funded design competition. As staunch advocates for 
building resilient infrastructure through Governor Cuomo’s proposal for the Restore Mother 
Nature Bond Act, RBD does continue to impact policy on a local level.  
New York Rising Community Reconstruction program. As previously noted, the New 
York Rising Community Reconstruction program (hereafter, “New York Rising”) was 
administered at the state level by the New York State GOSR. It was intended to be a  
community-based program that covered both New York City and New York State. The program 
actually began during Tropical Storm Lee (September 2011) and provided assistance to New 
York State communities after Hurricane Irene—which struck in August 2011) as well as after 
Sandy. As part of the post-Sandy initiative, the GOSR also managed the State’s voluntary buyout 
and acquisition programs (Buy It Back) in which homeowners could ask the state to buy back 
properties that were substantially damaged or destroyed. A similar buyout program was 
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developed by Governor Christie of New Jersey. Eli spoke of the multiplicity of actions that 
comprised New York Rising.  
We had a bunch of projects for [New York] Rising. The process from my standpoint is 
quicker and much more successful from the design perspective than other programs at 
that time. From the standpoint of getting the drawings done, getting these things rolling 
through that process versus the Build It Back program. (Eli, architect)  
 
I asked Eli what kinds of responses he would have liked to have for this program seen 
from the hindsight of seven years later. He responded, “What would be very helpful is to have 
some reflective analysis from the design community. I think there is no sort of feedback with the 
lessons learned.” 
On September 30, 2013, I attended the public engagement program of the New York 
Rising public engagement session at the New York Aquarium at Coney Island. This focused on 
Brighton Beach, Coney Island, Manhattan Beach, and Sea Gate. The session has been described 
in New York Rising’s (2013) meeting document, “Working Together to Build Back Better.” The 
session included an update of recent New York Rising actions, an overview of the public 
engagement format, visioning, description of the organizing committee role, a project review and 
action items.  
This resulted in a plan released the next March by the New York Rising Community 
Reconstruction Planning Committee (2014). The report explained,  
In the span of approximately one year, the State of New York experienced three extreme 
weather events. Hurricane Irene, Tropical Storm Lee, and Superstorm Sandy wreaked 
havoc. These tragic disasters signaled that New Yorkers are living in a new reality,[and] 
that we need to rebuild our communities in a way that will mitigate against future risks. 
(New York Rising, 2013, p. i) 
The report explained that Governor Cuomo “led the charge to develop an innovative, 
community-driven planning program on a scale unprecedented and with resources unparalleled” 
(New York Rising, 2013, p. i). Participant Brianna explained,  
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When the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery in New York Rising programs formed, I 
was nominated to be the co-chair of the New York Rising Community here. I led that 
process for Red Hook with another co-chair. Because of the way the New York Rising 
program was structured, I think that it created a structure for us to sincerely get involved. 
(Brianna, architect) 
 
Part of the funding that is mentioned below is from the Community Development Block 
Grant Program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, n.d.). The program is a 
flexible one that provides communities with resources to address a wide range of unique 
community development needs. Beginning in 1974, the program became one of the longest 
continuously run programs at HUD. The Community Development Block Grant Program 
provides annual grants on a formula basis to 1209 general units of local government and states. 
These grants are made available to state and local governments that the President of the United 
States designates as disaster areas. As part of these Federal grants, community participation is 
encouraged. Participant Brianna (architect) reflected on the block grant program in her interview 
for this study.  
From an internal structure there are many different perspectives. I was very excited the 
funding that came down was from the Federal Government and not to be allocated by the 
Governor’s office or politicians alone who were cherry picking their own projects. I feel 
like by having the communities voice in the process, that’s really great and that’s super 
interesting.  
Having the communities voice in the process, as has already been established in earlier 
report of the findings, is important. Brianna noted that even when there was a more integrated 
community approach time constraints and focusing on specific projects rather than holistic 
planning limited that actual impact .  
We went through an eight-month planning process. As part of Rising we were given 
wonderful planners to work with. We didn’t come out with a master plan, and we didn’t 
come out with a more holistic kind of thinking, partly because we just didn’t have enough 
time. In terms of funding these projects. We didn’t know at the time that we were only 
recommending projects.  
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As part of the interview for this study, I asked Brianna, what kind of support would be 
needed by design/planning professionals if this was going to be addressed in a future              
storm-related event. She responded.  
I think some sort of community, organizing, training, could have helped—long-term 
vision planning would have helped. I think helping us get further funding to be able to 
fund a secondary planning process. It just didn’t feel like there was very good closure. 
It’s really just opening the door to the next 100 years of thought process.  
Buy It Back. The GOSR had a Buy It Back program to purchase homes impacted by 
Sandy, at pre-storm value. The city offered buyout programs as well as previously noted by Vic, 
above. On Staten Island, neighborhoods including Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze (for 
location of these neighborhoods, see Figure 4.5), had people who were bought out on the 
condition that the land was returned to nature and not resold to developers who would buy low 
and rebuild and sell at a higher profit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Location of Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze neighborhoods (Staten Island). 
Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 
Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005). 
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Not all properties bought were returned to nature. Yet, this was a condition that Oakwood 
Beach community residents collectively had put on the buy-back.  
Beryl (landscape architect) elaborated on this challenge:  
In terms of managed retreat and buyouts, I think we are basically nowhere on that topic. 
What are the different techniques that states are using and cities in some cases, to 
encourage people to walk away? We had an experience in one community in Staten 
Island, Oakwood Beach, where folks did take a buyout.  
In an article in an online news service covering Staten Island, Kashiwagi (2019) noted,   
Since Sandy hit the region in 2012, the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery has 
purchased 612 properties as part of its buyout and acquisition programs, spending $234 
million in that effort. Oakwood Beach has the highest rate of buyout properties in the 
state. (paras. 4–5) 
In our conversation, Beryl brought the dilemma reflected in the Governor’s Office report 
into the personal and professional context of her life and work: 
As a landscape architect, and just as a person, imagine your friends, your family, and 
your neighbors that you’ve known for X number of years, and kids that your kids have 
gone to school with, just sort of slowly disappearing. Leaving you as the only resident on 
the block. Which has got to feel kind of both scary, and sad, at the same time. So, I feel 
as if, this notion of managed retreat, does have to be a rather democratic process.  
 
The “dismal prospect” of managed retreat also intersects with economic disparity. 
Individuals who do not own their own home, but rents are at the whim of a landlord. What kind 
of flexibility would a tenant have? What kind of flexibility would a working-class,               
middle-income renter have? Depending on your economic situation, even if you were a 
homeowner, re-locating could be challenging even with a buyout.  
 I asked participants in my study, what the profile was for a typical buyout. 
The State was looking for a particular profile of community where the area was 
vulnerable to future storms of people [who] had been hit by storms before Sandy. It also 
had to be a piece of property that was large enough and ecologically situated enough to 
be the environmental benefit if they returned it to nature. Then everybody, or mostly 
everybody, had to decide as a community to stay or to go. (Melissa, architect) 
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Further it was left to residents to discover where they might best relocate. Some realized that 
they could buy a house in upstate New York but there was no way they could take that money 
and buy another house in New York City. Esther observed, 
Even where my parents lived in Brighton Beach, there is so much development. There 
was a Sandy auction where they were auctioning off these homes to developers who 
would raze the homes and then turn a profit in rebuilding and reselling. Does that really 
make people safe? (Esther, activist/storyteller) 
 
It became clear that not all homes abandoned or bought back by a government entity 
were returned to nature. Climate gentrification, as described by Baptiste (2019), became a part of 
the Sandy aftermath:  
“Climate gentrification is when the response to climate impacts indirectly increases 
disparities in communities,” Jennie Stephens, director for strategic research 
collaborations at Northeastern’s Global Resilience Institute, says. Wealthy people 
seeking refuge from the effects of climate change are starting to move into 
neighborhoods that were once considered undesirable. The term is fairly new, but there 
are already examples of this new kind of gentrification taking place—and not just in 
coastal areas. “It can happen, and it is happening in all kinds of communities,” Stephens 
says. (p. 22) 
Thus, in their professional involvement in what may first seem to be primarily technical 
and financial work, the practitioners I interviewed often find themselves embroiled in dealing 
with the consequences of much longer-term inequities.  
Build It Back. While New York City SIRR (PlaNYC, 2013) was an initiative that 
resulted in a report, Build It Back evolved from an initiative to a structured program designed to 
repair, rebuild, elevate, and in some cases—which Vic noted below—a buyout. While well-
meaning, it has had a very controversial history. The participants’ comments underscored themes 
of leadership, structure, delivery, and ethical behavior. As described in Chapter I of this study, 
the Build It Back Program was part of the New York City Mayor’s Office of Housing Recovery 
Operations. It was launched eight months after Sandy to help New Yorkers with the construction 
funds needed to rebuild their homes. 
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Vic is a resident of Sea Gate, which is located at the far western end of Coney Island in 
the borough of Brooklyn in New York City (see Figure 4.6 for locator map). Vic and his family 
had lost their home during Sandy. His perspective is particularly unique as someone who was 
both a victim of Sandy and a member of the profession that was relied on to assist others in the 
aftermath.  
We got into the Build It Back program. It was a very, very badly employed program 
[and] extraordinarily frustrating in terms of bureaucratic minutiae. We were one of the 
first participants invited in the program and we jumped in, but it became harder and 
harder to thank them because the performance and the program was so badly managed. 
The value really became questionable. Vic (architect) 
 
Figure 4.6. Location of Coney Island and Sea Gate neighborhoods (Brooklyn). Adapted from a 
map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 
2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005).  
 
It took Vic four years after Sandy to get a house designed, built, and for them to move in. 
I recall many conversations with Vic during that time. He, his wife, and two sons had to find an 
apartment they could afford to move into while their house was being rebuilt—which was not 
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easy in the New York City rental market. All the while, they had to keep paying a mortgage on a 
house that no longer existed.  
There were many false starts. Many times they would call us up and say, “You have to 
come back in. We have to get all of your information again because the system that we 
used to scan all your information got lost.” The people didn’t know what they were 
doing. There were third-party consultants that were hired who, I think, really took 
advantage of the system. The city really did just a miserable job. (Vic, architect) 
 
After the end of Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration in early 2014, Mayor de Blasio’s 
Administration came in and took the program over. More staff was hired to cut through the red 
tape that had led, among other effects, to delays such as Vic had experienced. But after 
Bloomberg, Build It Back became a political football. Vic learned there was talk of another 
option. He shared,  
At one point they said, “Well, you have an option now, not to continue. We will pay you. 
The state will pay you for your property. Would you like to participate?” And my first 
question was, “What are they going to pay me?” And the answer was, “We’re not  
sure—and you have to make the decision before we’ll figure it out.” (Vic, architect) 
  
Vic was also on the local community board in Sea Gate (Figure 4.5). He understood 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and what it takes to get through the design and rebuilding 
process. He went on to describe more of the details as noted below. 
If you want to pursue it, you have to commit to it, and thereby, you lose your ability to 
continue rebuilding your house. You walk away from your property and we’ll pay you, 
but we’re not going to tell you what we’re going to pay you until you make the 
commitment. So, it was clearly a Catch-22. It was a very bad offer. (Vic, architect)  
I have reflected on just how challenging it would be for someone with less access and 
knowledge than Vic had to navigate these same circumstances. Thousands of people were in that 
position. Vic was among an informed and savvy minority as a professional architect with lots of 
city planning and permitting experience.  
Occupy Sandy. Occupy Sandy was a major and immediate intervenor in the aftermath of 
Sandy. They were on the ground as a post-Sandy relief organization, early and fast in some of 
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the hardest hit areas such as Red Hook, The Rockaways, and Coney Island. Their work 
underscored the importance of community organizations as first responders to the disaster.  
Occupy Sandy was a volunteer grassroots disaster relief organization which is the final 
and quite independent post-Sandy initiative comprising the first theme of Pillar 2. Each of the 
other initiatives arose originally from government intervention albeit, to varying degrees, in 
response to public demands; Occupy Sandy did not. While it grew out of Occupy Wall Street, 
after Sandy struck, the focus moved to relief work. Eventually the Occupy Sandy initiative 
worked in partnerships with local communities, FEMA, the Red Cross, and various 
design/planning professionals. Occupy Sandy was by no means the only grassroots group to 
address decades-old questions of helping those least able to handle extreme situations like 
Sandy’s aftermath. Other important efforts include but are not limited to We Act (n.d.), an 
organization “to call attention to and organize against environmental racism” (para. 1), and 
Uprose (n.d.), a Brooklyn based Latino public interest group. Both have been on the ground in 
their communities for decades, fighting for social justice and, increasingly, on climate justice. 
Both were also integrally involved in the Sandy recovery as was Pratt Institute’s RAMP, which 
was referenced earlier by one of the research participants, Brianna. RAMP was initiated by Pratt 
Institute’s Program for Sustainable Planning and Development by Ron Shiffman (MANY, n.d.). 
Students and faculty who were part of the RAMP initiative worked closely with community 
partners and clients to develop plans and strategies for rebuilding and adaptation. Occupy Sandy 
was a focus rather than on these other initiatives because they simultaneously provided outreach 
in a creative and facile manner to a wide range of communities. 
We started talking with friends in the organizing world, Occupy Wall Street was one of 
them but not exclusively. We started tracking the storm, [asking] “What’s going to 
happen? What are we going to do?” The morning of the storm Bobby had started a 
Facebook page almost immediately, Laura had a car, and said, “Let’s just see what’s 
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where?” And the first place we went was Staten Island, and Red Hook. (Joseph, social 
activist)   
Joseph and his colleagues were able to marshal resources from outside the community and bring 
them to Red Hook. It was the first hub. They started that initiative on the day of the storm. I 
asked Joseph how they were able to marshal the resources so quickly.  
  
 
      
              
            
              
              
   
   
 
 
 
Joseph referred to the relationship of Occupy Sandy with the Red Cross as “the bottom 
and the top coming together to meet in the middle” (Joseph, social activist). That’s why this 
example of the Red Cross and Occupy Sandy is such an important paradigm. It has some 
valuable guiding thoughts applicable to the design/planning profession and the concept of seeing 
design leadership as points in a concentric circle rather than a linear hierarchical model.  
The Red Cross plays an important function to marshal resources at scale. Occupy Sandy 
helps it to move, be agile and marshal a lot of resources really quickly because of the 
network approach. Like basically there was like all these little hubs and at the center 
spokes—pathways of both information and goods. It wasn’t flowing out just to one place, 
it was going to many places. (Joseph, social activist)   
 
 We surveyed and talked to people and we put out a call on Facebook, Twitter, email,
 word of mouth. First and foremost, we connected with people in other parts of the city
 that had things that others no longer had, and we started a call out to bring to Red Hook.
 Then more spots started to pop up and from there neighborhoods developed pop up
 donation centers. It grew like that. (Joseph, social activist)
 There was a desire to create a community-led recovery effort based on locally-run 
organizing centers, including faith-based organizations, that would act as a hub and spoke, 
connecting networks. The Red Cross worked with Occupy Sandy because of their social 
relationships with people within the community. Joseph talked about how this would be 
transferable to designers/planners.
The connection is addressing these issues from a systems perspective. I think when you 
look at natural systems there is a diversity of scale and organisms that function at 
different scales and they both need each other. It is really important that they co-exist and 
serve different functions.
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Accessibility is key both in the flow of information as well as the funding. This concept is further 
expanded upon by Eli in the context of community-driven design, as he noted the innovative 
nature of Occupy Sandy. 
Since Hurricane Sandy, you could talk about community-driven design, and before 
Sandy, it existed but did not go into full power. With Occupy Sandy, I think it was the 
first time you could see how the power of social media, and that type of technological 
awareness at the grassroots level, could bring to a community-driven design effort that 
turned into action. That was actionable in real time. (Eli, architect) 
 
Eli further expanded upon the point in the context of communication and being part of a 
system that is already a trusted structure within a community.  
If you engage a group, like Occupy Sandy, or We Act, or any of the other really amazing 
groups out there, they are already set up for communication, and you are part of that 
stream, then there is an extraordinary real-time design that goes on. It has a level of 
pragmatism and practicality and it reflects the intimacy of the neighborhood and then you 
can begin to infuse into that conversation, long-term goals and objectives and completely 
driven by a hugely successful buy-in. (Eli, architect) 
 
Eli also discussed how the design/planning community could leverage a type of approach 
as part of the profession’s own model of leadership.  
I’d love to see more of it. I’d love to see that, that opportunity taken hold, and taken out 
by either side. Or in a sense a sort of partnership of the grassroots folks saying, “Hey, 
we’re going to bring on these designs and designers as we did in the past and begin to 
reflect where we want to go and where we want to be.” To me, that is a business model 
that doesn’t exist yet, and if it does, I’d love to see who’s doing it. (Eli, architect) 
Susan also focused some of her discussion on the changes people experienced as a result 
of the involvement of Occupy Sandy.  
Occupy in my view was tremendously important. I was fascinated to watch how the 
Occupy movement morphed because of course it existed pre-Sandy, and then Sandy 
happened, and it immediately moved into this on the ground resourceful responsive   
community-based ground up. (Susan, urban strategist) 
 
I asked her if and how she thought Occupy Sandy had important lessons for the design/planning 
profession. She began by referencing their resourcefulness. 
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This is one of the smartest things, and I use it all the time as an example [in the 
profession]. In the past we would have said, “Oh here is a community in trouble and we 
are going to send them what we think they need”—[even] when we don’t have a clue 
what it is that they need. Then there is Occupy. They set a function on Amazon and 
create an Amazon wish list to ask for what is it they [the community] needed. (Susan, 
urban strategist) 
 
Thomas also referred to Occupy Sandy and FEMA. He pointed out how the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Studies & Analysis Institute, 2013) had 
actually been studying Occupy Sandy to “broaden future disaster relief efforts” (Schjonberg, 
2014, para. 1). He stated, 
Occupy was so efficient that FEMA ended up hiring a few of the Occupy Sandy, 
computation managers to make FEMA more efficient. And, what happened theoretically 
is that you have the slow-moving vertical system, and you serve the horizontal system 
formally for employment and both of them were improved by it (Thomas, landscape 
architect/urban designer) 
 
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy initiatives. These 
initiatives were foundational to the direction of post-disaster planning and post-Sandy recovery. 
They also served as points of reflection for those design/planning professionals in the study.  
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.2: Design strategies and challenges. It was difficult at 
first to grasp the magnitude of the storm and even once on the ground in the most heavily hit 
areas, devastation was mixed with disbelief. The seasoned professionals, those who had been 
through similar events like this before, were better prepared to cope with the aftermath. While it 
did not diminish the shock, it did diminish the paralysis. Brianna, as previously noted, lives in 
Red Hook and was hit hard during Sandy.  
I would say that it didn’t resonate right away because it was almost too much to deal 
with. I started participating in work that Ron Shiffman had started with the students as a 
reaction to Sandy to figure out how they could help mobilize communities. That was 
called the RAMP program. That was when I started to realize just how big an issue this 
was. (Brianna, architect) 
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Leah, also an architect/planner, left her home near the Gowanus prior to Sandy and 
returned after the event, helping friends and colleagues hard hit in Red Hook. During this period, 
Leah brought in Architecture for Humanity, an organization now sadly defunct, that was 
dedicated to rallying “the world around the cause of humanitarian design, inspiring designers        
. . . with the idea that design can make a difference in improving people’s lives” (Winter, 2015, 
para. 1). The organization helped to clean up on Coney Island in areas that would not be eligible 
for government funding. Parts of Coney Island were filled with small business owners who did 
not own those spaces and the land. They were therefore ineligible for money from FEMA to 
rebuild their businesses. Leah also used her connections in academia as a way to bring resources 
into that community. She cites one specific example through the RAMP initiative. 
I encountered you [referring to me] because of RAMP . . . so you saw the resources that 
we were able to channel at RAMP because of Ron Shiffman being such a trusted 
community advocate and planner. . . . RAMP, for me provided that piece that I had not 
experienced before . . . engaging the community on their terms. . . . that was the platform 
for me that had been missing. It was that thing that drove me to planning school. (Leah, 
architect/planner)  
 
When Hurricane Sandy hit, Paul had already retired from the Corps and had just begun a 
consultant career at a firm that I also had joined about six months prior. There were a number of 
public clients that needed services after the storm to begin the process of recovery. Given Paul’s 
background, he was assigned to this role in the engineering firm he had joined. He reflected on 
what he had learned from the Sandy experience during the interview: 
What were the takeaways and what do we have to do in terms of design strategies in 
response to Sandy? How to marshal the logistics and the resources that are needed to 
respond to the needs of the communities?—food, water, shelter, and debris removal to 
open up the roadways and so forth. With all that preparation that has to go into it, and 
then the recovery to get sorted out. (Paul, engineer) 
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Post-disaster recovery is the most critical initial step. The focus then becomes about how 
to rebuild in a manner that can prevent and/or reduce these vulnerabilities in the future? Paul 
continued,  
Recovery is all about establishing normal operations, if you will. But I think the real part 
of the discussion here is how do you prevent the level of damages in the future? How do 
you reduce them? Or, never deviate from them because you’ve got systems that allow 
you to operate throughout the event, whatever it is. I think that that is probably where we 
need to focus our discussion in terms of design strategy. (Paul, engineer) 
 
While Paul was focusing on a preemptive holistic systems approach in advance of the 
next Sandy-like event noted above, he also spoke about the importance of acknowledging what 
has been accomplished in both policy and small projects rather than just focusing on the large 
projects that require a different level of funding and buy-in. 
There have been lots and lots of policy progress. And then smaller scale solutions, at the 
building level or transit station level, that they’ve implemented. So, let’s not forget that. 
But it’s the larger scale projects, that’s the piece that really people focus on when they 
answer that question about design strategies in response to Sandy. (Paul, engineer) 
Similar to Paul, Eli focused on incremental steps through small-scale post-Sandy projects 
that actually got built. He referenced a demonstration project in Breezy Point, Queens (for 
location, see Figure 4.7) that had been devastated during Sandy.  
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Figure 4.7. Location of Breezy Point (Queens). Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman. 
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia 
Commons (2005).  
 
Flooding and high winds and fires destroyed more than 300 homes. The project was 
designed and built by Eli with a team of nationally recognized experts. This model was designed 
to withstand future Sandy-type events and to be replicated in other vulnerable communities. Eli 
contrasted the demonstration project with large-scale ideas that emerged after Sandy but how 
few of them had actual been funded:  
Post-Sandy, each of these little projects is a bite at a time. I have some reservations about 
overarching statements like some of the ones coming out of COP 21, and a number of 
other conferences. These are all great, really large-scale amazing decisions and ideas but 
how do we actualize down to the common person, is not measurable yet and that to me is 
one of the most critical questions. 
The demonstration project at Breezy Point has drawn public attention as in a recent 
article in Wired magazine that elaborated on the redefinition of both resilience and sustainability.  
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In architecture, resilience refers to a building’s ability to withstand the natural elements 
(hurricanes, tornados, fire), while sustainability refers to its ability to reside in harmony 
with its natural surroundings (passive heating, cooling, minimal footprint). Often thought 
of as separate practices, the two approaches were integrated like never before in the 
Hurricane Strong Home—a potential new direction for homeowners everywhere. (“The 
Future of Resilience,” 2019, para. 2) 
Hannah (planner) was similarly focused on tangible implementable steps but in the 
context of regulations and codes. She emphasized, “Focus on practical solutions” such as flood 
regulations and building codes and other solutions that people could be educated about and put in 
place. In contrast to both Eli and Hannah, Jeanine described a specific community-based 
scenario in which the damage incurred during Sandy, and the potential vulnerabilities in the face 
of another storm, were at odds with a potential solution. A number of members of the community 
did not want to relinquish their vistas or accessibility to what they consider key parts of the 
intrinsic value of their property and, ultimately, what it was they loved about their         
community—the beach. Complicating this were the site-specific challenges. Landscape architect 
Jeanine explained,  
This community wants to see the beach, but they also want to be protected. So, doing a 
levy, for example, they wouldn’t be able to see the beach anymore. The design that came 
out of the Governor’s office storm recovery workshop was really a sand capped, stone 
cord, a dune. Which worked in some places. This is not going to keep water out. (Jeanine, 
landscape architect) 
In the interview, Jeanine and I talked about some of the communities she has worked in 
and rebuilding in areas that remain vulnerable, including what has been built and if it should 
have been built at all. She stated,  
People don’t have the money to go somewhere else and to wholesale move The 
Rockaways or Coney Island; you’re going to have to rezone Brooklyn or Queens, and 
how do they afford that? Some people have lived there, their families have lived there a 
long time. (Jeanine, landscape architect) 
As Jeanine mentioned, even in the most heavily hit areas post-Sandy, there is a plethora 
of new high-end development:  
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I mean there are still a lot of developers to build on The Rockaways and Coney Island 
and sell those houses to people. It’s as if Sandy will never happen again. And it won’t not 
in the same way. Would it be better or worse? No one knows the answer to that. 
I asked the study participants about how they dealt with the rebuilding process navigating 
both the governmental and the professional challenges. Melissa provided a specific example in 
Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn (Figure 4.8), an area that suffered severe flooding and damage. 
So, when you give a presentation about how to get the mold out of your house, or how to 
get through the paperwork to file forms to get your insurance back, you address the 
immediate needs, with your professional advice. You start to hear people’s stories and 
you start to get the lay of the land. You survey buildings, and you look around, and you 
inform yourself. But you build the relationships. (Melissa, architect) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Location of Sheepshead Bay (Brooklyn). Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman. 
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia 
Commons (2005).  
 
Communicating common lessons is essential among design/planning professionals. In 
fact, part of the impetus for this dissertation was to have the voices of these professionals heard. 
Grace (engineer) discussed this in the context of the 100 Resilient Cities Program: 
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Sharing learning [among professionals] is something I find a little bit sad about the 100 
Resilient Cities program going away. That was one of the benefits—the common lessons 
we can learn and can be acquired so that the risk assessment and the resilient building 
process before something happens . . . then use that to transcend more broadly the 
potential risks that we face in our own communities.  
This exchange brought me to the question of where, in professional design/planning roles, does 
educating clients fit—and how that part of the work may have been rethought as a result of the 
post-Sandy experiences. As a number of participants in this study noted, for many seasoned 
professionals’ “normal” practice had not really prepared them for the challenges faced in           
post-disaster rebuilding or in longer term planning in climate vulnerable locations. Grace, one of 
the engineers interviewed for this study, observed,  
There are definitely lots of people who are resistant to it [understanding the unique design 
challenges working in post-disaster recovery and planning] . . . a lot of my role has been 
to educate clients and design teams in recent years about the different aspects of it . . . if 
they come into it with one specific risk or resilient item . . . Then you open the door wider 
by deepening the education process by widening that conversation.  
Similar to Grace, Beryl (landscape architect) felt that since Sandy, she has engaged in a 
design process post-disaster recovery in educating people so they can make the best informed 
decisions. This educational process has been for both other professionals and for herself. While 
design/planning professionals are bringing a specific level of expertise to these situations, on the 
other hand they are all in a process of educating each other. Beryl observed,  
So, I think that what I’ve spent, really from December 2012 up until now trying to do is 
to help people understand the choices that are being offered. If it’s a project I’m 
designing, say, I try to make it clear, so we have lots and lots of charts and graphs and 
whatnot sections to show what all of these words mean.  
She stressed the importance of sharing the meaning of fundamental nomenclature that can 
be confusing and often misleading.  
What does “storm surge” mean? What year are we talking about, in terms of the data? Is 
it in 5, 10, 20 or 30 years? [We are] trying to equip people with knowledge so there is 
less time spent arguing over misaligned facts and more time spent on evaluation of their 
options. So, that’s number one, some form of education, without sounding like an 
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instructor in a classroom, trying to do this in an empathic way, tailored to that specific 
community. (Beryl, landscape architect)  
One of the other key lessons is to not mislead people about protection but to encourage 
them to investigate adaptation in the short- and long-term. 
Encourage people to think about adaptation rather than protection. So, for those folks, 
who have a direct personal involvement in a place, their concern is [that] they want to be 
protected. They don’t want to hear that they are at risk by 2080, 2100, that notion of 
being protected is really not even possible to predict. That’s where things get really 
challenging. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
 
There are no federal subsidies for people who rent their homes or those who lose their 
businesses and do not own the space or the land. Those who rent, live in NYCHA housing, or 
own a business but not the space or the land the business is located on, will not be eligible for 
government subsidies in the same manner as owners would be. While people may carry 
homeowner’s insurance, they might not be aware that this does not usually cover flooding. Beryl 
(landscape architect) explained the delicate challenge of getting this across to people already 
reeling from the storm: 
I think it’s important to keep in mind, some people are homeowners that could have a 
choice of buyout or relocation. There is another whole very large group of folks that can’t 
move because there is no alternative for them. We can’t just say, “Too bad, so sad, you 
live in a vulnerable place and there’s nothing we can really do about it.” That’s a huge 
issue that I think the city really has to grapple with.  
We further discussed the importance of not being lulled into a false sense of complacency 
and for design/planning professionals to have conversations with people within communities as 
honestly as possible. In this regard, it is important to admit to not having all the answers.  
The issues surrounding intergenerational communities and how to have this tough 
conversation with communities that may not survive staying in place several generations from 
now has also been raised within this study. These are not easy conversations for design 
professionals to have and in many cases, the data changes based upon the science. 
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Beryl reflected,  
 
If someone [a design professional] goes in and says, “Well, we don’t have all the 
answers, and what we’re doing now, we’re planning for the next 10 to 20 years.” In a lot 
of intergenerational communities, that’s not going to suffice. So, how do you deal with 
that? You need to be honest but because you are dealing initially with a traumatized 
group, you don’t want to, have people feel like, they’ve been traumatized again.  
I asked Beryl, as I did others in the study, how equipped she felt for communicating these 
ideas. Her response was,  
Well, I feel very strongly that designers are very well equipped to explain things. To 
explain a problem, to offer alternatives, and to help communities, again, understand what 
their options are. That’s not to say that those options chosen to move forward may not be 
the ones that we feel are most appropriate. But at least we’re giving a community the 
tools to push back. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
Trust—how it is built, maintained, or lost—has been a theme throughout this research 
and more broadly, throughout the post-Sandy work of design/planning professionals. 
Communicating technically challenging and emotionally stressful ideas takes a lot of trust 
between the designers/planners and the recipients of these messages, the community. 
Designers/planners are hired by a client—the Office of Management and Budget for the City of 
New York, for example. A project is pre-budgeted, the funding is set, and so on. How do 
designers/planners have these larger conversations and stay within these pre-set structures? Beryl 
expressed her response as follows:  
I think that we’re pretty good at listening . . . that communities are more likely to trust a 
designer than a city agency. But, if we can’t deliver on that trust, then we have a problem. 
If we [designers/planners] could be at the table earlier in the process [with the city], we 
could have larger conversations about how the city should be thinking about vulnerable 
pieces of geography, vulnerable populations.  
Often it is not just a governmental agency that is not addressing a site’s vulnerability. It 
can also be the planning team working on the design. This reflects an earlier theme of educating 
not just oneself, the community, and the client, but other design/planning professionals. 
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As part of the Design Commission I was reviewing a project in Red Hook [hit hard by 
Sandy]. I said to them [the design team presenting], “How could you possibly present this 
project without presenting its vulnerability?  . . . I can’t review this project until you tell 
me how you’re addressing its vulnerability.” (Beryl, landscape architect)  
What shocked me most in Beryl’s vignette was the client agency’s response. These are 
the people who as the public servants are supposed to be the custodians of the communities they 
serve. 
The client agency said, “Let me see if I understand what you’re saying. Are you saying 
that this project is supposed to protect Red Hook?” I said, “No, but it’s got to have an 
approach within the design as to how it’s going to respond to these existing 
vulnerabilities.” (Beryl, landscape architect) 
Beryl went on to describe that the project she had worked on in Red Hook was designed 
with elevations that were lower than most elevations in the city. She explained to the team that 
they were designing in a community that was already vulnerable and impacted heavily by Sandy 
and that there were guidelines. I asked if she had felt discouraged or conflicted by this 
experience. Beryl noted that she was “not conflicted but felt an urgency that she had not felt in 
many years.” In that context, she shared the story of a project on the Lower East Side. It was not 
a predictable outcome. It was a choice the community made after assessing the information 
shared by the design team. 
I think Sandy hit about a week after we were given a project on the Lower East Side. It 
was flooded. Over the course of the next year, 2013 it was a robust engagement process. 
We reached out to the Chinese-American community—the kids that went to school in the 
neighborhood but didn’t live in the neighborhood . . . [and to] all the NYCHA buildings 
because they were also not attending the public meetings. (Beryl, landscape architect)  
Beryl is describing a very detailed and democratic engagement process in which 
alternatives were discussed and exhibited during the meetings. People were asked to vote on the 
programs. At the end of the process there were four alternatives. She further reflected,  
What really struck me is that the community voted for the river ecology scheme in spite 
of the fact that the river had flooded them… to let the water into the site . . . it was like 
we were playing with fire, right? This is the body of water that had damaged a 
198 
 
 
community for four months. Now, we’re actually welcoming that water into the site as 
part of an educational process, as part of a way to engage with water, et cetera. (Beryl, 
landscape architect) 
 
The community wanted a park that was just for them, that would give them a sense of 
pride, that would help educate their children about the water. And so, for them, being in an 
environment where they could watch the processes of nature was something that they felt 
outweighed the negative impact.  
And because we were going to provide a buffer on the backside, they felt that the         
trade-off was worth it. But, a lot of it had to do with education of the next generation. It 
was very touching, it was probably one of the most interesting experiences I had post 
Sandy, because rather than the other communities I worked with who said, protect me, 
protect me, protect me. This community said, educate me. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
Beryl was transparent in her discussion of the challenges of working with public agencies. The 
narrative about the project on the Lower East Side goes to what will be discussed below under 
Pillar 3 (societal), Theme 2—the intersection between nature and the built environment.  
I asked then what the biggest take-away from this project was that she would want to 
share with other design/planning professionals as part of this study. Beryl responded as follows:  
I do remember one woman. She was actually a woman who lives in one of the NYCHA 
projects said, “I just want a place where I can see the horizon, and I can just be.” And 
I’ve never forgotten that. [She said] “I just want to see an expansive space. I want to let 
my kids run around . . . I just want to be.” That woman has actually made me go on to 
think about a lot of things, which is, are we effectively over designing out public space.  
I followed up, asking if this compared to her other post-Sandy experiences? Had they all 
been this positive?  
Yes, it’s a good story and it helped balance some of the tougher experiences we had on 
Hunts Point, and certainly The Rockaways, Breezy Point. What was tough were the 
people. Facing people who were really hurting because of all that they had lost and 
experienced. The people on the Lower East Side were also hurting, but there are different 
degrees of suffering and loss. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
 
I discussed with Beryl how to grasp and deal with the high level of aggression that could 
be provoked in these meetings. She shared her own residual feelings about public meetings 
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having grown up in a NYCHA community. Outsiders, she regretted, would come in and make 
promises that were never kept. They would “study you to death” and then nothing ever changed. 
There was a rabid determination, like we won’t be put down, we will fight, we will come 
back. It was extremely macho, extremely suspicious. Anything that came out of the 
mouths of the Parks Department or FEMA was mistrusted . . . people felt that the 
response had been too slow. It comes down to trust, people feeling heard, believing they 
are sincerely being asked, listened to, and not lied to. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
It should be noted that the FEMA regulations in the context of New York City have been 
raised as problematic by other design/planning professionals who participated in the study. This 
comes out in the NYC SIRR report Stronger, More Resilient (PlaNYC, 2013) which implied that 
New York City and the federal government need to better align their objectives. These issues are 
further compounded by flood insurance and the national flood insurance programs.  
Robert, one of the architects interviewed for this study, further explored the importance 
of designers/planners making people more aware of their options and helping to educate the 
public. He described this as getting a seat at the table on community planning boards and 
planning agencies. 
More people need to get involved with local community planning boards and become 
members of various planning agencies. It is important, as architects . . . getting the word 
out about the growing vulnerabilities we face . . . it’s a requirement that architects and 
planners have to take on to make people aware. We are the ones that have the knowledge, 
we need to get that knowledge out to the masses somehow. (Robert, architect)  
 
Robert and I discussed how much of a bubble New York City is in. I asked him how he 
would deal with climate deniers. Earlier in this dissertation note was made of Mayor of Tangier 
Island in the Chesapeake Bay, James “Ooker” Eskridge a climate-change denier on an island that 
is rapidly submerging (Johnson, 2018). I asked Robert how he reconciled the position of climate 
deniers in the conversation of getting the word out to community groups. He replied,  
You have the climate deniers, who will literally get into fist fights with you if you even 
bring up the topic. . . I’ve had situations like that with my own family. . . It presents a 
challenge, but architects and planners should seek opportunities to really bring this out 
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into the open with community groups and specifically addressing planning and zoning 
boards. The facts are the facts whether you attribute it to climate change or not. (Robert, 
architect) 
 
The phenomenon of climate change denial is widespread enough in the United States that there is 
a strong likelihood that community members and even some professional designers/planners 
might be skeptics. Yet, no one I spoke with in the study claimed to be climate deniers or reported 
significant pushback after Sandy in public engagement in the New York area on the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change. Instead, there was a sense of unavoidably heightened awareness 
that storms of increasing intensity would be faced.  
   
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
     
 
 
            
                  
              
      
One of the things I’m finding after Sandy actually, the libraries became shelters. And 
that’s not something that we’re all thinking about. What are those spaces that you can 
build like cooling centers or heating centers or shelters or information centers? How you 
build to accommodate for that, is important. I feel like, as architects we can be more 
facilitators between government and communities. (Penelope, architect) 
 
 I think that there is a lot more awareness than what there was before [Sandy], building
 codes have been changedÑ that is good. There is a lot more awareness about equity,
 environmental justice, and design justice. I think that thereÕs  a realization that, in a lot of
 communities economical ly disrupted that theyÕve  been neglected for so long, that when
 there is a disaster, itÕs  even worse. (Penelope, architect)
 I asked Penelopewhat role she felt architects needed to play in this as part of their 
inherent design strategy. She responded,
 [In economical ly disrupted communities,] they donÕt  have, they donÕ t know, necessarily,
 where the resources are. If you donÕt  have your paperwork, if you donÕt  have certain
 things in order, you canÕt  get help. You donÕt  know how to get it. ItÕs  like how to help
 them through this process. ThatÕs  not real ly for architects; thatÕs  more a question about
 community organizers. Architects need to look at where people cannot shelter in place.
 (Penelope, architect)
 Within many of theeconomically disrupted communities, as referred to by Penelope,
peopledonÕt leave their homes for safer groundbecause they havenowhere to go or noway to
get to asafer spacewithin thecommunity. I fol lowed up,asking Penelopehow she thought
designers/planners could contribute to this strategy.
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Brianna’s thoughts in terms of implementing design strategies in response to Sandy are 
also ones of incredible frustration.  
I know that the dollars are astounding in terms of what we’ve looking at to actually get 
projects off the ground and construct it, but at the same time, there’s too much planning, 
and too much talk, and too much lack of actual action on the ground. (Brianna, architect)   
This goes back to an earlier point raised about post-Sandy lethargy of designers/planners 
being related to funding. 
There is a wide range of resilience, not just flood protection. For instance, putting solar 
lamp posts out, that should have been done from the day Sandy hit. Or, dealing with green 
infrastructure on a much wider greater scale. And flood protection, there’s a huge one, and 
with the Army Corps of Engineers’ new study maybe that’s going to push something in 
one direction, but [not] at the moment. (Brianna, architect) 
 
I then asked Brianna about the progress specifically in Red Hook in Brooklyn, as she has 
been engaged in efforts there since Sandy. She recounted,  
I was at the Mayor’s office, December 2018, when they were presenting their flood 
protection system. I was like, I’m done talking about this, we all know what needs to 
happen and you’re not taking any action. You can raise a street six inches, 18 inches, and 
I know that the FEMA money is restricting you, but you need to come to the table with 
another solution because that’s not the solution. (Brianna, architect).  
 
While Red Hook recently created its own community recovery and disaster response plan (Ready 
Red Hook, n.d.), Brianna was also referencing new development coming into Red Hook since 
Hurricane Sandy. 
What they [the city] are saying is, “Oh, we don’t have to use our own money, or spend our 
own money because each developer will come in and they will build their own sort of 
raised buildings that could then be connected through a wall system that they would have 
to build and that would protect the community.”  
 
This kind of building of approach would not include existing building stock of NYCHA housing 
or the middle-income wood frame homes on Brianna’s street. It is an approach that can be 
perceived as favoring the wealthy and that does not extend risk reduction to the entire 
community. 
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Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 1. 2: Design strategies and challenges. We 
can’t “fight the next war based on the last war” because no two storms are alike and, thus, the 
strategies and challenges are as unique as the communities and the individuals that are impacted. 
That said, there are lessons learned that are translatable to a variety of storm related events. What 
is clear from this study—and reflected in this theme—is that there is no room for complacency. 
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.3: It’s not just about design . . . it’s about data. A 
main thread through this study has been the tension between the aspirational and the pragmatic. 
Part of the pragmatism in the context of design strategy in response to Sandy is tracking and 
evaluating the data within the decision making in the recovery and rebuilding process. 
I’ve been in so many different situations where I’ve been presenting in conferences and 
brought up . . . the importance of benchmarking, tracking data and evaluating our 
decisions in a more pragmatic way. People just say, “Well that takes all the creativity out 
of what we do.” But at the end of the day, it really doesn’t do any of that. (Samuel, 
architect) 
I questioned Samuel on how he felt this had a particular impact in regard to Sandy and 
responses to rebuilding or planning in climate vulnerable communities. He responded: 
Benchmarking of information or data that we’re getting from other places globally, but 
then also using local or contextualized benchmarks so that we can understand how the 
situation is progressing to a specific area, or a specific region. It’s an interesting question 
because the concept for all of this actually started before Sandy. (Samuel, architect) 
In the context of Sandy, Samuel explained how, as a design professional, he would  
use data to inform communities so that they have a sense of ownership and he would then create 
design solutions based on that shared data.  
This is exactly the basis for setting up a platform, that doesn’t just track physical 
development; it tracks policy issues; it tracks issues of income, issues of diversity. We 
agreed to do this with Red Hook. To develop this platform, which, by the way is pro bono. 
The data was going to be collected bottom up. We were going to build the analysis around 
the views and the aspirations of the community. They are right now, very worried about 
gentrification and overdevelopment. (Samuel, architect) 
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What Samuel described is a platform that is built to capture, store, and analyze data 
creating a matrix of decisions that provide the 10 or 15 things we need to do to get the outcomes 
we want across the different sectors within a community. Samuel was expressing that the 
design/planning profession had lost a degree of rigor.  
After speaking with Beryl, I began to have a deeper understanding into Samuel’s 
concerns. Still, it seemed difficult to fathom how this could go unnoticed. In terms of the 
importance of data in the context of design she noted the following:  
We realized that the high tide was going deeper into the wetland than we had anticipated. 
We went back and realized that our survey and all of our design drawings had been based 
on the 1929 NAVD (North American Vertical Datum) elevation. Since 1929,  
sea-level had gone up a foot. So, our tidal wetland was essentially a foot off, just from the 
word go, as a result of using a 1929 survey. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
That was Beryl’s first glimmer of awakening to the realities of not only sea-level rise but 
to the data used to produce the design. She went on to describe another type of data vulnerability 
in Rockaway.  
When Sandy hit, I’ll never forget going out to Rockaway to do, what the Mayor called, 
an emergency beach restoration. Everyone was of course highly traumatized and anxious, 
and folks were just throwing numbers around like crazy. They were saying, “Well the 
flood waters went to 13—no, they went to 14. We have to build this to 16.” (Beryl, 
landscape architect) 
 
It became obvious at that juncture that no one was really using the same baseline data. 
And after Sandy, everyone realized that the Borough Datum System was just beyond antiquated, 
and that we need to be on the National Datum. So, that’s why, as Beryl explained, everyone now 
uses NAVD 88, which is the last time the benchmark was created. So, all surveys now, 
throughout the United States, are based on that baseline number.  
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It’s not just about design . . . it’s about safety training/deployment. The lack of 
accessible data was something that Vic (architect) deliberated on. How do you determine the 
damage? How does it compare to other similar situations locally and nationally? Based upon that 
data, can we salvage our homes? Can we fix it? Is it reparable? What does the data show? Vic 
found answers to a number of these questions by embarking on a safety training program.  
I became a certified disaster service worker. And the reason I took it from California is 
that New York State at that time did not have any kind of Good Samaritan system. So 
that means that if I, as an architect, came on the scene to help people identify dangerous 
building conditions, even if I weren’t charging for my services, I could be held liable and 
sued. I’m not sure New York State has fully satisfied the problem. There is a program 
CEDAR (The Code Enforcement Disaster Assistance Response) that allows us to provide 
disaster service in the event of an event. (Vic, architect) 
 
As Vic noted, “It’s a bureaucratic nuance to be able to affect a solution.” Vic also took the 
HURRIPLAN training course—one that I also took. This training has been described as follows:  
“HURRIPLAN Resilient Building Design for Coastal Communities provides the necessary 
training to integrate resilient community planning and building design strategies for hurricane-
prone sites” (American Institute of Architects, n.d., para. 2). Describing this experience, Vic 
stated,  
HURRIPLAN was a real eye-opener. It’s basic common sense training that kind of opens 
your eyes to areas that you just never thought of before. Like, evacuating people, where 
do you evacuate them? How do you make that work? How do you build environments 
that are setup to support people that have been displaced? Services related to that 
displacement that we just never thought about, cell phone service, pets?  
When design/planning professionals are trained in the safety assessment program, 
training, and deployment, you are training them not just to handle the psychological aspect but 
also to function as a team and the strategy for working with homeowners who may have lost 
everything. Eli (architect) also addressed the need for specific training: 
You are in a team, a minimum of three, one or two of you set off to do your job, the other 
one is tasked to just listen, talk to the homeowner, neighbor, directly affected. They are 
seeing the devastation, realizing what they’ve lost, and all of those pieces and all of their 
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grief and transformation is happening right there. As a team, you are training to be there 
to listen to them. (Eli, architect) 
 
I asked Eli how widespread this training was for designers/planners. There was not much 
mention of this in the interviews by others, and frankly, it had not been on my list of initial 
questions for I had not previously understood how essential this type of training was. 
I think what you’re bringing up is right on. And the profession does have a role in that. 
You are bringing your expertise to evaluate rapidly, is that building safe? And right now, 
it’s not safe for, or maybe you can go in and retrieve your goods and its needs a later 
inspection. Or, don’t go in there, it’s about a life safety and immediate relief of pressure 
on the shelter systems. (Eli, architect) 
 
Eli noted that a lot of architects have trained in New York State. He estimating that 
almost 300 architects in the last 30 years have fulfilled that role. Across the nation, AIA National 
has put together a program that has been pushing very hard to train architects all across the 
United States to do the secondary response effort. Eli further discussed the leadership role the 
profession has to play with more climate-impactful events happening locally, nationally, and 
internationally: 
You’re not calling the architect to build an addition onto your house or pick out what 
your new porch might look like. It’s not only how the building operates, how all the 
systems work, but is it still functioning properly, is it safe? That is a really powerful thing 
and not a lot of people out there can do it. There’s a huge leadership position that the 
profession needs to step up and step in and I’m glad many of us are.  
 
After 9/11, the design/planning community realized that they were less prepared to tackle 
a disaster than they should have been. In response, one of this study’s participants, Ross 
(architect), formed a task force called the Disaster Preparedness Task Force. Without knowing it 
at the time, this actually became a critical step for setting up a structure that would serve 
designers/planners well in the post-Sandy context of disaster preparedness. During this time only 
three states had this type of manual: California, Texas, and Kansas. 
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The first component is policy. I think a lot has been done [since Sandy] that everyone 
should feel good about. What I mean by that is zoning changes, the building code 
changes, design guidelines being integrated into capital investments. Those kinds of 
things, that had to get done or should have got done so what goes up, new, in the future, 
is not subject to the same type of damage that happened with Sandy. (Paul, engineer) 
13 The Urban Green Council is a non-profit organization working to “transform buildings for a sustainable 
future in New York and around the world . . . we convene, research, advocate and educate” (Urban Green, 
2019, paras. 1–2).  
The manual was delivered to the AIA chapter and state offices. Ross met with the New 
York State Office of Emergency Management to discuss the adaptation of the manual. This 
Disaster Assistance Handbook was published to help professionals better prepare and respond to 
disasters (American Institute of Architects, 2017). As Ross explained it, the reality is this: If 
something like Sandy happens again in New York, the New York Governor calls the California 
Governor to activate the California sanctions for second responders that were trained in New 
York to be sent to respond in New York. 
In 2010,  the  Task Force morphed into a standing committee of the AIA’s  New York 
Chapter, titled  the Design for Risk and Reconstruction Committee. Ro ss and  Eli became  the 
co-chairs. I a lso ha ve been engaged with this committee since Sa ndy.
It’s not just about design . . . it’s about deployment of codes and policy.	Changes to the 
building codes and policy were crucial after Sandy. Like data assessment, it is certainly not the 
“sexy side” of design but it is critical to implementing design decisions and planning approaches. 
This issue was brought up and discussed by several participants. Codes and policy issues are 
critical to creating structural changes in the system. After Sandy, the Mayor and City Council 
asked Urban Green Council13 to convene a Building Resiliency Task Force that would look at 
changes in the building code for best practices in flood conditions. 	
207 
 
 
How then, I asked Paul, when one is looking at sea level rise and climate change do you 
work with science to inform policy from the perspective of designers/planners? He responded,  
You’re looking at sea level rise, climate change, climate stressors that inform building 
codes. We can’t predict the future, but we sure have science to get us to understand what 
the range in the future might be. And then, let science inform policy. That’s what I mean 
by good policy change. Science-based policy, so we build in codes and zoning changes 
and what you can do if you build, the must dos or the can’t dos that are now in law. (Paul, 
engineer) 
 
The manual, Climate Resiliency Design Guidelines, was first released in 2017 with 
revisions twice since (New York City Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 2019). Paul 
and his firm were integrally engaged with that effort.  
Paul described the identification of climate datasets that would be needed by the 
design/planning community in the quest for climate resiliency. Future climate data was included 
in the framework that would take into account heat, precipitation, and sea level rise/coastal storm 
surge. A benefit-cost analysis methodology was developed from that.  
Grace, an engineer, also brought up the role and challenge of professionals establishing 
codes that would mitigate future climate-related disasters. She observed, “One of the challenges 
is that the building code has been designed specifically to protect life safety but not designed to 
think about the future and how risks are changing, think climate change, sea level rise.” Grace 
described how these challenges varied in terms of the owner and the building type: 
They [developers] are not necessarily willing to go above and beyond the codes to 
provide long term protection for a property they are just looking to flip today or 
tomorrow. If it’s an institution or a hospital they often have a much longer term view or a 
real estate developer who is looking to hold on to the property for a long time it is as an 
easier conversation to have with them because they care about the long term ROI. 
 
I then asked how design/planning professionals could best address this in response to 
design strategies after Sandy. Grace responded,  
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Climate science is so complex. And as engineers I don’t think we are in a position to 
comment on the work that has already been done other than it is science and evidence 
based. We should be on board with it because it is also what we do, right?  
Designers/planners are still hampered by regulations or the lack of regulations to include 
the data and projections into their design.  
 
Grace referenced what some cities, for example Boston, are now requiring in terms of 
future planning. It goes beyond guidelines. The Boston Development and Planning Agency 
requires climate change projections into any new significant developments.  
      
   
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
An elevator or water system that is not to working renders a building useless. It also puts 
people’s lives at risk. There were many people during Sandy that were trapped in residential 
buildings where they were unable to walk down the steps and the elevators were non-functioning 
as was the water and heat. Liz elaborated on this issue in the context of life safety. The question 
of defining life safety is critical to the discussion on codes and policy. 
Life safety referring to if the extreme happens the building is going to give you a chance 
of getting out of it alive. That is what it means. It doesn’t mean it is going to be 
occupiable. And it doesn’t mean it is going to return to service immediately. (Liz, 
engineer) 
One of the issues that came up in the discussion of policy was the mechanism of 
financing and execution to be tied into policy. There is the issue of funding for some of the 
larger-scale projects either being cancelled or put on hold. These are shared perspectives between 
 While codes are vital, so is policy, which is what Grace was underscoring in her example
with the Boston Development and Planning Agency, “that until we move to a point that banks, 
insurers, governments, departments of buildings are all on board with requiring it, it is very hard 
to actually change the tide.” In our interview, Liz, an engineer, also connected building codes 
and disaster preparedness:
I was a co-leader collecting data on Hurricane Sandy. I worked with NYC Department  
of Buildings post-Sandy and heavily involved with the NYC Building Code. There have 
been two revisions of the NYC Building Code, one in 2015 and theother this year in 
2019 that is trying to incorporate new information from Hurricane Sandy.
209 
 
 
the range of design/planning disciplines. The following narrative succinctly summarizes that 
viewpoint.  
There is a lethargy in the mechanism of financing and execution. That causes lethargy or 
sluggishness in the design profession because you have people who are no longer really 
interested in trying to appropriate or go after these types of projects knowing that if they 
are very large federally funded projects, that we’ve seen the failure or the stopping of 
these, or so many things that get in the way. (Eli, architect)  
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.3: It’s not just about design . . . it’s about 
data. As illustrated by the designers/planners within this pillar, ideas are strengthened through 
the tracking of data after a disaster. It can range from the views and aspirations of the community 
to the decisions and outcomes that have led to code, policy and on-the-ground training for 
professionals being deployed after a disaster to assist with recovery. 
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.4: Lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and 
Maria. The fourth topic drawn from the coding of Pillar 2 results was the salience of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Maria. Hurricane Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane that made landfall in Florida 
and Louisiana in August 2005, causing catastrophic damage, particularly in New Orleans. 
Hurricane Maria was a Category 5 hurricane that struck in September 2017 devastating Puerto 
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Dominica. Maria was especially deadly and, like Katrina, 
precipitated widespread condemnation of the federal government response. 
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Learning from Hurricane Katrina. Lessons learned—both effectively, and not so 
successfully—from Katrina, in subsequent responses to climate disasters, could be a lengthy 
study in itself. Therefore, the focus in this section is on the participants whose experiences of 
Katrina informed decisions and insights during and after Sandy. This discussion is organized 
under the headings of each participant’s name and profession to describe the lessons each drew 
from Katrina.  
Hannah, planner. Hannah volunteered a number of times in New Orleans. While Hannah 
was not there during the actual storm, six months later she began to volunteer on the ground. 
While the water had receded, the damage was still obvious. Sandy was seven years after that.  
I volunteered with Habitat for Humanity to build houses. I think the thing about New 
Orleans that’s pretty amazing is their sense of community. In neighborhoods people 
really come together. I think one of the things that I thought was amazing, people in New 
Orleans all had hurricane insurance, which is mostly for wind damage, you know, roof, 
stuff like that. But nobody had flood insurance. (Hannah, planner)  
 
Hannah also emphasized that one aspect often forgotten about Katrina was that the levees 
were breached largely because of prior corruption and flawed engineering. This was summarized 
in a report by the American Society of Civil Engineers, Hurricane Katrina External Review 
Panel (2007).  
With all of America’s political polarization around the issues of climate-impactful events, 
it has never been more important for designers/planners to remain vigilant as they plan and 
design in climate-vulnerable communities whether pre- or post-disaster. As Hannah and I 
reminded each other, Katrina is a cautionary tale. 
211 	
	
Ross, architect. Ross had gone down to New Orleans, not under contract, but by invitation 
to speak on panels or to advise communities on assessment and strategies for rebuilding. He had 
a group of friends who were victims of Katrina and another group of friends who were the 
professionals working on planning for the future of New Orleans. He relayed to me this story of 
exasperation:	
One day without any plan, I found myself screaming at my friends in New Orleans saying, 
“Wake up, wake up!” You’ve had a terrible, terrible tragedy and disaster and life is never 
going to be the way it was before. You can’t have your old New Orleans back; it’s gone!  
You have to look to the future of the New Orleans you’re going to get. You can’t do it by 
keeping your heads in the sand about what you want of the old days. (Ross, architect)  
 
As he reflected years later in our interview on this dialogue, he stated,   
 
I don’t know. It was at the time, the side I came down on at the time . . . and then the 
whole Ninth Ward idiocy with Brad Pitt and the failure of that to do anything other than 
hire some fancy architects.14 The urban attitude, the urban strategy, was wrong. And not 
as many people came back to that area wanting exactly what they’d had. New Orleans, 
for a while, became a bit of the primer for how we went about looking at a city. (Ross, 
architect) 
Susan, urban strategist. Susan, who was on the ground for both Katrina and Sandy, 
brings an interesting perspective. Susan was on a fellowship with a national foundation and it 
began the day the levees broke. The foundation was from the Gulf Coast and Susan was their 
person on the ground. She reflected,  
How do people self-organize to realize their aspirations and meet their needs? I got a 
bird’s eye view of that because so many of their systems had been broken as a result of 
Katrina, and many of which had been broken before the storm but then were completely 
shattered after the infrastructure failures. In the case of New Orleans, everything was 
wrecked, people’s homes were gone. It was a massive devastation. (Susan, urban 
strategist) 
 
14 Actor Brad Pitt established a non-profit organization called the Make It Right Foundation in the Lower 
Ninth Ward after Katrina. For a description and critical analysis of this initiative and its problems see 
Fuqua (2011) and Menza (2019). 
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That was of course quite different from Sandy, where most people went back to their 
homes and the city was still able to function. New Orleans could not. When Susan came to New 
York City it was to focus on urban livability: 
We found in New Orleans resilience became the best term, but the recovery needed to 
hasten. In other words, the community there wanted the city back, but they appreciated 
that they didn’t want the city back to the way it had been, but they weren’t willing to just 
have structures pushed upon them by outside experts.  
 
As will be noted in the next pillar, concerning resilience, it has taken on both positive and 
negative overtones in the design/planning profession. It is therefore important in the context of 
this discussion of Katrina as part of the impact of Sandy upon design/planning professionals to 
fully note the concept of resilience as described by Susan: 
In New Orleans we started using the term resilience but was trying to create something 
that wasn’t an end state but something rather we would choose as a filter of what to 
rebuild. What New Orleans was doing was incubating its own made in Louisiana 
approach to this which was quite innovative. I became a convert to the right to return the 
choice to come back to your home and be engaged in that conversation of resiliency.  
 
Paul, engineer. Paul, a former Colonel in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, indicated 
that a lesson from Katrina for him was the need for greater transparency between 
designers/planners and the community: 
Engineers and designers have to figure out how to communicate in layman’s terms what 
their solutions are going to look like and what the impact might be. And what the risk is, 
even after those solutions are in place. (Paul, engineer) 
 
Paul explained how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built interactive tools so that 
people within the community could see it and understand what it meant in terms of water in and 
around your property. You could go online and put in your address and it would show you the 
water depth around your residence in different levels of floods through a simulation. It doesn’t 
make people happy to know they are not completely protected but it also respects people enough 
to value their lives by not creating a false sense of security where there maybe none. 
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Melissa, architect. Melissa has written about New Orleans in a number of books 
including New Orleans Under Reconstruction: The Crisis of Planning (Reese, Sorkin, & 
Fontenot, 2014). She shared with me a number of similarities she found during Sandy.  
There are extended family networks that are in need of the properties. So, you might get 
somebody owning three or four houses or these little bungalows in Sheepshead Bay next 
to each other. It’s legacy and it’s their only form of wealth. It was shocking, but in New 
Orleans and Sheepshead Bay, the people didn’t necessarily have bills of sale or deeds so 
they’re kind of stuck. (Melissa, architect) 
 
Melissa also told a story about the Alexander family in New Orleans East, who owned 
about 20 properties. This goes to the importance of intergenerational communities and their 
preservation. She explained,  
If there is a young person and they want to move out of the house they’d live in somebody 
else’s. And then they would be able to buy one of the houses when they came of age. It 
was a whole little self-sustaining socio-economic group of people who build and take care, 
repair, and trade houses, employ each other, take care of each other’s kids. (Melissa, 
architect) 
 
Esther, activist/storyteller. Working with Sandy Storyline, Esther had spent many months 
in New Orleans doing a lot of post-Katrina storytelling around the housing crises. People felt 
disenfranchised and that they had lost their voice. Decisions were being made for them in terms 
of the rebuilding: schools were privatized, public housing was demolished, people got sick from 
FEMA trailers. 
One of the projects that grew out of Sandy Storyline was a project called Land of 
Opportunity in New Orleans. On the 10-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina we 
developed a project called Katrina/Sandy. It’s a timeline project where you can see the 
Sandy Storyline alongside Katrina. That is one of the big reasons we started Sandy 
Storyline as we knew housing would be a big issue. (Esther, activist/storyteller) 
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Leah, architect/planner. Leah has spent a lot of time in New Orleans, initially to help her 
friends with their flooded house and thought she would be there for only a few weeks but that 
turned into on-and-off for five years. She stopped working there in 2012. She recounted, 
When I went down there, I didn’t understand. Obviously you can’t. You can’t understand 
what these things are like. One of the many differences between Katrina and Sandy was 
that in New Orleans people were forcibly evacuated. It took people a long time to get 
back, if they ever did. (Leah, architect/planner) 
  
Leah spoke specifically about the public housing residents. I shared with her how I had 
been part of a team that went to New Orleans to do a HUD-sponsored study for a WPA art deco 
public housing development. After Leah walked the HUD study site it became clear that the 
buildings needed to be dried out but would be livable again. They were not damaged in a manner 
that would have required demolition. Our assignment was short-lived. The buildings were 
bulldozed to the ground. Leah then further reflected on the direct action of affected residents 
after Katrina:  
One of the things that we were doing in New Orleans that was such a great demonstration 
is that housing residents . . . [was building] these tent cities on the neutral ground in front 
of their development. Then they would break into the buildings whenever they could, cut 
down the fencing, climb their way in, and try to occupy their units again. I don’t know, 
it’s hard to fight, fight, fight, fight. (Leah, architect/planner) 
 
 Learning from Hurricane Maria. As noted, Maria was a Category 5 hurricane in 
September 2017 devastating Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Dominica. Four of the 
participants in my research had been influenced by and made note of their experience with 
Hurricane Maria.  
Eli, architect. Eli described getting colleagues ready for deployment to Puerto Rico after 
Hurricane Maria and sharing documents that he had referenced in some of his own safety 
assessment/deployment training earlier discussed: 
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If you are going to go down, I need to tell you guys something. You need to take this 
with you, and you need to read it before you get on this plane. And they did, and they 
thanked me backwards and forwards for it because I gave them the psychological stuff. 
(Eli, architect) 
 
Eli had explained to them that what they were going to be running into was “not The 
Rockaways”:  
You’re going to go into a country where you don’t speak the language. You’re going into 
the jungles and you’re going into that had been totally wiped out and the federal authority 
hasn’t reached them yet. You are going to reach them first. When you get there, the Urban 
Search and Rescue, has not gone all the way thoroughly through the jungles and the rural 
community sites. You may be running across dead animals and dead people. (Eli, architect) 
 
While this particular group of design/planning professionals didn’t run into the worst of 
what they could have, they ran into grief-stricken people seeing someone from the outside 
coming with aide for the very first time bringing solar panels. What they needed was food and 
water. 
Kaasar, planner. In the context of disaster recovery, Kaasar looked at both Sandy and 
Katrina as what he termed “shadow cases” to the experiences in Puerto Rico.  
Sandy is, in a way, the storm that devastated a very important area of the United States. 
Nonetheless, it is a different area of the United States if we compare it to New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and the Gulf area and of course, Puerto Rico. I’ve begun looking deeper into 
the Katrina experience an interesting point of comparison, into what is happening on the 
ground in Puerto Rico. (Kaasar, planner) 
 
Kaasar underscored how the colonial racism they experience in Puerto Rico as a 
commonwealth of the United States was not too dissimilar from the way in which the U.S. 
government had responded to their own citizens who are part of marginalized communities and 
communities of color in New Orleans post-Katrina.  
Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer. For Thomas, Hurricane Maria’s impacts 
struck close to home.  
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Penelope, architect. After Hurricane Maria, Penelope was active in the recovery 
conversations as she was personally impacted. She convened regular Puerto Rico expat meetings 
to talk about empowering people there and translating resilience through culture and through 
looking at just transition, and recovery. She explained,  
Personally, it was a pretty big hit for me and my family. We couldn’t communicate with 
anybody on the island. The only way people could communicate was with hand radios 
and Facebook for those people who had access. So, there were literally Facebook groups 
where people would just read off lists of names, to say, these people are here with us. So, 
we were moderating and scouring Facebook groups, to try and figure out who was okay. 
(Penelope, architect) 
 
One of the root problems for Puerto Rico in coping with Hurricane Maria is that it is so 
dependent on outside electricity and fuel that the disruption of transportation and transmission 
was severe. Other parts of the Caribbean were not so dependent on these kinds of infrastructure. 
They already had alternatives of energy, and were able to come back online, at least on the 
 I get a call from my father. He says, Ò ItÕs really bad here, the neighborhood is flattened.Ó
 He says thereÕs  no power, no water, theelderly on the block, some of them canÕt  get
 access, theyÕre  diabetic, they have no power. The hospital doors [were] closed and itÕs  a
 hospital for 60,000 people. We found it was much worse than what he describedÑ it was
 the entire island. It was flat, like pushed back to the stone age. (Thomas, landscape
 architect/urban designer)
 Puerto Rico is an island about the size of Connecticut. Thomas rhetorically called on me 
to imagine a devastation l ike what Maria wrought, al l across that state. He continued, Ò There
were food lines and there were mothers with f ive kids waiting to get water and this clips onto a 
lit tle bit of my experience with Hurricane Andrew growing up, getting that water in the first few 
weeks.Ó  In terms of navigating on the ground, Thomas said that he interacted with folks he had 
worked with under the Obama Administration, who were stil l in power and had been engaged in 
post-Sandy efforts.
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power side and for potable water as a result. Penelope considered disruption in Puerto Rico in 
terms of both political and social economies. 
They are very matriarchal in the grassroots effort that is leading the recovery. And they 
are very much taking on the form of collaborative and cooperative in what’s happening in 
the recovery stuff. I think that goes back to Indigenous roots if you really start to look at 
it. And I think there are also understanding that you have to work with nature. And one of 
the ways that that happens, how do we build in a way that can keep us connected?  
(Penelope, architect) 
 
Penelope further described this in the context of her own childhood in Puerto Rico: 
 
Like, collecting water is really important. We had to do it out of necessity, I remember 
growing up, we would go and have barrels that we would collect the water, because the 
water would just shut off, for weeks. So, the resiliency concept sort of translates into a lot 
of different things.  
 
Penelope shared how her grandmother took her to a location and said, “Here, this is clean 
water. It’s like a hole in a cliff. There’s like a fresh stream of water coming out of it and this is 
how you get there, and if you ever need water, you come here.” Penelope reflected,   
And one of the things that happened post-Maria, literally, he [someone in her family] was 
trying to figure out how to get water and remembered what his grandmother said. He 
went there and brought people from town and they went to this one location to get the 
water. The idea is the telling of stories, passing down institutional knowledge, like 
neighborhood knowledge. That’s part of understanding your history and your roots.   
 
Learning from 9/11. The September 11 attack in New York City by the Islamic terrorist 
group Al-Qaeda against the United States was probably the most impactful single event in 
contemporary city history. Not only was there massive loss of life and property all within the 
space of a few hours, but the shock and the pains of rehabilitating and building appropriately on 
the “ground zero” site severely taxed the capacities of many different kinds of professionals, not 
least those from design and planning. For me, 9/11 brought together the personal, the 
professional, and the societal. How 9/11 became a catalyst for the design/planning profession 
and how that impacted their response to Sandy is the subject of this section of the research. The 
218 	
	
focus in this section is limited to the response of one professional interviewed for this study, a 
man who was enormously impacted15 by the human-made disaster of 9/11 in the context of the 
natural disaster, Sandy: Ross, an architect. His description began centered on the report of a “pro 
bono coalition of architecture, engineering, planning and design organizations committed to 
honoring the victims of the September 11 tragedy by rebuilding a vital New York” (New York 
New Visions, 2002, p. 3).  
9/11 is my fulcrum . . . the first instance was New York New Visions. Everyone came 
together and did such monumental work on so many sectors of response. So, in a funny 
way, we kind of had a model for what to do with the man-made disaster but we weren’t 
even . . . weren’t nearly prepared for the magnitude and the effect of such a monumental 
natural disaster—which I think people thought would never affect New York City. (Ross, 
architect) 
 
So, I asked, how much have professional lives and practice been changed because of 
9/11? He answered, 
The planners, urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers . . . I still think 
it’s something that people still feel as they are touching a hot stove or like you don’t want 
to get burned. You don’t want to go through it, you don’t want to quite do it yet. It’s not 
what you signed up for [as a professional] . . . but it’s a responsibility that is entirely ours. 
And something that we have to do considerably more about. (Ross, architect) 
Ross’s history on the World Trade Center site began when he was 18 years old for four or 
five months. At the time he thought he had contributed to something that would last forever, as 
he notes below, like the pyramids. He felt a personal relationship to those buildings. 
I worked on the design of those two towers—the elevator system, tenant layouts, the 
dramatic design for Windows on the World [the complex of venues and restaurant at the 
top of the North Tower of the World Trade Center]. I think they helped define my attitude 
towards architecture. Without going too much into the romance of the stone, I thought this 
would be my pyramids. I said, I worked on something that will last forever. (Ross, 
architect) 
 
 
15 This is not to say that others among the participants were less affected or involved; Ross was selected 
primarily because our interview turned to 9/11 considerably more than did other interviews.  
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After 9/11, his world view was profoundly altered as was his relationship to the concept 
of a building’s permanence.  
I can’t tell you how profoundly it altered my view of the universe when those buildings 
came down. In terms of understanding, I guess, what the Buddhist understand when they 
do those sand mandalas. It’s about change and not permanence. It altered my attitude 
about my work, what I’m interested in, the preparedness side of the work, the human 
support side, rather than the object through the aesthetic nature. (Ross, architect) 
Before Sandy, the 9/11 experience and then Katrina began to condition people in the 
profession to the fact that big disasters really can happen in the continental United States.  
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.4: Lessons learned from Hurricane 
Katrina and Maria. Katrina was a cautionary tale for designers/planners before Sandy, not only 
in terms of the level of devastation to New Orleans but also, about the vast inequities in the 
aftermath of the recovery. For those designers/planners later deployed during Hurricane Maria, 
the Katrina crisis provided another bookend to what has becoming an increasingly morbid story. 
It is not the storm that discriminates between class, race, and wealth but how these same 
communities are treated in the aftermath and the rebuilding. 9/11 established for so many 
designers/planners that this kind of unthinkable devastation is possible in New York. Hurricane 
Maria further underscored a sustained horror and loss of life that was met with a level of 
indifference by some public leaders. 
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.5: Overall reflections post-Sandy. With the passage of 
time comes reflection. Urgency wanes. Lessons are (or are not) learned. The disaster once on the 
front page as the hot item of the moment, goes into the archives. I asked designers/planners 
within this study their own personal reflections since Sandy. Did they have any closing 
statements about professional lessons they learned as design/planning professionals for 
themselves and to share with others for the future.  
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Grace, an engineer, stressed the ingrained and risky inclination that people have to build 
and rebuild in vulnerable areas.  
Exposure and vulnerabilities are increasing because we continue to build in more and 
more vulnerable locations as development continues to expand and we build in places 
that weren’t so smart previously. Until regulators and insurance come to the party with 
government it is going to be hard to see a full resilience resolution which I think is what 
is required. (Grace, engineer) 
Brianna, an architect, similarly, worried about the short memory that residents, especially 
new ones have about the risks of places they want to live in. 
There are so many people moving to Red Hook, and all sorts of other low-lying places, 
that just have no concept of what happened during Sandy. They’re like, “Oh it did, oh 
that’s interesting.” And then they don’t really care. (Brianna, architect) 
For Beryl, a landscape architect, what came first to mind was again the doubtful reliance 
on engineering and constructing protective barriers.  
It’s 525 miles of shoreline in the city, so just do the math. We have barriers flopped 
around and a couple of sophisticated building [owners] said we’re not waiting around for 
the city to get their act together. They’ve put in their own flood barriers. If another 
hurricane came, we would be as vulnerable as before. (Beryl, landscape architect) 
Hannah, a planner, also focused her response on barriers, human-made and natural, and 
the foreboding prospect of their failing through time and climate change.  
You have some of the Corps of Engineers-approved projects. They’re not going to build 
the Big U [RBD project] the way that it was designed. You have the debate about the 
barrier from Sandy Hook, NJ, the Breezy Point side. It will take 40 years. Maybe it won’t 
exist anymore. I think it’s ridiculous: it’s the ocean. You can’t fight the ocean. (Hannah, 
planner)  
The issue of how to create resiliency for critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, is to 
first understand why it has failed in the past. Lyla, an architect, boiled it down to four things: 
first, the threshold you designed your building for was exceeded by the storm-related event; 
second, the geography for these events has evolved—Sandy is a perfect example, a hurricane 
further north than anyone had ever thought a hurricane would be; third, the extended duration of 
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an event that is not measured in hours but days; and fourth, that critical infrastructure is impacted 
by municipal infrastructure going down for an extended period of time. 
Since Sandy, I and a number of the people interviewed for this study have observed that 
major medical facilities within New York City have worked hard to upgrade their facilities and 
develop resiliency plans and redundant systems with design/planning professionals. The stakes 
are very high for hospitals. A massive evacuation of hospitalized patients could result in loss of 
life during a disaster. When a hospital is getting billions of dollars in National Institutes of 
Health grants for research, it cannot afford to lose decades of that research by inundation from a 
major storm. Lyla pointed out that in Houston, the Texas Medical Center is completely off the 
grid with their own powerplant which was installed after Hurricane Ike in 2008. Lyla, an 
architect, saw instituting similar protection and back-up as essential in New York City.  
Jeanine (landscape architect) wanted to stress the seemingly neglected but obvious fact 
that Manhattan is an island. Perhaps only during a major disaster do New Yorkers, including 
designers/planners, grasp this. How do you get where you need to go when travel becomes 
restricted and there are checkpoints and lines? How do you get communities to be inherently 
more resilient and self-sustaining? We can’t rely on evacuation. We need then to be able to 
shelter in place. 
I guess maybe I have always felt that New York is invincible. Now after Sandy maybe 
there are just places where you can’t live anymore. I think I learned a lot more about that 
than I did about design. It’s like those houses kept getting rebuilt and rebuilt, and we kept 
paying for people to live on the water. (Jeanine, landscape architect) 
I followed up asking how has this changed the profession—Or has it? Jeanine responded, 
The one thing I didn’t say was I also see—within the design profession—that it’s become 
a market. Before Sandy, yes, there were engineering firms that did work for FEMA, but it 
wasn’t a New York thing. So, right after Sandy, it was more of an emotional reaction to 
helping and I’m not going to say it’s a bad thing . . . now it’s getting into a new market.  
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Muriel (communications specialist) stressed the pressure that community expectations 
apply to professional work:  
The Department of Parks is doing a study in East Harlem. Like New Orleans, it is        
low-lying. These are poorer communities and it is where Hell Gate comes in and the 
water table is very high. I went to a few of these meetings and it is always the community 
that brings the awareness and thinking OMG are you going to be able to fund it so 
something can happen? It’s how many years since Sandy? Has anything really happened? 
There are good exemplars of design/planning professionals, the community, and the city, 
coming together to achieve heroic results. This is from one of the landscape architects.  
Sandy happened at the end of October 2012, and literally, the day before Christmas, I got 
a call from the Mayor’s office, asking whether we would be part of a team, to rebuild all 
of the beach access in Brooklyn, Staten Island, and The Rockaways . . . I’ve never seen 
such focused collaborative, and hard work to make this happen. (Beryl, landscape 
architect)  
Other professional disciplines represented in this study did not bracket their experiences 
with that same level of impressive outcomes. Rather, the focus was on small projects being 
accomplished over time. That was how success was gauged. The model house for sustainability 
that one of the architects in this study completed in Rockaway was used as a notable exemplar. 
Although one landscape architect did question in this context rebuilding there at all. 
It is difficult to come up with plans that take into account the possibility that rebuilding 
may not be the wisest action when there is no alternative place to either move or stay and have 
community-based actions in place so that communities could mobilize themselves. Eli (architect) 
concluded,  
There is no silver bullet. We can go through all of those analogies that we are all really, 
well, at saying: we can pledge to become the greenest and most resilient county on the 
planet. But then to get there it comes down to the common person [and] engaging them 
with the profession.  
With professional guidance comes transparency about real-world constraints. For 
example, while a budget of $20 million may sound like enough to make a community safe, in 
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reality it will take years to build and it may protect you to a degree but not to the point of the 
next Sandy having no impacts.  
I asked Paul how we could do better than for the next storm, yet with measures that do 
not cost billions and/or take too many years to build? He responded,  
If we do a little bit better planning and preparation for the next storm, we might be able to 
move certain assets that are part of your life and important to you, out of the way, and get 
you and your family out of the way, so there is less threat to your life. You may not get 
all of your risk reduced, but you can get some of it reduced. That’s the buying down risk. 
(Paul, engineer) 
And Roberta also summed up her concerns and frustrations ending on a note that captures 
much of what the design/planning professionals I spoke with have as abiding aspirations and 
concerns.  
I really think that we have to get quite savvy when it comes to the way to finance 
resilience and make financing resilience part of the beginning conversation not what you 
do when you’ve figured out what you wanted to design. (Roberta, architect) 
Design/planning professionals do not go into their profession with a focus on  
disaster-recovery or to work within communities impacted and traumatized by natural disasters. 
Yet as this pillar shows, there is a willingness and a commitment to be on the front lines 
developing and implementing approaches that will guide communities through these 
unprecedented challenges. There are no simple answers and no quick solutions. Yet despite 
challenges and frustrations there remains a cautionary optimism. 
Pillar 3: Societal Impacts 
This pillar comprises local and global impacts pertaining to design efficacy—and justice 
—especially for vulnerable and marginalized communities. My interviews revealed that 
participant professionals were especially moved to discuss issues of equity and social justice. 
Additionally, the other themes that emerged under Pillar 3 were at the intersection of the natural 
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and built environments; the meaning of and struggle for resiliency; the importance of thinking 
internationally (i.e., about approaches being used in other parts of the world), and finally, 
leadership—how the greatest adaptative leadership challenge—using Heifetz’s (1994) 
terminology—is being met, and how it must change. Figure 4.9 summarizes the themes that were 
identified with Pillar 3. 
Figure 4.9. Themes identified for Pillar 3 (Societal). 
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and marginalized communities. How does 
one map power, authority, and silence? Who becomes authorized to know? What voices have 
been silenced? How can we uncover the silence? How can we privilege the unprivileged voices 
in the system? What are the voices that are not heard? These are the core questions that 
participants returned to when considering Sandy’s impact on their own consciousness and the 
social structures of community.  
I think there is a part of me that’s a bit tired, a bit kind of fatigued by the constant 
sensitivity training or desire to become aware of somebody else’s reality all the time. 
Instead of just allowing people who have a different reality than yours to exist in their 
reality. (Talib, architect)   
Talib’s words resonate with what Anthony (2017) wrote in The Earth, the City, and the 
Hidden Narrative of Race. Anthony referred to the invisibility of African Americans in the 
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context of narratives about the city and how that “reinforced the perception of Black 
communities as contained by and subordinate to so-called white people rather than as actors in 
their own right” (p. 185). The reclamation or space and place after a climate impactful event for 
marginalized communities or communities of color can also reinforce the racialization of space 
and how the dynamics of class and race have been reflected multi-generationally in the built 
environment. As this research shows, vulnerable communities, whether denoted as such because 
of climate-sensitive location or due to class and race, face the greatest challenges prior to and 
after an event such as Hurricane Sandy. 
So, you just kind of create your own reality and take care of your spaces, take care of 
yourself and allow or empower others to do what they want to do with their own spaces 
and their own realities. If people are underprivileged or underpowered then give them 
more privilege and power. (Talib, architect) 
 
Participant and social activist, Joseph, chose to frame the post-Sandy work in this more 
connective way of seeing and being. He asked,  
On a more universal level, how can we problem solve better with people who don’t look 
like me? I’ve experienced this as an organizer. You don’t know what it’s like living here; 
you live five blocks away; you have no idea what my situation is like. (Joseph, social 
activist) 
Joseph was reminding the profession that all too often assumptions are made based on 
unconscious biases and sometimes not so unconscious when working within vulnerable 
communities. People coming in from outside think of themselves as leaders and often don’t 
consider that what may be needed is working with and listening to individuals who more than 
likely have a history of self-organizing and leadership within their own communities. Joseph 
continued,  
We need to take a hold of the complexity recognizing the leadership of people who are 
directly impacted; leadership of women, Indigenous people, folks of color, who have 
borne the brunt of marginalization and exploitation. We absolutely have to do that and we 
also have to understand that we don’t play the oppression Olympics of people saying,  
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“Well, you don’t have it as bad as I have so you need to shut up, step back and go the fuck 
away.” (Joseph, social activist) 
 
Ideas about “design justice” came up often in the discussions. The participants suggest 
that it requires a paradigm of organizational thinking where people work together as a team that 
offers different skills and perspectives. While particularly challenging after climatic events, 
staying the more usual course of just tackling solvable technical problems will just add to further 
marginalization. Penelope echoed such sentiments and concerns, saying: 
Justice, equity, diversity, and inclusion, all of those things really need to be thought about 
when we design. What happens now is we sort of fill in later. And there’s not these 
integrated designs. Design justice is sort of designing for—I want to say—for the people. 
It sounds really silly, but I think a lot of times we design for the client. But the client isn’t 
necessarily the end user. (Penelope, architect) 
 
Penelope went on to say, 
It’s looking at how we can look at the design process and all of the communities that 
maybe weren’t considered in the initial process and rethink what their design is doing. To 
be more self-reflective and honest with each other as professionals. 
 
One of the questions I asked was what direct experience design/planning professionals 
may have had working in NYCHA (public) housing before Sandy and how those perceptions 
may have been impacted after Sandy. One of the architects who lives in an area with a high 
concentration of NYCHA affordable housing shared the following insights: 
It wasn’t until the storm [Sandy] that I began to realize the bias and the judgment I had 
and things I never considered. What their issues were, the challenges they had to face. 
How so many people living in NYCHA Housing, despite what so many people think, are 
working. Just because you work doesn’t mean you can afford a place to live. (Vic, 
architect) 
 
There are a lot of prejudices about people who live in government-supported housing and 
many myths about those relying on government assistance programs such as welfare. I recall the 
denigrating remarks and racial slurs that I experienced when attending school in a White   
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middle-class neighborhood outside where I lived. That was a number of years ago—a stark 
reminder that these attitudes linger from generation to generation. 
Paul spoke emphatically about his sense of the problem and ways to redress the inequity 
that is almost inevitable in times of social crisis:  
Vulnerable and marginalized communities are engaged in the conversation about what 
makes sense to them, as well as any other community. And, sometimes, you have to use 
different methods to reach out to that community, [to] respect the community’s own 
internal structure for self-organizing. (Paul, engineer) 
Joseph added specific thoughts about the accentuated vulnerability and what it should 
mean to planners in the aftermath of disasters: 
Through Sandy Storyline we encountered a mobile home community in upstate New 
York and are typical of what land/home ownership looks like for working class people in 
America. Their mobile home—they are not actually mobile; if you tried to move them, 
they would fall apart. (Joseph, social activist) 
It was further explained that the after Sandy people were unable to return to their homes. 
While they were still sorting their lives out, people from the real estate office came to collect 
their rent but no one was there as they were still not able to return. Joseph further expanded upon 
what happened next:  
They came to collect even though people still in the community were dispersed and 
couldn’t even find each other but somehow this company did find them in shelters. And 
they went to the shelters and said if you don’t pay your rent you will lose your property. 
[emphasis added] Many of those people lost their property.  
I asked Joseph if he thought this type of behavior was generational. That younger 
generations who had not yet gotten into the workforce might share a different perspective on the 
poor and therefore would be less apt to enforce this kind of racial/economically motivated 
actions of injustice? This was his response: 
I gave a talk at the Columbia Journalism School. A student said, “I really want to find 
people who are abusing the system and getting aid when they don’t need it.” I said, “Why 
is that important to you?” [The student answered] “Well, because it happens all the time.” 
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I said, “No, it doesn’t happen all the time. It is like this racial myth [that they are] 
exploiting the system and living in opulence.  
 
The designers/planners on the ground in communities during recovery were humbled and 
reminded that when a climate-related disaster hits it can change people’s lives in minutes, 
sometimes in mere seconds. I visited Coney Island after Sandy with Hannah, a planner who was 
interviewed in this study. She came back to our mutual experience in our interview:  
Remember when we were serving that food in Coney Island? Most of those people had 
never stood in line for food in their lives. I was like, “Oh my God! These are regular 
middle-class people who have never had to do this in their entire lives. You know, it 
could be us.” (Hannah, planner) 
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and marginalized communities.         
Vulnerable and marginalized communities, whether noted as such because of climate sensitive 
locations, class, or race, face the greatest challenges prior to and after an event such as Hurricane 
Sandy. Sandy was also a reminder of the critical nature of dignity, justice, equity, and inclusion 
being fundamental to design/planning. While those are factors that should be present in the 
design methodology, the absence of this is particularly evident after a disaster, as was evidenced 
in Sandy. Additionally, what came through time and time again was for design/planning 
professionals to respect the community’s own internal structure for self-organizing—stand with 
them not for them.  
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.2: Intersection between nature and the built environment. 
The theme of intersection between nature and the built environment was most often raised and 
discussed by landscape architects and a small number of architects within this study. A 
philosophical approach of human beings as custodians of the land (an Indigenous perspective) 
rather than the colonial dominance mindset of having dominion over nature, was raised often. 
My purpose in asking about these two perspectives was to see if design was really being 
influenced by an epistemology that looked at land as a place that shapes humans and their 
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communities. I wanted also to understand the impact nature has on design decisions in the built 
environment. It is also a bridge between the challenges facing vulnerable and marginalized 
communities and the dark side of the historical precedent in this country—the “original sins” 
(Wallis, 2016) of how Indigenous peoples and African slaves were treated. Anthony’s (2017) 
comments make the connection between social justice and design in a way that resonates with 
many comments I heard in the research interviews; for example,   
Recognition of the price paid in human life and liberty for economic advancement—and 
the costs of resources extracted as nature’s systems were exploited—must inform and 
guide us as we work to transform our cities and regions. We must forge a new path 
illuminated by justice, respect for the dignity of each and every human being, and 
determination to maintain and restore the web of life as the foundation for health and 
sustainability. (p. 168) 
For example, Vic (architect) reflected, 
 
How to start to connect people with the earth? You feel that aliveness every day. And that 
to me, is the human and nature experience together. It is what makes living so powerful. 
How does one, within the profession, start to translate that into their work? It would be 
easy out of anguish, or grief, to further dissociate. And yet, what’s important is to associate.  
 
How this kind of connection with nature gets specifically translated into his work as an architect 
is, for Vic, an evolving question; but his ability to associate nature with living powerfully is an 
important reflection from a design professional who lost everything during Sandy. Eli, another 
architect who was among the study participants, also made the connection between natural 
environment, its hazards, and the built environment: 
My background is in geography as well as architecture. The geography’s physical as well 
as social economic. It is understanding the truth of the land that I saw from the 
Indigenous perspective working in Dominica. The underlying circumstances that           
pre-dated us and still underlying the city itself. So, I think that is where we start.  
This approach makes designing with nature more tangible, connecting geography, 
ecology, hydrology, and geographic information systems. What Eli referred to in terms of his 
work from the Indigenous perspective is his work on the small and hurricane-prone Caribbean 
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island nation of Dominica. This work after Maria in 2017 utilized the practices of the Kalinago 
people (Indigenous people of the Lesser Antilles) and their council of chiefs (Azaroff, 2019).  
Hannah (planner) poses the challenge of integrating nature and the built environment as 
an unsolved mystery:  
Post-Sandy one of the things that strikes me about the intersection between nature and the 
built environment is that we learned that the East River is eight inches higher than it was in 
1970. I think five years ago it was seven inches higher now it's eight inches. The river is 
our backyard. How then do you design without listening to what nature is telling us? 
 
What Hannah states is so obvious, yet to many there is a level of wilful ignorance. 
Listening to what nature is telling and showing must become part of the public’s and, specific to 
this study, design/planning professionals’ reframing of life and work. Brianna (architect) 
commented as follows:  
The whole geo-mythology is a very big unknown. We don’t know how high the seas will 
rise and when they will. Why don’t we just start flooding some locations? Let’s just flood it 
now where we want it to flood and how we want it to flood and what that looks like. We 
have to be working in a natural system. We have to adapt a model about how we’re going 
to let water be a part of our landscape in ways that we really haven’t thought about before.  
 
Deliberately flooding some areas to allow water in as part of our landscape has been tried in 
other parts of the world, a point raised by Paul (engineer). Sometimes engineers will flood an 
area to restore an ecosystem. Sometimes hydrologists may deliberately flood an area to prevent 
damage to a dam during heavy rainfalls; engineers may also flood an area to prevent worse 
flooding during a storm. In the Netherlands there is a Room for the River program (ClimateWire, 
2012; Rijke, van Herk, Zevenbergen, & Ashley, 2012) which emphasizes flood safety with 
deliberate flooding. Thomas built on the theme of designing with not against nature:  
Even the most advanced society on the planet . . . has to reconcile with nature. You can’t 
just tame . . . harness nature. We didn’t know until we had a real-time planetary 
monitoring that we had an impact on the earth on a planetary scale with a lot of the way 
we’re building our cities. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer) 
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In the Bible it was written that humans have dominion over nature, and some have argued 
that this ingrained religious perspective now dooms humans to fight rather than work with nature 
(e.g., White, 1967). In America, this was further underscored by the colonial perspective of 
Manifest Destiny. Perhaps, as participant Thomas stated, our “real time planetary monitoring” 
will shake loose the need to control nature so embedded in most Western dominant cultures. 
Participant Jeanine had this to say about awareness of nature as it interacts with designed 
environments: 
At the city around you that’s all concrete, you say, “Where is nature? There isn’t any 
nature in the city.” But every crack in the sidewalk tells a different story and a crack in a 
parking [lot] is a place from which a plant can grow. I don’t think it’s so dissociated in 
my profession between nature and the built environment. (Jeanine, landscape architect)  
While architects speak about contextual design, finding nature in a city of concrete can be 
a challenge, yet we are increasingly reminded, especially since Sandy, that we live on an island. 
Nature (the water) is our backyard. As a landscape architect, Jeanine has developed a more 
holistic perspective. This is also evident in Roberta’s remarks:  
There is a lot of expertise around the world that shows us how living on water or living 
with water can actually be quite positive. But we need to change our mindset of what that 
means that maybe we aren’t looking as carefully as we might in nature’s geology. 
(Roberta, architect) 
 
Consider the approach from the Netherlands to adaptive water management as it 
influenced post-Sandy practices: it is based on the premise that if water is afforded more space in 
designs, it will not have to take space by force (Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012). This is what 
Roberta stressed: the need to understand natural geology so as to make informed decisions based 
on the history of the landforms, the geology, predictions, and patterns. It is too often forgotten 
that nature and especially rivers like the Mississippi have their own personal histories just as 
people do. That is a level of reverence yet to be embraced.  
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Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.2: Intersection between nature and the built 
environment. A philosophical approach of human beings as custodians of the land (an 
Indigenous perspective) rather than the colonial dominance mindset of having dominion over 
nature, was raised often. I wanted also to understand the impact nature has on design decisions in 
the built environment and how one develops a mindset of working in a natural system where one 
adapts to nature and not always defending against it. These designers/planners recognize that the 
power of nature is a force far greater than humankind and that it will take a fundamental cultural 
shift to see nature as having intergenerational histories just as people do.  
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.3: Resiliency and sustainability. The concept of resiliency 
and of creating structures and communities that will be able to “bounce back” from significant, 
often harsh and unexpected events, has high currency in this time of climate change. Not 
surprisingly, the word and the idea arose repeatedly in the interviews for this study. Rather than 
begin with a definition, I will allow the meaning and interpretations of resiliency to emerge in 
what participants had to say. Referring back to discussions he and I had had previously, Eli said,  
When I talked to you years ago about being at a crossroads of leaving the profession, 
leaving and going and working at 100 Resilient Cities [a Rockefeller Foundation 
program] or someplace like that, that was very real. I often think those things because the 
greater voice that you have to try to affect change at a larger level. (Eli, architect) 
 
When Eli spoke about leaving the profession, he spoke of the daunting gap between the 
early optimism of what could be achieved in Sandy’s aftermath and the reality of recovery years 
later. Many of the big, exciting, and innovative ideas and painstakingly designed large-scale 
projects remained in the planning stages and were never implemented.  
Right now, we lack these artifacts. So, these past several years, my tiny little studio has 
been producing these artifacts, resilient projects. There are few and far between resilient 
projects. I think that drilling down, into making the actual project, has been my saving 
grace, into not leaving the profession. (Eli, architect) 
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Another issue Eli grappled with was how to make what he had begun to do more 
accessible to other communities and professionals. He spoke of creating a groundswell, a 
“critical mass” of resilient homes built within working class and middle-class communities. He 
explained, 
Like the house at Breezy Point, we’re giving the design of that house away. People can 
download the drawings. People can take these drawings, alter them, and make them their 
own. So, hundreds of thousands of people can see, here’s an example of something 
resilient that I can build, or have my contractor build, or give it to my architect. (Eli, 
architect) 
 
I then asked how he felt this addressed the lack of impact he had just expressed as an architect 
and the struggle of co-creating with the community. 
Knowing the scale of the problem we have the impact is that I’m training other architects 
and people within their own communities to do these things. Now I am really looking 
deeply into what I’m doing. How do you leverage that into making a bigger change?  
[How do you help] others have a bigger more profound change? (Eli, architect) 
 
The participants emphasized that a disaster can be an opportunity for turning another 
person’s pain into a money-making capitalist venture. Financing the recovery from climate 
impactful events, or planning for adaptation in advance of them, does require professionals who 
can navigate the solutions and requires capital to concretize them. However, there can be a fine 
line between creating solutions that are more about turning a profit than evolving accessible 
solutions. Samuel, one of the architects interviewed for this dissertation, said this:  
I think one of the challenges we've seen globally is that everybody's trying to come up 
with a kind of branded and graphically fascinating attempt to address resiliency. We care 
less about that, about the brand of the thing, right, whatever that ultimate platform is. We 
care more about getting the information out.  
Landscape architect, Jeanine also reflected on the shift towards resilience:   
I think more people understand that they have to have a relationship to resilient design, 
but I’ve also heard people, this was a couple of years ago, not understand the difference 
between sustainability and resilience. I think it’s also the concept of social resilience, and 
what that means.  
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A story illustrating Jeanine’s “theory-in-practice” (a phrase used by Argyris & Schön, 
1980) may clarify here the importance of social resilience.  
The project I did in Jersey City, some of the people had lived there since it was built in 
the 50s—and they were organized. They knocked on people’s doors to help them but 
since they had no electricity, they brought out barbecue grills and cooked outside for 
everybody. They were amazing. The social resilience of that group was very strong. 
(Jeanine, landscape architect) 
 
As I further spoke with Jeanine, we concurred that the community was used to fighting 
with the Jersey City Housing Authority for things they needed. This history contributed to their 
social resiliency and, as Jeanine aptly stated, “You cannot build social resiliency the day before 
the hurricane is coming. It’s got to be there. It’s got to be part of the fabric of the community.”  
The question then arose as to how the concept of social resiliency ties into physical 
resiliency and sustainability.  
Sustainability, if it gets stale, or if you don’t go deep enough, nobody will die or lose 
their lives, but in resiliency, if you don’t keep challenging it, it goes to a different level. 
Resiliency is a health and safety issue. People do lose their lives if you’re not designing 
buildings to be resilient. (Jeanine, landscape architect) 
As Jeanine is a landscape architect, I was also particularly interested in how she looked at 
landscapes rather than buildings in the context of resiliency. She explained, 
There is science in landscapes. Part of the flexibility of a wetland is where the water’s 
edge is moving, or the wetland is moving in reaction to a storm like Sandy. But buildings 
remain as they are. You can’t say the building is going to move. The landscape is 
different. The landscape is resilient because it’s changing, but buildings can’t change. 
(Jeanine, landscape architect) 
How does one get people connected back to the true meaning of what resiliency and 
sustainability are—and what they are not? On this, Eli shared his direct experience.  
A lot of great people who have jumped into resilience become great proponents of 
advancing adaptation and resilience. I also run into a lot of folks who just want to 
profiteer off of the next big thing. If you’re getting into this because it’s a new great field 
and you want to make some money, you have to know what you’re doing. Resilience is a 
different kind of thing, than what we’ve seen before. (Eli, architect) 
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I followed up asking him to be more specific in terms of how this has shown up in the 
design/planning profession. 
   
    
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
      
  
  
I can give you thousands of circumstances where a resilient measure is not sustainable, 
by any stretch of the imagination. But life safety is the big one. If the sustainable measure 
fails, no one is going to die, in the short term. The long term, you’re harming the planet. 
There is a different trajectory that even those two simple statements are not clear in the 
mind of the majority of architects and engineers out there as of yet. (Eli, architect)  
 
Grace also explained her understandings of resiliency and sustainability.  
There are lots of people who don’t understand the difference between that [resiliency] 
and sustainability. I feel like a lot of my role has been to educate clients and design teams 
about different aspects of it. (Grace, engineer) 
 
From both an architectural and engineering perspective, breaking down the barriers 
within the profession is one of the biggest challenges because even if people are trained in a 
single or multiple disciplinary approach, practicing (rather than just theorizing) a truly 
integrative approach is more challenging. 
 Folks that are like, Ò Hey, IÕm  a sustainabil ity officer or IÕm  a resil ience off icer.Ó  Well
 great, how are they different? They often donÕt  have a complete answer. If  youÕre  going
 to say you know something about resil ience, and you donÕ t, understand youÕre
 completely liable, on the professional side. YouÕre  going to be in trouble misrepresenting,
 not protecting people who need your help. So, please get the training. (El i, architect)
 While I would not personal ly position myself as an expert in sustainabil ity or resi liency 
from a technical perspective, I have taken the HURRIPLAN training (American Institute of 
Architects, n.d) which is certified by FEMA . This training Òi ntegrates resil ient community 
planning and building design strategies with civic and commercial projects located in hurricane 
prone areasÓ  (American Institute of Architects, n.d, para. 2). From that perspective, I would argue 
that what is key in the difference between resil iency and sustainabi lity relates to li fe safety. When 
resil ient measures fai l, people can die. The same cannot be said of sustainabi lity shortfalls. Eli 
helped to clarify this distinction further:
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When you look at resiliency you have to look at everything from the social to economic 
to the physical to the environmental aspects of a community or even a single facility. 
Everything is integrated. One of the commonalities is the integrated transdisciplinary 
thinking that is required. (Grace, engineer) 
 
This brings the discussion back to the integrated nature between the built and natural world 
(Pillar 3, Theme 3.2), which while seeming so obvious, and often talked about in green speak 
(i.e., discussions among those committed to environmental values), the reality is often very 
different. Grace continued, with some visible chagrin, on getting typecast in broader dialogue 
with other professionals and leaders: 
I often will hear that you care about that because you are a fucking “greenie” or 
something. But all of us need fresh air and clean water to drink, correct? The integrated 
big systems thinking is required to change the way we build more resilient 
cities/infrastructure; a single system in a siloed manner is never going to get us there.  
 
To repeat, during this study, the connection between resiliency and sustainability—and 
how they are related or different—was discussed with all the participants. A number of 
participants were questioning what the next step was after resiliency. Grace’s response, 
differentiating between the terms resilience and resiliency, was a singular one among study 
participants—and, in my view, an important step in developing this understanding: 
I definitely prefer the term resilience over the term resiliency because resiliency sounds 
like you get to your destination and you are there whereas resilience is something we 
have to constantly work on. It is an approach rather than something you achieve or a 
destination you get to.  
 
Grace’s perspective also highlighted reactive responses to proactive risk approaches to 
design. The challenge from my perspective is that having a resilient plan and resilient 
practitioner involved can give people a false sense of complacency. As was noted earlier in this 
study, there have been a lot of plans developed pre- and post-Sandy. It does give one a sense of 
security that people are thinking about these things and have ideas about how to protect 
communities from climate-change induced events. But within the larger and often political 
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context of making things happen, how much of this is truly realistic and attainable? Grace’s 
response: 
From a resilience perspective, we need to get past just responding to the last event and 
needing an event to actually spur on the action we really should have done before an 
event. An entire mindset change has to occur from the reactive disaster response and 
recovery built back better to a proactive risk and resilient approach to design.  
 
Replying to my question about how many resiliency projects have actually been 
accomplished since Sandy,16—and how effectively they have worked—Beryl (landscape 
architect) pointed to several examples:   
We probably had six of those significant projects since Sandy. The Rockaways, Pier 42, a 
resiliency project in Coney Island, Hunts Point, and then of course, what was once called 
East Side Coastal Resiliency.   
 
For a number of the participants in this study, the concept of resiliency went far beyond 
definition and the distinction between resiliency and sustainability. Several, in fact, are pushing 
against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it as quickly becoming a catch phrase to further 
a more colonialist and economically privileged agenda. Kaasar, for example, explained,  
The concept in and of itself is a very powerful one. The ability to bounce back—you can 
equate it to a superpower. Being threatened or struck and to come back and keep going is 
a wonderful thing to be able to do. This is where again we need to make a distinction 
between the technical and the political. By the political I don’t mean partisan. I mean 
when technical ideas become deployed on the ground and engaged with power. (Kaasar, 
planner) 
 
One of the issues that came up several times with the participants was that while they can 
all point to times in their own lives they experienced resilience, in principle, it is very different 
when it is operationalized on the ground and in community. Again, it was Kaasar who stated, 
I think that our resilience has been operationalized. On the ground it has created a lot of 
resentment in a lot of places. Part of it has to do with how different interested parties have 
 
16 It should be noted, that The Living Breakwaters project (Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, n.d.-a) 
on Staten Island, led by Kate Orff, landscape architect, and her firm Scape/Landscape Architecture, is in 
construction. It is a project that I was initially engaged with during the early phases of the Rebuild by 
Design competition. 
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decided to implement the ideas on the ground and part of it has to do with that fact that 
over time it has become an alternative to pushback or resistance.  
 
    
  
 
     
   
 
Analytically people have made a distinction between the resiliency discourse and the 
resistance discourse. That distinction has served governments and institutions well. When 
they have a disaster and people’s needs are not being met, the answer becomes [to] just 
be resilient bounce back stronger than ever. Be hit but don’t hit back—just get back up. 
(Kaasar, Planner) 
 
Kaasar’s perspective reminded me of the former-Governor Christie’s campaign, Stronger 
Than the Storm, a PR campaign to promote tourism in New Jersey. It idealized the concept of 
resiliency like a Hollywood movie, making invisible the realities of the pain and anguish still 
being faced by New Jerseyites who still suffer from what happened during and after Sandy 
(Hutchins, 2014; Izzo, 2013). 
I try to understand how resilience is being deployed by observing how it is being rolled 
out on the ground. This catch-all term allows us to talk about moving forward in a 
sanitized way. It allows us to create a comeback story that denies in many ways our 
inability to count the dead and honor their lives. (Kaasar, planner) 
When resilience is employed, as Kaasar describes above, it does a disservice not just to 
the reconstruction and recovery efforts but to the notion of social justice. A recurring leitmotif in 
the stories of survivors of climate-impactful events, prominent notably in Sandy Storyline, is that 
for people in vulnerable and marginalized communities, the return to the status quo is not what is 
wanted or needed. Instead, the push is to achieve a more equitable community. Kaasar expressed 
his mixed feelings about focusing planning for future climate-caused disasters on resilience.  
While both the SIRR report, Stronger, More Resilient, ( PlaNYC, 2013), and later, NY Rising 
(New York Rising Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014) implied the goal of 
bouncing back to something you wanted to reclaim, there is another crucial question: What 
about communities that do not want to bounce back to an unfavorable status quo but to bounce 
forward into a new more equitable future? I asked Kaasar about his thoughts on this.
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I am not opposed to the term resilience in its entirety. I am opposed to the usage in a way 
that allows it to mask or sweep under the rug all of the other grave things that happen on 
the ground. I am not opposed to resilience as an idea as long as the ability to come back 
provides an opportunity for us to engage in acts of resistance. The ability to bounce back 
and resist, I would deploy resilience for that. (Kaasar, planner) 
 
I asked Kaasar for greater clarity into how he defined and connected the ideas of bounce back 
and resist concurrently.  
Resilience is not an end undo itself. It’s the ability to come back and do something. That 
something is what we as planners should be working on. Yes, we should all be able to 
come back, but come back as just what? (Kaasar, planner) 
 
I am reminded that in the aftermath of Sandy, I too have struggled with the role for philanthropic 
organizations who seemingly had the best of intentions and performed well in moving some 
many of the initiatives forward, but over time, became too comfortable with their own 
perspectives on guiding concepts like resiliency. Kaasar shared those concerns. 
Resilience narrative and programs being deployed by many major foundations across the 
world do not provide what we are talking about. When asked to come back, come back to 
what? If it’s to reproduce the status quo, then I am not for that. If it is the ability to 
rethink, re-propose, reconfigure, transform, and upend structural inequities, then that’s 
when resilience really works for me. (Kaasar, planner) 
 
Susan (urban strategist) had done a lot of work in New Orleans immediately after 
Katrina. One issue she focused on quite a bit in our interview was the impact of outside 
professional experts (design/planning professionals) “parachuting” in and then forcing their ideas 
upon a culture about which they that they had no real insight. In that context she spoke about 
resiliency not as a concept to snap back to what had been but rather as something that would 
provide the capacity to adapt. 
The community wanted to fashion rebuilding in ways that reflected their own culture, 
their own challenges, and their own priorities…resilience being more about developing 
the capacity to be continuously adaptive to all sort of changes that were coming. Climate 
challenges social justice, cultural, economic challenges. It wasn’t an end state but a filter 
of what to rebuild. (Susan, urban strategist) 
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In New Orleans, some of the city’s affordable housing stock had been demolished and 
then replaced with market-rate housing. After Katrina, people who had been primarily from long 
term marginalized and vulnerable communities were relocated to other states, and many never 
returned because those affordable homes were never rebuilt. I asked Susan whether there had 
been a backlash about the concept of resiliency because of that. She responded that,  
Tracie Washington, a lawyer from Louisiana, and President and CEO of the Louisiana 
Justice Institute, rejects the term “resilience” because of how it has been used as a term to 
justify hardship on vulnerable populations. From her perspective, resilience is a term that 
has become permission to inflict more challenges on low income populations. (Susan, 
urban strategist)  
 
Susan pointed out several publications that have underscored and reflected this 
community concern over resiliency as a name for what is sought in post-disaster planning (Kang, 
2018; Woods, 2017). She and I discussed at length how resiliency is no substitute for justice and 
how it should never be perceived as such.  
So for me, it still is a term that I still want to embrace because it insists, that in order to be 
resilient you need to have the resources, you need to have the capacity, the agency, the 
imagination and if you are lacking in any of this, your resilience is compromised. (Susan, 
urban strategist)  
 
I then asked Susan how she viewed the term “sustainability.” She answered,  
I thought “sustainability” had become like “love,” a term used for everything, but I also 
felt that sustainability implied a fixed state: either you were sustainable, or you were not. 
What I liked about resilience is that it is a capacity . . . [the] quality you continue to foster 
and build foster and build. (Susan, urban strategist) 
 
About the time of this interview it was announced that the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 
Resilient Cities initiative was changing to a different mission under its new leadership. I asked 
how she felt this would impact the resiliency movement since 100 Resilient Cities and the 
foundation had been at the forefront of taking this concept to cities throughout the world. They 
seemed to have become a connective tissue of sorts. Susan responded,  
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So, I continue to believe that . . . [resilience] is a valuable word. I will be going to 
Rotterdam next week for 100 Resilient Cities for its swan song, and I am really interested 
to see how 101 chief resilience officers working around the world have . . . assembled a 
movement [and] that I hope they have. And I don’t know if the entity became so much on 
its structure that it lost some of its movement capacity. (Susan, urban strategist)  
 
I suggested that one of the key elements that appears throughout the resiliency discussion 
is the term “interdisciplinary” and it includes not just collaboration between design/planning 
professionals but also members of the community and other adjunct professionals such as 
builders (constructors), sociologists, psychologists, peacebuilders, social justice activists, 
communication specialists, storytellers, and the like. Susan replied,  
I ultimately think the answer is [being] more interdisciplinary in pushing authority to the 
most local level so that people have more of a sense of their autonomy and their own 
agency but at the same time there is responsibility so that you can foster a kind of 
grounds-up resilience that I am making an informed decision on behalf of my neighbors 
on how I am going to function here. It is hard to do that. 
Edward also devoted a sizeable part of our interview to resilience, suggesting,  
There feels like there needs to be a new dialogue—like we are in a loop. Part of the 
challenge with resilience is that it is all-encompassing and therefore it is hard to pin 
down. We have had people try to create a rating system for resiliency like the Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED, a worldwide green building certification 
program). It becomes so watered down. (Edward, architect) 
 
Part of the challenge I discussed with Edward was how to develop powerful yet simpler 
narratives that people can understand immediately and get excited about.  
I think we have a lot of work to do. We are not separate from the earth. We are not 
separate from each other. Everything is interconnected. This is where modernism has a 
lot to answer for, that we are somewhat removed from the earth and that we own it, we 
dominate it. It is a power thing. It is the same with marginalized communities, exactly the 
same. (Edward, architect) 
While Edward was addressing these issues differently than Kaasar, there is overlap in the 
context of social/philosophical triggers that could help shift this conversation. 
As soon as you think of them and us or the earth as part of who we are then the attitude 
changes. I think this is what happens to design professionals that fall into resilience work 
and then begin to see themselves part of something greater. Far too much of architecture 
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is still about the image of the building, the look of it, rather than the performance of it. 
(Edward, architect) 
This brought me to ask Edward about the interdisciplinary approach in my study as it is 
inclusive of designers/planners which, in this study, includes architects, planners, landscape 
architects, and engineers.  
This might be something you look into the difference between landscape architects and 
how they think about permanence/impermanence versus the way architects think about it. 
A landscape architect when they start the design process has to think about how it will 
grow and change. Architects think in terms of finite objects and everyone strives to be 
remembered by a portfolio that people will worship, right? (Edward, architect) 
 
This variability among practitioners when there is a need for an interdisciplinary approach was 
one of the perspectives Liz, a geotechnical engineer, shared.  
I think this is where we have a problem . . . I call it the new Babel Tower—everyone is 
talking about this new thing and this thing is not defined. We all want to be resilient; we 
all want to bounce back but bouncing back to how things were, I don’t want to go there, I 
don’t want to be in the same situation again. (Liz, engineer) 
I then asked her to expand on her perspective of “bouncing back” not being how one can 
develop innovative ideas. Liz underscored that “bouncing forward” to a better future is what she 
considered a resilient philosophy. Without that she felt we had a missing link between the 
technical (which she defines as the technocrats, planners, and politicians) and the human factor 
(within which she includes more vulnerable segments of society). 
I call it the missing link because they speak in their own terms, and we cannot agree with 
each other. The geotechnical engineers cannot agree with the structural engineers who 
cannot agree with the mechanical. So, how can we even translate this to people who do 
not have the background that we do? Engineers like problems that can be translated into a 
formula. This is not that. This requires the human factor. (Liz, engineer) 
I raised the same topic with Paul, an engineer who had been a military colonel and former 
commander of the New York District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, prior to going into private 
practice. I asked Paul, as I had of other participants, about the differences between sustainability 
and resiliency from his perspective. He replied, 
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You can’t throw out sustainability in order to get resilience. Resilience has to be blended 
into the design process, along with sustainability, and that to me is preserving resources, 
enhancing the environment, or reducing the impact of the environment as much as 
humanly possible. (Paul, engineer)  
 
My follow-up question was on how to maintain the integrity of a community in the 
context of resiliency.  
You want to maintain the integrity of all of that. You don’t want to just completely 
change that for resilience sake. And I think another thing, from Sandy in particular, was 
the offer to include, from the very beginning of the planning projects, community input. 
From my perspective, we have Shaun Donovan17 to thank for a lot of that. (Paul, 
engineer) 
Architect Samuel responded to my questions about the role and meanings of resiliency as 
follows:  
We’ve been heavily involved in resiliency effort within the practice for the last four or 
five years, if not longer. It includes things like partnering with the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the 100 Resilient Cities program. There was a great article in The New 
Yorker in 2008 called “Big Foot” [see Specter, 2008] which talks about sustainability and 
the difference between reality and perception.  
What is particularly interesting in the context of resiliency and the article Samuel 
mentioned, is the idea of focusing on changing people’s perceptions and how that impacts 
behavior. From his perspective, the concept of resiliency and sustainability are part of an aligned 
efforts of broad sweeping reforms that can actualize those changes.  
In regard to the relationship of resiliency and sustainability, Thomas then described 
resiliency as relational and non-static in nature as creating a “oneness and inseparability of 
 
17 Shaun Donovan served as United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 2009 to 
2014 and Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2014 to 2017. He was instrumental in 
developing the Rebuild by Design competition and integral to bringing forward the importance of design 
and community engagement  
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people and nature.” In further discussing the difference between sustainability and resiliency he 
went on to say, 
It’s not that [sustainability] is over. It’s just that it was eclipsed by resiliency. But 
resiliency is not the same as sustainability, they come from very different philosophical 
underpinnings. Sustainability sees people and nature as separate things and then if people 
can come in balance with nature then nature will take care of us and it’s all harmonious 
and holistic. But it’s also three dimensional and linear; it’s fairly static. (Thomas, 
landscape architect/urban designer)  
 From this vantage point, resiliency and sustainability take on a different perspective 
—dynamic versus static. So, in taking this conversation further with Thomas, if resiliency is 
equated with dynamism and sustainability is static what would be the next thought model? 
Thomas had a clear and though provoking response:  
Yes, that’s the big idea…when you go back to dynamic thinking there is a lot of other 
ideas that will come from that thought model and one of them is transformation. So, it’s 
really our own understanding of nature and how it’s evolved, but it’s where the stuff is 
coming from. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer) 
 
I asked: What’s after resiliency? It has always seemed like what followed the word was a 
semicolon, not a period. Eli (architect) felt that the next step should be transformation. Others in 
the focus group discussion were not as sure what that actually meant and what it would look like. 
Thomas however had some very clear thoughts about the concept of transformation. 
As long as you understand the thought model of dynamism, static versus dynamic model 
of nature, you will then find, what comes next. But it’s important to understand the 
philosophical [question of] the limits of resiliency. Where do they come from and how do 
you go back to that thought model and then add in new factors of where we are now as a 
society and where will that take you. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer) 
 
Just as Thomas emphasized the concept of resiliency as a partnership with nature, Joseph 
(social activist) focused on resiliency in terms of cohesion and recovery: 
I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding about how social change happens. I mean 
resiliency is the buzzword now, but is it an accurate word? Social resiliency . . . people 
build up relationships with their friends, their neighborhoods, that’s why from the design 
perspective we need the Jane Jacobs style of design . . . so people interact with each other 
and build up social cohesion. Joseph (social activist)   
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Joseph and I further discussed how after disasters one sees the Red Cross, a                 
well-financed, top-down organization, and FEMA having problems in terms of lack of capacity 
and of financing. This makes having designers/planners to support social cohesion and social 
resiliency within communities all the more necessary.  
Resiliency is about having a social fabric of cohesion and recovery; so, a resilient system 
is not rigid; a resilient system is fluid, a resilient system is agile, it is based on 
components and has the ability of its components. It has a natural way, and what I mean 
by natural is, a self-determined way of interacting rather than those not involved in the 
system telling them how they should interact. Joseph (social activist)   
If one takes Thomas’s definition of resilience as a dynamic model of nature and Joseph’s 
definition as fluid natural system of social cohesion, a bridge between the natural and built 
environment is, in effect, created. 
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.3: Resiliency and sustainability. The concept of 
resiliency and of creating structures and communities that will be able to “bounce back” from 
significant, often harsh and unexpected events, was a debated question in this study. For a 
number of the participants in this study, the concept of resiliency went far beyond its common 
definition and the distinction between resiliency and sustainability. Several, in fact, are pushing 
against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it as quickly becoming a catch phrase to further 
a more colonialist and economically privileged agenda. It turned out that they all could point to 
times in their own lives that they experienced resilience. In principle it is very different when it is 
operationalized on the ground and in community. Most particularly for people in vulnerable and 
marginalized communities, the return to the status quo is not what is wanted or needed; instead, 
the push is to achieve a different, more equitable community. Resilience is not an end in itself 
and may even encourage regressive policies that try to bring cities back to a reality that favors 
the well-off and perpetuates inequity. 
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Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.4: Managed retreat. Of the several broad strategies humans 
can use to adapt to climate change, probably none are as inherently and automatically unpopular 
as the idea of managed retreat. People almost inevitably expect that their governments will “fight 
the good fight,” shoring up the defenses no matter the threat. In contrast, the underlying precept 
for thousands of years among nomadic hunter–gatherers was voluntarily relocating, often in a 
cyclic though sometimes in a once and for all move (Fang & Liu, 1992). But for today’s human 
communities, especially mega-cities like the New York region, a policy of “packing things up” 
and moving to higher, safer ground is close to unthinkable—and, potentially, political suicide for 
anyone advocating it. Nonetheless, managed retreat as a concept has quite recently (re)emerged as 
a serious alternative (e.g., Freudenberg, Calvin, Tolkoff, & Brawley, 2016; Koslov, 2016; Siders, 
Hino, & Mach, 2019), if for no other reason than the enormous costs of disasters and defending 
against them.  
According to a review by NASA (2020), working with NOAA’s National Centers for 
Environmental Information, since 1980 the United States has had 254 weather and climate 
impactful events in which damages and costs in each case exceeded $1 billion. Adjusting the 
aggregate figure for inflation, this means a price of $1.7 trillion, and that is quite aside from the 
massive cumulative loss of life, human and not. 
The most common form of policy intervention for the purpose of managed retreat is for 
public agencies to purchase privately held property and (sometimes) provide relocation cost 
assistance as well as other non-monetary forms of adjustment (Freudenberg et al., 2016). These 
are called buyout programs and utilized as a form of post-Sandy and post-Hurricane Irene 
response in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut—with mixed results. According to 
Freudenberg et al. (2016),   
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Buyout programs were employed in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut following 
Irene and Sandy, but they were considered politically unfeasible and thus were available 
to only a handful of communities. Of the billions of federal aid spent on resilience and 
recovery in the New York metropolitan region, at least $750 million has been spent on 
buyouts, which alleviated the flood risk for more than 1,500 homes. However, the vast 
majority of recovery efforts focused on other measures of adaptation. (p. 4) 
At what point does rebuilding in an area impacted by a climate impactful event make 
sense and at what juncture does one no longer adapt and retreat from the site? These and other 
interrelated stories and observations about managed retreat make up my fourth theme.  
Someone living in NYCHA housing in Coney Island or Rockaway who might not have 
the ability to move themselves to another locations would be in a very different position than 
someone who has a second home in Southampton, New York. Managed retreat and buyouts 
could be the subject of its own study. So, while this will not be handled in the course of this 
study with the level of detail it deserves, to not focus on it would be leaving out a challenge that 
will be facing many communities, local, state, and federal government in the years to come.  
Meeting the challenges of managed retreat underscores what John Paul Lederach said in 
his acceptance speech on May 8, 2019, at the Niwano Peace Prize Ceremony. He spoke of  
“‘in-between wisdom’ . . . Commitment to intergenerational accompaniment opens us up to 
unanticipated insight and breakthrough that rise when extraordinarily diverse people commit to 
deep listening, mutual encouragement, and courageous joint action” (Lederach, 2019, p. 5). 
Melissa (architect) was well aware that in many cases in cities like New York and New 
Orleans highly valued built environments go along with beloved communities from which few 
want to consider retreating. She was rather surprised when she saw a similar kind of cultural 
legacy that she experienced in both New Orleans and during Sandy, which she explained as 
“communities that rely on their social networks for their wellbeing in the absence of the 
shrinking welfare state.” She continued,  
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In the absence of the shrinking welfare state, family networks are really, really important. 
The problem with the notion of displacing people, not building in the flood zone—which 
is a really good idea, do not build, or rebuild in a flood zone, in these communities—it’s 
that if you are not careful you really disrupt the social networks, which are very valuable. 
(Melissa, architect)  
 
Melissa went on to give a very specific example of someone in Sheepshead Bay, 
Brooklyn, NY, which was hit hard during Sandy: 
The man was not in good shape. He was unemployed. He was a former veteran with 
mental issues. He was an alcoholic. If he had not had the support of those extended 
family in this place with this property, he would not have survived. They had family 
networks and they didn’t want to leave [and] they couldn’t afford to move. (Melissa, 
architect) 
While the issue of managed retreat may have the most challenging effects on individuals 
and communities without the financial solvency to relocate, there is a level of fear and denial that 
goes beyond economics. There are communities of wealthy people who by their privilege, feel a 
level of immunity. Hannah had this story of an elderly woman of means: 
She didn’t want to evacuate for Irma, and her husband is in a wheelchair. I told her about 
the data predictions and cautioned her about her safety. She wrote: “You’re scaring me.”  
I said, “Well, you should be scared.” . . . she wrote back . . . “How much time do I have?”  
I said, “Five to 10 years.” A lot of people think they don’t have to worry about it because 
they have a lot of money. (Hannah, planner) 
One of the questions, I asked the design/planning professionals is if they broached the 
subject of managed retreat post-Sandy with residents during recovery and how they were 
responded to. 
I’ve talked to the Mayor’s office and they are like, “We can’t even begin to talk about 
that because of real estate value and land.” I’m like, “Well then, we’re acting in just 
denial. You’re putting everybody in greater jeopardy than actually caring for your 
citizens.” To me, the Mayor’s office just wants to look at real estate as the solution 
eventually, not as an issue. They want to build their way into flood protection. (Brianna, 
architect) 
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We further discussed the implications for communities that are more economically 
vulnerable and how one even begins to approach the difficult and sensitive questions of 
relocation. As Melissa suggested, sensitivity is of the utmost importance. She said,  
Many people are in bare survival mode; they struggle to keep a job, earn a sustainable 
wage, and feed their children. In no way should we force this to be a top priority for 
people. And yet, it’s where political will and the government come in, to make sure these 
people are safe. (Melissa, architect) 
One of the other architects in this study, Vic, had to make a very personal decision for he 
and his family as to whether to rebuild or not after Sandy. Given the location of his home, in Sea 
Gate at the very tip of Coney Island (Figure 4.3), if there was ever a strong case to be made about 
retreating and not rebuilding, this would have been one of them. I also asked how, from the 
perspective of a design professional, he would advise others on the subject of managed retreat. 
I think in my particular case it was an individual decision. It was for myself and my 
family about rebuilding and not retreating. It was a decision we all made together. If the 
rest of my community, or any community, were involved I think the decision process 
would clearly be different. (Vic, architect) 
 
As Vic and I extended the conversation to The Rockaways, Red Hook, the Lower East 
Side, and Lower Manhattan, it was daunting as to just how wide an area we could be talking 
about. 
But if you take a look at how many linear miles or square miles of an area, in New York 
City alone, that potentially are going to be subjected to being under water in the next 20 
to 50 years, you’re talking about a lot of people, a lot of area. And I honestly don’t know, 
logistically, or economically, how to make something like that work. (Vic, architect) 
 
Beryl (landscape architect) related the need for managed retreat to the natural underlying 
ecology that several prone communities are located on, The Rockaways and Coney Island: 
They are both barrier islands. They are in constant motion . . . from wave action and tides 
and sand deposit. They are geologically very transient bodies of land . . . [In] 500, 1000 
years, Rockaway will be really skinny in one part and really fat in another part, or it may 
get breached and become two or three islands. (Beryl, landscape architect)  
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NYCHA has 326 housing developments across the five boroughs. Many of them are 
within the highly vulnerable communities that Beryl mentions. As stated in the Sandy Regional 
Recovery Agenda, “Sandy impacted nearly 20% of all NYCHA properties (i.e., 402 buildings 
with over 35,000 units)” (Sandy Regional Assembly, 2013, p. 1). These statistics give an even 
greater understanding into the kind of massive effort Beryl is talking about. We discussed at 
length that managed retreat was an urban planning issue more than an urban design issue and 
how, after Sandy, many of the residents Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze (both on Staten 
Island) chose to take a buyout plan.  
Another study participant, Hannah (planner), has been highly focused on managed 
retreat. She described a project by Concordia, the architecture firm engaged with developing the 
Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Plan (2019). This plan is mentioned in more detail in the focus 
group at the close of this chapter. During the interview we discussed how the terms 
“transformational adaptation” or “resilient relocation” have been used instead of managed 
retreat. These are attempts to find wording that is less loaded than “retreat” with its strong 
connotation of giving up and conceding defeat.  
Ross, who is both an architect and an educator, talked about a studio he had taught at City 
College of New York that focused on a project about managed retreat: 
I looked very broadly for a community that would be willing to work with my studio, 
openly, without paranoia, looking at the pragmatic aspects that we were going to confront 
with managed retreat. I did find one community off the Hudson River—not the first place 
I would have looked at, but a community that was slammed by the surge from Hurricane 
Sandy—the town that Klaus Jacob18 lives in, Piermont, NY. 
 
 
18 Klaus Jacob is a research scientist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. He 
has been advocating for the development of fair and equitable plans to relocate flood-threatened 
communities, ones that have a fair probability of being under water before the close of the 2lst century.  
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One of the primary issues in working with any community on this subject, is trust. Ross 
immediately earned that because Klaus Jacob had been a resident there for 15 years, had worked 
with the community who, as a result, already had a climate sea-level rise committee. Ross went 
on to share more of the details of the actual planning exercise. I was curious as to how far Ross’s 
team went in devising actual solutions for Piermont. He responded, 
We’re not giving them a solution. Amongst eight, you can be sure that you have some 
very, very modest ideas about how they might secure their shoreline. What if their park 
land up the hill becomes their urbanized land? Piermont asked us if we would ready our 
materials for a later spring conference (2019), that they can use what we did for them as 
examples of alternative futures. That’s about as far as I’ve been able to go. (Ross, 
architect) 
 
Part of what Ross and I further discussed was the time frame people are willing to 
consider. While scientific authorities like Klaus Jacob may talk about the very long-term and the 
impact on our grandchildren’s children, most people are not ready for nor willing to engage the 
long term. Ross argued,  
We’re dealing with the immediate, since we know people have rebuilt in West Hampton, 
South Hampton, and Jersey Shore. People rebuild in extremely vulnerable areas. People 
would rather die than move in some cases. Moving a discrete number of families by some 
funded mechanism, you can kind of do, but nobody has suggested that we move a major 
American city. In that case, when you talk about retreat, retreat to what and where? 
 
For many, including me, one’s brain goes blank forecasting 60 years into the future. How 
does one get past this? It begins with not thinking about this framed only by one’s own sense of 
longevity and mortality! Rather, what is needed is to adopt a philosophy based on legacy, tied to 
altruistic pragmatism—an intergenerational form of leadership or what Milfont and Sibley 
(2011) called “environmental generativity” (p. 21). This important insight that arose during the 
research will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
So for example, there are places where communities are at a huge and significant risk; 
there is no doubt about that. But I think before “experts” or practitioners look at the maps 
and say to people that they have got to go, I think the communities themselves need to 
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realize when they have to go or when they don’t. The idea that communities really don’t 
know is a little bit condescending. (Samuel, architect) 
 
Samuel also noted the difficulties created by the idea of, and, even, just the word retreat. 
So now they’re calling it “adaptation” as opposed to “managed retreat because” it was a 
hard and scary phrase. How do you maintain the social infrastructure when you’re 
moving people? Where do you move people to? [Think of] the Lower Ninth Ward after 
Katrina: all the affordable housing cleared for market-rate housing. People are suspicious 
when you mention managed retreat. That is why. It was a way to clear the poor. 
 
Robert, also an architect, addressed the law and politics of managed retreat, pointing to 
how, at some point, it may no longer be a matter of choice:   
It’s going to present a new requirement for architects. Unless it’s a law that somebody’s 
going to have to retreat, they don’t necessarily have to retreat. All they have to do is lift 
their house up or make that kind of correction. You can’t force them to retreat.  
 
A forced retreat would harken back to other tragic experiences in America: forced 
relocations, such forcing Native Americans off of their land; urban renewal that bulldozed       
so-called slums leaving working class and poor people without affordable housing (Gans, 1965). 
Then as Robert went on to say, to not plan ahead in a realistic manner could bring a different 
kind of destruction. 
If we start waiting until it is too late, you are going to have a situation where it’s going to 
be forced retreat, and that’s not good, or you are going to have destruction. It’s a tough 
one to talk to housing clients specifically about and how to achieve what I would call, a 
controlled retreat, a phased retreat, as opposed to a panicked retreat. (Robert, architect) 
 
And Brianna (architect) spoke of the analytical challenges her profession faced in 
developing a “model” for decisions around managed retreat:  
The thing is, Red Hook itself, is like in the middle of the city. It’s not like we’re some 
outer banks kind of location. We need to start figuring this stuff out now . . . and partly 
because retreat itself can take 20 or 30 years.  
 
Brianna is both an architect and an educator. She spoke about programs such as RAMP 
and studio courses at the Pratt Institute that have become incubators for ideas and 
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experimentation. They also were places where communities could work with design/planning 
professionals to vet ideas and co-create future alternatives in a non-politicized environment. I 
asked Brianna how a design/planning professional can deal with the issue of managed retreat and 
not rebuilding. She answered,  
It’s our responsibility to always [have] an upfront conversation and then figure out how 
to move forward through that. Another model that they [residents in high risk areas] 
could do, they could sell their property and they could build a floating house . . . It’s 
important, for the city to start having those conversations. Nobody wants to talk about it. 
(Brianna, architect) 
 
When I spoke to Thomas, a landscape architect who lives in Red Hook (and also was 
very engaged with Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria), we talked a lot about The Rockaways, 
where he has worked and sailed from. 
Should we retreat? We’re living in these vulnerable areas, or do our lives depend on these 
vulnerable areas? For people that are fishermen, surfers, and sailors, they want to be in 
the ocean zone. They need it for their happiness, they have to see the horizon line of the 
ocean. So, for folks like that, it’s worth the risk of it. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban 
designer)  
 
For architect Roberta, such questioning needs to be moderated with at least some 
optimism if professionals are to have any chance of gradually opening up the option of 
relocation.  
You have to stay positive about what can be done, and we know a lot of what can be 
done. We may not have the money to do it all, but we also have some tough decisions 
about where it doesn’t make sense to invest. I don’t think that the question of managed 
retreat has been warmly landed yet because it’s such a political nightmare. (Roberta, 
architect) 
 
Finally, on the issue of managed retreat, Melissa (architect) ended on a less optimistic 
note recognizing not only the natural reluctance of individuals but the massive challenge of 
relocating the large numbers of people living in massive public housing developments.  
The idea that at some point your house will be dry but you’ll get there by boat because 
that’s actually where the coastline would be, is grounds for considering managed retreat. 
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People don’t get it… that’s a lot of the problem. The other . . . is the places where you 
have large concentrations of poor people, in NYCHA housing. The idea of moving them 
out of harms’ way, is too expensive, where are you going to put them? (Melissa, 
architect) 
 
Summary—Pillar 3, Societal, Theme 3.4: Managed retreat. At what point does rebuilding 
in an area impacted by a climate impactful event make sense and at what juncture does one no 
longer adapt and retreat from the site? The answer to these questions are further complicated for 
communities that are more economically vulnerable. How does one even begin to approach the 
difficult and sensitive questions of relocation which would be very different for someone living 
in Southampton, Long Island, compared to residents of NYCHA public housing in The 
Rockaways. We discussed how the terms “transformational adaptation” or “resilient relocation” 
has been used instead of managed retreat. These are attempts to find wording that is less loaded 
than “retreat” with its strong connotation of giving up and conceding defeat. Managed retreat is 
going to present new challenges for design/planning professionals. A forced retreat would harken 
back to forced relocations—moving Native Americans off of their land—or urban renewal—
leaving working class and poor people without affordable housing. Yet to not plan ahead in a 
realistic manner could bring a different kind of destruction. What is needed is to adopt a 
philosophy based on legacy, tied to altruistic pragmatism—an intergenerational form of 
leadership. 
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.5: International connections and lessons. It is fitting, 
given the global scale of climate change, that lessons on how to deal with disasters get shared 
between experts and professionals from many nations. After Sandy, much was learned and 
developed as HUD worked with Dutch water expert Henk Ovink, who played a leading role in 
formulating and implementing the Rebuild by Design initiative. In the interviews the 
significance of such cross-fertilization internationally came up a number of times. For example, 
255 
 
 
Jeanine (landscape architect) spoke about learning from another of the study participants such as  
Eli (architect) because of his international experience.  
It was interesting to me when Eli was talking about this trip to Japan to the area of the 
tsunami and how there, they relocated people together. So, whoever your next-door 
neighbor was, you took your next-door neighbor wherever you were going. So, they kept 
the community together and also had some people say to them, “Yeah, well I might not 
want to live with my old neighbors.” (Jeanine, landscape architect) 
 
Grace brought up the impacts of and professional work that took place in the aftermath of 
earthquakes in New Zealand: 
[Regarding] New Zealand and the earthquake of 2010, we did have a larger, more 
impactful event in February 2011, and we hadn’t yet fully finished examining all the 
properties before that. That was a big learning experience. To apportion the damage 
between events when you haven’t actually looked at the property in-between time is 
really very challenging. (Grace, engineer) 
When the time between catastrophic events is short, assessing the damage, let alone 
readying the infrastructure and communities for the next catastrophe can be very daunting. This 
is an important lesson to be learned as the frequency as well as the intensity of major climate 
change-induced events increases in the United States and the Northeast. Having two “Sandys” in 
close succession could overtax not only short term but longer-term response planning. Liz also 
drew on lessons from New Zealand’s handling of earthquakes:  
[During the] Christchurch earthquakes 2010 and 2011, the ground became liquified            
. . . and the real estate changed, and you were in a flood zone and before you were not. 
People then had to have flood insurance and earthquake insurance on the real estate. (Liz, 
engineer) 
 
The issue of insurance is a big one in the aftermath of disasters. Though this was not a 
point of focus for this study, it is important to put what Liz was describing into the context of 
Sandy. After Sandy, many insurance policy holders learned that their insurance may not cover 
damage done before the storm. Most of the damage was not caused by hurricane winds but by 
severe flooding from storm surge. And most traditional homeowner policies do not cover floods. 
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Flood insurance is something bought separately through the government (FEMA). Referring to 
New Zealand’s disasters, Liz went on to explain, 
To get back the damages the earthquake insurance said you are not in a flood zone so you 
should go to the flood insurance. The flood insurance [companies] told them, “Well, the 
flood was created by the shaking of the earth therefore you have to go back to the 
earthquake insurance.” The building code looks at shaking but not at the earth liquifying. 
(Liz, engineer) 
 
This international example states it so clearly through the phrase, “the real estate 
changed.” This not only pertains to the insurance an individual may hold. Design and 
construction continue locally in some areas after Sandy, including Red Hook, the Gowanus 
Canal, and The Rockaways, all hit heavily during the storm surges and resulting floods. While 
design standards and codes may be changing, so is the geology of the earth that these 
developments are being built upon. 
Liz also touched on her work after a major quake in South America:  
I [led] the team after the 2016 earthquake 7.9 devastating the whole shoreline of Ecuador. 
I collect newspapers after earthquakes. People [demand] water, safety, milk for their 
children, going back to their houses, not live in tents. I thought I would see that; what I 
saw was images of devastation and the word resilience in Spanish. I was like in shock. 
This word made it all the way there because this was the demand of the people.  
 
What stood out in Liz’s international experience is how much the design nomenclature, 
such as resiliency, has become part of the public narrative. This harkens back to the disaster of 
9/11, when phrases like “progressive collapse,” “design charrettes,” and “Jersey barriers,” 
became part of the public narrative and nomenclature in the New York region.  
For Claire, the devastating earthquake in Haiti was replete with very painful lessons, not 
least because that is where she was originally from.  
I lost a lot of family in the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Haiti ended up with 80,000 people 
with some level of amputation because of hard cinderblocks from buildings falling on 
them. My response was not just the resiliency of construction techniques, but architecture 
rebuilt different than before. Architecture with accessibility. (Claire, architect) 
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Claire saw firsthand how inappropriate planning or design responses can be when they 
are fashioned by outsiders with minimal or no guidance from the affected communities. Similar 
to what happened in New Orleans during Katrina, there was a lot of push back with people 
coming in from outside to rebuild who had no understanding of the local culture. 
Some of the competition results in Haiti looked like log cabins, Spanish Style houses, 
none of this was a cultural alignment with Haiti. And all of the financial resources that 
could have gone back into the Haitian economy was going to people from the outside 
coming in. (Claire, architect) 
 
As a Haitian American, Claire wanted to go back and offer her assessment after the 
hurricane. She volunteered to go down and assess and evaluate buildings for structural integrity, 
but because she was only two years out of school, even though she was working as a practicing 
architect, the Haitian government told her she was too inexperienced to make those assessments 
and evaluations. Claire did get her hands on a manual for construction from Habitat for 
Humanity that was written in both English and Creole and went to work with the contractors.  
I worked with the construction workers sharing other techniques that could make 
buildings safer, like tying the rebar accurately, etc. I shared what I called the tricks of 
trade, gave them the printouts from Habitat, and talked to them about the power they had 
to make the environment safer. That they had the power to come in and make it safe. 
(Claire, architect) 
Claire explained that in Haiti if you say you are an architect, they refer to you as an 
engineer. 
Those who call themselves engineers are really contractors. So, there was no one there 
checking foundation depth, water tables, soil stability, etc. There were rebars sticking up 
from the roofs that detach the metal from the concrete. So, when the earthquake happened 
it was catastrophic. Roofs were made heavy to resist the next hurricane which further 
exacerbated the collapse of anything more than a single story tall. There is technically a 
building code, but it is not reinforced, and no one is liable. (Claire, architect) 
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Samuel (architect) drew attention to the special challenges of Kuwait which is both 
highly vulnerable to climate change and a major source of fossil fuels whose usage is a major 
driver of global warming:  
In Kuwait, obviously there’s huge issues that have to do with climate change; it’s 
arguably the hottest inhabited place on the planet and it's primarily organized around 
fossil fuels. China is built out so completely and so inappropriately, that it’s going to be 
dealing with issues for at least 100 years. What’s really disturbing is that now the Chinese 
are moving into Africa.  
Of particular note from Samuel’s perspective is how developed countries like the 
Republic of Kuwait—which according to the World Bank Group (n.d.) has 98% of its population 
living in cities—face a scarcity of water and, yet, an economy built upon a major contributing 
factor to climate change. Of note, in light of Samuel’s concern, it is to be noted that after the 
United States under President Trump pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, China began to 
champion what it called “Ecological civilization . . . achieving harmony between people and 
nature” (Pennington & Kastner, 2018, para. 3).  
Roberta turned to Thailand in search of changing paradigms of professional work in 
regard to engaging communities that are both vulnerable to disaster and marginalized 
socioeconomically. She observed,  
There is a group of architects in Thailand doing something called CODI. Community 
Organization Development Institute . . . co-creative efforts with community members, for 
community members, if you need to do work in a community that has nominally 
significant needs you have to figure out a way to work with and support the community. I 
heard this similarly, from [African] representatives who said, “Nothing for us without 
us.”  (Roberta, architect)  
Roberta worked with the CODI team in Bangkok and spoke at length about the Baan 
Mankong Collective Housing and how people moved from rickety shanties to owning solid 
upgraded homes. While the primary motivation for this program was not imminent effects of 
climate change, the program is one we can learn from in the developed world. Upgrading and 
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storm proofing the dwellings of those who live in disaster-prone areas of New York, and doing 
so in a way that enhances community capacity, certainly describes challenges that I heard of 
repeatedly from professionals who worked in rebuilding post-Sandy. Roberta further discussed 
how this tied into creating income generation and the local issues in the context of the greater 
regional challenges. This goes to a point raised throughout my research in direct response to 
Sandy: The need for “a new story of unified effort to heal [rebuild] communities harmed by 
racial [economic] injustice so that they can participate in repairing our damaged ecosystems and 
social networks” (Anthony, 2017, p. 8).  
Finally, in terms of the theme of international lessons and comparisons, Penelope 
(architect) brought up the Caribbean island jurisdictions, some of which have started reducing 
climate change impact through use of renewable energy sources:  
The Governor [of Puerto Rico] signed a bill, on 100% renewable energy, by 2050. 
Dominica signed on to be a 100% resilient nation, in the rebuilding. There is a lot of 
opportunity that is happening there in regard to case studies and new projects. They have 
different governmental structures than what we do, which creates different hurdles.  
 
There were many architects interviewed in this study with close affiliations to Puerto 
Rico and to other Caribbean islands. Of particular interest in terms of lessons learned 
internationally was how areas with different governmental structures than in the United States, 
and having a wholly distinct set of economic, social, and political hurdles, are making great 
strides in committing to policies that many cities in the United States have yet to adopt.  
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.5: International connections. After Sandy, 
much was learned and developed as HUD worked with Dutch water expert Henk Ovink who 
played a leading role in formulating and implementing the Rebuild by Design initiative. The 
significance of such cross-fertilization internationally came up a number of times in the study. 
As noted, one participant referred to how, in New Zealand after two earthquakes struck in quick 
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succession, “the real estate changed.” While design standards and codes may be changing, so is 
the geology of the earth that these developments are being built upon. It was also shown by way 
of international examples how inappropriate design/planning responses can be when they are 
fashioned by outsiders with minimal or no guidance from the affected communities. Similar to 
what happened in New Orleans during Katrina, there was a lot of resentment about non-local 
people, including professionals, who had no understanding of the local culture yet came in from 
outside to rebuild after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010. Of particular interest in terms of lessons 
learned internationally was how areas with different governmental structures than in the United 
States, while having a whole different set of hurdles, are making great strides in enacting policies 
that many cities in the United States have yet to commit to. 
Pillar 3 (Societal), Theme 3.6: Leadership. Despite widespread constructive critiques 
of conventional ideas about what it is to lead (e.g., Heifetz, 1994; Vaill, 1996), even the most 
progressive professionals still often instinctively feel pressured to have “all the answers” for 
dealing with climate change disasters. Yet realizing, through experience with climate-change 
induced disasters, they also aspire to alternative models of leadership. This dilemma was a 
recurrent theme in the interviews for this dissertation   
When asked about the qualities of leadership needed for dealing effectively with the 
climate change crises, most participants suggested that it is no longer possible or desirable to 
lead from the top down. Others simply acknowledged that leadership is desperately needed in the 
aftermath of events like Sandy but did not know where it would come from or what it would 
even look like. Talib (architect) cautioned,  
Don’t construct a whole reality for them [communities] through your own eyes. And this 
is why it’s so important for designers to understand [impacts] of what we do. We 
interpret peoples wants and desires into physical space. We need to begin to change the 
paradigm to, “I’m not going to stand up for you, I’m going to stand with you.” 
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Susan spoke of the dangers for professionals in overestimating the decisiveness of their 
expert knowledge in contexts where, in fact, no one person really has “the truth”:  
Let me give you something completely on the other side of leadership which is the guru 
effect. People come into these situations and because communities are desperate and 
confused, we are all susceptible to somebody coming in with all the answers. As I think 
about it, they are almost always men. They come in with big grand sweeping initiatives 
that they are going to solve it all. (Susan, urban strategist) 
 
The term, “guru effect” was coined by Sperber (2010) in reference to how a  
jargon-rich authority’s perspective is often over-valued, what Schön (1983) earlier called the 
strategy of mastery through mystery (p. 126). Susan’s point was that in the midst of a confusing, 
uncertain, and even dangerous situation as was the aftermath of Sandy, professionals may fall 
back on technical prowess when the challenge is beyond the grasp of current expert knowledge.  
Susan (urban strategist) summed up the guru effect with this impact: “In New Orleans 
they used to say that New Orleans had two storms. One was Katrina, the actual storm, and the 
second one [was] the attack of the experts and a kind of dogma that is disrespectful and 
destructive.” It appears that one of the greatest barriers to environmental and social justice in the 
aftermath of climate change-related catastrophes is the expert or group of experts that come in to 
“save the day.” Most of the time they are coming from the place of privilege rather than 
inclusivity. They use their privilege not to engage but rather to control and have power over. It 
goes back to something architect Talib (architect) mentioned earlier. It’s the difference between 
standing with rather than for. It’s a form of bias that comes from feeling like the anointed one 
while the local and neighborhood community have less credibility. It also runs against the kind 
of global perspective Roberta discussed from the ever more valued perspective of communities 
in relation to design/planning professionals in Africa: “Nothing for us without us.” Liz (engineer) 
expanded on this: 
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From a preparedness, planning aspect and leadership perspective, professionals need to 
explain details of what they do from the top down and the bottom up. It should start from 
a very early age from a school level and if the parents are more aware then they can have 
a productive conversation with the technical and the political.  
 
Along the same lines, Brianna (architect) concluded, “You can’t force people to 
understand it. And we have to be sensitive in that there are lots of people who have just 
hardships around keeping a job, or making enough money, or feeding their kids.” 
When discussing the issues of climate change, particularly in marginalized or 
economically challenged communities, the reality of priorities comes into play, as Brianna noted. 
This perspective further substantiates what Liz stated on the importance of educating children so 
they in turn can educate their parents in a way that is conversational, accessible, and not a 
burden. Considering the gradual and educative leadership role that design/planning professionals 
need to take, Paul used a metaphor of descending a staircase: 
When you walk down one step as a time. you might not get down 15 stairs, but you might 
get down five or six or seven. As a leader it’s important to let people know that you’re 
still on the staircase. You’ve got eight stairs to go, but at least you don’t have 15. And 
then people can make decisions about how much farther they want to go. In a post-
disaster scenario that translates to where they want to live and the amount of risk that 
they want to take. (Paul, engineer) 
 
What has been thematic in this research is the overlap between the professional and 
personal. Many professionals whom I interviewed used their professional knowledge but 
personally within their own communities. This is a form of servant leadership (Greenleaf, 1977), 
wherein the desire to make a positive difference in others’ lives is modulated by using one’s 
knowledge in a way that makes room for everyday wisdom to develop in the client group. 
Samuel reflected, 
I’m very much an optimist; I think you have to be an optimist if you’re in our profession, 
but I’m not super optimistic about what’s going to happen in the next 20 years. I find it 
hard to believe that we’re going to make any kind of tough choices in the next 15 to 20 
years unless something ultra-catastrophic happens. (Samuel, architect) 
263 	
	
 
Inclusive leadership is intrinsic in Samuel’s response: The best way to deal with tough 
times and choices ahead is to engage all in a shared vision.  
Look at what happened with New York. It completely flooded the southern part of the 
island. What’s been done since then? I would just say that our goal is to give people 
information so that they can make informed decisions and somehow do that in a way 
that’s compelling [emphasis added]. (Samuel, architect) 
There is a sense of shared purpose. Leaders create an environment that is participatory 
and transparent. This type of approach in leadership could not only counter the guru effect but 
also, as Eli had noted, help with the dilemma professionals have assisting people to make 
informed decisions in the middle of a crisis.  
A somewhat opposite take on the kind of leadership needed for tackling the 
unprecedented design/planning problems after Sandy was advanced by Muriel who said, 
We need another Moses,19 a czar, someone tough enough to say, “No, we are not building 
here.” The water will rise—and the land will not be there. The big question is how this 
will happen? Who has the authority to do this—crack the whip and do this and where 
does the money come from? How are we going to deal with this? (Muriel, 
communications specialist) 
 
Muriel seemed to be implying this is a leader who is more charismatic in approach, quite 
different from other participant perspectives that described an adaptive and inclusive leadership 
process for the long-term. However, when one looks at the most famous 20th century leaders 
who brought their nations or communities through crises—Roosevelt, Churchill, King, and 
Gandhi, for example—charisma paid a huge part in galvanizing people and keeping them 
focused on intention during stressful times (House, 1976; Northouse, 2007). While this may be 
 
19 Here, Muriel was referring to Robert Moses, the legendary public official in New York City who in the 
mid-20th century was a dominant force in shaping the public infrastructure. His life and work is described 
in Caro (1974).  
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justified in light of the even more global crisis of climate change, however, the world has many 
charismatic leaders who do not necessarily fall on the side of making the climate great again.  
I asked Muriel specifically why she feels the design/planning community has not had 
better leadership. She responded, 
Why isn’t it moving faster? There are too many people employed in this within their 
various silos and their own small power base and are more committed to their silos then 
to the challenges of the issues . . . We have fires, flooding across the country. Do we just 
have a nation of zombies who just can’t move? (Muriel, communications specialist) 
I was curious if design/planning professionals viewed the most effective form of 
leadership during and after Sandy as leading from the bottom up, top down, or “from the 
middle.” Thomas (landscape architect/urban designer) described the most effective form of 
leadership being where the horizontal and the vertical come together. He calls it the “middle 
out,” where the leader is ever toggling between the horizontal resources of community and the 
vertical resources of governments.  
Thomas linked the potentially delicate balancing act of leading from the middle to the 
need for professional self-awareness. He said this approach depended on,  
not being afraid to engage leadership at all levels, and play inside ball, but also play 
outside ball and organize with all the non-profits on the ground for those who do not have 
access to those resources and just being a connector of resources and a conveyer of 
power, in a way, and not a concentrator of power. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban 
designer) 
 
Thomas’s description of power and its use is a good example of the positivity of leading from the 
middle: the leader as connector of resources, a conveyer, not concentrator of power. Joseph 
supported the need for leadership that transcends command versus consensus models. He said,  
There is this hierarchical thinking . . . top down notions that the expert will be able to 
solve all the problems. We need solutions that not only address complex problems but 
complex systems. The hierarchical thinking approaches are not as complex as the scale of 
our problems. And while I think it is leading from the middle, I think the bottoms and the 
tops have to come together. (Joseph, social activist) 
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Roberta’s remarks in response to my asking about leadership went straight to achieving a 
more collaborative leadership approach:  
I think that we have to put collaboration at the forefront. Sometimes you need to play 
rhythm guitar, you don’t always need to be the lead guitar. How do you create this desire 
for collaboration as a new trend? [How do we] change our motivation and incentives for 
celebrating success? Are we able to say we’re not going to give anymore design awards 
for individual contributors? Everything has to be a collaboration. Are we bold enough for 
that? (Roberta, architect) 
The impacts of Sandy and other climate-impactful events are having consequences on the 
societal role designers/planners play. Will this lead to some fundamental changes that may in 
fact include, as Roberta notes, “knowing when to play rhythm guitar and when to play the lead.”   
One of the puzzles that many of the design/planning professionals spoke of in one way or 
another was basically, why isn’t it moving faster; who is in charge here? The participants 
acknowledged that designers/planners will need to find their place as leaders of a movement that 
is both reflective and proactive. A leadership model that addresses our environmental challenges 
may be hard to achieve but, from what the participants observed, greatly needed. These ideas 
will be further discussed in Chapter V. 
Focus Group Reflections 
Ironically, on the day of our focus group call, Hurricane Barry struck the Gulf Coast 
causing flooding from Louisiana into Arkansas. I convened the focus group as a means to 
triangulate and/or challenge my research data. Zac (architect/planner) was in attendance with 
Adam (architect) and Therese (landscape architect/architect). All three of the participants were 
recruited through the efforts of Ross, another architect in the study. Adam committed his career 
to housing, most specifically affordable housing and community-based design in underserved 
communities. Therese is a multi-disciplinary professional whose work integrates ecologically 
and socially progressive design and is a leader in resilient urban design. Zac is the founder of a 
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planning and architectural firm in which collaboration and community engagement is central to 
his work. He is also the only person in the study who was engaged in relocating a community 
from a climate-vulnerable location to higher ground (i.e., managed retreat). I provided all the 
participants with a series of five questions. One participant, Adam, answered all of the questions 
and sent the answers back to me in writing. In providing the questions in advance, I discovered 
that the three pillars used in the interview analyses did not align with the more integrated themes 
that emerged from the focus group.  
Zac, like the interview participants, landscape architect Beryl, architect Eli, planner 
Kaasar, urban strategist Mary, and engineer Paul (along with many others in the study) 
emphasized the importance of community engagement. Zac referenced a particular project in 
Louisiana with extensive community involvement. 
People don’t know what they don’t know. We went through an extensive project in South 
Louisiana called LA Safe that involves 3,000 people. We had 70 community meetings and 
we were able to present to people what the options were, what their future conditions 
might look like. It was an enormously complicated, costly exercise but a lot of people’s 
awareness was raised. (Zac, architect/planner)  
 
There was then further discussion about being able to be sensitive in how those options 
are presented. 
Even as simple as what the options are—either you stay here, and this is what your future 
is going to look like, or you can move, and your future can be different—you won’t have 
the same culture because everyone might not end up in the same place, but these are the 
choices based on the facts about sea level rise and that your community is going to be 
under water 30 years from now. (Zac, architect/planner) 
 
Therese commented on this from the perspective of how difficult it is to hear the options 
when you are feeling so vulnerable. That vulnerability, as further noted in the study extends to 
both the community and the designers/planners that are the ones delivering the information. 
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I think a lot of people may just feel helpless because they can’t engage with the issue and 
giving people an idea of how they can actually do something or help or make their 
participation meaningful; it is really important. (Therese, landscape architect/architect) 
 
Therese further expanded upon one of the themes that emerged during interviews on how 
designers/planners are making decisions and developing new standards for the purpose of 
adaptation but that incentives may not always make the most sense from a personal or financial 
perspective.  
We are working in Miami Beach developing new standards for how private homeowners 
can raise their buildings, adapt their landscape for climate change, and sea level rise of 
five feet. The presumption is the city is raising the street by five feet because the 
emergency vehicles will have to get to the homes so you as a private homeowner have to 
adapt. How do you make this make economic sense? (Therese, landscape 
architect/architect) 
 
Therese described that what she has been trying to work through is not only the financial 
mechanisms driving decisions on redevelopment of infrastructure in coastal areas but also the 
belief that people must have power over nature rather than living with her. 
Holly Whyte—The Last Landscape—it was as if it was written yesterday.20 I kind of 
couldn’t believe . . . I guess I am surprised we haven’t been able to make more change. 
It has to be more than education. Because I feel like people know they just haven’t given 
up on the post-War idea that we as humans can control nature and that I don’t know why 
we haven’t figured that out. (Therese, landscape architect/architect) 
 
The discussion of managed retreat added another dimension of gravitas to the 
conversation because Zac had actually planned and participated in such a move. He also had 
more hands-on experience with people in Louisiana in this context than many who worked solo 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. His insights were invaluable.  
People don’t want to move. That’s human nature and no matter how logical we can think 
of it being logical. People don’t do logical things all the time Like in Plaquemines Parish 
in Louisiana when you have to pay $30,000 a year for insurance then it finally hits you 
that it is time to move. And they won’t go no matter what. Those are the things as a 
professional that I feel I need to be able to listen to. (Zac, architect/planner) 
 
20 The Last Landscape was written in 1968 by William H. “Holly” Whyte about the urgent need for land 
conservation including the concept of protecting open (undeveloped) spaces.  
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Therese commented plainly on managed retreat, saying, “A lot of people don’t want to 
leave these places because they are home. And that’s what’s makes us human. The humanity of it 
is not something to be taken lightly.” Looking at larger global issues like climate change and 
migration we also have to foresee the next 2.5 billion people that are going to move into cities 
worldwide. This scenario has made professionals like Therese more conscious of the crucial 
nature of the role of design.  
It has made me more aware of the role of design because that is often neglected and 
environmental planning policy not only in anticipation of events like Katrina or Sandy 
but I also am concerned about the planned integration of renewable energy systems such 
as wind turbines, solar farms, and transmission lines with minimal disruption to the 
existing urban and rural fabric. (Therese, landscape architect/architect) 
 
Adam looked at this from the perspective of policy: “I think the country needs a larger 
environmental planning policy that looks at all these issues and tries to think proactively and get 
mayors and governors to sit and think about this” (Adam, architect). 
The focus groups attention then moved to another polarizing theme within the           
study—resiliency. Of the three participants in the focus group, Adam was the one who had 
worked the most within marginalized neighborhoods. He has been working with NYCHA 
housing in Coney Island post-Sandy and that is to continue into 2020. When I raised the question 
about resiliency in the context of marginalization, Adam responded, “I can say in New York 
resiliency has worked in concert with marginalized communities, in Coney Island where I have 
worked since Sandy. I don’t see where it hasn’t. Don’t know what context you found in other 
people.” 
While Therese did not engage in this part of the discussion, she punted the question to 
Zac who acknowledged that it is a very sensitive topic. In the course of the study, this was not 
unusual. There were different degrees of comfort level responding to the question. Some had 
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little prior awareness of the challenges of resiliency in marginalized communities while for 
others the issue was so in the forefront of experience that it brought them to a place of outrage 
and sometimes rage. 
This is a really touchy subject. Some of you might know about the Green Dot plan for 
New Orleans. It was dead on arrival. People were put in harm’s way because they were 
placed in low-lying areas and they were told that is where they could live. They were 
Black. And it was red lining. And red lining produced low-lying African Americans areas 
who communities that were conflicted between resiliency and social justice. (Zac, 
architect/planner) 
Zac went onto explain that ironically people in those areas, even knowing all this didn’t want to 
leave. There were five generations of families there and those homes were their major financial 
asset.  
It was the only wealth that they were allowed to build so who was going to take that away 
from them. It was a very complex [issue] and also confusing. I feel like that are a lot of 
places where you can make this kind of comparison. Resiliency is great for people who 
can afford to move to higher ground. But it doesn’t work so well for people who can’t.        
. . . It doesn’t mean it’s wrong. Maybe the word resiliency has taken on almost an elitist 
perspective. I can’t tell you how many people have said they don’t want to use the word 
resiliency anymore. (Zac, architect/planner) 
Adam wondered what other words were beginning to be used. They were the same ones 
brought up earlier in the research: transformation and adaptation. The conversation then returned 
to NYCHA/affordable housing and the false sense of safety. 
You all bring up the issue of public housing, but in places like Red Hook, transformation 
is happening that is changing the nature of that whole community. It is not adapting or 
fixing the public housing in ways that are meaningful, but it is suggesting a berm around 
an area in a low-lying zone, so you are keeping people in harm’s way and giving them a 
false sense of security. (Therese, landscape architect/architect) 
Another point raised by Therese is that the landscape is being created by speculative real 
estate people: how will they be able to assure people that it is safe. This was a point brought up 
earlier by other participants in the study, most specifically Beryl, Brianna, and Jeanine. 
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It is problematic and not okay. I don’t think it makes sense to pour public resources into 
landscapes that are potentially vulnerable when we could be pouring resources into other 
neighborhoods that could be rebuilt better that are already on high ground. (Therese, 
landscape architect/architect) 
Adam, Zac, and Therese all concurred that no matter the event, what we were all talking 
about was people’s feeling about nature, human nature. 
We can talk about the environment, we can talk about floods, we can talk about tornadoes 
we can talk about fires, we can talk about everything but the real challenge is how we 
understand how human nature works—how psychologists spend their lives trying to 
figure this stuff out. (Zac, architect/planner) 
Zac’s hindsight in the aftermath of Katrina gives a different perspective into what was 
previously discussed in the research. 
I would say we are beginning the recovery process [2019]. It has taken this long to think 
and feel that there are moves we can personally make. All the planning and policies that 
people can propose—until we get to the point where people can feel it and touch it, and 
have agency about it—then I don’t think we are making much progress. (Zac, 
architect/planner)  
Especially when they are telling you that you have to leave your family and friends. It is 
not going to happen. So, you have to have a lot of agency to make that decision to leave 
your family and friends. (Adam, architect) 
“And it all costs money. It all costs money” (Therese, landscape architect/architect). At 
this point, the conversation evolved into one about wisdom. Zac, along with another participant 
in this study, Eli, had spent time with the chief of the Kalinago Indians in Dominica. The chief 
explained that his people had lived on their land for 3,000 years and the reason they didn’t lose a 
single life during Hurricane Maria was they never built a house near the water. From memory, 
Zac paraphrased the Chief’s words on this as follows:   
[He had said]: The reason why on our 37,000 acres of tribal land we didn’t lose a single 
life is we don’t build our houses near the streams even if it is prettier. We learn from 
ancestors. So, there is something about that or, as someone mentioned, we are so built 
around technology and that is the new normal to be thinking of not to live with nature but 
to live against nature. I think that is real wisdom. Learning to live, plan, and live in 
harmony with nature.  
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“And it all costs money. It all costs money” (Therese, landscape architect/architect). At 
this point, the conversation evolved into one about wisdom. Zac, along with another participant 
in this study, Eli, had spent time with the chief of the Kalinago Indians in Dominica. The chief 
explained that his people had lived on their land for 3,000 years and the reason they didn’t lose a 
single life during Hurricane Maria was they never built a house near the water. From memory, 
Zac paraphrased the Chief’s words on this as follows:   
[He had said]: The reason why on our 37,000 acres of tribal land we didn’t lose a single 
life is we don’t build our houses near the streams even if it is prettier. We learn from 
ancestors. So, there is something about that or, as someone mentioned, we are so built 
around technology and that is the new normal to be thinking of not to live with nature but 
to live against nature. I think that is real wisdom. Learning to live, plan, and live in 
harmony with nature.  
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“Addressing these issues more with wisdom than through knowledge,” Zac remarked. 
All of the focus group participants agreed that designers/planners had to continue to break down 
silos. 
We have to engage as many people as we can and break down the silos and bring as 
many people in and work towards formulate ideas in a way that people across the country 
can begin to buy into what needs to be done and do it. It’s not someone else telling them 
what has to be done will be a future. (Adam, architect) 
What is implied here is the need for a resurgent wave of action initiated by 
designers/planners that spreads within the communities of people across the country (including 
their own). The following snippet quotes from the focus group discussion illustrate this point. 
 “It has to be a movement. We have to think about planning a movement. All we are 
doing is putting band aids and twittering around the edges” (Zac, architect/planner). 
 “There have been a lot of successful movements in this country. Maybe it’s time for a 
new one” (Adam, architect). 
 “That’s where we need to learn those lessons. We can’t tweak our way to get there” 
(Zac). 
 “And we can’t do it through building codes alone” (Adam). 
 “That’s right. It has to be all of the above” (Therese, landscape architect/architect). 
 “How do you build a movement?” (Zac) 
The whole concept of breaking down silos that could lead to a movement initiated by 
designers/planners was something new that had not appeared earlier in the research. What Zac, 
Adam, and Therese are suggesting through these words is that tackling the most challenging 
issues of climate-impactful events requires a wisdom-based movement. I interpret that as a        
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non-siloed approach within which designers/planners work towards a practice which is inclusive 
for both people and nature.  
Chapter Summary 
My effort in presenting these extensive and multilayered discussions has been to ensure 
that the rich and thoughtful ideas that the diverse participants voiced, are documented. To do so 
has relied on the metaphor of the three pillars subdivided into a total of 16 themes. Chapter V 
integrates these themes, considers these findings in light of the extant literature, and proposes 
how design/planning professionals affect and have been affected by the climacteric21 now 
unfolding, and which is now going to be with us, probably forever.  
Designers/planners acknowledge that leadership is desperately needed in the aftermath of 
events like Sandy but most did not know where it would come from or, really, what it would 
even look like. For leadership in dealing with the climate crisis participants overwhelmingly 
believe it is no longer possible or desirable to lead from the top down. What has been thematic in 
this research is the overlap between the professional and personal. There is a sense of shared 
purpose—and purposes that need to be more widely shared. Leaders, my participants all stated in 
one way, must create an environment that is participatory and transparent.  
It will take a reshaping of our global system to reclaim the core values of human dignity 
and ecological sustainability (Capra & Luisi, 2014). As Talib (architect) argued, “If one creates 
their own reality and empowers others to do the same, you are creating a unifying element 
between the individual and the larger community.” This connects to designer/planners in 
21 Lord Eric Ashby (1978) spoke of the complex transitional time humans are going through as a 
“climacteric” (p. 3) more than 40 years ago, rejecting referring to environmental problems  as a “crisis.” 
He suggested that a crisis is something we get through, albeit often slowly and painfully. A climacteric is 
something, Ashby argued, that humanity will have to live with “for the rest of man’s (sic) history on 
earth” (p. 3) 
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requiring the profession to continually challenge the status quo through design, ecological 
balance, and social equity. The practice of designers/planners is not based upon a natural law but 
rather a human one. Therefore, it can be challenged and reshaped. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
The focus of this study arose from my research question: “In what ways did experiences 
after Hurricane Sandy impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future             
climate-related events personally, professionally, and societally?”  This is about how working 
within highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster climate-vulnerable communities, specifically 
Hurricane Sandy, broadly impacts design/planning professionals (architects, planners, landscape 
architects, and engineers). Within the methodology of an embedded case study with narrative 
inquiry, professionals’ individual stories were the lynchpin of the research and served as the best 
way to hold and convey the depth of experience and information. It is through these stories that 
solutions to address the effects of future hurricanes (superstorms) can be found. This chapter will 
discuss the key findings, limitations, and implications for leadership and change that emerged 
from this research. Finally, I will conclude with how this research has impacted me personally. 
Key Findings 
The findings of the study were derived from two stages. In the first stage, interviews were 
conducted with architects, planners, landscape architects, and engineers, along with several 
tangential but interconnected post-Sandy professionals. This was followed by a second              
data-gathering stage, a focus group (consisting of one architect, one architect/planner, and one 
landscape architect/architect) which triangulated the data from the study’s interview stage.  
All data was gathered using biographical narrative interviewing during which I relied on 
minimal questioning or prompts, giving participants wide latitude in structuring their “stories of 
Sandy” in their own way. The focus of this research was on the post-Sandy experience and its 
ramifications on the design/planning professional. However, many participants also discussed 
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other climate-impactful events they experienced before or after Sandy as a means of expanding 
upon their responses.  
The data were then classified into three pillars: Personal (self/individual, psycho-social 
challenges, empathy/stress), Professional (impact to professional practice, reflection on strategies 
post-Sandy, impact on future events), and Societal (local and global impacts, leadership). It is 
important to note that the research results analysis in Chapter IV included post-Sandy and other 
disasters that design/planning professionals worked on before or after Sandy. This chapter 
emphasizes the impacts of Hurricane Sandy and its aftermath. 
General reflections on Pillar 1 (Personal). This pillar comprises issues that pertain  
either to the research participants themselves or to issues that other professionals have faced on 
the individual level. This includes topics from psycho-social challenges to emotional and  
spiritual well-being. Matters pertaining to depression and stress and the need for empathy and 
compassion are also of relevance. Given the rich volume of data discussed in Chapter IV, only  
the most prominent themes will be highlighted: permanence/impermanence, grief/empathy/PTSD, 
and dignity.  
Throughout the interviews, there was a prevailing opinion among design/planning 
professionals that their actions carried intergenerational consequences: Design needs to be 
considered not merely as a structure that will withstand the test of time, but also serve as a 
structure built within the context of the time. Because of that pervasive insight, there was an 
existential question emerging that many had not entertained before—impermanence.  
Permanence/impermanence. After Hurricane Sandy, a number of the designers/planners 
experienced what can only be described as the reality of an unreality; what was once considered 
permanent was no longer. How do you reconcile impermanence in the context of a profession, 
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specifically architecture, based upon the permanence of structure? This is what Kan and Parry 
(2004) referred to as “paradoxical discourse” (p. 482). This occurred, they said,   
most often when respondents discussed change efforts that had caused conflict and 
misunderstanding for them and others. More specifically, the conditions under which 
paradoxical discourse most often took place were when respondents described change 
incidents or relationships that involved others with divergent realities. (Kan & Parry, 
2004, p. 483) 
The motif of impermanence arose not only from a personal or emotional perspective but 
as a refocusing of a professional quest for a physical solutions-based perspective. Yet what 
makes this particularly paradoxical is that designers/planners are expected to guide solutions that 
are going to protect the community in the future, which, conventionally, implies permanence. 
When they are designing for storm protection no client wants to hear that structures will not and, 
indeed, cannot be built to last. A surprising lesson for me was the different perspective 
impermanence played after Sandy for professionals within the different practitioner fields.  
One architect reflected that as an immigrant and first generation American, permanence 
and legacy were part of the motivator for becoming an architect. However, since Sandy his 
perspective has changed with the realization that what he had always thought of as perpetual was 
actually so vulnerable. Another participant, Ross (architect), commented further on this: 
It was the experience with Sandy of the impermanence of everything that underscored 
the paradox that as an architect, you believe that what you build, will last forever. And it 
makes me think also about what just happened yesterday with Notre Dame de Paris.22 It 
has an intergenerational history; it’s been around longer than you have been alive, and 
everything looks so solid—and then you realize it’s not.”  
For the landscape architects who participated in this study, the focus is on ecology, not 
the built structure. When a landscape architect begins the design process, the focus is on how it 
22 Our interview took place just after the revered Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris was severely damaged by 
fire in April, 2019.  
277
will grow and change. They are not dealing with finite objects. One of the landscape architects 
described impermanence in the context of the shoreline itself:  
When you are dealing with something like Sandy, impermanence becomes your reality. I 
feel like the past several hundred years have been about humans moving out into the sea. 
Now the next hundred, several hundred years is going to be about the sea moving back 
into the land, reclaiming what had once been nature’s own boundaries of permanence. 
(Beryl, landscape architect) 
Equally, design/planning professionals were deeply impacted, helping people who 
sustained severe loss during Sandy and had to help them navigate loss and impermanence. 
[They say] “I want it back. I want it back.” It’s not a response of wanting their house 
back, it’s a response of, I want it back, I want my life back. They are looking at a global 
context that you can’t imagine unless you went through it. That’s a great profound 
question and a huge hurdle for the design profession to take in. (Eli, architect) 
Perhaps in order to get there, professionals will need to step outside of their usual patterns 
of behavior and “… explore the uncharted waters of the art and soul of social change” (Lederach, 
2005, p. 63). What he said in reference to peacebuilders could just as easily apply to 
designers/planners and their post-Sandy reality, for climate change can become an impetus for 
social change. 
Grief, empathy, and PTSD. At first glance, empathy and stress seem to have a limited 
correlation. In the context of the disaster, one expects victims to be stressed and those who 
respond, whether in short or long term, to have empathy as they help. Marking one year after 
Sandy, Redlener and Abramson (n.d.) reported on a mental health conference organized by the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation which concluded that there were “clear and compelling links 
between exposure to natural disasters and increased levels of anxiety, depression, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and strained marriages and family relations” (para. 16). However, what if 
professionals from whom empathy is required are devastated by this same suffering? How are we 
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to take care of those who are supposed to be, through their short- and long-term application of 
technical planning and related skills taking care of society? 
Design/planning professionals are also impacted personally in varying degrees of 
magnitude of empathy and resulting stress. While everyone in this study responded with empathy 
to the distress of others, it was difficult for most to acknowledge that response or` to recognize 
when they needed empathy from others. 
Additionally, in 2014, two years after Sandy, the Associated Press–NORC Center for 
Public Affairs Research (2014) surveyed 1,009 residents of 12 neighborhoods that were highly 
impacted by the hurricane. Keeping in mind that “fear is the key emotion . . . motivating survival 
via defensive behaviours” (Cantor, 2009, p. 1038), Leah (architect/planner) said that she doesn’t 
talk to anyone about her disaster experience. After seeing the world turned upside down during 
Katrina, she developed a lot of “hurricane fear.” Once she knew Sandy was approaching, she left 
and returned after the storm to help with the recovery. Commenting on what it has been like 
living through this trauma in two completely different cities, and yet how much of it was actually 
the same, she said,  
It is the sense of a place being turned inside out and how upsetting that is to see. That’s 
even more [traumatizing] than seeing a house demolished or in the middle of the street 
and to see a family’s contents on the curb. (Leah, architect/planner) 
While much has been written on how individuals within a community are impacted in the 
context of recovery efforts, it is unusual for a study to focus on the impact of grief, empathy, and 
PTSD on design/planning professionals. Focusing on shared trauma of mental health 
professionals and their patients in the context of post-Hurricane Katrina, Boulanger (2013) 
commented, “Neither clinicians nor their patients in New Orleans had anticipated the long 
psychological reach of adult onset trauma; [there are] catastrophic and sometimes chronic 
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disruption of fundamental aspects of self-experience that survivors of life-threatening disasters 
may face” (p. 32).  
When asked if they felt Sandy had impacted them in a way suggestive of PTSD, research 
participants seemed to show a general feeling of discomfort, either because the idea had never 
occurred to them, did not apply to all of them, or the very association made them uneasy. There 
were, however, three interviewees who had a personal association with the term. They felt their 
knowledge was both a blessing and a curse. They knew “too much” about how climate affects 
city infrastructure and coastlines. Robert (architect) commented that while talking to 
homeowners in The Rockaways, he was trying to process this tragedy while simultaneously 
providing guidance, and felt like he was experiencing PTSD.  
Even if members of the study did not directly identify with experiencing PTSD, they did 
acknowledge the considerable difficulty design professionals face in their emotional response in 
the midst of major and traumatic disasters.   
Dignity. While I have chosen to categorize the concept of dignity as part of the personal 
pillar, it was referenced in all three pillars from a variety of perspectives. Anthony (2017), an 
African American architect, regional planner, and social justice activist, wrote: “We must forge a 
new path illuminated by justice, respect for the dignity of each and every human being, and 
determination to maintain and restore the web of life as the foundation for health and 
sustainability” (p.168).  
With the fostering of greater understanding into human nature, comes the question of 
dignity, its loss or maintenance. From my perspective, dignity within this context extends not 
just to human dignity but the dignity of nature herself. Hicks (2011), an associate at the 
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Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, is in the field of international conflict resolution, 
stated, “Dignity is at the heart of our soul. It’s part of the shared human condition” (p. 1). 
One of the planners who participated in this study talked about the importance of helping 
people maintain their dignity with small, simple acts: a warm blanket, bottled water, or a place to 
charge a phone. A social activist/storyteller spoke about the importance of witnessing someone 
else’s story in the context of dignity. “It is about honoring the dignity of the person [in the 
community] telling the story. You know there is some value to being both a storyteller and being 
a witness to someone else’s story” (Esther, activist/storyteller). Talib (architect) pointed out that 
there is also a kind of dignity in understanding how people live after a disaster that needs to be 
part of the narrative. He said, “Dignity doesn’t only have to do with shelter, and food, and 
hygiene; people still need to form community.”  
Ultimately, it will take a reshaping of the global system of wealth and poverty to reclaim 
what are the core values of human dignity and ecological sustainability (Capra & Luisi, 2014). 
This may depend on rediscovering and applying longstanding visions from an Indigenous 
perspective that sees and lives unity between people and the environment (Deloria, 1997; L. 
Smith, 2013). To creates one’s own reality and empower others to do the same, serves as a 
unifying element between the individual and the larger community. That is probably the richest 
and most lasting form of dignity applicable to the setting of post-disaster professional work with 
vulnerable and marginalized populations  
General reflections on Pillar 2 (Professional). This pillar is about the impacts on the 
work of planners and designers involved in in the aftermath of Sandy. The underlying issue was 
how, if at all, the nature of what they do, especially their underlying “theory in practice” (Argyris 
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& Schön, 1980), was affected by the often unprecedented challenges in their professional work 
required in the days, months, and even years after the storm. 
Sandy had left the professionals in this study within terms of defining and refining their 
practices. Varied as the responses appeared to be on the surface, what was most striking was the 
heightened importance of reflective and reflexive practice. Donald Schön (1983) wrote about the 
underlying process of reflection-in-action with professional practitioners (including two chapters 
on each of design and planning). He concluded that 
[Different] professions draw on very different bodies of professional knowledge. But          
. . . there are also similarities. In both . . . the practitioner approaches the practice problem 
as a unique case. He does not act as though he has no relevant prior experiences; on the 
contrary. But he attends to the peculiarities of the situation at hand. In neither example is 
the problem given …The situation is complex and uncertain . . . These points of 
similarity create the conditions for reflection-in-action. (Schön, 1983, pp. 128–129) 
Schön’s comment unquestionably described what a number of the participants were 
saying in various ways. They stepped into the post-Sandy context and tried to apply their 
“relevant prior experiences” but were often overwhelmed with the “peculiarities of the 
situation.” Furthermore, rather than paralyzing them they reflected more deeply on the nature 
and implications of the technical practices that they would typically employ. This reflection led 
to new thoughts and, most important, to new questions that participants found distinct from their 
past experiences.  
Model for a more reflective design process. “Sandy made it clear that the way we were 
building things was wrong. It was no longer going to work,” noted Eric Klinenberg (2018, 
p. 101), who served as research director of Rebuild by Design. “There was an urgent need to
design things differently. We all wanted a different outcome and that meant we were all open to 
a different process” (Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018, p. 101). The objective was for Rebuild by 
Design to be a new model, more holistic in nature, in concert with each specific community and 
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with sources of funding and leadership that involve non-profit organizations with a history of 
community-based change locally and worldwide. This was an example, that was at the time, was 
breaking new ground by broadening awareness and maximizing interdisciplinary involvement. 
It also was about slowing down the design process so that there was time for reflection 
with the professionals engaged with the community rather than rushing to solutions. Olshansky 
et al. (2012) establishes the compression of time as one of the distinguishing factors between 
post-disaster conditions and normal times. “Post-disaster recovery takes place in a different 
world where the community does not function as it does in normal places (Johnson & Olshansky, 
2016, p. 8). Therefore, strategic decisions that set up a structure for reflection and dialogue 
becomes all the more critical. 
One of the engineers, in pondering the importance of recovery and how to prevent the 
same level of damages in the future, said the question had become, “How do you get back to 
normal faster through the redundancy of systems in place? Preparedness was also a big part of 
reducing loss of life in Sandy” (Paul).  
Funding. Another point of reflection was about money. Design/planning professionals 
who are accustomed to planning and implementing single projects generally can make a 
reasonably accurate estimate on how much it will cost. In contrast, recovery planning for an 
occurrence like Sandy is wrought with uncertainty given the staggering costs of restoration. The 
political posturing and promises compound the financial challenge and its uncertainty in the 
wake of disasters. Many of the recovery professionals interviewed commented that political 
changeability added to the difficulty of securing municipal or federal funding. 
Optimism. Were these professionals going to be able to keep pace with the environmental 
changes and prepare adequately for the next Sandy-like events? The responses from the 
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professionals in the story were varied but always tending toward optimistic. As Eli noted, “It 
depends on what side of the bed you wake up on. You’re hopeful one day and the next day you 
look at it and say, ‘We’re not going to make it, in terms of transformation and time.’” 
Several participants felt that society as a whole, is not prepared to make tough choices in 
the next 15 to 20 years unless something ultra-catastrophic happens. These include retreating 
from the most vulnerable locations versus staying in place and facing unforeseeable but probably 
disaster. Rebuilding may not be the wisest choice when there is no alternative place to either 
move or stay. Yet, how does this get taken into account when people have a much-valued home 
and/or community that they have lived in for generations? Eli (architect) concluded,  
There is no silver bullet. We can go through all of those analogies that we are all really 
well at saying. We can pledge to become the greenest and most resilient county on the 
planet but then to get there it comes down to the common person [and] engaging them 
with the profession [is very difficult].  
The professionals in this study were aware of the extraordinary vulnerability for future 
events that are certain to destroy property and take or ruin lives. “It’s 525 miles of shoreline in 
the city, so just do the math” (Beryl, landscape architect).  
General reflections on Pillar 3 (Societal). This pillar described the broader social issues 
that emerged from the interviews. The participants had very different perspectives and 
approaches to their work with neighborhoods, the city, and other regions. There were two 
significant findings within this pillar: lack of justice and equal treatment for marginalized 
communities and lack of diversity and inclusion within the design/planning profession. 
Post-Disaster—Lack of justice and equal treatment for marginalized communities. 
Hurricane Sandy did not discriminate: The storm wiped out homes of owners and renters, 
wealthy, working class and the poor. However, aid to communities and the speed in which it 
arrived vividly showed bias. I witnessed this personally while on the ground working in Coney 
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Island. After hours of waiting for water and blankets, food relief organizations went first to 
Seagate (a middle class community) but made no attempt to distribute aid to the NYCHA 
(comprising the lower socio-economic class reliant on regular government social assistance ) 
community, which was located directly outside of the gates. Ultimately, several of the 
participants from this study built support from within the NYCHA community. There were 
residents who knew well what was needed and who began the distribution themselves. In sharing 
this story Talib observed, 
Don’t construct a whole reality for them through your own eyes. And this is why it’s so 
important for designers to understand because of what we do. We interpret peoples’ 
wants and desires into physical space. We need to begin to change the paradigm to “I’m 
not going to stand up for you, I’m going to stand with you.” (Talib, architect) 
His comment was an awakening for me as I became aware of my unconscious 
bias—acting on “standing up for others” rather than “standing up with others.”   
Several participants particularly noted the influence of race on the ability to collaborate 
and cooperate. Joseph (social activist) spoke of trying to get people to understand how to 
problem solve better with people that don’t look like them. He paraphrased a strongly worded 
view from the community:   
“Just because you live five blocks away from where I live, doesn’t mean you know what 
it’s like living here.” Those are the assumptions people make and most of the time those 
assumptions fall down the line of race and class. (Joseph, social activist) 
One of the key findings of this study is that while the role that race, gender, and 
socioeconomic composition of the design/planning profession was significant within the 
Personal Pillar, it is of equal, if not more importance that it be included in the discussion of the 
lack of diversity within the profession itself.  
The lack of diversity and inclusion within the design/planning profession. In 1968, 
Whitney M. Young, Jr., civil rights activist and, at that time, Executive Director of the National 
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Urban League, gave the keynote address at the AIA National Convention. He stated, “You are 
not a profession that has distinguished itself by your social and civic contributions to the cause of 
civil rights . . . You are most distinguished by your thunderous silence” (American Institute of 
Architects, 2019, para. 4). At the time, Young was critical of the high-rise housing projects that 
were being built in some of the poorest and toughest neighborhoods. He questioned why there 
wasn’t pushback from the profession. The AIA responded to his speech by launching a task force 
focused on opening the profession to minority groups. An article in Curbed (2017) on race and 
architecture made the following points:  
Though African Americans made up 13 percent of the total U.S. population at the last 
census, only 2 percent of licensed architects in the U.S. are African-American, according 
to the National Association of Minority Architects (NOMA). In 2007, African American 
women made up a scant two-tenths of a percent of licensed architects in the U.S., for a 
total of just 196 practitioners. (The University of Cincinnati’s database of African 
American architects reports an increase in that number, to 385, of a total 107,581 licensed 
practitioners in the U.S.). (para. 5) 
Talib reinforced how architecture as a profession distances marginalized groups from the 
very nature of design:  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
The interface that most Black people in this country have with architecture is in spaces
that are given. So, it’s spaces that are designed and handed to them. Instead of spaces that
they’ve had agency in creating. You can connect it to any kind of communities, from the
Jewish ghettos in Europe to modern ghettos . . . spaces that are either left over—or we
design what the reality is for you instead of allowing you an individual agency. (Talib,
architect)
This professional indifference was noted by Whitney Young, Jr. and by critics of the
design of public housing/urban renewal half a century ago (Gans, 1965; Goodman, 1971;
J. Jacobs, 1961; Krumholz, 1982). “So, we need to be able to take a hold of the complexity,
recognizing the leadership of the very people who are directly impacted; leadership of women,
Indigenous people, folks of color . . . we absolutely have to do that” (Joseph/social activist).
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Joseph’s point goes directly to power dynamics and the kind of leadership that will be 
needed in the times ahead and can provide the opportunity for a shift in the dynamics of design, 
power, and social justice. 
In June 2020, as I am finalizing this dissertation, the New York chapter of the AIA, 
prompted by COVID-19, the death of George Floyd and resulting mass demonstrations locally, 
nationally, and globally, issued a statement titled “Dismantling Injustice and Systemic Racism” 
(AIA New York & Center for Architecture, 2020). Aiming to “amplify the voices of people of 
color in our profession” (AIA New York & Center for Architecture, 2020, para. 6), this striking 
and brief document links the tragic death of a Minneapolis man, George Floyd, through police 
brutality, the COVID-19 pandemic with its disproportionate negative impacts on people of color, 
as “glaring inequality [that] serves as a call to action” (AIA New York & Center for 
Architecture, 2020, para. 3). This advocacy converges with the findings and implications of this 
study and the urgency for a more racially, gender and economically diverse design/planning 
community of professionals.   
Resilience. While the term resilience is becoming more and more entrenched in the 
recovery, planning, and design nomenclature, it has many definitions. It is derived from the Latin 
word, resilio, meaning “to jump back” (Klein et al., 2003, p. 35). Probably one of the earliest 
uses of resilience in environmental science was by Holling (1973) and his associates whose 
primary interest was not in disasters but how disturbed natural populations ecosystems return to 
prior functioning, if not identical equilibrium points, after major perturbations.  
The 2013 final SIRR report (PlaNYC, 2013) referred to resiliency as “bouncing back.” 
While expressed as something positive, in the context of marginalized communities, it would not 
be experienced as necessarily positive if bouncing back meant returning communities to the 
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status quo. Resilience has as much to do with shaping the challenges being faced as responding 
to them. Similar to the distinctions between permanence and impermanence, resiliency is viewed 
differently for landscape architects than it is for architects, planners, or engineers. Thomas  
landscape architect/urban designer) described resiliency in nature as something that is not static 
but relational. He called it a four- not three-dimensional mirroring of the cycle of nature. He 
suggested, “Instead of a separation of people and nature, it assumes oneness, the inseparability of 
people and nature.”  
Participants noted that resiliency has become a brand and may be losing its clarity of 
purpose by turning into a marketing gimmick for big business and big government. In this it is 
not unlike sustainability, which steadily transmuted (Foster, 2012) in the years after being first 
popularized in the Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). Samuel, one of the architects interviewed for this study, 
said this:  
I think one of the challenges we've seen globally is that everybody's trying to come up 
with a kind of branded and graphically fascinating attempt to address resiliency. We care 
less about that, about the brand of the thing, right, whatever that ultimate platform is. We 
care more about getting the information out.  
Some study participants spoke critically about people claiming expertise in the fields of 
sustainability and resiliency but who lack the requisite knowledge and experience. Several of the 
participants were against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it not only quickly becoming 
a catch phrase but also as actually furthering a more colonialist and economically privileged 
agenda. The concern is that those who are privileged always want the status quo to bounce back 
no matter the nature of the disruption. This is articulated by Graham, Debucquoy, and 
Anguelovski (2016) in the aftermath of Sandy:   
As the concept of (urban) resilience continues to gain popularity and more municipalities 
are engaging in urban resilience interventions and adaptation planning, further research is 
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needed to assess how community-based organizations can be supported in resilience 
efforts and how unintended consequences of resilience interventions might exacerbate or 
create new socio-spatial inequities. (p. 121) 
Also, Amundsen (2012) cautioned, 
There is a risk that community resilience may be an illusion, leading to complacency 
about the need for adaptation to multiple factors of change. Hence, the ability of 
communities to actively engage in reflexive learning processes is of importance for both 
adaption and future resilience. (Abstract) 
Many of the designers/planners in this interview debated what comes after resiliency. 
Many have begun using the word transformation instead of resiliency because the term resiliency 
can have differing contexts and meanings (Zac, architect/planner; Eli, architect; Beryl, landscape 
architect). 
Managed retreat. Managed retreat was one of the most controversial issues raised by the 
participants in this study. It is a professional dilemma as it forces decisions between what is 
technically best and what communities want. Listen to the science, or listen to the people? 
Koslov (2016) focused her research on Staten Island, the site of the most deaths in New York 
City attributable to Sandy. Her findings ran contrary to the notion that those most affected will 
“bravely” reject managed retreat, similar to Mayor Michael Bloomberg who adamantly stated, 
“As New Yorkers, we cannot and will not abandon our waterfront. It’s one of our greatest assets. 
We must protect it, not retreat from it” (as cited in Koslov, 2016, pp. 360–361). In the years 
since that report, it has been acknowledged that buyout and managed retreat needs to be 
considered as the science points to an increase in sea level rise and vulnerability to coastal 
communities. Very much on the minds of participants in this study was how to begin a 
conversation on managed retreat. “So, when you talk about retreat, are we providing solutions? 
Retreat to what?” (Ross, architect). They claimed that the quality of the relationship that 
289
design/planning professionals established with affected local people would impact the manner in 
which conversations were conducted and different choices were considered. 
Managed retreat may have the most challenging effects on individuals and communities 
without the financial solvency to relocate. However, fear and uncertainty of relocation knows no 
economic boundaries. In the last five years, managed retreat has been referenced instead as a 
form of adaptation (Beryl, landscape architect; Roberta, architect; Hannah, planner). Without 
discussions about what retreat from certain areas would look like, or how to adaptively keep 
people safely in place, the more crucial it is to examine how low-income communities are 
disproportionately impacted. 
Hino, Field, and Mach (2017) defined managed retreat as “the strategic relocation of 
structures or abandonment of land to manage natural hazard risk” (p. 364). In considering 
managed retreat and marginalized communities, the conversation with this study’s participants 
more often than not circled back to the “experts” who make the assessments and conclude 
whether it is best if people stay or go. In the context of lessons learned after Sandy for 
designers/planners, one of the architects summed it up in the context of managed retreat in this 
manner:  
The first step is to assess risk from the standpoint of the community. What are the risk 
factors now and how does that dovetail with future projections? I think we have to 
understand that we seldom see risk from the eyes of those who live through it. If we don’t 
we are simply mindless technocrats not practitioners. (Kaasar, planner) 
Summary of key findings. While there are projections of what the future may hold, there 
are no assurances. One of key findings was that from impermanence and uncertainty come 
reflection about who design/planning professionals are after being impacted personally, 
professionally, and societally. As many within the study expressed, it will become increasingly 
harder to not address issues of social justice, diversity, and economic inequity as more urban 
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populations are being impacted by Hurricane Sandy-like events. This extends not only to 
communities within urban populations but within the profession itself. Further reflection on these 
key findings bring to mind the following: In the context of both resiliency and managed retreat, 
transparency and a willingness to be guided by the very people designers/planners are called 
upon to serve remains an important part of the professional interpersonal dynamic. This 
translates into, “We must support the strong. We must give courage to the timid. We must 
remind the indifferent, and we must warn the opposed. Civil rights, which are God given and 
constitutionally guaranteed, are not negotiable in 1963” (Whitney Young, Educational Radio 
Network coverage of the 8/28/1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom). My challenge 
to designers/planners in response to these key findings is this: What is not negotiable in 2020? 
Limitations of the Research 
There were three key limitations to this research. These limitations pertained to ethnic or 
racial diversity, experience within the field, and professional diversity. First, there was an 
underrepresentation of racial diversity within the study. To reiterate, problems faced by 
marginalized populations is a significant theme in this study. This relates not only to those in 
affected communities but also to the professionals within the field. The questions stands out:  
Would first-hand experience growing up in a marginalized and disaster-affected community 
influence professionals’ views of resilience, managed retreat, or how they proceed with 
post-disaster recovery and planning? Late in this study I became aware of an initiative that are 
promising in terms of a start at rectifying the design/planning professions’ underrepresentation of 
long-time marginalized groups, the ones, as this study has shown, who ironically and tragically 
are usually the ones most impacted by climate change-driven disasters. BlackSpace (2020) 
comprises “Black urban planners, architects, artists, activists, and leaders working to protect and 
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create Black spaces” (para. 1). Architect and educator Sekou Cooke (2020) has recently offered a 
compelling perspective on “Blackness and Architecture in America” (para. 5). He pondered 
openly, “Maybe there is a parallel to be drawn between the lack of Black perspectives within the 
architectural ‘we’ and the inability of the architectural profession to find a suitable response to 
the current state of social justice” (Cooke, 2020, para. 8). So clearly a study like the present one 
that finds its own ways to be inclusive could contribute enormously to foreseeing how 
designer/planners can work better with and for marginalized communities. 
A second limitation to the research was not interviewing professionals with less than 10 
years of experience. Over time, there has been more information about climate change in the 
mainstream media. Would there be quite different results in a study if the sample was drawn 
more from younger professionals who have grown up with climate change a more inescapable 
truth now and for the future? It is frequently suggested that Millennials are more aware of 
climate change (e.g., Meehan, 2019) and that it plays an important part in how they think about 
the future. The current version of global climate movement, as invigorated by 17-year-old Greta 
Thunberg (Leiserowitz et al., 2018; Meehan, 2019), is one such example. However, recent 
applied research on climate-related risk and risk management options suggest that this is not 
necessarily the case. In fact, in some cases, the younger generations are less concerned than older 
generations and do substantially less to combat it (Costache & Sencovici, 2019; Gray, Raimi, 
Wilson, & Árvai, 2019). No matter the overall trends, how younger generations of 
designers/planners perceive climate change is of paramount importance to the way in which 
these fields move forward. 
Lastly among limitations, there were issues with the types of professionals I was able to 
interview. I had hoped to have a greater cross-section of engineers as part of the study. But many 
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engineers that I had invited to participate declined because I worked with a firm that was seen as 
a competitor. Additionally, there were no participants engaged in the study who were climate 
deniers. Perhaps this meant missing the perspectives of professionals with radically different 
points of view on the approach to recovery and planning in the future.  
Future Leadership for Designers/Planners 
The natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the 
responsibility of everyone. If we make something our own, it is only to administer it for 
the good of all. If we do not, we burden our consciences with the weight of having denied 
the existence of others. (Pope Francis, 2015, Article 95) 
At some juncture, designers/planners will need to find their place as leaders of a 
movement in which designers/planners take both a reflective and proactive stance to both climate 
and social justice. A leadership model that addresses our environmental challenges may be hard 
to achieve, but greatly needed. Based on the themes garnered from this study, to achieve 
effective design/planning, professionals now working in the face of rapid climate change, would 
need to do the following:   
embrace shared community-based solutions rooted in dignity and inclusivity; 
balance the present with the designing/planning for future generations;  
witness other people’s stories and be aware of personal and cultural biases. 
recognize the kinship between human nature and mother nature;  
affirm that social, economic, and environmental justice are non-negotiable. 
The following are four leadership theories that embody this ambitious agenda: 
complex adaptive leadership,  
servant leadership with inclusive leadership, 
leadership in place, and  
Indigenous leadership. 
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Designers/planners within this study have exhibited both the capacity and desire to lead 
change that might otherwise not be possible. This will require leadership such frameworks to 
challenge status quo and reaches beyond personal ambition.  
Complex adaptive leadership/Real-time strategic change. Addressing the multifarious 
issues of Sandy’s aftermath requires the ability to work within a complex adaptive system, which 
Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey (2008) defined as a framework where hierarchical structures 
and the needs of individuals and groups of individuals overlap and must be addressed 
interdependently. This can be particularly challenging when the needs of the individuals and these 
hierarchal structures conflict and leadership within a relational context becomes increasingly 
critical to generating system-wide solutions that are not dictatorial but interactive in approach. 
The adaptive leadership model can be an effective tool in achieving these results because it 
provides an overarching framework that provides for engagement and coordination among 
administrative, adaptive, and enabling leadership, in particular between a complex adaptive 
system and bureaucracy (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008, p. 199).  
Thus, while leadership within a complex adaptive systems may provide the ability to 
adapt swiftly and creatively to environmental changes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008), immediately after 
a disaster like Sandy, there is a period of shock followed by the gradual awareness that not only 
is the situation catastrophic, it is even worse than anyone had initially expected. In the aftermath, 
victims will look to first responders to make decisions and take action to deliver emergency 
services. However, because damaged public infrastructure to impacted communities (roads, 
electrical power grid, water, and sewage, etc.) makes entry inaccessible, actual on-the-ground 
contact with people and professionals outside the community can be greatly delayed. This can 
result in a form of disequilibrium described by Plowman and Duchon (2008) as “people and 
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groups interacting, exchanging information, and taking adaptive actions without the intervention 
of someone occupying the central controller . . . calling into question the purpose of leadership, 
as it is traditionally viewed” (p. 134). This is the scenario that designers/planners as the second 
wave of responders would probably experience. 
In the case of Sandy, communication was cut off when the power went out and people 
within these heavily impacted communities had to mobilize without any formal leadership 
structure. With no central authority, leadership was exercised through interaction with your 
neighbors or local grassroots assistance, a form of “enabling adaptive responses to challenges 
through network-based problem solving” emerged (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008, p. 196). During Sandy, 
this type of adaptive structure was critical to the survival of many individuals as well as 
providing a structure into which design/planning professionals could begin the process of 
reassessment, rebuilding, and planning. 
Given the complexity of post-Sandy issues, real time strategic change (R. W. Jacobs, 
1997) would augment the adaptive leadership approach. Real time strategic change deliberately 
includes multiple stakeholders where aligned action is required and results need to be achieved in 
radically reduced time frames. Consistent with the participants’ views, this approach advocates 
for participants within a community to interact with their internal leaders, outside experts, and 
each other forming a collective framework for analyses and strategy development.  
It is, how you co-create this process in a way that works for the way that you live as a 
community and build a mutual responsibility and hope that is key to leadership. You sit 
down with someone and say, tell me how you see this place. (Roberta, architect)  
The three phases of real time strategic change assist in the consideration of multiple 
possibilities for moving forward post-disaster. This collective design complements the 
uniqueness of a group’s culture, needs, and constraints, “ultimately allowing a community to 
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develop their own road map which symbolizes the power and possibilities of the collective” (R. 
W. Jacobs, 1997, p. 276).
Bringing alignment of purpose among core community leaders and designers/planners 
will help build a solid foundation between strategies, actions, processes, systems, practices, 
scope, scale, and plan. This becomes the basis of translating actions and ideas into something 
tangible that can be implemented as short-term achievable victories and longer-term phased 
implementation. 
Servant and inclusive leadership. A leader within the design/planning community must 
be both reflective and proactive. Their actions must be guided by a high level of self-awareness 
combined with a commitment to be of service for the greater good. This description is aligned 
with Greenleaf’s (1977) model of servant leadership. Servant leadership is based on a model of 
service and has the capacity to produce outcomes in the context of vulnerable circumstances. This 
is a model that is about human nature and making life better for others rather than doing things at 
the expense of others. This does not imply that servant leaders are powerless. Power is a tool that 
can serve the moment and be passed onto others. As Greenleaf said, “Servant-leaders differ from 
other persons of goodwill because they act on what they believe. . . . and there is a sustaining 
spirit when they venture and risk” (as cited in Keith, 2008, p. 71). Servant leaders are active 
listeners, gather feedback, support the expression of others, and create living systems within 
which everyone can participate. This approach aligns with one study participant’s comment that 
“Leaders need be a bridge between the earth herself and the people living on the earth.” Leaders 
would therefore need to be exercise wisdom and meaning that goes beyond their own personal 
goals and ambitions. 
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It is challenging for leaders to adopt this stance given the rapid change, human 
vulnerability to injury and loss, and a highly emotionally-charged circumstances of a  
post-disaster environment. “With its strong altruistic and ethical overtones,” writes Northouse 
(2007), servant leadership “emphasizes that leaders should be attentive to the concerns of their 
followers and empathize with them; they should take care of them and nurture them” (p. 348). 
This is leadership of social responsibility, social justice, and equanimity. Would this idealistic 
leadership model be able to stand up to the harsh realities of disaster-related events? Given the 
views of the professionals canvassed in this study, a leadership theory that values everyone 
within the community and fosters dignity, trust, and strength, is exactly what is needed after the 
post-Sandy losses and recovery. In the context of post-disaster/climate change leadership, I 
would position inclusive leadership as closely allied with servant leadership largely because of 
its parallel emphasis on consensus. It is a good combination of the aspirational (servant 
leadership) and the pragmatic (inclusive leadership).  
Inclusive leadership is an approach within which members of the community and local 
authority feel valued, respected, and engaged in a shared vision. Inclusive leaders, create and 
support integrated groups that cross boundaries (geographic, professional, cultural, etc.) and are 
valued both for who they are and for their ideas. Not all people engaged need to be leaders but 
can still be made to feel like owners with an empowered stake in their own future. Diverse voices 
can be heard and approaches can be more consistent with the common goal of achieving 
consensus that serves many constituent groups. Inclusive leaders are authentic in their approach 
and respect for others—they are committed to diversity. “Not being afraid to engage leadership 
at all levels, and play inside ball, but also play outside ball,” was critical to leadership              
post-Sandy world, from Thomas’s perspective. As a landscape architect/urban planner, he further 
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noted the importance of “being a connector of resources and a conveyer of power, and not a 
concentrator of power.”  
Leadership in place. Leadership in place is another important potential leadership model 
in the context of dealing with climate change. As described by Wergin (2004), it is,   
A form of leadership that deliberately avoids any trappings of hierarchy and privilege, or 
any form of formal authority at all. Instead, it’s a type of lateral leadership that promotes 
collaboration and joint exploration of issues, with decisions that are built on solid, 
evidence-based deliberation. (p. 2) 
While Wergin posited this form of leadership in an academic environment, it has direct 
applicability to cities and community-based adaptation given that it is based more on human 
exchange than power and creates space for people outside of the traditional top-down 
hierarchical model. In the case of climate-impacted cities and communities, formal authority, 
while an integral part of the equation for implementation and change, is ineffective without        
in-place leaders. Wergin (2004, 2007), drawing upon Heifetz’s (1994) adaptive learning and 
Mezirow’s (1991) transformative learning, created a much-needed balance in leading and 
learning, needs and process. 
The inclusiveness within the leadership in place model and servant leadership does have 
specific value when looking at leadership and fostering effective design responses within  
post-disaster communities. Additionally, the key points that foster adaptive leadership and 
transformative learning seemed like a made-to-order manual of the responsibilities leaders 
should embrace in communities impacted by climate disaster: “Go deep . . . Be patient with 
distress . . . Attend to needs . . . Monitor the process . . . Record progress” (Chapman & Randall, 
2007, p. 60). 
Advancing Mezirow’s model (1991) and looking through the lens of Sandy, 
designers/planners along with a government agency or a local grassroots group would need to 
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become co-learners and leaders so that people around them can determine what adaptation and 
transformation looks like for them and mobilize to bring them into effect. These events are 
personal but also contextual and situational. While there are shared solutions, they are also not 
necessarily one-size-fits-all. Even at the most local scale this variability must be kept in mind. 
Someone from the eastern end of The Rockaways would experience the storm and its aftermath 
differently than someone from the western end.  
The advantage of the leadership in place model in a post-Sandy environment is that at 
different points in the process one person may be a leader and at a different time, a follower 
depending on the events that are unfolding and how it is impacting the situational dynamic. The 
model calls for and enables leadership as fluid as the context in which it must be exercised.   
Indigenous leadership. What is missing from the leadership theories noted thus far is a 
framework focused on both the human and natural worlds, as well as on storytelling. An 
approach is needed to “promote partnerships that foster effective climate solutions from both 
Western and Indigenous perspectives” (Cochran et al., 2013, p. 50). “What is also needed is an 
approach that engages storytelling,” wrote Kenny (2012, p. 1 ), an Indigenous scholar of 
leadership. She continued, “For thousands of years prior to colonization, leadership in 
Indigenous communities was based upon the character of the land and the needs of the people in 
their traditional territories” (p. 1). She explained the power and centrality of storytelling in 
achieving such leadership: “Stories are a creative act of leadership through which we manifest 
our solidarity and strengthen our people to take their next steps in encouraging good and healthy 
lives” (Kenny, 2012, p. 1).  
In the course of interviewing design/planning professionals for this study, my objective 
has been to understand how these complex problems have impacted them personally, 
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professionally, and societally. After completing the analysis of the research, it was clear that the 
participants’ stories are necessary for a deeper understanding of the profession in the wider 
context of humans as part, not at war with, nature. These personal experiences will contribute to 
the profession as the built environment takes on changes that many leaders within the field have 
not seen in their lifetime or are ill-prepared to even imagine. “Stories, especially in the oral 
tradition,” wrote Kenny (2012), “provide powerful bridges that connect our histories, our 
legends, our senses, our practices, our values, and, fundamentally, our sustainability as peoples” 
(p. 4). 
There is an intergenerational aspect to Indigenous leadership that looks at seventh 
generational thinking within a multi-generational framework (Gutierrez, 2012, p. 97). This is 
where lived experience integrates with shared knowledge. This is the place from which wisdom 
is born. Given the complexity of climate impactful events, and the impacts on design/planning 
professionals and the communities they serve, stories of reflection that connect us to our hearts, 
the earth, and to each other, will grow increasingly important. One of the architects from the 
study thought that one of the leader’s important qualities would be to “find the answer to how 
you talk to one generation about the future of the next generation” (Samuel). 
Future Research and Practice 
 This research served as an initial guidepost for a more holistic approach for 
designers/planners to consider as they tackle the challenges of post-disaster adaption in the 
future. There are a number of significant areas that lend themselves to future research using 
mixed methods and action research methodologies.  
What is the relationship between design, power, and social justice? A study exploring 
this relationship would deepen what has already been discussed in this study. Ideally, 
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the community would lead the design and the designers/planners would act as a 
resource as facilitators and docents.  
A study that focuses on the interrelationship between designers/planners and 
peacekeepers. The study would look at the similarity and/or differences in the 
challenges they each face; where their practices intersect and what the two 
professions can learn from each other.  
A study that focuses on designers/planners with less than 10 years of experience with 
an emphasis on a diverse representation of participants. The broader sampling would 
help to deepen understanding of intergenerational/intragenerational and racially and 
ethnically diverse perspectives. 
The findings from this study offer feedback to professional programs in architecture, 
landscape architecture, planning and engineering. Future applied research could 
address identifying and testing out new skill sets or interdisciplinary courses to enable 
emerging professionals who will have to grapple with a rapidly changing earth 
environment and vulnerable communities. For example, should there be courses 
specific kinds of courses in trauma psychology, conflict resolution, Indigenous 
philosophy and leadership, and storytelling as part of a core curriculum? 
Create a six-month series of design charettes where Native American and a larger  
cross-section of designers/planners of color work with a cross-section of participants 
from this study to look at where local challenges can create global solutions. Possible 
sites in the United States could include Rockaway or Red Hook; Isle de Charles/New 
Orleans; Sonoma, California; Tangier Island (climate deniers); Anchorage or Barrow, 
Alaska. 
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Conduct a series of design charettes led by developers to re-imagine real estate in 
NYC in the next 50 years. 
In addition, an area of complementary future research could involve community members 
in collaboratively assessing the work and accomplishments of architects, planners, landscape 
architects, and engineers. Community-based participatory action research (Genat, 2009) could be 
used to identify what was strong and supportive, and what was not, as professionals planned and 
implemented post-Sandy projects and initiatives. In the end, improvement and/or fundamental 
change to professional practice in the aftermath of major climate-change induced events, must be 
significantly defined and evaluated by those most affected.  
Significance of This Research 
The designers/planners of this study have shared their insight, wisdom, an understanding 
of the vulnerabilities, fears, and resilience of communities that have endured the fury of 
Sandy. I intend that the personal narratives of this research will provide a point of reflection 
for the designer/planners within the profession. This is foreshadowed so well in the words of 
Isabel Lopez’s (2000) “Finding Wisdom and Purpose in Chaotic Times”:  
Only through reflection do we find our purpose and the core of who we are. Reflection 
enables us to become our own teachers, and we never finish––never finish taking our 
own class, reading our own heart, and liberating our own spirit. Reflection forces us to 
face our own lives and beliefs. . . . Perhaps the greatest gift of reflection is that we . . . can 
find the place that is true for us, the place where passion and serenity meet, both 
personally and professionally. (p. 85) 
In the intersection between the personal, professional, and societal lies the understanding 
of not only how these individuals responded to challenges on the ground but how they were 
impacted by it. These shared experiences can support a dialogue between designers/planners that 
might otherwise not be exchanged. Further, these narratives have insights that show the 
importance of having a more racial, gender, and economically diverse community of 
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professionals. This has implications for education within the profession. It also extends to the 
intergenerational/intragenerational nature of their work that is not just about how the 
communities respond to designers/planners but how these professionals respond to each other. 
In the focus group, we discussed development of a consortium of design councils at 
universities with mayors, to work collectively with designers/planners. By working collectively 
on similar challenges, a foundation of a shared ethic and ethos could be developed and 
implemented within a short timeframe. The significance would be development of a national 
platform for tackling the more challenging issues. It could also help develop an approach that is 
systems and wisdom-based, creating agency for both the built and natural worlds. This could 
help to reinvigorate designers/planners as a profession with a mission and a calling—a 
profession with societal impact that went beyond themselves. This was a way to take what is 
altruistic and create a structure with tactical steps that could develop a new model of leadership 
and change within a climate-vulnerable landscape. This led to further discussion on how the 
significance of such actions bore the potential for a “movement” within the profession and that 
the time was ripe for one. 
Personal Reflections 
I am a pool in a peaceful place, 
I greet the great sky face to face, 
I know the stars and the stately moon 
And the wind that runs with rippling shoon 
But why does it always bring to me 
The far-off, beautiful sound of the sea? 
The marsh-grass weaves me a wall of green, 
But the wind comes whispering in between, 
In the dead of night when the sky is deep 
The wind comes waking me out of sleep 
Why does it always bring to me 
The far-off, terrible call of the sea? 
—The Sea Wind by Sara Teasdale (1915) 
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Arising. I remember speaking to a Sandy survivor in Coney Island in November 2012. 
She did not speak English, so shared in Russian, how the water kept rising until it stopped right 
below her nose. Not being able to swim, she stood there waiting for it to continue to rise and take 
her life. She stood frozen and cold waiting for death. It began to recede. In her recalling, she 
sobbed and shook with terror. So did I. I felt her story on a deep personal level. I could easily 
imagine myself in that same scenario with a different ending. She was at least three inches taller 
than me. I would have drowned. I too did not know how to swim. But as she said, her God and 
her height saved her life. 
So how do I conclude such a long and arduous doctoral journey on Hurricane Sandy, 
rising sea levels, and all that goes with these without facing my own terror around water and 
learning how to swim? It can’t be done. So, I did.  
I don’t know why the Russian émigré woman never learned to swim but for me it was 
because of an accident in a swimming pool. I am told I almost lost my life, had to be 
resuscitated. I have no memory of what caused the accident, but my body does.  
Learning how to swim and drowning is not the point of this recollection. What is are the 
stories that connect us. The woman who spoke only Russian knew I understood every word of 
what she said because I understood her experience.  
Holding the research. While I had previously conducted narrative interviews for other 
professional research projects and listened to historical oral histories, this experience was 
different. It was far more intimate and more directly aligned to my own personal and 
professional experiences. As a result, my heart and spirit felt a heavy weight during the analysis 
of the material. As for my soul, it listened quietly as the witness, remembering. 
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It seemed like the beginning of each chapter or rewrite in the past eight months was 
accompanied by yet one more climate-related calamity—another flood, tornado, fire, heat wave, 
drought. While these disasters underscored my sense of purpose, it did the same for my anxiety. I 
struggled with stories that were intimate, revealing, and provocative. They became my lived 
experience as I was writing and analyzing, which made me scrutinize everything I did. In cutting 
the narratives down, I did not want to inadvertently transfigure the literature of fact into fiction. 
Maintaining the dignity of the individuals within the community as well as their stories was, after 
all, a strong theme in the research. Reconciling the push to complete the work and the pull to 
honor all that I heard, created a dramatic tension within myself. I reconciled that by staying in 
the role of the witness rather than the actor.  
 
  
 
   
    
  
 
  
 
 
How does a mission become a movement? Earlier in the doctoral journey, during what
would later become known as my first dissertation topic, I was researching how a
personal/professional mission at the Lower East Side Tenement Museum became a movement.
Prior to delving into my interviews for this study, I reached out to Al Guskin, Professor Emeritus
at the Antioch Leadership and Change Doctoral program, as well as a co-founder of the Peace
Corps. My question to him was: How did a moment in time at the University of Michigan in
1960 became the groundswell of a societal movement of change? What had been the tipping
point? Al noted that it was a confluence of events that he described as serendipity. The students
were inspired by President Kennedy heralding a future that they could all imagine themselves as
agents of change; they were saying yes to more than an idea: it was a calling. It seemed that what
was going on environmentally required that same kind of collective action. The efforts from
within the design/planning community seemed to be more piecemeal and siloed than the kind of
collective action that was needed.
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Conclusion 
During a time when we as a society are being collectively called to take a stand for the 
equality, well-being, and future of the partnership between humanity and the earth, 
designers/planners have a significant role to play. This will require not resting content with the 
status quo. It will require an increased willingness to take risks.  
                
              
               
                 
               
      
  
 
  
Risk is mystery. It requires a journey. Risk means we take a step toward and into the
unknown. By definition, risk accepts vulnerability and lets go of the need to a priori
control the process or the outcome of human affairs. It is the journey of the great
explorers for it chooses, like the images of the maps of old, to live at the edge of
cartography. Risk means stepping into a place where you are not sure what will come or
what will happen.” (Lederach, 2005, p. 163)
This demands leadership with courage, leadership that reclaims the ecosystem of a built
            
wisdom to step boldly into this unknown; designers/planners are uniquely positioned to rising
to this call.
environment standing on the foundation of the natural world. Everyone needs the courage and
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Afterword 
Since defending my dissertation on March 16, 2020, much transpired in New York City, 
the nation, and the world. Within a few days, New York State (City) issues a Stay-at-Home order 
in an effort to flatten the curve of the COVID-19 Pandemic. For close to three months all          
non-essential businesses close. COVID-19 and Hurricane Sandy are not comparable in their 
levels of devastation and destruction. However, the engagement of design/planning professionals 
(architects, planners, engineers, landscape architects) is. Personally, professionally, and 
societally, the challenges of how we live, work, and publicly congregate in the days, weeks, and 
months ahead, will engage the very community of professionals at the center of this study. 
While the COVID-19 “new normal” addresses the many and not the few, similar to 
Sandy, some communities are affected far more than others. As of June 2020, more than 400,000 
people die from this virus across the globe—more than 100,000 in the United States; a 
disproportionate number of these deaths continue to be within communities of color (Vergano & 
Goba, 2020).  
Amidst this, George Floyd is killed May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis by police officers, 
underscoring the widespread use of police force on Black lives for decades. Protests begin in 
Minneapolis the following day. A local response turns into a national movement that goes global. 
Rioting and looting run parallel but in opposition to peaceful protests.  
As the history of systemic racism is further exposed and addressed within our 
communities, we once again have the opportunity to extend the conversation of social justice and 
civil rights to include not only design but the profession itself. This is not a new conversation. 
Like systematic racism and economic disparity, it must be addressed with action taken in our 
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workplace, our communities, our homes and how we interface with each other on our streets and 
shared public spaces. 
That said, my objective is not to make designers/planners the saviors. As architect Sekou 
Cooke (2020) noted, 
If we set ourselves up as the saviors of society, we separate ourselves from the 
experiences of the people we design for. We must, instead, directly confront the realities 
of the environments we seek to manipulate. If these spaces do not become painfully real 
for us as designers, they will remain virtual play spaces in our minds, to be gutted and 
destroyed at will. (para. 11) 
The questions arising from the events over the past three months are further akin to and 
resonant with some of the other findings that are the subject of this study. Climate-impactful 
disasters create uncertainty and underscore the impermanence and fragility of life. So too do the 
events of today. In both contexts, it will become harder to avoid addressing intergenerational 
racial, gender, and economic inequities personally, professionally, and societally as more 
populations are impacted. To accomplish this will require a new kind of leadership, where 
leaders have the courage to stand for a future where all are equal and live in right alignment with 
each other and the earth. 
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